

CHINA
AND
THE FAR-EAST

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CHINA AND THE FAR EAST

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CLARK UNIVERSITY LECTURES

EDITED BY
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PREFACE

THE following chapters were first delivered as addresses during the recent second decennial celebration of the founding of Clark University. Under the general direction of the President, Dr. G. Stanley Hall, each Department arranged for a gathering of specialists who should give a series of lectures upon topics of present interest in its special field. The Department of History held a conference upon China and the Far East. The aim was two-fold: first, to emphasize the importance of presenting in school and college work the leading features of the development of the Eastern world—a subject that better illustrates the working of the laws of history, and is of more vital importance to the civilization of to-day, than much that forms the subject matter of the usual history courses; second, to do its part in furthering a more general and accurate knowledge of Far Eastern conditions.

During the nineteen sessions of the conference, the lectures and papers of the forty-five authorities who took part in the meetings covered nearly every aspect of the situation in the Orient—political, social, economic, military, educational and religious. It was the original intention to publish all of the proceedings in a single volume, but as this would make the work of unwieldy size, it was decided to exclude the shorter addresses, together with all the material upon the Philippines and India, and to publish only certain of the more formal papers upon China, Japan and Korea. Each of the present chapters deals with a distinct topic; together they cover progressively the field of what is both most inter-

esting and most vital in the situation of China and Korea at least. Several of the addresses upon the Philippines and India will be published in the early numbers of a new journal soon to be issued at Clark University, which will deal with the problems connected with the attempts to extend western civilization to peoples less highly developed.

The Department wishes to express its grateful recognition of the kindness of those who, by their papers and lectures, made the conference a success. It is believed that the interest in these meetings upon the Far East has been so genuine that it will warrant the University in holding a similar conference each succeeding autumn.

“The Problem of the Pacific,” said President Taft this summer, “is the greatest problem now before the American people.” This volume is given to the public in the hope that it may be of some service in helping to present the facts, in accordance with which America must attempt to do her part in solving this problem. It is, too, our most earnest and sincere wish, that these chapters may help to bring about a more sympathetic understanding of Far Eastern peoples; an appreciation that, after all, in the essentials of life, in their faults and their virtues, they are much like ourselves; and a recognition that, with all of their other qualities, they have much of strength and manliness and nobility.

GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE.

CLARK UNIVERSITY, Worcester Massachusetts,
January 5, 1910.

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INTRODUCTION

“THE Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and the vast region beyond, will become the chief theater of events in the world's great Hereafter”—this was a prophecy of William H. Seward, fifty years ago. In our own time, Theodore Roosevelt has expressed the same belief: “The Mediterranean era,” he says, “died with the discovery of America. The Atlantic era is now at the height of its development and must soon exhaust the resources at its command. The Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, . . . is just at the dawn.”

If this be true, if the Pacific is to be the center of the world's interest, then whatever vitally affects the countries on the Asiatic side of the Pacific—the lands which make up the Far East—must be of fundamental importance in the development of the world's civilization. And there is a movement of vital importance taking place in the Far East: there is a change going on which constitutes an epoch of much the same significance in the Orient as was the period of the French Revolution in the history of Europe. The Far East is coming to the stage of constitutional self-government. This means that each of the great countries of that part of the world will eventually control at least its own local affairs; and control them by a government in which the people shall express themselves by constitutional methods.

This advance is merely in accord with the natural law of political evolution, as is clearly shown by the history of Europe. From the fall of the Roman empire to the

present day, Europe, as a whole, has passed through three quite distinct stages of government: first, feudalism; then, absolutism; and finally, constitutionalism.

When the Roman empire was overthrown by the German tribes in the fourth and fifth centuries, chaos was the result; but chaos soon came to be tempered by feudalism, which has been well called "organized anarchy." During the following and seemingly stagnant centuries of the Middle Ages there was a very slow improvement in all that goes to make up civilization. Commerce and industry developed; learning was extended; cities came into existence; until finally the picturesque castle and the mailed knight no longer satisfied the governmental needs of the existing society. Europe had simply outgrown feudalism; it had come to need above all else a strong central power which should establish order and assure protection. So feudalism was replaced by absolutism. This change began in many of the countries of Europe about the middle of the fifteenth century, and is associated with such rulers as Henry the VIII. in England, Louis the XI. and the XIV. in France, and Charles the V. and Philip the II. in Spain.

After kings had crushed feudalism and become well-nigh absolute, Europe still continued to develop, until, after some three centuries it no longer needed an unrestrained power to enforce order. Absolutism was in turn outgrown. The people were at last ready to control their own destinies and direct their own rulers. So constitutionalism came in. In England it was an unusually early growth, but continental Europe received its constitutions from the impulse of the French Revolution.

A little over a century ago, then, there was not a single leading power in continental Europe which had a constitutional form of government; to-day every coun-

try, even Russia and Turkey, has some form of constitution.

This epoch, this constitution-securing epoch, which Europe is just completing, Asia has just begun. This should occasion no surprise, for in a broad, general way, Asia has had much the same governmental evolution as has Europe. The great countries of the East, Japan, China, and India have had their era of feudalism, their era of absolutism; these are naturally followed by an era of constitutionalism. The countries of Europe, to be sure, passed from one period to another with greater uniformity than have those of Asia, for France, Germany, Spain and England have always been in close mutual contact, so that any change in one at once hastened a similar change in the others. In Asia, during the past two thousand years Japan, China and India have, for the most part, been isolated, each from the others. Nevertheless, their development has been, in fundamental respects, substantially that of Europe.

In Japan, after the semi-mythical ages were past, there grew up an imperial state, much like the Roman empire. Gradually, however, this central power declined; strong families made themselves practically independent, till finally there came the age of full-fledged Japanese feudalism. There were the strong castles, the armored knights, the miserable peasants, and the proud hereditary local dukes and counts. To be sure, the Japanese castles had a peculiar architecture, and the knights' armor was not made of chain mail, but in all essentials the feudalism of Japan and that of Europe were the same. When Commodore Perry opened Japan to the world, it was still in this feudal period; but forces were at that time already at work which, had the country never been brought into contact with the outside world, would very probably have overthrown feudalism and replaced it by

a strong absolutism. As it was, contact with the West hastened changes which were already taking place. Feudalism was abolished. Then, twenty years later, constitutional government was introduced. Thus Japan, by the aid of Western example, passed from feudalism to constitutionalism in two decades—something which it took Europe well-nigh four centuries to accomplish.

In China there was a well-marked period which is always known as the feudal age. It lasted for several centuries, coming to an end shortly before the beginning of the Christian era. During all of this time there was an emperor who nominally and theoretically ruled over the whole country, but actually was almost as powerless as were the early Capetian kings in the days of European feudalism. Real power in China was in the hands of the hereditary and practically independent rulers of the provinces and districts, just as real power in feudal France was held by such princes as the dukes of Burgundy or the counts of Champagne. Feudalism, however, was finally overthrown in China, and the present imperial power was established—although it must be admitted that the government is still somewhat decentralized. The marked slowness of historical evolution in this country is due to the fact that China is a world by itself, and, till very recently, has lacked the stimulus of competition or comparison with outside nations. China, then, had her feudal era; outgrew it; came to her absolute era; has been living in that for some centuries; and in accordance with natural historical laws, should be nearly ready to pass to some form of popular government.

India shows this same general development. The Mogul empire in the sixteenth century was the first to establish itself for any length of time over the greater number of the warring states of the peninsula. In 1707,

however, this empire went to pieces, and though the imperial name remained, political anarchy everywhere resulted. Petty princes and military adventurers struggled each against the others, and carved out small territories for themselves, much as was done in Europe in the early days of feudalism, after Charlemagne's empire was broken up. Into this political chaos came the British East India Company, which, as it developed into the British Indian Empire, gradually brought to the country a real unity and a strong central government. For the first time in her history, peace and order were established throughout the whole land. In this way the era of absolutism and unity came to India, an era in which India has now lived for upwards of a century. Here, too, it is only to be expected that eventually the country will pass to some form of constitutional self-government.

This great era of constitutional self-rule the countries of Asia have already entered, their normal rate of political progress having been marvelously quickened by contact with the nations of the West. Twenty-one years ago, not a single state in Asia had any form of constitution: to-day, with the insignificant exception of Siam and Afghanistan, every country on the continent either has a constitution or has decreed the establishment of one. Just twenty years ago a constitution was declared in force in Japan; since which time the Japanese government has been representative and parliamentary. Four years ago Russia, which it must be remembered is almost as much an Asiatic as it is an European power, was forced to grant the famous October Constitution. However limited this may be, it yet gives to the people of Siberia the privilege of electing delegates who represent them upon the floor of the national Russian Duma.

Three years ago a constitution was proclaimed in Per-

sia. The people of this peculiarly Oriental country rose in revolt to demand self-government and a parliament. They have since defeated the armed reaction which followed, have deposed the Sultan, and established their new régime more firmly than before. Within the past year Turkey, the land of the "unspeakable Turk," a country entirely Asiatic in race and civilization, and very largely so geographically, has overthrown its absolutism, deposed its Sultan, and established constitutionalism.

In China a constitution has been promised by the imperial power. September 2, 1906, the Empress Dowager issued the decree: "Let there be no delay in making China a constitutional government." In 1916, when it is thought the people will be fully prepared for it, there is to be a Chinese Parliament, the Lower House of which will be elected by popular vote. This past fall, in October, Provincial Legislative Assemblies met for the first time in Chinese history; while during this present year there is to be convened at Peking a national Provisional Parliament.

Thus every one of the leading independent states of Asia, Japan, Russia, China, Persia and Turkey are to-day either constitutional or are becoming so. This same tendency, moreover, is seen in such countries as India and the Philippines, which are held as dependencies or colonies of some Western power. India is to-day struggling to obtain constitutional self-government. The present unrest in that land is profound and far-reaching; its true import may be judged from the statements of English political leaders and from the discussions by the more thoughtful writers. "The present agitation," says an American scholar, "is not the expression of a transient or superficial discontent, but . . . is a part of the new awakening of the East." Again, we read from the pen of a native: "India is going through a great trans-

formation," and addressing the English, he adds, "it is a new India which you have to deal with." An English army officer recently testified: "One fact is tolerably certain. . . . There is now no question that a wave of unrest is pervading India. . . . It is universal. . . . It is the slow growth of many, many years."

That England can forever govern this capable and highly civilized nation of almost three hundred million people, against their strong, continued opposition, is unthinkable. As Goldwin Smith very recently declared, in speaking of the future of English domination in India: "Some day the end must come."

Some day every great dependency in the East must control its own local affairs; it may become completely independent, or may remain in the position of such a colony as Australia or New Zealand, but self-governing it surely must be. The recognition of this fact, and of the latent capacity of the dependent peoples in the East, is bringing about as profound a change in the colonial policy of the Western powers in the Orient, as is noticeable in the government of the independent states.

It is America which has the honor of leading the way. The United States in its Philippine policy aims neither at exploiting a dependent people, as most colonizing states have done in the past; nor at ruling them permanently, in their interest but against their wishes, as England believes she is doing in India and in Egypt. It will not permit them to live untutored and uncontrolled, while they are still in the school-age of nations, as the so-called Anti-Imperialists would do; but aims at taking them by the hand and leading them slowly and gradually along the pathway well marked by the footprints of the most highly developed nations, until they are fully prepared to enter the great field of constitutional self-government.

To attempt to rule over a dependent Oriental people forever, is simply hopeless; the recent history of Japan has made a laughing-stock of the old idea of the inferiority of all Asiatics and their incapacity for modern self-rule. On the other hand, to leave all of them to themselves until they may be fitted for a constitutional régime, is unwise. There are those, however, who would wish to leave every backward race to work out its own salvation; who would permit each primitive people to enjoy to the full all the misery, the civil anarchy and the recurring wars through which Europe passed on its way from feudalism to constitutionalism. But the world to-day is too small, the demand for general security and peace is too great, and the need for the product of the tropics too urgent to permit any considerable section of the earth to be fenced off as an ethnological park where backward races may run wild.

The constant intercommunication between different countries, the general and increasing desire for universal peace, and the strongly developing sense of an unlimited humanitarianism are making this world of ours every decade more and more a family of races. And the race-children in this world family—children in need of development and yet in the school-age—should be under instruction, as much as the children in the cities of America. It must, however, be a school in which there is finally a graduation, and from which the race-child can pass, sufficiently matured to take his place as a man in the world. The Western powers have been school teachers to the East for over four hundred years, but the United States is the first and only nation school teacher to found a school in which a race-child may look definitely forward to graduation—to a time when its school days shall be over.

This policy of developing the Filipinos by granting

them a continually greater share in their own government, has, in the main, been honestly and rapidly carried out. The United States to-day permits the Filipinos to hold—and in the great majority of cases to hold by popular election—all the local town offices, two-thirds of the provincial offices, the vast majority of the judicial, and over sixty per cent. of the civil service, positions, and, now that a national assembly has been organized, it gives them one-half of the full legislative power in the islands. That is, year after year the Filipinos have been granted a greater share in administration, a greater control in the government, while the Americans have been restricted more and more to the task of supervision and general direction.

This American policy, which was originally opposed and well-nigh laughed at by the colonial administrators of other nations, has more recently been followed by the British government in India. Ten years ago, the English were, upon the whole, well contented with the character and methods of their Indian administration; to-day there is a general apprehension among thinking people that their old absolutistic policy is breaking down, and that something new in principle must be adopted. The great English explorer and colonial authority, Sir Harry Johnston, says in a heart-searching review in this last August's "Nineteenth Century": "It seems to me that unless we can . . . admit the demand of the black, brown and yellow peoples under our sway for a voice, and a slowly increasing voice, in their own destinies, we must be prepared to face an awful national rebellion in India and an uprising of the negroes throughout British Africa." Another English colonial writer has declared within the past few months: "We must give them (the people of India) a reasonable share, commercially and politically, in their own concerns. This, up to the present,

we certainly have not done. . . .The whole of the system on which we govern India must, in fact, be re-constituted afresh." Even the British government itself has come to feel that radical changes must be made. This is seen most clearly in the famous reforms which Lord Morley has just introduced into India: to certain of the highest advisory and executive councils of India one or two natives have been appointed, and in the consultative assemblies in the provinces, the natives are permitted to have a majority of the members, many of whom are elected. These councils do not, however, possess full legislative power, as does the Philippine Assembly. Lord Morley, by his reforms in increasing the native representation in the government of India, is following along the path which America has blazed in the Far East, but there still remains this difference: the United States publicly aims at fitting the Filipinos for self-government; England has not made any such promise in regard to India.

In the general and relatively rapid transformation from absolutism which is taking place in Asia, this new colonial policy is the only one which will sufficiently satisfy the native peoples, so that they will give up their agitation for immediate independence, and cooperate with the sovereign power in the developing of their nation, until the time shall come when it will be ready for complete self-government. This has been true in the Philippines; the grant of a national assembly did more than everything else to put an end to insurrection and to bring peace to the islands. To-day, while the mass of the people probably desire immediate independence, the leaders are working harmoniously with the American authorities in the carrying out of the policy of training their people for constitutional self-rule. As for India, Mr. Gokhale, probably the best known native

leader, has recently declared that the relatively small amount of self-government granted by Lord Morley's reforms has saved India from drifting into chaos.

Much the same general situation exists in Egypt as in India, for we may consider Egypt as Asiatic, since it is so in race and civilization. It, too, is profoundly and growingly dissatisfied, and demands, in the words of a recent Egyptian petition to the British government, "some parliamentary control of its own affairs." The petition states, further, "We appeal . . . with confidence to the support of the British public in our desire to obtain a sort of representative assembly with limited powers."

All the lands of Asia, whether independent or dependent, are now turning with eagerness to a more liberal, a more popular form of government. For centuries these countries had been plodding along the path of political evolution, which the West long since trod, till in our own time the pressure from America and from Europe hastened a development which otherwise might have lingered for decades. So rapid has this progress now become that some of the Eastern peoples—notably the Japanese—seem to be passing at a bound over whole periods of natural development. It is the teaching, the example, and the inspiration of Western civilization which is showing the nations of the Far East how to escape the suffering and horror which marked the birth of political liberty in Europe.

There are still peoples in the Orient—some, on account of peculiar political conditions, as the Indians; others, on account of general backwardness in civilization, as the Filipinos—who are not yet prepared for full modern self-government; but the powers which control them can do so successfully only by adopting the new colonial policy—that of gradual instruction until their

dependencies shall be prepared to carry on alone and unaided the work of further advance.

In the past the countries of Asia were isolated; to-day a new unity has been given to them through their contact with the West. In the past the reform movement was urged on by the scattered energies of single states; to-day it is carried forward by the momentum of a continent. And these reforms are little more than begun: the Far East is still in the very midst of one of the most profound and most rapid of the world's political and social revolutions.

G. H. B.

China and the Far East

I

THE POSITION OF CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS

THERE are few countries about which opinion has varied more often and more completely than it has about China in the course of the last hundred years. When the nineteenth century opened, the Middle Kingdom was known to the outside world only through a few books, most of them written long ago—books some of which retain a value even to the present day, but others were fanciful in the extreme. Few living Europeans had visited the country. Most men thought of China as a very large, rich, magnificent empire, inhabited by an enormous number of people with queer manners and customs. It was known that this empire had had a history and a civilization which had lasted several thousand years; and strange as that history and civilization appeared to the Western world, their very antiquity and the magnitude, if not the quality, of the results, were such as to inspire respect.

The few strangers who had a first hand opportunity of judging, namely, the colony of traders at Canton and Macao, felt very little of this respect, and they resented the tone of lofty superiority assumed by the Chinese, as well as the restrictions imposed upon commerce. Also, they were aware that the military power of the Empire was ridiculously feeble. These foreigners were not for

the most part men of a stamp to appreciate the higher side of Chinese civilization, but all its weak points and the decay which had corrupted the Chinese official system were evident to them. They had come to China to make money, and they rebelled against the treatment they received, in what they considered a perfectly legitimate occupation. They repaid the contempt which the Chinese openly expressed for them as barbarians by an even greater scorn for things Chinese.

After the event of the Opium War and the Arrow War and the Taiping Rebellion had shown the whole world the weakness of the Chinese system, the opinion of the Empire held in the Treaty Ports became the one that was generally accepted by the outside world. In the days when a few thousand English and French troops captured Peking, when a large slice of territory was seized by Russia and was ceded to her without resistance or *quid pro quo*, and when the imperial authority for years proved itself incapable of putting down the rebellions that raged in many parts of the land, China was by common consent regarded as a hopelessly decrepit power, perhaps on the verge of dissolution. The proper way to obtain anything in dealing with her was, in the opinion of the time, to have a prompt and drastic recourse to forcible measures, in other words "the gun-boat policy."

Gradually this sentiment underwent a change. The reconquest of Eastern Turkestan showed that, when well led, the Chinese troops were capable of not only fighting bravely, but of winning victories. The impression was still further strengthened by the so-called Tonking War, where the successes were far from all being on the side of the French. In the Kuldja dispute it was Russia rather than China that yielded from fear of hostilities between the two states. Then, too, some of the

reforms that the Chinese were beginning to introduce attracted the notice of the outside world. The famous statesman and, in his way, reformer, Li Hung Chang, enjoyed an international reputation which increased the prestige of his country. Many people starting from the impressive figures of the population of the Empire, reasoned that if the Chinese could train their soldiers in Western fashion—and it was said that the soldiers of Li Hung Chang at least were so trained—they could put into the field such armies as to menace the very existence of Europe. It was in these days that the term “Yellow peril” first came into use.

The Chinese-Japanese war of 1894-5 produced a sharp revulsion of feeling. A defeated nation usually receives little indulgence from the rest of the world. Its neighbors are only too ready to prove that all its misfortunes are the fruit of its faults, and have been richly deserved. The pitiable weakness of Chinese arms and the inability of the imperial authorities to control the course of affairs were interpreted as showing that China was feeble in every way. The events of the next few years, such as the acquisition of spheres of influence by one power after another, the helplessness of the Peking Government to resist pressure of any kind—served to confirm the belief that China was on the point of dissolution, or at least so decadent that she could with difficulty be kept together. Her rôle in the world was henceforth to be a purely passive one. We can judge of the general opinion in which she was held at that day by the titles of some of the books that came out about her in foreign lands—“The Breakup of China,” “The Partition of China,” and the like.

In 1900 the Boxer revolt disturbed a little this complacent theory. The Chinese showed a power of resistance which availed little for the moment, but might prove

more formidable another time. The fact is that the movement for the Westernization of their institutions, and particularly for the modernization of their means of defense, had really been begun many years before. Bitter experience had taught them the lesson of their own weakness. They were not, however, ready to accept this weakness as more than temporary. Patriotic men of energy and influence became convinced of the necessity of thorough reform, believing that these reforms, if accomplished, could restore to their country something of its former greatness. Then came the Russo-Japanese War. Chinese opinion, thanks to the preparation of the previous year, was more profoundly impressed by the victories of the once despised Japanese over the mighty Russians than it had been by the victories of these same Japanese over the Chinese themselves ten years earlier. The reform movement in China received an extraordinary impetus till to-day it has progressed so far that the rest of the world is beginning to change its mind once more. The titles of the books we see now are "The Awakening of China," "The Reconstruction of China," and others of similar import. Of course there are still many skeptics, and since the death of the late Empress Dowager, and the disgrace of certain well-known liberal officials at the hands of the new régime, fresh doubts have been raised as to what extent the reforms are really progressing. But the general opinion outside still seems to be favorable.

In the relation of a country to its neighbors, we may say that in a certain sense it plays an active and a passive rôle, that is, it acts positively upon others, and at the same time it serves as a motive for their action. We might almost compare this double rôle to the export and import sides of trade. In the case of China in the last century the passive side of her rôle has been by far the

more important. She has done little to them and they have done much to her. She has suffered greatly in her dealings with foreign countries, and the question whether it has been rather through her fault than theirs does not affect the fact of her losses. In immediate territories she has ceded formally and permanently Hong-kong to England; Macao (which formerly she only leased out) to Portugal; Formosa to Japan. By leases which come dangerously near to permanent alienation she has given up Kiauchau to Germany; Kwangchauwan to France; Kowloon and Weihaiwei to England; the Liaotung peninsula first to Russia and now to Japan. These cessions are embodied in treaties which she recognizes as valid. Besides this she has practically lost the provinces of Manchuria to Russia and Japan. She has likewise had to give up her ancient suzerainty over the Liukiu Islands, Burma, Siam, Anam, Korea. She has been obliged to submit to the humiliation of allowing foreign nations to arrogate to themselves "spheres of influence" in her own undisputed territory, which has thus been ear-marked for the future partition with which she has been menaced. Still, when all is said and done, we have to remember that she is one of the largest and perhaps the most populous empire in the world, a country of enormous potential resources, and one with which all the other great states are eager to develop closer relations for their own sakes and, they loudly assure her, for hers also.

During the greater part of the nineteenth century Great Britain was without doubt the leading power in the Far East. It was she that opened up China, that fought two victorious wars with her, that has always had the greatest trade, and that has organized the Chinese customs service, at the head of which is an Englishman. From the first there have been more Englishmen in the

Empire than foreigners of all the other Western nations (excepting the Portuguese) put together. For many years Great Britain led in the concerted action of the powers, and she had without question the dominant influence among them at Peking.

France took part in the second war with China and the march on the capital. Her protectorate over the Roman Catholic missions in the Empire has given her an influence greater than what she has obtained from her trade, which has been relatively insignificant. But the prestige of France in the Far East never recovered from the results of the war with Germany in 1870. It is true the annexation of Tonking established her on the southern edge of the Empire and gave her a powerful base for future operations. But in spite of this, French influence at Peking has in recent years been usually overshadowed by that of some other nation, either a rival or an ally.

The connection of Russia with China is older than that of the other European nations. Already in the seventeenth century a first treaty was signed between the two empires. Since then they have had occasional official communication with each other, and a regular trade was maintained overland between them; but their relations were not close, and along the boundary of several thousand miles which they had in common, little happened to attract attention. In 1859 and 1860, profiting by the weakness and confusion in Peking as a result of the English and French invasion, the Russians by very clever diplomacy persuaded the Chinese to cede to them the left bank of the Amur River and a strip of territory along the coast. This cession added immeasurably to the strength of their position in the Far East, but its full results could not be felt until the new acquisition had been at least partially settled, and still more until it had been connected with the rest of Russia by railway. In gen-

eral, the Russian Government rather avoided taking part with other powers in affairs of common concern and looked quietly after its own business.

During the earlier part of the nineteenth century the trade of the Americans with China had been very flourishing. American missionaries, too, came into the country in considerable numbers, so that American interests in the Empire and American influence were both of no small importance. But from about the time of the Civil War the American merchant marine in the Pacific declined steadily, and thereafter, although the situation of the representative of the United States at Peking was an honorable one, it was not of great consequence.

In 1894, when the Chinese and Japanese so suddenly plunged into war, the relations of the different foreign powers to China had not undergone any marked change for some time. Now, beginning with the outbreak of hostilities, we have to note a series of startling events and far-reaching changes. The war itself came as a surprise to everybody except the Japanese. Its result greatly enhanced their prestige, though the check they received in the end, when they were forced to give up part of the territory they had demanded, slightly tarnished the lustre of their glory. Henceforth Japan was recognized as being a new and important factor in Eastern affairs, if not quite one of the first magnitude. To England, the conflict had been most unwelcome. Any change in the state of the Far East would hardly be for her advantage; therefore, when the trouble began, public opinion was frankly hostile to Japan. As the war went on, this attitude was modified, and by the time it was ended English sympathies were on the side of Japan, the coming power, as against China, the decadent one. Then occurred the incident of the combination between Germany, Russia, and France, which forced the Japanese to moder-

ate their claims for indemnity. England found herself in a hard position. She had been invited to join with the other European powers in putting pressure on the Japanese, but this she was unwilling to do. She was now openly friendly to them, and already regarded them as possible future allies against Russia. She might even have taken their side, but it would have involved her in very serious risks in view of the strength of the powers opposed to her. Besides it would have been an attitude almost too violently opposed to the one she had assumed a few months before at the outbreak of hostilities, and would have cost her the good will of China, to which she attached value. All things considered, the British Government decided to follow the most natural and easiest course under the circumstances, to observe neutrality, that is to say, to do nothing. This was very probably wise, but at critical times inaction, especially in the East, is interpreted as weakness. British prestige received a blow from which it has never entirely recovered. It was still further damaged by the disasters to English arms during the Boer War, and although Great Britain by the Anglo-Japanese alliance recovered some of the ground she had previously held, she can never hope to hold again in Peking the dominating position she once did. There are now too many rivals for the place.

Japan was indeed not the only power to appear upon the scene in the last years of the nineteenth century as a new active factor in the Far Eastern situation. The events of the war were soon followed by others equally unexpected and of almost equally great influence. In 1897 the Germans seized and occupied the harbor of Kiauchau, and forced the Chinese to consent to their presence there. Germany already had an active and growing commerce in Eastern waters, but until then politically had kept in the background, even when she had

joined the coalition against Japan, for this had been regarded merely as a small favor to Russia, and not as indicating any sudden departure in her policy. But after the occupation of Chinese territory and the sending of a German fleet under the Emperor's brother to Chinese waters, and various other demonstrations, it became evident to the world that Germany intended to play a leading part henceforward in Far Eastern politics.

We may call the United States another newcomer. It had long had a voice in Far Eastern affairs without aspiring to dominate them. But in the last years of the nineteenth century the revival of American commerce in China helped to awaken American attention to what was going on across the Pacific and a determination to be consulted in the important events taking place there. The immediate cause, however, of the new prominence of the United States was the acquisition of the Philippines in 1898. To the surprise of the world, as well as to its own, the United States suddenly found itself a Far Eastern power, a near neighbor of the other great states, and one that very soon took an active share in the international politics of the day. The first exhibition of this new activity was Secretary Hay's well-known circular in 1899 on the subject of the "open door."

Meanwhile Russia had abandoned the policy of silent growth and observation she had pursued for so long. The Japanese attempt to get Port Arthur had alarmed her. Not satisfied with balking it, she showed from this time on an energy and avidity which for a number of years were to make her the leading figure in Far Eastern affairs. She now had a strong fleet in Asiatic waters; and at Vladivostok she possessed a well-fortified naval base. Thanks to recent immigration, Eastern Siberia was beginning to have a considerable Russian population, and the approaching completion of the Trans-Siberian rail-

road was increasing immeasurably the military power of Russia in the immediate vicinity of both China and Japan. Upon China she was able to bring pressure at any point along their common frontier. The permission to shorten her railway by building it across Manchuria might seem only a fair reward for the assistance she had rendered the Chinese in the hour of their distress. But the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula was an act of aggressive imperial policy even if it was immediately provoked by the German seizure of Kiauchau. The troubles of the Boxer Rebellion made the Russians masters of Manchuria, and it was evident from the first that at least some of them had no intention of giving up their prey.

Thus we see that at the opening of the twentieth century every one of the world powers was interested, and actively interested, in Far Eastern affairs. As was natural, their conflicting interests and ambitions produced rivalries among them, and they soon tended to form into separate groups. At one time the alignment consisted of Russia and her ally France on the one side, usually, though not always, supported by Germany; on the other were England and her ally Japan, who could ordinarily count on at least the sympathy of the United States. Between the two China appeared powerless.

This was but a few short years ago; since then we have witnessed another change of the kaleidoscope which has affected the attitude of every one of the parties interested.

The first consequence of the Russo-Japanese War was a general recognition of the power of new Japan. She had proved herself far stronger than people had supposed her to be, and since the treaty of peace she has been adding feverishly to her military equipment so that today she is far stronger than she was then. Russia has suffered a very severe check, which, though it has not

permanently weakened the strength of the Empire, has diminished its situation in the world for the time being. The war came as a surprise to the Russian people. It was never popular, and its outcome has disgusted with ambitious Asiatic enterprises, not only the Russian public, but Russian statesmen. The feeling to-day is in favor of peace, of internal reforms, and of attention to European rather than to Asiatic international questions. Many fear further hostility on the part of Japan. On the other hand, it is not at all impossible that Russia and Japan, moved by the same desire to keep the territory they control in Manchuria, may soon not only follow a common policy, but act in unison, against those who oppose them.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in 1905. Since then enthusiasm for it has rapidly diminished. The English traders in the Far East suffer severely from Japanese competition; the English self-governing colonies refuse to admit Japanese immigrants of the laboring class, and there are not a few people in England itself who fear Japanese influence in India, and look on Japan as a dangerous future rival. England and France, so recently in danger of being drawn into conflict with one another, are now on the best of terms through the *entente cordiale*. England and Russia are more friendly than they have been since the days immediately after the fall of the great Napoleon. Germany is less in evidence in Eastern affairs than she was a few years ago, for indirectly one result of the Russo-Japanese War has been to put an end to ambitions which some Germans indulged in with regard to China. Japan has made a treaty of friendship with France, and appears no longer hostile to Russia. But her relations with the United States, though officially friendly, are not as cordial as they were five years ago.

The commercial rivalry between all the various powers

for ascendancy in the Chinese markets bids fair to be keener than ever. The chief competitors will be England, Germany, Japan, and the United States.

In this competition all parties concerned see golden possibilities. They all make the same claims and use the same war cries, such as that of the "open door"; but each is quick to accuse the others of violating the principles he pretends to uphold. America, while taking a firm stand in favor of the open door in China, is now doing away with it in the Philippines for her own benefit and that of the Filipinos, and it will be difficult for her to protest if Japan follows her example in Korea. On their part the Japanese have been loudly accused both in Korea and Manchuria of using their dominant political position to give their citizens unfair advantages in the way of trade.

Then besides the scramble for trade we have the scramble for concessions. Until now, England, France, and Germany have been the three chief capitalistic powers offering money to China, indeed urging her to accept it, in order to develop her resources for her sake as well as their own. Now the United States has just taken a step indicating her intention in the future to assume and claim the same rôle as a capitalistic friend.

It is evident that the question of foreign trade and the internal development of China must in the long run go hand in hand. China can not continue to buy indefinitely the manufactured goods of the Western world unless she finds some means of selling her own wares in return. In the early days of foreign trade the Chinese sold much more than they bought. To-day the situation is reversed. The growth of the opium trade first made the imports of China exceed her exports. Since then the Chinese export of tea has suffered very severely from the competition of India and Ceylon; and cotton goods which,

as long as it was a question of hand labor could be produced more cheaply in China than in the West, now are being imported in ever-increasing quantities, not only from Europe, but from America and from Japan. This last branch of importation may, however, suffer from the establishment of cotton mills in China, a process which has already begun. Still there are a very large number of Western articles which the Chinese are not at present able to produce, and which they will demand in increasing quantities. But in the end if they are to continue to buy they must sell.

In speaking of the international situation in the East thus far we have been talking of China only in her passive rôle, of the way that by her existence, character, and conditions she affects the policy of other powers. Let us now consider briefly what her attitude is likely to be in the situation in which she finds herself at the present day. Her awakening, which is probably the most important result of all of the Russo-Japanese War, precludes the idea that she will sit calmly and allow others to do with her as they please. On the contrary we may expect her to assert herself, to have a policy of her own, and to have her friends and her enemies, or, to put it in the milder language that suits present-day politics, the nations with which she is on more intimate terms, and those with which she is on less, like anyone else. It is an interesting object of speculation which countries will be her intimates, for all proclaim themselves ready and even eager to assume the rôle.

We shall do well to remember in the first place that the present movement in China, like those in Turkey and in Persia, is in large measure a patriotic, nationalistic one. The Chinese reformers most eager for Western education and liberal institutions want them, not only in order to make their country more civilized, more pros-

perous, happier, but also in order to enable it to assert itself. This is a perfectly legitimate ambition and one deserving of our sympathy. But it behooves the people of other nations, including those of the United States, to understand clearly what this term "assert itself" means, for such self-assertion affects the interests of other nations besides China.

We need not imagine that Chinese statesmen and patriots are planning wars of revenge to reconquer their lost territories or suzerainties. Like other people, they have to accept certain accomplished facts. They have, however, a right to hope that some day they may be able to get back the lands which they have only leased to foreigners, and they will direct their policy towards that object. It is also obvious that they do not intend to let any more of their land go by the board, if they can help themselves; and that they are anxious to recover from both the Japanese and the Russians complete possession of the region they never formally surrendered, namely, Manchuria. We may expect, too, that they will endeavor to recover the branches of the administration now controlled by foreigners, particularly the customs service. Excellent as this has been, profitable alike to Chinese and to foreigners, we can not demand that reformed China should leave so important a branch of its governmental system in the hands of strangers, no matter how honest and efficient.

Another thing, which observers who have followed Chinese affairs in these last few years have been able to note, is that people in the country are anxious to develop its resources themselves. Here they run against the difficulty of lack of sufficient capital, technical skill, and perhaps administrative honesty. Nevertheless a good many Chinese patriots would prefer to advance more slowly rather than to rely upon outside help, and all are

agreed that they must scrutinize more closely than in the past the contracts made with foreigners in order to save China from economic servitude. This disposition to jealous scrutiny is legitimate enough, but it does not smooth the path of the foreign capitalist who wishes to make profitable investments in the Far East.

Finally, we must accept it as inevitable that as China progresses in strength and modern civilization and in self-consciousness she will demand equality of treatment at the hands of the rest of the world. This has occurred in the case of Japan, it is happening now in India, Turkey, and elsewhere, and is in the nature of things. It is entirely in keeping with American liberal traditions that the United States should recognize the justice of such a demand and should show herself ready to make the necessary concessions in no grudging spirit. But Americans will do well to keep in their own minds from the start what the Chinese demands for equality involve, and what attitude the United States should adopt in meeting them—an attitude that must be influenced, not only by considerations of justice, but also by the legitimate interests of its own citizens. This, then, raises the question, What are the inequalities from which China suffers to-day?

We may note first the commercial and fiscal inequality. By treaty China is so bound that she is not at liberty to fix her own tariffs. To the Chinese the cry of the "open door" must often appear a hollow mockery. The door that is held open is theirs, and it is held by people who make no pretense of holding their own doors any more open than they want to. We can understand how China came into her present unfortunate position. We can justify the Western powers for insisting in their earliest treaties on security against arbitrary and vexatious impositions. But we can not expect that modern China

can remain permanently contented with a system which denies to her in her trade with foreign countries a liberty which they assume as a matter of course for themselves. As soon as Japan was strong enough, her claims to freedom from local trammels had to be accepted by other powers.

A second inequality consists in the establishment of foreign courts in China similar to those existing to-day in Turkey and Morocco. We may admit that these courts grew up naturally and indeed were unavoidable. No Western power could consent to handing over its subjects to the tender mercies of Chinese justice. Chinese ideas and Chinese practice on this subject are still too different from ours to make such a thing possible. In spite of the fact that Japan has succeeded in creating a modern judicial system to which foreigners submit with but few murmurs, it does not look as if China would be able to achieve the same thing for a good while to come, and until this has been achieved no Western nation will entrust the lives and liberties of its citizens to the native courts. Justifiable as such an attitude is, we can hardly expect it to be pleasant to the Chinese. Their views and ours as to the merits of Chinese justice are not likely to be the same. We can hardly imagine a Chinese judge dispensing his own law to the Chinese population of New York and Boston, and ignoring local jurisdiction. Such a thing would seem utterly incompatible with our ideas of the sovereignty of the American people on its own soil. We need not therefore be surprised if the Chinese regard the exercise of American or European jurisdiction on Chinese soil as an abuse of superior force, and if it excites increasing discontent as it did in Japan as long as the system continued. We may have to disregard this discontent, but we can not call it unnatural.

A third inequality of which the Chinese complain is

one that touches America particularly, and that is the refusal to receive Chinese immigrants. The whole internal history of China is one long story of colonization, often checked, often seeing the work of generations undone, but always beginning again and pushing steadily forward. It is thus that the Chinese who, three thousand years ago, inhabited only a comparatively small territory about the Yellow River, have in course of time settled the much larger regions which make up their present empire, displacing or absorbing the earlier populations. There are few non-Chinese elements in China proper to-day. In Manchuria the Chinese far outnumber the Manchus. They are making progress even in the barren regions of Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan, and Tibet. They have also in the last few centuries been spreading outside the bounds of the Empire and crossing the seas.

The reception with which Chinese immigrants have met in foreign states has varied many times, and the attitude adopted towards them is very different in different countries of the world to-day. The Chinese are now excluded in great measure from most of the countries of white races where they have tried to settle. The United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa keep them out save in a few instances. They are also shut out of certain territories inhabited by colored populations but under white rule. They are welcomed by the English in the Malay States and in Burma. They are limited and watched with some apprehension by the French in Indo-China; by the Dutch in Anam; and by the Russians in eastern Siberia. They are excluded by the Americans in the Philippines.

We need not enter here into the question of whether this exclusion is right or not. Admitting for the sake of argument that it is wise and even necessary, this does

not alter the fact that the arrangement is one-sided and can hardly be agreeable to the Chinese. Their special grievances may perhaps in time be removed by general legislation limiting immigration into the United States in such a manner that it would no longer be necessary to discriminate specifically against them. Indeed, recent action in regard to the immigration of Japanese tends to lessen the odium of American conduct towards China. But the least that the Chinese will feel entitled to demand is equality. If the United States is entitled to shut out certain classes of their citizens and to examine others closely, they may claim the same privilege with regard to Americans. Practically, of course, a treaty which should exclude from each country the laboring classes in the other would make little difference in their present relations. One can not conceive of an American laboring man trying to earn his living in China in competition with the natives. On the other hand, any distinction between different classes of American citizens is quite contrary to all American democratic traditions. One can imagine the clamor that a treaty would provoke which provided that the American capitalist should be allowed to go to China, but the working man should be excluded. We can hardly conceive, too, of the American tourist or merchant visiting China submitting placidly to minute inquisition into his character and to anthropometric measurements of his person to make sure that he is not a laborer in disguise. The truth is, blink the fact as we may, the American public is not yet ready to treat the Chinese as on a level with itself. However natural such an attitude may be, it is not conducive to good feelings.

It is not the object of this paper to suggest a solution for the difficulties we have just touched upon. The questions raised are very grave ones which will not be settled

in a day, and whose ultimate solution we can not foresee with certainty. All that we can do at present is to face these difficulties with a clear comprehension of their nature, and to deal with them as they arise according to the best of our ability in such manner as shall seem, not only wise to ourselves, but fair to all parties.

II

A SKETCH OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND THE WESTERN WORLD

It is a trite and self-evident proposition that, in order to give any broad and comprehensive knowledge of past or existing affairs and conditions, the causes and circumstances which led up to them must be clearly understood.

In no department of Chinese politics and affairs does this remark apply with such pertinency and force as to that of her foreign relations. The attitude of China towards foreign governments has seemed so peculiar and abnormal, her disposition towards all forms of intercourse so recalcitrant and unwilling, as to provoke all varieties of criticism and censure. At times it has appeared necessary to remind Western people that the Chinaman is human, moved by the same feelings and purposes which actuate and guide other men, that there may be peculiar reasons for his peculiar attitude and action, and that he who desires to be just and fair might well seek to know more, and to judge less. To know more, because there are few more interesting chapters in history than that of Chinese diplomacy. To judge less, because China deserves a more kindly judgment than that which is usually recorded against her.

Two natural factors—to call them such—have had much to do with Chinese seclusion from the rest of the world. The first of these has been the extreme difficulties of her language. The second is her geographical isolation. It is only necessary to consult a map to understand this latter condition fully. Her eastern frontier is

the Pacific Ocean, no longer a barrier but a facility to intercourse. Her northern neighbors were, and still remain, wild wandering tribes who could give China nothing, and who long since became Chinese dependents. The whole stretch of her western boundary was, and still is, occupied to a large extent with sandy deserts scarcely less painful and perilous to traverse than the Sahara of northern Africa. Towering above her southwestern and a portion of her southern frontier arose the impassable Himalaya Mountains, upon the slopes of which rests the insignificant Principality of Tibet, long since drawn within the essential control of the Chinese Emperor. To the south and southeast are the petty kingdoms of Burmah, Siam, and Cochin China, now substantially absorbed by Great Britain and France. Thus China has been, from the beginning of time, geographically isolated, by barren deserts, mountain ranges and broad seas, from all those parts of the earth which were peopled by races in any measure her peers, and among whom the progress and development of the earth have been brought about. Only with the evolution of the modern means of rapid, easy, and cheap intercommunication has it become possible for the people and government of China to come into any close and intimate touch with the Western world. And while the peoples, races, and tribes which surrounded the Chinese Empire gained much from her civilization, and, as will be shown, borrowed nearly all of her knowledge, they could give nothing to her. China had no neighbors from whom she could learn anything.

There is, however, abundant evidence that the Chinese possessed a limited knowledge of southwestern Asia and the adjacent portions of Europe before the Christian era, and, probably, before the birth of Confucius. And, of course, there is equal evidence that the peoples of those regions had some knowledge of the Chinese. There

is strong reason for the belief that the Prophet Isaiah referred to China when he mentioned "The land of Sinim." The prophetic words were spoken about 712 B.C. or more than a century and a half before the Chinese sage was born. It is certainly known from Persian writings and legends that a demand for the splendid silks even then woven in China had sprung up in the Persian Empire previous to the birth of Christ. At a period at least two centuries before Christ, the Phoenicians, Carthaginians, and Syrians were already masters of an extensive trade, and it is abundantly evident that an active commerce existed some centuries before the Christian era. It is quite impossible to identify the names of cities mentioned in these ancient chronicles with any centers of commerce now known in China. Knowledge of the country and the language was exceedingly slight. Names were misunderstood and confused. And the modern student who undertakes to fix the localities mentioned by these foreign merchants will meet with somewhat the same difficulties which, so says Williams, a Chinese geographer, writing at Fuchau as recently as 1847, found confronting him in his efforts to identify the Colossus of Rhodes with Rhode Island.

From some cause which may neither be understood nor explained, commercial and friendly missions between the Emperor of China and the heads of various Asiatic and European states first were dispatched at about the beginning of the Christian era. From that period they greatly increased in frequency and importance. And they were not altogether of a commercial nature. Thus, in A.D. 61, the Chinese Emperor, moved alike by a dream, and by a statement made five hundred years earlier by Confucius, that a sage having the true wisdom would be born in the West, sent an envoy to the West "for teachers and books of the true religion." So ran the Imperial

instructions. But the envoy, dreading the hardships and perils of the deserts, deflected his course to the south, entered India, and returned with Buddhist writings and priests. In A.D. 126 a Chinese general reached the valley of the Caspian Sea, and carried the grape vine back to China. In A.D. 166 the Roman Emperor, Marcus Antoninus, sent an embassy by sea to China, to procure the rich silks which the people of that empire manufactured. The culture of silk was introduced into Europe from China, during the reign of the Roman Emperor Justinian. It is certain that at the time of this ruler a large exchange of commodities was being carried on between the two empires. The Romans obtained from China silk, iron, and furs. And the Chinese received in exchange, glassware, asbestos, woven fabrics, drugs, dyes, metals, and gems. It is at this period that the first recorded knowledge of China is to be found among European records. It was written by Ptolemy, the Roman geographer. And it is a curious, though not strange, fact that, at about the same period, the Chinese historical records contain the first mention of the Romans. It is extremely interesting to read what each says of the other. The Romans said of China: "The region of the Seres (Chinese) is a vast and populous country, touching on the east the ocean and the limits of the habitable globe, and extending west nearly to Imaus and the confines of Bactria. The people are civilized men, of mild, just, and frugal temper, eschewing collisions with their neighbors, and even shy of close intercourse, but not averse to dispose of their own products, of which raw silk is the staple, but which include also silk stuffs, furs, and iron of remarkable quality." And of the Romans the Chinese said: "Everything precious and admirable in all other countries comes from this land. Gold and silver money is coined there; ten of silver are worth one

of gold. Their merchants trade by sea with Persia and India, and gain ten for one in their traffic. They are simple and upright and never have two prices for their goods; grain is sold among them very cheap, and large sums are embarked in trade. Whenever ambassadors come to the frontiers, they are provided with carriages to travel to the capital, and after their arrival a certain number of pieces of gold are furnished them for their expenses."

The tea plant, not indigenous to China, was introduced from India in A.D. 315. Ivory, apes, peacocks, silks, medicines, and gums were transported, both by the dangerous sea route, and the more dangerous land route, in these early Christian centuries. A little later a trade developed with Arabia, Greece, and Constantinople. The extent to which the foreign sea commerce in China grew in those ancient times, may be inferred from a statement made by an Arab writer that, at the sacking of Kan fu, a seaport of southern China to which all Arabian traffic was directed, no less than one hundred and twenty thousand Mohammedans, Jews, Christians, and Parsees, all merchants engaged in the foreign trade, lost their lives. The destruction of this city took place about A.D. 877. Missionaries of the Nestorian form of faith had reached China long ere this, probably as early as 300 A.D. In 505 A.D. they had a complete ecclesiastical organization in the Empire, in 551 A.D. returning missionaries carried back the eggs of the silk worm to Constantinople, and by A.D. 781, the faith had spread throughout China, was patronized by the Emperor, and many high officials of the Empire were among its numbers. The Nestorian tablet, still in existence at Hsi An Fu, furnishes ample proof of this.

The trade missions from Rome, Constantinople, and Arabia continued down to about A.D. 1100. Envoys from

Ceylon were also frequent. In 1266 the King of Ceylon, then an independent ruler, had Chinese soldiers in his service. In 1406, the Emperor of China sent a fleet to Ceylon, by which the King, his family, and ministers were captured and carried as prisoners to Peking, where they remained in durance for five years. The little kingdom thereafter paid tribute to China until 1459. And—to turn again to Persia, Chinese engineers were employed upon public works in that empire in A.D. 1275, and before that date, Chinese physicians and astrologers healed the sick and foretold the future in Tabriz, then the Persian capital. The Mongol incursions into China, which had commenced shortly before the date last mentioned, were followed, as is well known, by the seizure of the Chinese throne. Those two great Mongol emperors and military leaders, Zenghis and Kublai Khan, overran and subdued nearly the whole of Asia; they led their armies into Europe, terrorized that continent, and were at last only brought to a halt at the very gates of Vienna. These great military events put an end, for a considerable period of time at least, to the quieter forms of commercial intercourse between China and the West, which had been carried on for so long, and had reached such large proportions. For the purposes of this sketch, the antique period of Chinese foreign relations, as it may be called, ends with the Mongol rule, or about A.D. 1500.

If this lengthy detail, of the principal features of the earlier intercourse between China and the outside world, has proved somewhat tedious, it also has been necessary in order to develop clearly certain facts, facts full of significance, but not generally understood. It has thus been made evident that in this ancient intercommunication, the Chinese played a full part. They were not merely passive recipients of trade caravans from remote countries. Chinese merchants pushed their way over all the

known regions of Asia, Europe, and Africa, seeking new avenues and new centers of traffic. Nor was the Imperial Government either indifferent or hostile to this enterprise. There are abundant evidences to show that, upon the contrary, it was encouraged and fostered by the Throne. The details already given may be considered sufficient proof of this fact. But one circumstance, purposely kept out of its chronological order in this narrative, will establish it more positively. In A.D. 98, an envoy was sent from China westward with directions to learn more about the Roman people, and to establish direct trade between that empire and China. He reached a seaport where he proposed to go westward by sea. He was hindered and dissuaded from doing this by the people of the port, the Parthians, who, as intermediaries, had controlled the traffic between Rome and China, and so failed to accomplish the object of his mission. It was in order to avoid the Parthian monopoly that later—A.D. 166—the Roman emperor opened the sea route of traffic.

That the Chinese, government and people, should have taken an active part in the development and maintenance of commercial intercourse with foreign countries, in those early days, cannot seem at all strange to any person who is even moderately familiar with the characteristics of the race. They are a nation of merchants. The commercial instinct is, and always has been, strongly developed in them. To this day the merchants of China rank second to none in the world in ability, shrewdness, and integrity. They know how to drive a sharp bargain, how to make the most of small profits, and how to keep their pledges and commercial honor. And these facts, coupled with others which need not be given here, must prove that, in those ancient days, the Chinese had no objections to foreign intercourse, but, on the contrary, welcomed and fostered it. They were easily receptive of all

forms of knowledge, sent embassies abroad in search of it, welcomed new theories and practices with their teachers and apostles, and China was freely and fully open to theorist, priest, traveler, merchant, and any other respectable wanderer. Foreigners were welcomed by the Government and then, later, rose to high positions in the service of the state. Foreign forms of religious belief could be freely taught. The policy of the Throne was that of entire toleration, the Emperor made gifts to churches and temples alike, and the members of the official class were free to profess what form of faith they might choose.

Such was the consistent and unvarying policy of the Chinese Government, in all matters touching foreigners, from the earliest times down to a comparatively recent period, when it was all changed, and a rigid policy of exclusion and seclusion adopted and adhered to. Since the Chinese are human beings, moved and governed by the same impulses and purposes which control other races of men; since it is wise and safe to measure their actions as the actions of other men are measured, *is it possible to resist the conclusion that conditions must have changed and that reasons of the most serious, permanent and formidable character must have arisen to justify and necessitate such a sweeping change in the ancient policy of the Empire? And is it too much to expect that fair-minded, intelligent persons will take steps to inform themselves of the actual causes of this change before they join in the common outcry against China for having made and persisted in it?*

While the international trade, destroyed during the Mongol incursions, and short-lived dynasty, appears to have never been renewed, a considerable amount of communication and intercourse was kept up by travelers. Special embassies were also sent from various parts of

Europe to the Chinese Emperor. Thus the Pope, in 1241, sent two monks to the Mongol ruler to urge him to the exercise of greater humanity to his European captives. They carried no presents to the sovereign, as was then the invariable custom, and in consequence were roughly treated, barely escaping with their lives. Louis XI of France, having heard that a Chinese general, then holding command upon the western frontier of the Empire, was a Christian, sent a mission to him in 1253. This mission consisted of a friar and three companions. They were sent on to the Chinese capital, where they found a Nestorian high in favor and the only medium of approach to the Emperor. They at once became involved in dangerous religious disputes, and were finally sent back home, which they reached after an absence of two years. It can hardly be necessary to continue this list of monks, friars, and travelers of every kind and degree who made their way at different periods, during several centuries, from different points in Europe, by different routes, and with different purposes, to the court of the Chinese emperor. Though they accomplished little else, they kept alive in Western lands some knowledge of a great and civilized nation "lying in the extreme east upon the shores of the Pacific."

Two of these travelers, however, deserve notice for the greater knowledge of the China of those days which they secured and for the valuable information which they gave to the European world upon their return. The more important of these was Marco Polo, a Venetian. He left Constantinople for the East in 1260. He spent twenty-one years in China, held a responsible office under the Emperor, with whom he was high in favor, visited his native land under a promise to return to China, which promise he fulfilled, bearing with him letters from Pope Gregory X to the Chinese sovereign. His narrative, as

translated and edited by Colonel Yule, is exceedingly interesting and valuable. The other of the two travelers was a Moor, named Ibn Batuta, who commenced his wanderings in 1325. They were wanderings, rather than travels. He remained three years in Mecca, and eight years in Delhi, India, where he was high in favor with the Sultan. In 1342 he was sent as an envoy by this ruler to China. While he failed to reach that destination, in his capacity as ambassador, he arrived there in what was evidently his more natural character, of wanderer. Among his observations in China is to be found the statement that the use of paper money, by orders of the monarch, had entirely driven all metallic currency out of circulation.

The idea of diplomatic establishments permanently settled at the capitals of all independent nations, for the consideration and adjustment of such international questions as may arise from time to time, is, comparatively and essentially, modern. The initial factor in all such intercourse is trade. And under the older and Oriental theory, it was beneath the dignity of the government to concern itself with such matters as the interchange of vulgar commodities. All questions referring to commerce belonged to the merchants. Let them adjust them among themselves. If, indeed, attempts were made to evade taxation, or to smuggle goods contraband of law, then the authorities must intervene. But that, again, was the business of the local officials. They knew the law and their duty under it. Why trouble the sovereign? This was the ancient and Oriental idea. Hence, when it came about, in much later times than those which have been under review, that Western powers sent ambassadors to China, who had much to say of the protection and development of commerce, and insisted upon the right to establish permanent diplomatic missions at

Peking, the Chinese were unprepared for any such request, and not merely unable to comprehend and sympathize with the motive of the proposition, but inclined to regard with scorn any government which would "dabble in trade." From the Chinese point of view, the utmost limit of any reasonable request would be, that the viceroys and governors of provinces within which were located centers of foreign trade, be instructed to confer with foreign officials as occasion might arise, and to adjust any points of difficulty or disagreement. And this was one of the reasons, though of minor importance, when compared with others yet to be mentioned, why the government of China resisted so stubbornly the continued presence of foreign ministers at Peking, and why the United States legation, in common with others, tossed about for so many years in our ships of war upon the restless bosom of the China Sea.

Almost from the beginnings of her history, China has been the central figure in a world, largely of her own creation, in which she was the final dominant moral force. She has been the planet, the powerful civilized and cultivated empire, surrounded by a circle of admiring satellite kingdoms. Korea, upon the northeast, the Tartar families on the north, Kashgar and Samarkand upon the west, Tibet, in its Himalayan clouds and snows, at the southwest, Burma and Siam at the south, Anam and Cochin China, trailing off from her southeastern frontier, and those tiny and inoffensive specks which lie, like a fringe, off to the east, marking the eastern limits of the China Sea, and known as the Liukiu Islands, these formed a system, an Oriental world, of which the Chinese Empire was the center. They flattered her by that most delicate and subtle form of flattery, imitation. They copied her form of civilization, modeled their governmental systems after hers, borrowed her religions,

adopted, in several instances, her written language, gained their knowledge of the arts and literature from her, and all of them deferred and appealed to her, as final authority and sovereign mistress in an intellectual and moral, *but not governmental*, sense of the term. She was arbiter of their disputes, whether domestic or international. She aided each, at times, to quell insurrection by the force of her arms. She held herself, and was held, as the patron and superior of each and all.

The relationships between China and the other nations and tribes named were always, to an Oriental mind, definite and well understood. Embassies reached Peking from each of the smaller states at each New Year, bringing presents and the felicitations of the season to the emperor. They were imperially entertained by him, and on their return home were the bearers of return gifts to their rulers, which gifts were always as much more valuable than those which they brought, as the emperor was greater in power and wealth than their lords. It is only within a few years that the King of Siam has ceased sending a biennial gift of white elephants to the Court at Peking. And the winter of 1894-95 marked the first Chinese New Year in many centuries in which the King of Korea failed to dispatch his annual embassy, of compliment and congratulation, to the Chinese sovereign. Large bodies of merchants accompanied these envoys, the merchandise which they sold and bought being, as a matter of privilege, exempt from all taxes and imports of every kind. And it is important to keep in mind that, whatever may have been the interruptions and however vexatious the course of commerce between China and Western Asia, Europe and America, this international traffic, between the Empire and neighboring Asiatic countries, has not been disturbed or interfered with for many centuries except in the unusual circumstance of

war. The annual procession of clumsy craft, jogging along their journey from Bangkok, Siam, to the ports of China, going as far north as Tientsin, and making one round voyage each year, may be seen to-day, as it might have been before the discovery of America by Columbus.

As was, perhaps, to have been expected, when the chief Western powers, having succeeded mainly by force of arms, in establishing permanent diplomatic relations with the Chinese Empire, turned their attention to these nearby states, there arose a universal misunderstanding in regard to the loose-jointed and essentially Oriental connection which has just been described. Having no accurate idea of its nature, and ignorant, or forgetful, of the fact that all forms of feudalism had been abolished in China two centuries before the birth of Christ, they decided it to be the relationship of suzerain and vassal, of which, in fact, it lacked every essential quality. One incident in this connection may be taken as a fair sample of the misunderstanding, and what came of it. Korea—the Hermit Kingdom, as it has been called—was close shut against all foreigners except neighboring Asiatics. The United States was anxious to put an end to the horrible cruelties practiced upon American seamen when ship-wrecked and cast ashore in Korea, and, to that end, sought to make a treaty with the king. Efforts directly made having failed, the fancied authority of China over Korea was appealed to. The Chinese Government disclaimed all right to interfere. Then a United States fleet was sent to the little kingdom, accompanied by an ambassador duly empowered to conclude an agreement. When this fleet arrived off the coast, no communication could be established, and when one of the vessels of war entered the mouth of a river, she was promptly fired on from the forts. A force was landed, the fort was attacked and taken, and a number of men were killed upon

both sides. The project of direct negotiation with the King of Korea was then abandoned. A few months later, a formal demand was made upon the Chinese Government, that it force Korea to conclude a treaty with the United States, or itself assume responsibility for the proper treatment of American seamen. But China declined to do either, in turn formally asserting that the Emperor possessed "No right or authority to interfere in either the internal affairs or foreign relations of the Korean Kingdom." This was strictly true, though not so understood at the time. The Empire might advise, but could not command the Korean ruler. Ten years after these events occurred, China *advised* her neighbor to enter into diplomatic relations with the United States, and the existing treaty was the result.

There is no word in any European tongue which will exactly describe the position which China claimed to hold *vis a vis* the smaller states named, because the idea is wholly foreign to our conceptions of international relationships. Vague, indefinite, and difficult of classification as it may appear to the Occidental, to the Oriental it is simple and clear, because it is exactly in line with his idea and theory of government. He describes it as the relation, or position, of an elder brother towards a younger. When the Chinese Government has had occasion to describe her attitude and relationship towards any of the neighboring states, precisely the same word and phrase is used which is employed to indicate the relative positions of two brothers, the elder and the younger. Recalling the fact that the entire theory and basis of government in China is to be found in the patriarchal, or parental, system, in which the elder brother has a certain authority over, and responsibility for, the younger, it ceases to be difficult to understand the tie which connected China with her surrounding and less powerful

neighbors. It carried a sort of moral superiority and right of control, which could be exercised, or evaded, at will. And perhaps, in this fact is to be found that feature of the systems which is most pleasing to the Oriental mind. Citizens of the United States, at least, should readily understand the relationship, and as readily discover the value of it, since in application, where an outside government is concerned, it bears a striking resemblance to a theory strongly maintained in this country. In certain phases of its practical use, what is it but a sort of Asiatic prototype of the Monroe Doctrine?

Prior to the year 1500 A.D. the entire foreign relations of China, whether of an official or commercial character, had been with the nations and peoples of Asia and south-eastern Europe. And it cannot be too clearly pointed out and understood that, up to that time, excepting only the period of the Mongol invasion, there were no signs of any policy of exclusion and non-intercourse. The Empire was open and free to all foreigners of every calling and profession, subject only to those restrictions and limitations which were usual in all countries in those days. The people of modern Europe had not made their appearance upon the Chinese borders, and were quite unknown to the natives of that Empire. The latter were, however, soon to learn of them. A period of exploration, exploitation, plunder, and piracy, had set in among the nations which bordered upon the Atlantic, and deeds were done—and are admired to-day—which if done to-day would cause the perpetrators of them to be swung from the yardarms of their ships. China was to receive her first introduction to the manners, methods, civilization, morals, and Christianity of western Europe from such men. The French first appeared in China, in 1506; the Portuguese followed them in 1516; the Hollanders at about the same time; the Spaniards appeared in 1575;

the British in 1635; and the Russians in 1658. With the possible exceptions of the British and the Russians, the conduct of all these pioneers of, so-called, peaceful commerce, was such as befitted pirates rather than amicably disposed and civilized men, and they well deserved not merely exclusion from the Empire, but extermination by the hands of the Chinese authorities. They harried the southern coasts of China, plundered and destroyed towns and cities, killed inoffensive men, women and children by scores and hundreds, and then sailed *peacefully* away. Or they landed, forced the native Chinese to construct fortifications for them, by the most outrageous brutalities, seized and carried away women, robbed the natives of whatever valuables they possessed, and violated every principle of humanity and decency.

Take one or two instances as fair examples of all. The Portuguese merchants came to Canton in 1517, and gave great satisfaction to the authorities by their fair dealings. They were cordially welcomed and well treated. The next year they came again and behaved so atrociously that, after several years' effort and endurance, on the part of the Chinese, they were driven away in 1521. Later they came again and established themselves at Ningpo, a seaport in central China. Their conduct here was such as to draw upon them the vengeance of an outraged people, who at last rose against them, "destroyed 12,000 foreigners, of whom 800 only were Portuguese, and burned thirty-five ships and two junks." Four years later they were driven from another settlement, and for the same reasons. In 1560 they obtained temporary footing upon the peninsula of Macao, by trick and fraud, which, by trick and fraud, they have continued to hold down to the present time. In recent years, it was the center and depot of the infamous coolie trade under the permit and patronage of the Government of

Portugal, and since that was crushed out by the Chinese Government in 1872, Macao has been the headquarters of gambling, which is forbidden in China, but which has been encouraged for purposes of revenue, by the so-called "Most Christian King" of Portugal.

The Dutch introduced themselves to the peaceable and peace-loving Chinese by means of a fleet of seventeen men-of-war, with which they bombarded a city upon the coast. Being repulsed, they took possession of a group of outlying islands which they proceeded to fortify, forcing the natives, with brutal measures, to do the work. At different times they made descents at several points along the coast, committing acts of piracy, and working havoc wherever they appeared. Being repeatedly driven off, they finally abandoned their efforts to secure a "foothold for commerce" in China. The French, who came in 1506, introduced themselves, also by means of armed vessels, and by acts of plunder and murder.

This sort of "kindly intercourse in the interests of trade," here necessarily described, and dismissed, within the compass of a few sentences, continued at varying intervals for nearly three centuries. In its more acute form, it died out gradually, not from any growth of respect for the rights of the Chinese, nor from any keener sense of decency upon the part of those actually engaged in it, but partly from an increased power of resistance shown by the Chinese with a consequent diminution of profits from such enterprises, and because of a change of conditions in Europe.

Would the Government of China have shown itself to be anything less than utterly incompetent, or infamously neglectful of the lives and property of its subjects, had it failed to adopt a policy of strict seclusion against nations which, so far as it knew or could learn, were fitly represented by the specimens described above? Was not

the length of time during which the Empire suffered from these atrocities, and the range of experience gained from them, more than ample to justify such an extreme measure? With all men, first impressions and experiences appear to strike deeper and to have a more abiding force than any which may come after. The Chinese are no exception to this rule, and to this day they judge the nations of Europe by what they learned of, and suffered from, them a number of centuries ago.

Harold Gorst, British authority, writing so recently as 1899, thus places his verdict upon record: "Rapine, murder and a constant appeal to physical force, chiefly characterized the commencement of Europe's commercial intercourse with China. It was not until they had fully earned the title, that the Europeans acquired the disagreeable appellation of 'foreign devils.' In the eyes of the Chinese, the goal at which all Western barbarians aimed was war and robbery." And Dr. Williams says: "The outrageous behavior of foreign traders themselves must be regarded as a chief cause of the watchful seclusion with which they were treated. These characteristics of avarice, lawlessness, and power have been the leading traits in the Chinese estimate of foreigners, from their first acquaintance with them, and the latter have done little to effectually disabuse Orientals upon these points."

Such were the earlier experiences of the Chinese with the men from modern Europe, and such the resultant ideas which they gathered concerning them. Under the most favorable conditions of later intercourse, with great conciliation and forbearance, generations must have passed before these memories and ideas could have been removed, and contempt and fear could give place to respect and kindly regard. The Chinese are slow to abandon prejudice, and much tact, patience, and open-

handed generosity of feeling must have been called into exercise, before the old barrier wall could have been torn down, and any satisfactory relationship have been created.

Most unfortunately, no such favorable conditions as those mentioned have been fulfilled. True, the Chinese have learned very much regarding Western foreigners during the past sixty years of constant intercourse. To a limited extent they have learned to discriminate between nations, and to dissociate the generous feelings and plans of mutual benefit which animate some, from the arrogant spirit of proprietorship, selfish greed of gain, and lust for political domination, which determine the conduct of others. But it has been an unwelcome study upon the part of the Chinese. Within this period of sixty years, they have been taught to their bitter sorrow, the aggressive force and persistent determination of Western governments, and their power to accomplish their will. They have had many object lessons in Western civilization set before them, some of the highest and best type, and others of the lowest, most repulsive and degrading. They have fully discovered, or *think* that they have, which amounts to the same thing, what is the underlying motive and purpose of all European interest in them and conduct toward them. And that motive and purpose, as the Chinese to-day believe it to be, can be stated in two words, *money-making* and *land-stealing*. The intelligent thinking minds of the Empire, and they are many, have not been quite ignorant of, or watched idly, the course of political events in other parts of the world, as directed and determined by the great European powers. They put their own construction upon the absorption of Burma, the mutilation of Siam, and the dissection and distribution of the great body of the African continent. And within the last sixty years

they have at least recognized the necessity of copying one Western idea—the development of the resources of the Empire in the direction of self-defense.

So far as is known, the first treaty negotiated between China and any European government was with Russia, and was signed in August, 1689. This, however, was not a treaty of commercial intercourse, its object being to delimit certain disputed boundary lines between the two empires. While the English were the last of the great nations of modern Europe to establish intercourse with the Chinese, their commerce has been greater than that of all other foreign nations combined, and the British Government made the first commercial treaty with the Emperor of China. What the influence of the English in the Chinese Empire was, prior to the negotiation of this treaty, may best be told in the words of Dr. Williams. He says: "This intercourse has not been such as was calculated to impress the Chinese with a just idea of the British nation as a leading Christian people; for the East India Company, which had a monopoly of the trade between the two countries for nearly two centuries, systematically opposed every effort to diffuse Christian doctrine and general knowledge among them (the Chinese) down to the end of their control in 1834."

What British influence and action have been in the Chinese Empire since the date just mentioned, 1834, is described in detail by Dr. Hamilton Wright, in his address upon the "Opium Problem."

There is no intention to assert that, during the sixty years of modern intercourse with foreign governments, the latter have had no causes of complaint against the Chinese Empire. Upon the contrary, such causes have been many, persistent, and serious. China has evaded and nullified treaty obligations, and, by devious ways and methods, destroyed the value of her pledges. As inti-

mated at the outset, her constant disposition has been recalcitrant in the extreme, and her unvarying attitude has been that of one whose friendship had been unwillingly granted, and, but for fear of the consequences, would at once be withdrawn.

But what thoughtful person, possessed of even a slight knowledge of human nature, could look for any different attitude. The entire situation is so plain as to require hardly a word of explanation. Her only knowledge of the Western world had been gained by the contact and experiences already described. And when modern diplomatic relations were established, it was accompanied by force and, as every Chinaman will believe to the end of time, for the sole purpose of the profit to be derived from a traffic alike unwelcome and deadly to the entire race. Is there anything unnatural or impertinent in the inquiry, made by every intelligent Chinese, why, if opium is harmless and even wholesome, the government of Great Britain does not encourage the natives of India to use it, and so create a home market for the product? And, so long as the Chinese are human, and reason as do men of other races, under what peculiar mental process can they be expected to differentiate the modern European from his prototype, the earlier freebooter and pirate? Modern modes of getting gain at the expense of others may be more quiet and gradual, and even more strictly within the lines of civilization, but they are more widespread in their fatal results.

The whole point lies just here. If the same efforts had been made by Great Britain to develop any honest commerce with China, it would at first have been opposed. But, gradually, the mutual benefits arising from it would have changed Chinese sentiment, for they are shrewd traders, and the empire would have come slowly, but willingly, into friendly intercourse and kindly relations

with Europe and America. And if Great Britain had made the same efforts to develop honest commerce, not one-tenth of the complaints justly made against the Chinese Government would have arisen.

Under the most favorable conditions, it was inevitable that a considerable amount of friction and disagreement should exist. For, when the detailed treaties of "amity and commerce," as they are called, were negotiated, practically at the point of the bayonet, it was thought necessary, and wisely so, to deprive the Emperor of China of two of the essential qualities of sovereignty. He was not allowed to fix the rate of export or import duty upon foreign-owned merchandise, and he was not allowed jurisdiction over the persons or property of foreigners who might be within the limits of his Empire. These conditions were intensely galling to the emperor, as they would be to any other monarch, and were only accepted under force. What but the narrowest possible interpretation of treaties, which contained such degrading features, could be expected? What but friction and dispute were to be looked for in the enforcement of the two great departments of every general international compact, the regulation of commerce, and the protection and control of individuals?

It is like gaining a breath of pure air, after breathing the poisonous fumes of a narcotic, to turn from the history of this wretched and disgraceful attempt to force opium upon an unwilling people, to the primary treaty negotiations between the United States and China. Caleb Cushing, that distinguished authority upon international law, was the representative appointed for the purpose. He received the most courteous treatment at the hands of the Chinese authorities, negotiations were promptly begun, and the treaty was signed July 3, 1844.

Because of its fullness of details and clearness of statement, it was for many years the final authority in settling all disputes, between the Chinese officials and foreigners of all nationalities, regarding treaty rights. A French envoy reached China in August of the same year, and the French treaty was signed in October, 1844. Of these two embassies, Dr. Williams, who was upon the spot at the time, says: "The gratification of the Chinese statesmen at finding that the missions from the American and French Governments were not sent, like the English expedition, to demand indemnity and the cession of an island, was great." The United States has always maintained the good opinion of the Chinese Government, then and thus secured. But it ought to be said that whatever remissness in formulating demands France exhibited at that time, has been amply atoned for and balanced since. Treaties between other Western powers and China were not concluded until some years later. And all of these first compacts were, in a sense, tentative and preliminary. They did not bring foreign governments into direct touch and communication with the Imperial head of the Chinese people. That was not accomplished until 1861, when, as a result of the second opium war, a forced consent was given to the permanent residence of diplomatic representatives at Peking.

Perhaps the most important period of the foreign relations of China lies between 1861 and 1902. Ample material for volumes of the most interesting history may be found there. None of it, however, could be either rightly understood, or justly weighed, without some knowledge of the facts and events of the preceding centuries, rather than years. Only a sentence or two, of the most condensed summary of this recent period, can be given here, in conclusion.

The general attitude and disposition of the Chinese Government has been sufficiently described. And it ought to be said, in order to correct many current mis-statements, that, in the main, the authorities, in their policy and action, have been simply the servants of Chinese public opinion. The policy of European powers has not been of a conciliatory character, but rather one of aggression, greed, and self-seeking. Foreign trade interests have been pressed, and insisted upon, when they forced the Chinese Government to discriminate against its own people; and China has been forced to grant concessions to foreigners, which involved serious injury to native commerce. Pecuniary claims have been presented, and forced to a settlement, which no diplomat would dare whisper to an American or European Secretary of State. And if China, upon her part, has shown arrogance and conceit, the European representatives have talked threateningly, made a show of force, and, in general, assumed a constant air of patronage and proprietorship which has been insufferably vexatious to the Chinese.

As has been said, Great Britain has persisted in her prosecution of the opium trade in the face of almost constant appeals from the emperor, has carried on a system of exploitation of the interior in the interests of British trade, as though it were her own soil, and not the home and property of a so-called "friendly power," and has shown her usual readiness to seize territory wherever it was consistent with a purely selfish policy to do so. Germany has been guilty of aggression upon the domain of the emperor. Russia has crowded down upon the north and west. And yet it ought to be said that the Chinese fear Russia less than any other European power, and have a kindlier—or rather, less hostile—feeling toward her. And France has played a full part in the creation and maintenance of Chinese animosity, by a

policy identical with that just outlined. In particular, she has sustained the unwise demands of Catholic missionaries, especially those in the south and west, for a sort of semi-political position, and for the right to interfere in civil matters between native converts and local authorities.

In short, the entire attitude of the great European powers towards China has been selfishly aggressive and unendurable by the sensitive and proud-spirited Chinese. They have regarded that ancient empire as a cow to be milked, or butchered; as a goose to be plucked. As an English writer said, not long ago, in reviewing a book entitled "The Real Chinese Question," "The only question is, what the powers of Europe will decide to do with China." That statement correctly represents European policy and action. And the Boxer movement was the inevitable result of it. The statement that it was caused, directly or indirectly by Protestant missionaries, is a baseless and wicked falsehood. The only wonder is not that it came, but that the coming was delayed so long. If the great powers of Europe had concurred, forty years since, in the humane and reasonable policy adopted and consistently followed by the United States, there would have been no Boxer movement, and no serious or irremediable friction, or conflict, between this great Oriental empire and the Western world. And when those powers will recognize the fact that the Chinaman is a *man* with a man's rights, among which is the right to the occupancy and possession of his own soil; that "China is for the Chinese," and not merely a treasure deposit for them, then better relations will come.

When China is given such opportunity as, thanks to the initiative of the United States, was conceded to Japan, to develop and progress somewhat along her own

lines, and in free conformity with her own ideas, then the growth of the empire will begin, the path of international intercourse will be less vexed and stormy, and the story of the foreign relations of China will be a more pleasant story to tell.

III

A SKETCH OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA

THE intercourse between America and China constitutes only a single, and relatively a brief, episode in the history of the past century in Asia. It is inseparably connected with the relations of various European states with China, but some advantage may be derived from considering the story by itself. As illustrating the larger subject of the attitude of the Chinese toward all foreign nations it has certain features not to be found in their dealings with Europeans, while it shows in every incident their consistent determination to maintain the ideals of their ancient culture. The purpose of this paper is to review briefly a hundred and twenty years of recent history with the hope of finding at once some basis of American policy toward the Chinese Empire and some interpretation, if possible, of Chinese polity.¹

As a race the Chinese possess many qualities of great economic value which make them a factor of significance in the industrial world of to-day. The question, however, which attracts the speculative historian, relates rather to the influence of their past upon the mentality of the people. The place of China as a potential factor in the world's future, is evident enough even to those superficially acquainted with the country and its inhabitants. It remains to explain from our knowledge of her

¹ An admirable summary of American intercourse with China is to be found in General J. W. Foster's "American Diplomacy in the Orient," Boston, 1903.

history why she has thus far persisted in her opposition to Western peoples and in her indifference to their message, and then to determine, if we may, what prospect there is for a change of attitude in the immediate future. The status of China among nations is not without precedent in history; it is interesting because she alone amongst great states has preserved into modern times the antique idea of isolation and self-sufficiency, and because ages have hardened the habits of the multitude of individuals concerned. The shrewder and best informed among these individuals are now aware that something is wrong with their great civilization, but they rebel as yet, for the most part, against those who insist upon applying unpalatable European ideals as a panacea for all their ills. These ideals are hateful to them in essence because they contravene the basic principles upon which their own glorious past was established. The West has long emphasized the individual as the social unit, and the individual when spurred to personal ambition is the dynamic factor in the history of its progress. The East in abiding by the family as the unit, maintaining the principles of the past, refuses to advance beyond the point which the past has considered the limit of safety. It is as difficult for the one as for the other to refrain from exalting its own superiority. It is hard for each to understand, harder still to sympathize; but it is at least possible for the unprejudiced observer to comprehend from these premises how the idea of progress and improvement in international intercourse, symbolic of the hopeful West to-day, must to the righteousness of old-fashioned China appear simply a sacrilege because it disregards precedent. Representatives of Christendom in dealing with the Chinese have for the most part estimated them by Western standards, unconscious of the difference in values between the two civilizations. It is

only at rare intervals that individuals of strong sympathy and breadth of view have modified the antagonism inevitable between self-reliant and widely separated races.

With this as an introduction it may be easier for us to undertake a consideration of some phases of American intercourse with the Chinese. International relations between the two peoples began at the opening of our national life. At the conclusion of our Revolutionary War, England's colonial system, which had forbidden all outside trade with her American colonies, could no longer prevent our ships from going abroad, but the removal of this check at the same time closed the hitherto lucrative commerce of these colonies with the West Indies. *The Empress of China*, from New York, was the first Yankee ship to invade the exclusive region of the English East India Company, by arriving at Canton with a load of ginseng in the summer of 1784. As a beginning this epoch-making voyage may be considered most auspicious. Shaw, the supercargo, says: "The Chinese were very indulgent toward her. . . . Styled us the new people; and when by the map we conveyed to them an idea of the extent of our country with its present and increasing population, they were highly pleased at the prospect of so considerable a market for the productions of theirs." He did not understand as well as we do today that this was the complacency exhibited by a few local traders welcoming the prospect of some increase in their traffic and perquisites. It was a long time before official China realized that anything had happened in the advent of a new nation thus quietly heralded.

Shaw's expedition, if it may be so called, met with the approval of his own countrymen and trade between America and China began with a rush. Profits, however, fell because there was no adequate supply of articles in either country which were demanded by the other, but

two important causes maintained it for nearly half a century. The first of these was the turmoil of the Napoleonic wars, which after 1795 made the Americans practically common carriers of the world. A second cause was that derived from a development of the gathering of fur seals and sandal wood, both of them highly prized in the Chinese market. The chief reason, however, for the success of American traders in the East must be found in their entire freedom from government restraint at a time when all Europeans were controlled by the monopolies given to their various East India companies. As an indication of the relative importance of China to America a hundred years ago and now, it is rather suggestive to learn that the thirty-seven vessels, carrying in 1805 nearly five and three-quarters millions' worth of goods to Canton, represented a larger fraction of our total commerce than our trade with the whole empire to-day. So far as it went, moreover, it was a profitable business despite the quantity of silver which it took to Asia. The silver imported to balance American trade with China averaged over two and a half millions annually in the thirty years down to 1827, reaching a maximum of seven and a half millions in 1818, but the import of opium from India eventually turned the balance of trade against China until the drain of silver from that country became one of the ostensible causes for the rupture with Great Britain.

For profitable though the trade was for the time being, it must not be imagined that it bulked very large in the imagination of our forefathers who were occupied in exploiting their own great domain. A trader was given the nominal position of American consul at Canton, but his powers were confined to ordinary commercial business, and he had no real status as a diplomatic agent. It is evident that the United States as a nation did not

care to incur the responsibilities of diplomatic intercourse with China until it had made its way across the American continent and faced her from across the Pacific.

The only episode which ever caused any real contention between America and the Chinese previous to the Opium War was the apprehension of one Terranova, an Italian sailor, who in 1821 had to be handed over from an American ship to the Chinese authorities on charge of homicide. The poor fellow was executed, as our countrymen thought, most brutally, but they were well aware that they lived in Canton only upon sufferance and under Chinese law. The contempt of the Chinese for all foreigners as barbarians, and the lack of any means of adjusting disputes between nations who had no diplomatic agents, made it necessary for America, unless indeed she wished to declare war, to keep aloof from the Chinese Government and throw her traders living in the Empire upon their own resources. There was some similarity in the situation to conditions on our frontier. Criticism, indeed, was heard in America of the English policy which ultimately took up the gauge of war and came to blows with the Chinese in 1840. But whatever may be said for the morals of the famous opium-war controversy, the Americans showed no hesitation in carrying goods in their vessels during the war and in taking advantage of the fortunate outcome.

After the conclusion of peace at Nanking in 1842, Admiral Kearney of the American squadron, then visiting Canton, induced the viceroy of the two southern provinces to memorialize the palace to place America on the same footing as England in securing the advantages of that treaty. One of the British commissioners declared that to this man was due the credit of throwing open the five treaty ports to all foreigners alike. It

might be an interesting speculation to consider what China might have done had she bethought herself in this crisis of a selfish compact between England and herself against all other trade competitors. It is worth remarking that China on this and other great occasions has exhibited a breadth of view curiously in contrast with her astuteness and narrowness in many small affairs.

In Caleb Cushing, the commissioner sent by the United States in 1844 to begin our diplomatic history there and negotiate a treaty with China, we have the first of a series of Americans remarkably endowed by nature to deal with the rather elastic conditions of Asiatic diplomacy. The Cushing treaty negotiated with Kiyong, the Chinese commissioner, bestowed upon Americans all the rights and privileges which had been secured by British military operations. It is chiefly notable for comprising these in language at once so felicitous and succinct as to have rendered the document, negotiated by a Boston lawyer, the model for many subsequent conventions between China and foreign powers.

With this treaty began the residence of Westerners at five places along the China coast under the government and control of their own consuls. It was the condition of extra territoriality, familiar now to Europeans in Asia, but until that time confined to a few scattered settlements outside of Christendom. The Chinese conceded this right to all Christian peoples who asked for it, almost as a matter of course, as had been the case in Turkey long before, and was to be the case in Japan.

In order to understand the readiness with which this important privilege was yielded as a mere by-product of the war, we must recall the premise with which I began—China constituted a society working automatically, obdurate to new ideas, capable only of applying ancient precedents. It was easier to award the “barbarians”

the treatment meted out to certain recalcitrant aboriginal tribes in the interior, allowing them self-government under various restrictions, than to study and comprehend the complex nature of the irrepressible visitors from beyond the ocean. Though conscious of its weakness on the sea, the Chinese Government still felt that it had nothing to learn from the West. It had been defeated but not convinced. The autocrat cooped up in his palace at Peking cherished the foolish phantom of a state supreme above all other states in the world, yet in his vanity he was yielding to the detested strangers rights under which they were presently to defy him in his own domain. In this crisis of national life we realize therefore that the chief menace to China's existence arose from her fidelity to her own ancient institutions. Had she been less thoroughly imbued with the idea of her high culture she might have bent to the storm and taken counsel in her adversity. But she refused to learn. Weakened by political corruption and vitiated by the new vice which was stealing away the brains of her officials, she persisted in an attitude of *non possumus* toward the Europeans who would willingly have helped her, and so drifted on the way to destruction.

Throughout this pathetic phase in the distress of a great nation the policy of America was from the first one of friendship. The interest in our country in preaching the gospel in Asia was of itself sufficient to render Americans sympathetic with a helpless though obdurate people, and the cause of missions has influenced public opinion more in America than elsewhere. But however great the sympathy of Christian teachers with the needs and helplessness of China, it was from the first obvious that she required a degree of compulsion from abroad sufficient to force her away from her vain belief in the efficacy of her ancient system. Yet it is a danger-

ous thing when any nation undertakes the work of the schoolmaster. No nation in the past has emerged very creditably from the self-appointed task of instructing another; the teacher soon becomes the bully, punitive expeditions turn into predatory raids, and national character under the strain of easy victories deteriorates. As the figment of China's supposed strength was dissipated, representatives from all Christian states showed indications of the immoralities involved in this peculiar international relation. Perhaps the mere fact that Americans did little at this time in the East, owing to the engrossing problems of politics at home, may account for the creditable record of our country at this period. We need not boast, but we may at least declare that we emerged as little corrupted as any of the partners concerned in the great game. It is true, nevertheless, that all Christian peoples alike must be blamed for adopting an attitude of hauteur and disdain toward the Chinese. Our Minister, Mr. George F. Seward, a few years later than this epoch, rightly called a halt to this attitude of our own people when he wrote, "The sooner we rise to the idea of dealing with this government as being actuated by very much the same motives of dignity, patriotism and public policy which actuate other governments, the sooner we shall be able to place our relations upon an enduring basis of good will and common interests."

For a dozen years after the conclusion of Caleb Cushing's treaty, the United States contented itself with representatives who were entitled Commissioners in China. The first of these, Mr. John W. Davis, was chiefly occupied in installing our consuls and defining their judicial functions under the system of extra territoriality. He was followed by Humphrey Marshall and Robert M. McLane, both of whom failed to meet the

famous Viceroy Yeh in Canton, or to make the least impression in resisting his policy of studied insult in respect to all foreigners. The latter joined with British and French representatives in a visit to Taku in 1854 in order to meet a Chinese commissioner there, and plan with him some revision of the existing treaty. The attempt met with no success whatever, but in spite of this check, it is creditable to our representative that in his disappointment he had the fairness to insist upon the payment by American merchants in Shanghai of customs duties which had been withheld from the Chinese Government during the period of the rebel occupation of that city. Under similar circumstances the British merchants in the same place had refused to do so.

Our relations with the Chinese officials were gravely threatened in the period following the "Arrow" incident by the opening of the guns on the Bogue forts upon a United States warship. The forts were promptly silenced by the only military operation which Americans ever undertook against the Chinese until the year 1900. The Chinese, however, appear to have been as clearly conscious of the nature of this offense as the Americans; and no ill-will resulted from a gross insult promptly avenged. Had our representative, Dr. Peter Parker, then had his way, we should, with some justification, have joined in the military expedition of France and Great Britain against the Chinese, but to Dr. Parker's suggestion of co-operation, Secretary Marcy replied that "The British Government evidently had objects beyond those contemplated by the United States and we ought not to be drawn along with it, however anxious it may be for our co-operation." This attitude of America in the Far East has been consistently observed ever since that time. The crisis, however, was much too important for the United States to ignore. Our new representa-

tive, Mr. William B. Reed, was sent to China with the higher title of Minister Plenipotentiary to press negotiations by peaceful methods only. He united with the allies, convinced of the futility of treating China like any ordinary power, and advised his government to advance upon Peking "with a decisive tone and available force." But when he in turn asked for the necessary power to enforce coercion upon an obdurate court, Secretary Cass replied that the President was not yet willing to ask Congress to seek redress by resort to arms. It was a tempting opportunity and might have been morally justified, but America held her hand except to endorse by her minister's presence the claims of the West to free intercourse.

The expedition to Tientsin which followed involved the American envoy in an uncomfortable and anomalous position as regards his colleagues. The situation was greatly ameliorated by the suavity of Baron Gros, the French representative, and the co-operation of Count Putiatine, the Russian minister. We must not blame too severely the reserve of Lord Elgin, remembering the great responsibilities committed to his charge. But it remains to be said that a more genial diplomatist than he might have secured from his coadjutors more sympathetic support.² America's contribution to the negotiations at Tientsin was chiefly the acknowledgment of religious liberty obtained from the Chinese, the Magna Charta in some sense of all present missionary operations conducted in that country. New trade regulations involving a revision of the tariff were settled subsequently in Shanghai. In all, the American indemnities for losses to the merchants and missionaries before the

² A brief documentary history of the negotiations is contained in C. S. Leavenworth's "Arrow War with China," (Samson, Low, 1901), a little volume not sufficiently well known.

war amounted to only \$735,000; of this an unexpended balance of \$453,400 was returned to China by our government in 1885.

Mr. Reed's successor, Robert E. Ward, arrived at Taku in the summer of 1859 with the European allies on his way to exchange the ratified treaty in Peking. It was at this time that the sudden check of the second battle of the Taku Forts occurred, when Commodore Tatnall valorously but with doubtful propriety assisted in towing some of the British boats into action on the plea that "blood is thicker than water." As we were not involved otherwise in this conflict, there appeared to be no reason why our representative should decline the offer of safe conduct on the part of the Chinese authorities to Peking by another route. In the long controversy which ensued at the capital between our minister and the statesmen at the court over the question of Audience Ceremonial, appears once more the China of immutable institutions face to face with the new world. Although dealing with a matter which most Americans would have considered a mere trifle of etiquette, the legation was fortunately alive to the extreme importance of the debate. Thereby depended the fate of future diplomatic relations between China and the West. It was her desire to induce compliance with the ancient ceremonial usages of her court and impose the famous *koto-w* upon the ambassador approaching the throne in order to establish a high precedent, and thus in her own expression "to save her face" before her own people. There can be no question of the genuineness of Chinese civilization when we recall that this little company of twenty Americans, representatives of those hated foreigners who had already inflicted so much disaster upon the Chinese, were entertained in perfect safety in the heart of the capital and allowed to withdraw without embarrassment after

refusing compliance with the dearest wish of the Emperor and his supporters. A barbarous state would never have shown such moderation. The rejection of all offers to compromise the ceremonials brought about no show of truculence or any acts of petty spite on the part of the court. The President's letter to the Emperor was honorably received by Kweiliang, the highest official in the Empire, but an Imperial audience was refused, and the exchange of ratified treaties was relegated to Peh-tang, the town on the seacoast where the party had landed.

Mr. Ward was ridiculed and even reviled by his compatriots as well as by Europeans, for the visit to Peking and its apparent failure. But he was right; in some senses it may even be said that he accomplished more by the exercise of patience under peculiar provocation, and without the support of armed force, than the allies and their military array. His refusal to perform the *kotow* meant to the Chinese a refusal to acknowledge the sacrosanct character of the imperial ruler, and consequently the supremacy of the Chinese Emperor over other sovereigns. Even when, as they were made aware of the material strength of Western nations, they reluctantly conceded the equality of the Treaty Powers, the Chinese officials declared that they would perform the *kotow* and even burn incense before foreign sovereigns abroad as testifying to their conviction of the divinity of a ruler's person. "It is the same reverence that we pay to the gods," said one of them, and after such witness to the religious character of the homage demanded, one may comprehend the abyss which separated the East from the West in this commencement of their diplomatic intercourse. It is the duty as well as the right of a nation to defend its honor; in acknowledging this, while refusing to compromise the dignity of a Christian

plenipotentiary, Mr. Ward established a precedent, under circumstances which seemed at the moment to involve him in grave personal risk, that reflects great credit upon his competence and temper.³

The second period of China's political education on the part of the West ends with the Anglo-French expedition of 1860, in which America had no share. This campaign avenged the disaster at the Taku Forts, and established the right of permanent diplomatic residence in Peking, as an effectual guarantee of official intercourse upon terms of equality. The instrument of this intercourse was the Tsung-li Yamen, or Bureau of Foreign Affairs, in which, after the death of the Emperor Hsien-fung the same year, Prince Kung and Wensiang were the controlling spirits guiding China along her difficult path. The American envoy who reached China to take up diplomatic relations under the new conditions, found at first little sympathy or support from the ministers of other nations who were entering their new legations at the same time. There was a general disposition, not yet wholly dissipated, to assume that Asiatics understand only the argument of force, and to consider that Mr. Ward had discredited his country by a tactical error in returning from the capital without exchanging ratifications. The man who took up the diplomatic work at this juncture had, in addition to the repugnance of the Chinese, to face the critical attitude of Europeans in

³ U. S. Senate Ex. Doc. 36th Congr., 1st Ses., No. 30, pp. 569-624. S. W. Williams, Narrative of the American Embassy to Peking, Jour. China Br. R. A. Soc., Vol. I, 1859. W. A. P. Martin, Cycle of Cathay, 1896, pp. 143-203. Gen. Foster, American Diplomacy in the Orient, p. 252, while declaring that Ward "bore himself with dignity and self-possession" considers his treatment at Peking an affront to himself and his country. It does not appear that the Chinese intended it to be so.

China. It was not a delightful prospect. Fortunately, not only for America but for China, this minister proved himself to be possessed of a temperament that accepted without prejudice the idea of including men of all races and colors in the common family of civilized nations. This was Anson Burlingame, whose presence in Peking at this crisis might fairly be considered providential. At a moment when the Imperial Court was in terror of further aggression from abroad and rebellion at home, and foreign merchants clamored for unwarrantable liberties in trade, he made it clear to the Tsung-li Yamen that his government opposed on principle any policy of spoliation toward China, and called the attention of foreigners to the grave dangers attending illegal attempts to exploit China for selfish aims. His idea was essentially the same as the "open door" policy of America announced forty years later. As a result of the friendly impression he produced upon the Chinese authorities, he was asked, upon his resignation after six years, to become the head of a Chinese embassy to all the Treaty Powers—a remarkable instance of the power of sympathy and cordiality.

The appearance of Anson Burlingame upon the arena of Asiatic politics was, and long remained, a subject of conventional pleasantry among Europeans unacquainted with certain types of American character. His friendliness and optimism, shown alike to Caucasians and Asiatics, were held by those accustomed to old-fashioned methods in diplomacy, as too good to be true. Presently, however, his sincerity so impressed those who came intimately into contact with him that he was able to influence his diplomatic colleagues in Peking to accede to his "policy of co-operation," in further dealing with the government of China. This, and the policy inaugurated by Great Britain, of holding the Imperial authority and

not local governors responsible for observance of treaties, may be called, perhaps without exaggeration, the turning point in China's foreign relations. It meant a substitution of fair dealing for sheer force. As the most important contribution of an American at this time toward a solution of the political complexities which confronted alike all civilized nations, it deserves an explanation in his own words:

"It was not (he declares in his first speech made after landing in California in May, 1868), until recently, that the West was in proper relations with that empire [China]. Affairs went on upon a system of misunderstanding, resulting in mutual misfortune, down till 1860, when the representatives of the Treaty Powers met with the great men who carry on the affairs of the Chinese Empire. Coming into personal relations with them, they had occasion to modify their views as to the capacity and as to the intentions of these men. And they were led straightway to consider the question: How should they substitute for the old, false system of affairs, one of fair diplomatic action? They addressed themselves fairly to the discussion of that question; and that discussion resulted in the adoption of what is called the 'co-operative policy.' That policy is briefly this: An agreement on the part of the Treaty Powers to act together on all material questions; to stand together in defense of their treaty rights, but determined at the same time to give those treaties a generous construction; determined to maintain the foreign system of customs, and to support it in a pure administration and upon a cosmopolitan basis; an agreement to take no cession of territory at the treaty ports, and never to menace the Territorial Integrity of China."⁴

It is as unfair to measure the real significance of the

⁴ Official Papers of the Chinese Legation, Berlin, 1870, p. 4.

Burlingame mission to the Treaty Powers by its immediate results, as it would be to estimate the extraordinary ability of its leader by the newspaper ridicule which followed his optimistic speeches. In some respects the Europeans were as blind to the crisis in China's affairs as she was to their theories of statecraft. China had just passed, in the Taiping uprising, through the most alarming social disturbance that the Empire had known since the coming of the Manchus. The Arrow War had been sprung upon her in her emergency, yet she had been saved as by a miracle from the terror without, and these same "barbarians" who had attacked her with such a shameless lack of justification, had afterwards both refused to recognize the Rebels, and later had countenanced the equipment of the Ever Victorious Force under Western officers and drill. This force, first enlisted by the American, Frederick E. Ward, and subsequently made famous by General Gordon, materially hastened the conclusion of the rebellion, though it is idle now to repeat the claim made by most accounts published in English that this result was accomplished by its unaided efforts. Certainly the motive promoting the mission was a hope on the part of a few Chinese statesmen that the West might listen to an appeal for patience and fair play, and the hope was as surely instilled by the magnetic influence of a man whose humanity was invincible—"a power (as Mr. Blaine described it) growing out of a mysterious gift, partly intellectual, partly spiritual, and largely physical." Behind this personality was, happily, the good will already accruing to a Western Government, disavowing all territorial ambitions in China, and not herself an object, at this time, of jealousy among European powers.

Unfortunately death cut short in its prime a brilliant career. Mr. Burlingame died in St. Petersburg before

accomplishing his tour through the chief European capitals, or being able to use his wonderful influence upon the palace officials after returning to Peking. China lost in him her only helper.

The text of the Burlingame Treaty is easily accessible and, as it became in time the object of some contumely, I might almost add, too well known to need quotation in full. Its eight articles, drafted by Secretary Seward, (1) recognize China's right of eminent domain over all her territory, even where occupied by foreign traders; (2) concede her sole control over inland navigation; (3) give a right to appoint consuls to American ports; (4) grant protection to foreign religions and cemeteries; (5) endorse naturalization rights and forbid the coolie trade; (6) give reciprocal rights of travel and residence to citizens of each party in the country of the other; (7) open all schools in each country to children of either nationality; and (8) acknowledge the right of the Emperor to make internal improvements unobstructed by foreign interference.

As it is the underlying idea of this compact that concerns us just now, rather than its treatment by its enemies, we may as well hear it expounded by Mr. Burlingame himself:

"In the first place, it declares the neutrality of the Chinese waters in opposition to the pretensions of the extraterritoriality doctrine, that inasmuch as the persons and the property of the people of the foreign powers were under the jurisdiction of those powers, therefore it was the right of parties contending with each other to attack each other in the Chinese waters, thus making those waters the place of their conflict. This treaty traverses all such absurd pretensions. It strikes down the so-called concession doctrines, under which the nationals of different countries located upon spots of land in the

treaty ports, had come to believe that they could take jurisdiction there not only of their own nationals, not only of the persons and property of their own people, but take jurisdiction of the Chinese and the people of other countries. When this question was called under discussion and referred to the home governments, not by the Chinese originally, but by those foreign nations that felt that their treaty rights were being abridged by these concession doctrines, the distant foreign countries could not stand the discussion for a moment. And I aver that every Treaty Power has abandoned the concession doctrines, though some of their officials in China at the present time undertake to contend for them, undertake to expel the Chinese, to attack the Chinese, to protect the Chinese, although the territory did not belong to them. China has never abandoned her eminent domain, never abandoned on that territory her jurisdiction; and I trust she never will.

“Again, this treaty recognizes China as an equal among the nations, in opposition to the old doctrine that because she was not a Christian nation, she could not be placed in the roll of nations. . . .

“There is another article which is also important to China. It has been the habit of the foreigners in China to lecture the Chinese and to say what they should do and what they should not do; in fact, to prefer almost a demand, and say when they should build railways, when they should build telegraphs; and, in fact, there has been an attempt to take entire possession of their affairs. This treaty denounces all such pretensions. It says particularly that it is for the Chinese themselves to determine when they will initiate reforms—when they will build and when they will refuse to build—that they are the masters of their own affairs; that it is for them to make commercial regulations, and to do whatever they

will, which is not in violation of the laws of nations, within their own territory. I am glad to say that is in the treaty; and while the treaty expresses the opinion of the United States in favor of giving to China the control of her own affairs, it assumes that China is to progress, and it offers to her all the resources of Western science, and asks other nations to do the same. The United States have asked nothing for themselves. I am proud of it. I am proud that this country has made a treaty which is, every line of it, in the present interests of China, though in the resulting interests of all mankind. . . . I know this treaty will be attacked: you will wonder at it. It will be attacked by the spirit of the old indigo planters in India; resisted by the spirit of the old opium smuggler in China. But notwithstanding all this, I believe that treaty or the principles of that treaty will make the tour of the world, because it is founded in right, it is founded in justice.”⁵

If true statesmanship is loyalty to right and justice, the man who stood for this treaty was a statesman, if not a master politician. Politicians on our Pacific seaboard and elsewhere arose to revile, but in forty years we, as a nation, have come to see that the prospection of a Burlingame based upon eternal principles of righteousness, discerned the true policy to be pursued toward China. With the passing of the sanguine ambassador, however, there came a change in the demeanor of America. Professor Mayo-Smith justly observes in this treaty the parting of the way between our previous and subsequent attitude toward China:

“This treaty of 1868 marks the dividing line between two distinct and contradictory policies on the part of the United States toward the Chinese. Up to that time our

⁵ Speech in Boston, Aug. 21, 1868. *Offic. Papers of the Chi. Leg., Berlin, 1870, p. 38.*

efforts had been directed toward compelling the Chinese to admit Americans to China for the pursuit of trade and commerce. In this contention, we placed ourselves on the broad platform of the right of free migration and the duty of international intercourse. Shortly after this declaration, we found that the influx of Chinese into this country was causing us inconvenience, and we immediately turned our backs on the principle of free migration, and passed laws excluding the Chinese as effectually as they had ever excluded foreigners.”⁶

California at the time of the Burlingame mission was on the eve of political and social changes which presently brought her people into serious opposition to its main idea of unchecked intercourse. The alteration of sentiment toward the Chinese in the United States resulting from the outcry from the Pacific Coast, induced a change of front which Americans do not now greatly enjoy recalling; but with this we need not be concerned at present. The fact remained, so far as the two nations were involved, that a more generous policy than the old had been shaped for China. The man who had been chiefly instrumental in calling a halt to the familiar plan of aggravation and reprisal, was an American, and Americans were thereafter believed by the more enlightened Chinese in Peking, to be in some way sponsors for the recall of China into the list of independent states. That we did not stultify ourselves before the Chinese as a result of our treatment of their immigrants into this country in the decade following the treaty of 1868, was due chiefly, of course, to their general ignorance of events outside of their own domain, and their indifference to the fate of subjects leaving the Empire. Some grace, more-

⁶ Emigration and Immigration, N. Y., 1895, p. 229. The Burlingame treaty was not ratified by China until sixteen months after it secured the approval of the Senate.

over, was given us from the rather melancholy fact which remained true in those evil days, that Americans were, on the whole, the least contemptuous and truculent of the foreigners in China. The merchants of other countries there wanted radical changes and were unwilling to give anything in return. They both despised and mistrusted the Chinese, and frankly advocated the substitution of brute force for diplomacy. As to the generous faith of Burlingame, "All who are conversant with China, they wrote, regard Mr. Burlingame's mission as suspicious in its origin, mischievous in its progress, and likely in its results to prove disastrous to all countries connected for commercial purposes with China."⁷ Their opposition in the end decided the British Government to refuse to ratify the Alcock Convention of 1869, revising the treaty of Tientsin.⁸ The discussions involved in negotiating this document are of interest as revealing the chief desires of the Chinese to restore their national prestige; these were abolition of extra-territorial privileges, prohibition of opium, and the withdrawal of missionaries from the interior. To gain these points, or even to advance them, they were willing to promise much to the foreigners, but so long as European traders maintained the attitude of *væ victis*, any advantages to be hoped for from compromises were lost.

But vicious merchants were not the only cause of shipwreck of a more merciful political idea. The Tientsin massacre of 1870 showed that the dual nature of the Chinese Government, involving different aims of a central

⁷ Parl. Papers, lxxiii, Memorials of Chambers of Commerce in China, 1867-68.

⁸ Parl. Papers, lxx and lxx, 1870 and 1871, Treaty of Tientsin, and Correspondence respecting the Revision, summarized in A. J. Sargent, *Anglo-Chinese Commerce and Diplomacy*, Oxford, 1907, pp. 152-175.

and a local authority had been left untouched by the new diplomacy. There were, in fact, even greater difficulties in the way of overcoming prejudice against aliens in China than in California. The massacre itself was of a sort which has become pretty familiar in the East; a credulous and fearful community hounded on to pillage and murder by agents who remained concealed, a local administration desirous for its own ends of hiding the real culprits, and back-stairs influence with the Palace impeding the efforts of the Government officials to meet the inevitable demands of the outraged foreigners. In the old days before official China recognized its obligations to foreign governments, it had been necessary to summarily punish breaches of treaty by using force against its immediate offenders. Thus foreigners had got to disregard the Imperial authority, and expect undue advantage from exercise of the "gun-boat policy," after the manner of extra dividends declared on highly speculative stocks. By the creation of the Tsung-li Yamen, however, China had expressly recognized its political responsibilities. It then became properly the aim of foreign powers to strengthen the central authority. They had to do so in the face of the claims of their own nationals with selfish ambitions. The new phase of political relationships was unpopular with the traders in proportion as they had made use of their unfair advantages in encountering native competitors.⁹ Hence arose

⁹ Consul Alcock draws a striking picture of the foreign community in China in the sixties. "The worthless character of a numerous gathering of foreigners of all nations, under no effective control, is a national reproach as well as a public calamity. They dispute the field of commerce with honest men, and convert privileges of access and trade into means of fraud and violence. In this career of license, unchecked by any fear of their own governments, and protected in a great degree by treaties from the action of the native authorities, the

a factor which, though negative in its operation, may be called one of some effectiveness in defining American policy in China. Immediately after the opening of Peking, America, being plunged in a civil war, had no forces at her disposal to exert pressure upon the Chinese. If there was to be international competition for trade supremacy in the East upon the basis of superior armed force she was hopelessly discounted. She had therefore everything to gain from a policy of supporting a supreme Imperial authority to be held responsible for the acts of subordinates, and from inducing her colleagues to do likewise. Her argument to Great Britain did not need to be a selfish one, nor was it a mere appeal to friendly consideration. The end of a policy of pin-pricks and persistent demands for more concessions was inevitably war and the disintegration of China. If a weak China involved the precipitation of a new Eastern Question, England with her responsibilities elsewhere was bound to be among the first to prevent the incalculable damage which might be expected from such a result. The co-operation of Russia and France followed, chiefly because Russia was content for the time in building Vladivostok, and France after 1870 was practically eliminated from the galaxy of predatory powers. In this review it becomes evident at once that support of the Imperial authority in the Taiping uprising was most logically forced upon the chief foreign representatives in China, and that, in general, Burlingame's plan of saving China was recognized as the only one consistent with the common safety of all concerned.

Chinese are the first and greatest, but by no means the only sufferers. There is no government or nation of the great European family that does not suffer in character, and in so far as they have any interests at stake in China, in these also both immediately and prospectively."

The chief blemish in the conduct of American relations with China is, of course, our treatment of her subjects in the United States. I have no excuse or palliation to offer for conduct in which our national honor has been compromised for the sake of a group of unscrupulous politicians in the Pacific Coast States, but it is at the same time true that to our previous fairness toward China has been due her patience under indignities received at our hands. Unhappily for our own credit, it is now evident that as a people, we spoiled our case with China by mere blundering. Had political societies and State legislatures been sufficiently far-sighted to restrain their impatience in the presence of a supposed menace of invasion by Chinese workmen, it would at any moment have been possible to adjust the matter of Chinese immigration with the Government in Peking. As it was, we placed ourselves in the wrong, violating our treaty stipulations while insisting that China should fulfill hers. In spite, nevertheless, of just causes for resentment, the Chinese authorities, mindful of past mercies, have acquitted themselves with decorum and conceded to us the further restrictions demanded of them. Their conduct is a notable instance of the political value of long-continued friendly relations when unexpected circumstances may suddenly threaten to overturn them.

I shall attempt nothing more here than a cursory notice of some features of this unpleasant subject. After some radical legislation proposed in Congress in open disregard of international law had aroused the better sentiment of the American people, as shown in the endorsement of President Hayes' action vetoing the Fifteen Passenger bill of 1879, some modification was confessedly necessary in the Burlingame treaty. To effect this the Angell commission was sent to Peking in 1880 to negotiate certain changed provisions. So delicate was the

political situation at home at this time that the commission actually arrived in China without any specific instructions as to what these changes should comprise.¹⁰ At the end of the negotiations these gentlemen procured the consent of the Chinese Government to clauses enabling the President and Congress to limit or suspend the immigration of Chinese artisans and laborers into America for a reasonable period whenever they thought necessary. "Reasonable" was afterwards taken to mean about ten years, though some difference of opinion was expressed as to its proper interpretation. In the course of a few years both Hayes and Arthur vetoed bills on the ground that twenty years was a violation of the treaty. The success of this commission was due partly to a desire of the Chinese Government to keep its subjects at home and to its wish for American support in prohibiting the import of opium into China. The opium clause, it may be added in passing, was hardly more than an expression of good-will on the part of Americans who, though somewhat compromised by individual traders, had no interest as a people in the opium trade; but it served an excellent turn.¹¹

During the course of the following decade, gross frauds in the return of Chinese laborers who were readmitted to the United States were claimed to actually nullify the effect of this treaty. To remedy this defect, the Chinese minister at Washington negotiated in 1888 a new treaty restricting the privilege of return to Chinese owning at least \$1,000 or having families in the United States. In return provision was then made for an indemnity covering outrages which had been committed against Chinese

¹⁰ C. Holcombe, *The Outlook*, April 23, 1904, pp. 993-4.

¹¹ U. S. Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 200. Comments covering the opium clause in the treaty are rather significantly omitted in the dispatch of the Commission as published.

subjects in Wyoming, Tacoma and other places. Under pressure from the Pacific States, in the subsequent Presidential campaign and while this treaty was being considered by the Chinese Government, the so-called Scott Act was passed in Congress prohibiting altogether the admission of Chinese laborers, a rude violation of the treaty conditions which President Cleveland signed, however, upon the curious plea that China had delayed too long in ratifying the compact. A similar treaty was, however, more decently negotiated and ratified in 1894 upon substantially the old terms. Again a new bill prohibiting immigration was with difficulty defeated in the Senate when, as a substitute, the Platt Amendment, continuing in force, stringent provisions against possible fraud, provided for the situation until a new treaty should be negotiated ten years later. There were indications at this time that despite impulsive speeches in Congress and in the Far West, sober public opinion in America favored adherence to treaty obligations, while fear of the so-called "Yellow Peril" was gradually dying away as the influx of Chinese continually decreased.¹²

¹² Mrs. Coolidge's *Chinese Immigration*, N. Y., 1909, fairly summarizes all the legislation upon this matter and tells the ignoble story with sufficient fullness so far as California is concerned. See also *Chinese and Japanese Immigration*, in *Am. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science*, for September, 1909. Mr. S. W. Nickerson in the *N. Am. Rev.*, for Dec., 1908, gives the following summary of administrative tergiversation in one particular: "In the summer of 1882, Attorney-General Brewster decided (17 Op. Atty. Gen., 416), that Chinese laborers in transit to or from China and some other country could not lawfully be transported across the United States, and thought his opinion not obnoxious to the imputation of harshness or inhospitality toward a friendly power. About six months later, this same official retracted his first opinion and came (17 Op. A. G., 483) to a contrary decision. In the spring of 1886, Attorney-General Garland decided (Op. A. G., 388) that the first opinion was

We come now to the great climax in the affairs of Eastern Asia which arrived with the close of the century. Into the underlying causes of the Boxer revolt I cannot here enter. The subject takes us altogether away from interests which are exclusively American into the whirlpool of international politics. Of the three basic factors involved in this uprising, Christianity, commerce and politics, the last only was really important. After the revelation of China's military weakness in the war against Japan, Europeans in Asia found themselves yielding to the same temptation to which they had been exposed at the conclusion of the Arrow War. But now the scale of operations and interests was vastly increased. In 1897 began the series of seizures of Chinese territory by Europeans followed by that assignment of spheres of influence which divided up practically the whole area of China like a derelict body. It seemed for a year or two that the Christian world headed by Russia and Germany was ready to partition the helpless empire, and in the play of rival ambitions all remembrance was lost of the old idea of co-operation in dealing with China. Then occurred the dramatic uprising in which the Chinese people themselves, driven to desperation, surprised the Western world by their loyalty to a national idea, blindly and recklessly exhibited but significant in its intensity. The dispatch of a division of the American army to China has been called by a high authority¹³ "One of the correct. In the summer of 1889, Attorney-General Miller decided (19 Op. A. G., 369) that the second opinion was correct. Here we have four conflicting opinions in the short space of seven years, each temporarily controlling the attitude of the United States Government as to the right of an humble Chinese person to cross our territory while in transit from his native land. . . . Not until 1894 was the matter put at rest by Attorney-General Olney (20 Op. A. G., 693)."

¹³ General J. W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, p. 421.

most extreme acts of executive authority in the history of the United States." But it was not a case of war against China.¹⁴ The forces were sent to Peking to protect American citizens and their interests when the authority of the Chinese Government had been superseded by a mob. No Chinese in authority, so far as I am aware, have yet blamed the United States for this technical violation of international comity. Their attitude was for the most part actually favorable to the presence of those foreign troops who remained at Peking long enough after the siege of the legations to prevent anarchy and the destruction of all private property. The Americans by their refusal to enter upon any of the punitive expeditions, by the sober conduct of their soldiers and by the removal of the troops at the earliest practical moment, proved to the Chinese that their expedition was in the nature of an action by constabulary, not in any sense an armed invasion.

It was Secretary Hay of the United States who first called the attention of the powers (July 3, 1900,) to the purpose of the United States to rescue Americans and then "Seek a solution which might bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve its territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed by treaty and international law and safeguard to the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

This policy, as wise as it was magnanimous, substantiated the promise of Admiral Kempff's refusal to concur in the action of his colleagues of the Allied fleets in attacking the Taku Forts on June 17, considering their ultimatum unjustifiable in public law and suicidal in policy.¹⁵ With the Boxer crisis it became for the first

¹⁴ "Our declared aims involved no war against the Chinese nation," Pres. McKinley's Annual Message, December, 1900.

¹⁵ He was right. Their unwise attack seems to have been

time evident to all that the politics of Asia are inextricably bound up in those of Europe and the Western hemisphere. Mr. Hay's programme was criticized by some of his countrymen as too ambitious and too political to conform to our national traditions. He was accused of committing us to a policy "impossible of attainment by our own independent action, and if pursued in common with other powers fraught with the gravest possibilities of those international entanglements with European nations, which it is our historic policy to keep out of."¹⁶ His action was, however, only the logical development of an interchange of diplomatic notes during the previous September whereby he secured the formal agreement of the great powers to the open-door policy in their trade with China. So far from involving the United States in international entanglements it proposed the only safe course by which a world conflict over distracted China was avoided. For herself, indeed, America had everything to gain and nothing to lose by an undivided China, but China was rescued none the less at this juncture by a statesman whose genius and imagination impelled a return to the Burlingame policy regarding the empire. Before the greater menace, when foreign domination, aggression and spoliation threatened her political existence, the lesser grievance arising from the molestation of her subjects in the United States faded away from China's estimate of America.¹⁷

An admirable summary of American achievement in the final outrage that impelled the Court to consent to the beleaguering of the legations.

¹⁶ "China and Russia," by Josiah Quincy, in *North American Review*, Vol. 171, Oct., 1900.

¹⁷ There is plenty of literature upon the Boxer uprising, but none of it is of lasting value to the historical student in forming conclusions as to its causes. Dr. A. H. Smith's "China in Convulsion," 2 vols., N. Y., 1901, remains the best general account and discussion.

the International Conference in Peking in 1900-1901 appears in Mr. Rockhill's report to his government.

"Throughout the negotiations [he says] our object was to use the influence of our Government in the interest of justice and moderation. . . .

"The twelve demands made by the powers on China may be classified under four principal heads: (1) Adequate punishment for the authors of and those guilty of actual participation in the anti-foreign massacres and riots; (2) The adoption of measures necessary to prevent their recurrence; (3) The indemnification for losses sustained by states and foreigners through these riots, and (4) The improvement of our relations, both official and commercial, with the Chinese Government and with China generally.

"As regards the punishment of the responsible authors and actual perpetrators of the anti-foreign outrages, the Government of the United States, while insisting that all such should be held to the utmost accountability, declined to determine in every case the nature of the punishment to be inflicted, and maintained that the Chinese Government itself should in all cases carry them out.

"As soon as the chief culprits had been punished . . . the United States threw the weight of its influence on the side of moderation and the prevention of further bloodshed. To this it was mainly due that the long lists of proscription, which had been prepared by the representatives of the powers, of Chinese in the provinces charged with participation in the massacres or riots, were repeatedly revised before presentation to the Chinese Government. . . .

"While seeking with the other powers the best means to prevent the recurrence of such troubles and to guard the future American residents in Peking from such dangers as they had passed through, the United States did

not lend its support to any plan which contemplated either the prolonged occupation by foreign troops of any portions or points in China or the erection of an international fort in the city of Peking from which to carry on friendly relations with the Chinese Government. Our policy has always been in favor of a strong, independent and responsible Chinese Government, which can and will be held accountable for the maintenance of order and the protection of our citizens and their rights under the treaties. Throughout the negotiations we strictly adhered to this just principle, with results which have proved beneficial to all.

“As regards the third point of the negotiations, the equitable indemnification of the various states for the losses and expenses incurred by them in China. . . . and also the securing of indemnities to societies, companies and individuals for their private losses through the anti-foreign riots, the Government of the United States advocated that the sum total of these indemnities should not exceed a reasonable amount, well within the power of China to pay. After careful inquiry you reached the conclusion that with her present resources and liabilities, China could not pay as indemnities to the powers more than two hundred millions of dollars. The representative of the United States was instructed accordingly, and he was further told that in the opinion of our Government the amount should be asked of China by the powers jointly, without detail or explanation, and afterwards divided among them, according to their losses and disbursements.

“Though it became necessary, after protracted discussion in the conference, to accept the proposition of the other powers to demand of China the sum total of their losses and disbursements, reaching the enormous sum of \$333,000,000, our insistence in pressing for a

much lower sum, and the weight of the arguments adduced in favor of such a policy, resulted in closing the indemnities to be paid in bonds issued at par and bearing a low rate of interest (four per cent. was finally agreed upon) and running for forty years, resulted in saving a vast sum to China, hastened the evacuation of the country by expeditionary forces and the restoration of order and of normal relations with the Chinese Government.

“In connection with the question of the indemnity, I should particularly mention that it having been proved necessary to the powers in their search for revenues applicable to the service of the indemnity debt that the existing nominal five per cent. ad valorem customs tariff on foreign imports should be made an effective five per cent. ad valorem, the United States, mindful of the furtherance of lawful commerce in China in the interests of the world, declined to consent to the above increase of the customs tariff on imports unless (1) all the Treaty Powers and China agreed to co-operate in the long-desired improvement of the water approaches to Shanghai and Tientsin, and (2) that specific duties should be substituted to the present ad valorem ones in the tariff on foreign imports. Both these conditions were ultimately agreed upon.

“Such, in brief, has been the part played by the United States in the conference of Peking. While we maintained complete independence, we were able to act harmoniously in the conference of powers, the existence of which was so essential to a prompt and peaceful settlement of the situation, we retained the friendship of all the negotiating powers, exerted a salutary influence in the cause of moderation, humanity and justice, secured adequate reparation for wrongs done our citizens, guaranties for their future protection, and labored successfully in the interests of the whole world in the cause of

equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." ¹⁸

It is evident that in spite of just causes of resentment against the people of the United States, the Chinese realize and appreciate the value of a friendship which has been honorably proffered and renewed. On the whole, as we have seen, though we have sometimes blundered, our attitude toward China has been more friendly in act than that of any other nation. The last and perhaps most amazing instance of official stupidity on the part of the United States, was the flagrant discourtesy shown to official representatives of China at the time of the St. Louis Exposition. The result of this has shown at once the increasing sensitiveness and more general knowledge among the Chinese people of affairs outside of their own country. In spite of denials, it is perfectly evident now that the boycott against American goods in China during the year 1905 was the direct result of this unwarrantable insult. The merchant guilds chiefly in Shanghai and Canton instituted a movement to refuse the use or purchase of any American goods, ordered the withdrawal of children from schools established by Americans and removed the Chinese servants from American families. The movement, which at first was very generally supported, soon met several antagonistic influences under which the merchants gradually withdrew their support, while a good many students began to extend it so as to cover a general anti-foreign agitation. In this way, it became possible to enlist the co-operation of European representatives against it, while on their part the more moderate Chinese feared that the movement might become the excuse for a general revolutionary uprising. But on the whole this action of loyal and democratic

¹⁸ Report of W. W. Rockhill, late Commissioner to China. Senate Doc. No. 67, 57th Congr., 1st Sess., 1901.

China may be conceded to have carried its point. I note only two among several evidences of this conclusion. President Roosevelt responded promptly to this kind of pressure in agreeing to certain modifications in the administration of the law. The American Asiatic Association, representing the most important mercantile interests concerned in the Far East, offered to the President the following illuminating statement of their view of our relations with China: "It must be held to be unfortunate that these laws are at variance with the treaty stipulations . . . which are in force between the two countries. We are not here to question the competency of Congress to modify the provisions of any treaty with a foreign power, but we do question the expediency of the Government of the United States occupying an attitude in opposition to the principle which it has long maintained, that a nation cannot plead domestic legislation as a bar to the observance of its international obligations. In the judgment of this delegation and the association which it represents, the treatment accorded by the officers of this Government to the exempt classes of Chinese visiting our country is more oppressive than either the letter or the spirit of the law requires." The boycott, then, was a counterstroke on the part of China against America, the value of which was clearly appreciated by the practical Yankee. It came very properly at a time when his hopes had been raised as to the increase of a commerce which has not yet nearly reached the figure of his expectations. It has, to use a useful every-day expression, "taught him some sense," and undoubtedly inspired in his breast a new and higher appreciation of Chinese character. But while it has served the purpose in this country of "awakening both public"¹⁹

¹⁹ Editorial in *Journal of the American Asiatic Association*, July, 1905, p. 162. See also T. W. Chang's article in the *Review of Reviews*, Vol. 33, p. 424.

and official sentiment to the magnitude of our interests in the Chinese Empire and to the folly of trifling with them," it has developed a feeling of union in the hearts of the Chinese people and shown the Imperial Government that where the honor of the country was concerned it might depend upon the support of the nation. Most happily America has since this incident justified her reputation and given fresh indication of her intention for the future by returning the yet unpaid portion of about sixteen millions of indemnity money due her. It is adequate proof that she proposes to abide by her own high traditions of generosity toward China, a policy which, we must believe, is to be continued under a President who, to noble principles, adds a broad and intimate knowledge of Far Eastern problems.

"I am not one of those," Mr. Taft declares in his now famous speech of October, 1907, in Shanghai, "who view with alarm the effect of the growth of China with her teeming millions into a great industrial empire. I believe that this instead of injuring foreign trade with China would greatly increase it, and while it might change its character in some respects, it would not diminish its profit. A trade which depends for its profit on the backwardness of a people in developing their own resources and upon their inability to value at the proper relative prices that which they have to sell and that which they have to buy is not one which can be counted upon as stable or permanent."

This is palpably a call to return to the economic position of the United States in relation to the Chinese trade a century ago, when American ships created a thriving traffic there despite the monopolies long maintained by Europeans, winning such successes as came to them without fear or favor. The merchant of to-morrow can conduct his operations with no apprehensions as to the safety of his person or diminution of his profits through

a system of enforced bribery; the scale of transactions will in future be enormously enlarged; a great empire will be encouraged and assisted to develop her own abundant resources; but the "open door" of the twentieth century is in all essential respects the same objective that was desired by our countrymen who first sailed around the Cape to compete in a world market without expectation of support from naval forces behind them.

In the hundred years since that intercourse began we have refused to yield to the temptation presented by military weakness unexpectedly exposed. We have steadily refrained from coercing a helpless people ourselves, though we have not denied to others their right to defend their commercial and political interests by stern measures, nor have we shown any quixotic reluctance to reap from these measures the benefits that accrued to all. We have accepted no cessions of territory, even at the treaty ports. We have never menaced the territorial integrity of China and have been among the foremost in upholding her sovereign right to her own soil. However fatuous and unfair our treatment of Chinese in America, it cannot be denied that we have endeavored to treat the Chinese Empire as honorably as other countries and have consistently desired to include men of every race and color in the great family of nations so soon as they could prove their birthright by the plain tests of morality and culture. And, finally, we have declined at all times to force upon an unwilling people our scientific and economic methods of industry or transportation, or to take possession of their affairs in the proud and selfish conviction that we could manage them better than they could themselves. In policy, if not always in performance, America in her relations with China has tried fairly to maintain the high ideals of a Christian nation.

IV

THE NEED OF A DISTINCTIVE AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA

THE development of China's political and commercial relations with other nations to their present status has been a gradual evolution, involving a constant modification of conditions and consequent alteration of the broader motives which have influenced its course. The question has two major viewpoints—the point of view of China, and that of nations which are concerned with her fate; but both are focused upon the same issues, include the same propositions, and must conform to the onward march of civilization.

The early relations of Western nations with China are remarkable for uniformity of theses. They had the general purposes of extending to this Empire the Christian religion, of opening it to foreign trade, and of bringing it within the modern comity of nations. It was felt that these were objects wherein all Christian nations are in accord, and whose accomplishment would benefit China as well as the world. That their prosecution was from time to time accompanied by international jealousies and bickerings merely intimates the frailty of human nature. They were not due to any radical divergence of national policy. In the course of time this condition changed. Western statesmanship began to perceive the strength of the new forces which Oriental participation was injecting into world politics. Western relations with China became less abstract. The evolution and rise of Japan contributed a striking object lesson. Suddenly, in a time

measuring hardly more than a decade, the issue of the fate of China has developed from an academic to a practical question in the field of international affairs, until to-day there is none of the so-called major powers which does not accord it a place of primary importance. It is not exaggerating to say that issues focused upon the fate of China constitute the greatest international problem with which the world now has to deal.

The reaction of this condition upon the relations of foreign powers to China has brought into play new forces, created new ambitions and designs, fomented international rivalries hitherto unforeseen and unsuspected, and by consequence we find fresh and some times semi-hostile theses formulating 'neath the old common one. So to-day, instead of one common thesis in the attitude of foreign nations toward China, there are several being actively promoted. As frequently happens in international affairs, the counter currents of these different theses are partly cloaked by a general policy to which all important nations interested in the Far Eastern Question outwardly subscribe. This is embodied in what are termed the "open door" and "integrity of China" doctrines, and which by reiteration have become too familiar to require explanation here. Of these two doctrines, the more essential is that designed to secure and preserve the territorial integrity and political autonomy of China; for it is apparent that if China becomes self-reliant in an international sense, the "open door" policy in her trade relations with other nations will follow logically.

It is in certain interpretations now given the "integrity of China" doctrine that one fundamental divergence of the theses of foreign powers can be discerned. Some construe this doctrine merely to mean preservation of the *status quo*; that is, China's territorial domain should remain nominally under her sovereignty, but that her ad-

ministrative processes continue to be subjected to external suggestion and advice amounting, when stripped of its veil of political fiction, to actual coercion. This thesis bases its ethical justification upon the theory that China is now incapable of conducting her affairs and instituting governmental reforms without assistance; therefore, it is paternal in conception. If the *bona fides* of this thesis is conceded, it is evident that the proof of this will be demonstrated by the paradox of it being rendered futile by its success; for an infant will grow to years of discretion (unless arbitrarily restrained in swaddling clothes) when tutelage will not be needed nor tolerated. Obviously it is preposterous to assume that the oldest government in the world is internally incapable of sustaining itself. So a paternal attitude toward China must be confined to her effort to reform her government, and by applying this thesis to certain fundamental elements of the reform movement in China we can secure a test of its *bona fides* in this instance.

The reform movement in China is in a nascent stage; but the popular sentiments and impulses which give it initial vitality take root in propositions palpably definite and practical. Their sentimental slogan is "China for the Chinese." This idea runs through all phases of the reform movement, and provides the basic doctrine for all political groups, although variously expressed. Put more specifically, it is expressed in the so-called "right of recovery" policy. This policy has numerous forms, but all of them turn upon the following propositions:

1. The abolition of extra territoriality.
2. Restoration of the fiscal autonomy of the Empire.
3. Abolition of residential districts, or "concessions," within the Empire which are under the administration of foreigners and outside the full jurisdiction of China.

4. Recovery by Chinese of ownership and management of concessions to foreign governments, and corporations which serve to mask governments, such as railways and leased territory.

In respect to these propositions, we are now concerned less with the reasons for their establishment and existence than with their relation to the possible rehabilitation of China. There is no doubt that they are inconsistent with real national autonomy and with wholesome national pride, and cannot be regarded by Chinese except as anomalous and only temporarily tolerable. No really autonomous nation will submit to these conditions; therefore, genuine reform in China, having as an object and result a reconstruction of the Empire and its establishment on equal plane with other nations, logically means their ultimate abolition, and nations which are sincere in wishing China to reform logically must desire the abolition of extra territoriality and quasi-sovereign foreign concessions. It appears, then, that the real attitude of foreign nations toward China may be deduced from their attitude toward these phases of the reform movement, which should demonstrate whether they are at heart disposed to aid or obstruct reform. It is clear that an interpretation of the "integrity of China" doctrine which balks at accepting its logical outcome is at best a makeshift, and is really opposed to the true spirit of the doctrine.

Among foreign policies which have been applied in China with enough power to make them felt in shaping the broader course of events, that of the United States of America alone has taken a course which now enables it sincerely to support the "integrity of China" doctrine without being suspected of inconsistency. It is true that our first treaties with Oriental nations, notably China and

Japan, were made the model from which extra territoriality was built, and provided the foundation upon which the present relations of those nations with the world were laid. But in framing those treaties our Government, while recognizing the need to meet a practical condition then existing, conceded the principle that it was to be regarded as temporary. For many years after Japan first proposed to abolish extra territoriality in her territories, the United States was the only great nation which assented to her wish, and supported her petition. This demonstrated that the American conception of the paternal relation of Western to Oriental nations is not incompatible with the development by them of a genuine autonomy, as in the case of Japan; which demonstrates the *bona fides* of our nation in this matter.

Our policy in China has been equally consistent. It is only within the last decade, since Japan's easy victory over her revealed the military weakness of China, and which was followed by a series of aggressions upon her territory by foreign powers, that her situation has become acutely important to America. From the time when John Hay became Secretary of State our nation has played an important though unobtrusive part in China's affairs. The Washington Government had early adopted the view that preservation of China's territorial integrity and political autonomy harmonizes with broader interests of the United States, and it consistently exerted its influence in supporting its thesis. Several times in the last decade America has initiated international action in China's favor; indeed, it reasonably may be claimed that every important proposal concerning the international status of China that was at once practical and sincere, which during this period the powers have been induced to accede to, was promoted by the United States. The more important of these moves are:

1. The Hay Agreement, acceded to by the powers in 1899, by which the principle of China's political integrity and the "open door" was formulated into an international covenant.
2. The refusal of the United States to assent to the imposition, in 1901, of an oppressive indemnity upon China, which would have made her the fiscal vassal of foreign nations for an indefinite period.
3. Action of the United States, in 1904, in inducing the belligerent powers, Russia and Japan, to confine hostilities to a defined region, in order to limit the devastating results of war upon the Chinese inhabitants, and to prevent the further embroilment of China.
4. The action of President Roosevelt in using his influence to terminate the war between Japan and Russia, and to secure definite assent of those nations, in their treaty of peace, to the restoration of Manchuria to China and to the doctrines of the "open door" and "territorial integrity."

It is chiefly due to the attitude of the United States that no nation in any treaty or agreement it has since made regarding Eastern affairs has, whatever its designs may be, felt able to omit a reaffirmation of the Hay Doctrine, and so it has come about that all important nations which are interested in the Eastern Question are on record in one or several conventions as favoring the maintenance of China's integrity and the "open door." It may be argued that if all interested nations are agreed in the premises of the Eastern Question, and have expressed their policies in formal notes and specific conventions with each other and China, a satisfactory course is assured. Unfortunately, however, the practical application of certain policies in Asia is now, as ever, running

directly contrary to fundamental principles of the Hay Agreement. Instead of being relieved of apprehension of external aggression, and feeling free peacefully to reform her internal administration in compliance with modern requirements, China is still confronted with a situation which threatens her national existence; and the "open door" is being evaded and undermined. Unless this tendency is again checked the forces of disintegration may get the upper hand, and it may be impossible to prevent disruption of the Empire. This condition, which is recognized by most students of the course of events in the East, is causing the chancelleries of the world to re-study the question and to re-examine their policies in order to test their theses in the light of developments. It is conceded that years are required for China to become able herself to repulse foreign aggressions; hence it follows that in this interim her equilibrium only can be sustained, if it is threatened by any powerful nation or nations, by inducing the counter-balancing pressure of other nations to preserve her. In such a situation, each passing year more clearly demonstrates a hypothesis that only the direct intervention of the United States of America can accomplish this.

That there are fundamental differences between a distinctive American policy in China and the conventional attitude of other nations becomes more obvious as time passes. This divergence involves much the same propositions and incompatibility as the American policy in the Philippines and the British policy in India, and comprises both ethical and political considerations. All the greater powers profess to desire the rejuvenation of China into a nation capable of sustaining its own position; but some of them are either actually hostile to reform there, or fear some of its tendencies and inevitable results. The so-called "interests" of most foreign

nations in China have been established and now to some extent rest upon conditions which real autonomy will eliminate. The courses in recent years of several powers conclusively intimate that the kind of reform they favor for China is just enough progress to provide opportunity for foreign enterprises, while keeping China subordinated to pressure in their favor by foreign diplomacy. To some extent the situation of foreigners and foreign interests in China now rests upon the power and disposition of foreign nations to apply pressure upon China amounting, if need be, to coercion; and which frequently is expressed by a condescending and overbearing attitude in diplomatic relations. Many foreign interests in China are beneficiaries from the extraordinary conditions which now obtain, and are opposed to change; and these are tacitly arrayed against genuine reform, although perhaps vociferous in complaining about inconveniences caused by archaic administrative methods.

The thesis of the American policy in China runs contrary to the opinions of many foreign residents there, and to the prosecuted policies of most governments, as distinguished from their diplomatic pronouncements; and consequently it encounters strong opposition from quarters whence it might be presumed to receive moral and practical support. Speaking at Shanghai in October, 1907, Mr. William H. Taft elucidated the thesis of the American policy as follows:

“The United States and others who *sincerely* favor the open door policy will, if they are wise, not only welcome, but will encourage this great Chinese Empire to take long steps in administrative and governmental reform, in the development of her natural resources and the improvement and welfare of her people. In this way she will add strength to her position as a self-respecting na-

tion; may resist all foreign aggression seeking undue, exclusive or proprietary privileges in her territory, and *without foreign aid* enforce an open door policy of equal opportunity to all."

This aptly illustrates the difference between the American and what may be called the European (including Japan) theses. Both are paternal in the sense that they recognize that China needs help in getting on her feet; but the European thesis evades the logic of its major premise. America wants to help China become ACTUALLY self-reliant; some other nations seem to be determined that she shall not, but will remain in their leading strings indefinitely until, perchance, her alleged backwardness can be made an excuse for assuming that her case is hopeless, and that she must remain a permanent international ward, or be segregated into portions, as parts of her territory now are, under foreign quasi-sovereignty. It is argued that real autonomy for China will operate to the disadvantage of foreign interests, thereby impairing the security of their position; and it may be conceded that this will be true in a measure, for there is no reform without its vicarious sacrifice; but there would be ample compensation in the stimulus such a change would give the development of China's industry and trade, in which all nations will share.

In aiding China to acquire modern administrative efficiency disinterestedness, patience and firmness should be employed. Real disinterestedness might mean indifference; but sufficient interest in China's stability and prosperity to induce activity in propelling her in the right direction, without being wholly selfish, is the measure needed. It may be expected that China will in years to come often try the patience even of disinterested friends almost to the limit of endurance, by procrastinating methods which

have heretofore been inseparable from her administrative processes; but the attempt to help her should not be abandoned on this account. There is a genuine community of interests with China and the United States. Political and social forces now operating in the East are steadily inclining China toward closer contact with America, and in my opinion it requires only circumspect diplomatic activity for our nation to become the most influential foreign power with the empire. It is difficult to conceive how the American people can be indifferent to the situation of this nation of 430,000,000 souls, or unaffected by its fate. Invention is every day bringing us closer to Asia, and we cannot escape contact with Orientals or avoid feeling the effects of their evolution whether we wish or not. Who can reflect on recent developments of air and water navigation and fail to realize that probably another twenty years will place China as much at our doors as was Cuba in 1898? The interest of the United States in the balance of power in the Pacific Ocean is fundamental, and the policy of our Government should be shaped in recognition of the fact that China is the true axis of political stability in the Far East.

It therefore will be necessary for the United States to decide whether in the crisis which is approaching it will actively move to compel a satisfactory solution, or will permit American interests to continue to drift on the current of events; whether it will formulate its own policy or have one thrust upon it; whether it will lead or follow. That the United States **MUST** have an Asiatic policy cannot be doubted. American statesmen and people may shrink from participation in the Eastern Question, but it inevitably will intrude upon them; and it is bound up in the fate of China. This great Empire will be the storm center of the forthcoming diplomatic struggle and the

scene of any international conflicts which failure of peaceful adjustment will provoke. As the Monroe Doctrine invokes the United States to interfere should stronger nations aggress upon Central and South American states, so may a strong Pacific Ocean policy invoke its aid to preserve China.

That the proposition contains this possibility may be granted; and admitting this, we should not hesitate to admit the logic of the conclusion. And this compels us to face the obvious fact that a distinctive American policy concerning China never will attain full vitality until our nation is prepared to accept the responsibility for certain possible results; in other words, our Eastern policy will not be respected until the world is convinced that failure to consider and meet our reasonable wishes carries a probability of war. I deprecate war; but I wish to confine my discussion to practical conditions, and we cannot ignore the fact that a nation which will not, upon due provocation, fight to protect its interests will quickly feel the force of foreign aggression. What better illustration of this than that afforded by the Empire whose precarious situation is the subject of this conference?

The time is ripe for an American statesman to extend and make more comprehensive the principles enunciated by Mr. Taft at Shanghai. The thesis of a distinctive American policy toward China was admirably stated by the experienced administrator who now is President of the United States; but to be effective in accomplishing its objects it must be expanded into something more definite and conclusive. On a day not far distant, I hope that an American statesman will define our attitude toward China in words something like these:

“The United States of America considers the territorial integrity of China and her political autonomy

within the entire limits of the Empire as now constituted to be important to its (the United States) interests and to the preservation of the existing *status quo* in the Pacific Ocean, and would regard any encroachment or aggression upon either, by any nation whatsoever, as inimical to the interests of this nation."

Such an utterance probably would startle the diplomatic world, and perhaps cause a temporary international flurry; but as soon as the momentary excitement subsided, and its real import was appreciated, it hardly could fail to clarify the Eastern situation, and be a makeweight for peace in that locality; just as the Monroe Doctrine undoubtedly has tended to safeguard South and Central American states from being embroiled in the scope of ambitions of European nations.

I am convinced that the time has come for America's policy in China to break away from the leading strings of the European thesis in practice as well as in theory. I cannot see what our nation has to gain by lending support, even passively, to a thesis which tends to secure our competing nations in their present advantages and projects by arraying against American enterprise in China the inertia of obsolete conditions. The principles which always have imbued the dealings of our nation with Oriental states, and which were re-stated by Mr. Taft at Shanghai, carry greater promise for all legitimate interests in China; and it may be hoped that this theorem will be given practical effect by the prosecution of a distinctive American policy there.

V.

THE HISTORY AND ECONOMICS OF THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA

DURING the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the traders of the Western nations went to China for tea and silk. There was a moderate demand for cotton cloth—nankeens—which was superior in color and texture to the more expensive product of Western looms, and for those articles, such as porcelain, lacquered ware and ivory carvings, which were desired for their quaintness; but tea and silk were always, even down to the middle of the nineteenth century, the main staples of China's export trade. Comparing the trade of 1906 with that of 1837, it will be found that tea, which to-day furnishes 11 per cent. of the value of all exports, in 1837 furnished 61 per cent.; silk, to-day 30 per cent., is unaltered in its relative proportion from the 33 per cent. of 1837; but, outside tea and silk and its products, the unlimited range of other productions of the Celestial Empire has grown from a modest 6 per cent. to nearly three-fifths—59 per cent.—of the entire export trade.

The American colonies had not reached the dignity of being clothed in home-spun silk; and the colonial connection with the China trade was entirely through the honorable East India Company, coming to an abrupt end in Boston harbor, and elsewhere from New Hampshire to South Carolina, in December, 1773. Colonists, as in Australia to-day, are always great tea drinkers, but for ten long years the American people denied themselves. Then, on February 22, 1784, the year following the peace

which first made it possible for an American ship under the American flag to cross the ocean in safety, the good ship *Empress of China* left New York for Canton to bring back a cargo of tea, for the cup which cheers, but not inebriates. Various factors tended to cause a great development of this trade. First the capacity of the merchants of Salem, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, whose attention had not then been turned to the railway development of their own country. Then the skill and boldness of the American sailor; in 1788 the ship *Alliance* sailed to Canton with no charts, but only a map of the then known world on Mercator's projection, and never dropped anchor from the time she left Philadelphia. But above all other causes were the Napoleonic wars, which gave neutrals a golden opening, in China as along the coasts of Europe. During the first decade of the nineteenth century, Great Britain, mistress of the seas, took about three-fifths of China's exports, the Americans, the great neutrals, a third, and the other nations "also ran." American trade continued to flourish, until in 1852 no less than 47 per cent. of the foreign tonnage entering the port of Shanghai was under the American flag. Then England struck away the crutches from her ship-owners by abolishing her navigation laws, and before 1860 had begun to recover her old-time supremacy.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the balance of trade was always "in favor" of China, a situation so dearly loved of economists of the old school. The foreign trader had to find the means of buying his tea and silk, of providing for heavy disbursements for his foreign establishment and his ships, and of meeting the taxes and other and much heavier charges laid by the officials on his ships and goods; to illustrate the last it is enough to say that the tonnage charges alone on an East India Company's ship were not less than

\$8,000, and even on the smaller American ships, averaging about 400 tons, never fell below \$4,000. To provide this export fund, the import of goods never sufficed; during the eighteenth century it never amounted to one-fifth of the sum required; there were then no securities, by the transfer of which the international balance could be adjusted; and during the whole of that century Europe was drained of its silver, and poured into China a mass which, for the period to 1830, cannot be estimated at less than \$500,000,000. Except a small quantity of English woollens (and on them the East India Company declared the loss to have been £72,500 sterling a year), China wanted no foreign products, except two alone; opium was one, and the other was cotton, of which China is the second greatest producer in the world. The drain continued down into the nineteenth century, until 1830. From 1818 was seen the even more wasteful process of importing in American ships the silver which was at once shipped away in English ships; from 1818 to 1830 in round figures the known import of silver in American ships was \$60,000,000, and the known export in English ships was \$40,000,000. This indicated the turning of the tide.

Up to 1830 the American trade with China was conducted on the basis of a triangular operation. American products were shipped to Europe; with the proceeds in Spanish dollars—the Chinese would take no other—the ship sailed, practically in ballast, either direct from Europe or from an American port to Canton, and there loaded tea for the United States. Up to 1815 a full four-fifths of the export fund for American ships was provided by Spanish dollars in this way; and in the fifteen years from 1816 to 1830 a full two-thirds; but in 1830 an abrupt change was made. The American trade at Canton was thereafter financed by bills of ex-

change on London, for which the money was readily found at Canton through the expansion of the opium trade.

Opium was produced in China long before it was imported, both the home and foreign product being used for medicinal purposes. Tobacco was introduced by the Spanish from America about 1620, and its use for smoking was prohibited by Imperial edict; but to-day it is smoked by every man and woman in China. Through the Dutch the practice of mixing opium with the tobacco was introduced from Java about 1650; and in 1729 its use too was prohibited by Imperial edict. At that time the import of foreign opium was less than 200 chests a year. The home production and the foreign import increased slowly through that century, and the evils of smoking increased in proportion; until in 1800 an Imperial edict prohibited both the importation and the production. Until 1800 opium was in the Chinese custom house a commodity like another, being classed in the tariff with fragrant gums, like olibanum, asafoetida, etc. The edict was absolutely disregarded by the officials whose duty it was to enforce it; and the only visible changes were that opium was thenceforth smoked by itself, and no longer mixed with tobacco, and that it no longer came to the city of Canton, but remained at Whampoa and Macao, both equally under Chinese fiscal and territorial control. Up to 1821 the value of the cotton imported was never less than double that of the opium, and both together contributed less than a third of the import of goods, and much less than a fifth of the total export fund. In 1821 a reforming viceroy ordered the opium away from Whampoa and Macao, and showed that he meant his order to be obeyed; and from this time opium showed an importance in balancing China's foreign trade which it never had had before. In 1823

the value of opium for the first time overpassed that of cotton, in 1829 it was double, and in 1837 two and a half times as great. Up to 1800 the import had in only one year exceeded 2,000 chests, and, in the twenty-one years following, the average was under 4,300 chests. Then came the period of successively greater restrictions and greater corruption of the officials, the one providing the opportunity for the other, and the trade rapidly expanded, until in the year 1830 the import reached 16,257 chests. This was the year in which the American trade finally abandoned the practice of importing dollars and substituted bills on London, which of course were bought at Canton with the proceeds of the sale of opium.

The foreign opium came from three sources. Let us take as typical the year 1829 in which the total import was 13,868 chests. Of this quantity, 4,903 chests were Bengal opium proceeding from the East India Company's monopoly, from which ten years later it derived an annual revenue of upwards of £1,500,000 sterling. Then 7,709 chests were Malwa opium produced in the states of the independent princes of Rajputana; of these, 2,820 chests were shipped through the English port of Bombay, contributing to the Company's revenue a transit duty of 125 rupees a chest, making a total of £35,250; and 3,889 chests passed through the Portuguese port of Damân, reaching it by way of the independent port of Karachi, this latter port becoming English only on the annexation of Sind in 1843; the remaining 1,000 chests is the approximate estimate of the quantity introduced by the Portuguese through Macao, presumably from Damân. Then 1,256 chests were Turkey opium imported on American account in American ships from Smyrna or London.

The trade had finally found its means of balancing itself with opium, which the Chinese would take when

they would not take other commodities. In 1837 it provided 53 per cent., and cotton 22 per cent. of all imports, English manufactures and tropical spices supplying the remaining 25 per cent.; the movement of treasure had turned the other way, and in that year the shipment from Canton of something over \$3,000,000 was required to balance the trade, and in addition the agents of the East India Company bought bills to the amount of \$4,186,663. For two centuries the problem had been to find the means of buying export cargoes without continuing the drain of the precious metal (silver only; gold is a commodity in China) from the Western treasuries; since then for seventy years the problem has been to find Chinese produce with which to pay for the imports, and, in order that the problem may be studied, I propose to analyze somewhat the trade of the year 1906. The year 1907, the latest for which the figures are now in my hands, has been a period of depressed trade and liquidation of stocks.

In 1837 opium provided 53 per cent. of all imports, and in 1906 under 8 per cent. The quantity had increased absolutely from 28,307 to 47,732 chests (having in the interim risen as high as 76,811 chests), but the proportion to the whole trade was much less. The permanent American connection with the trade ceased in 1855, three years before it was legalized in 1858; and, except for one English house, the trade is now in the hands of Bombay Jews and Parsees.

In 1837 cotton fabrics were exported from China, and the importation of machine-spun and machine-woven cottons had only just begun. In 1837 the value of the export was \$500,000; in 1906 the value of the import of cotton manufacturers was 153,000,000 taels (\$122,500,000), which was 37 per cent. of the value of all imports. In 1906 there was, however, still an export of

Chinese hand-woven cloth to the value of 2,300,000 taels (\$1,850,000) called for by the colonies of Chinese settled in the Malay Archipelago. Of cotton products imported, yarn and twist constituted 42 per cent., the quantity being close on 340,000,000 pounds; of this 72 per cent. came from the mills of British India, 26 per cent. from Japanese mills, and 1½ per cent. from English. Plain fabrics came next, with an import of 20,250,000 pieces, averaging about 40 yards; of these 53 per cent. came from English mills, 42 per cent. from American, and 3 per cent. from Japanese. Fancy cottons, chiefly imitations of more expensive woollen fabrics, were valued at 27,500,000 taels (\$22,000,000), chiefly from England, but the cotton flannel from America.

Woollen fabrics were valued at 4,400,000 taels (\$3,500,000), which was less than half the value of the import in 1837. The Chinese who can afford woollens prefer silk, and the wearers of wadded cotton garments cannot afford woollens.

Of metals China imported a small quantity of English tin in 1837; in 1906 the tin imported came from Banka, off Sumatra, and was valued at 2,200,000 taels (\$1,800,000). The consumption of iron is said to be the best measure of a country's civilization and the best gauge of its prosperity; with a small home production by primitive methods, the import of iron and steel in 1906 was under 180,000 tons, and of this quantity 40 per cent. was in the form of old iron and cuttings. The total value of all metals was 4 per cent. of all imports.

Outside these categories of opium, cottons, woollens, and metals, there is a long list of sundries which were, for the most part, unknown in 1837, but which in 1906 were valued at 198,250,000 taels (\$158,600,000) or 48 per cent. of the total import trade. Raw cotton, which in 1837 provided 22 per cent. of all imports, in 1906 gave

only one-third of one per cent. ; while, on the other hand, the quantity of Chinese cotton exported was seventeen times that of the foreign cotton imported. In 1837 the Chinese smoked only their own home-grown tobacco ; in 1906 they imported tobacco, cigars and cigarettes of the value of nearly 8,000,000 taels (\$6,500,000), of which cigarettes accounted for 5,850,000 taels (\$4,700,000), coming, something over a half from the United States, a fourth from England, and a tenth from Japan. The import of coal, unknown in 1837, amounted in 1906 to 1,558,000 tons, almost entirely from Japan. Ice, of which the first shipload arrived from Boston in July, 1845, has disappeared from the import list. Aniline dyes were unknown before the days of Magenta and Solferino, but their import in 1906 was valued at 5,750,000 taels (\$4,600,000), including 3,180,000 taels (\$2,550,000) for synthetic indigo, to displace the native and natural product. The import of flour from Oregon and California amounted in 1906 to 4,750,000 fifty-pound bags (237,500,000 pounds). In 1837, Chinese and European alike used flint and tinder for striking a light ; in 1906 the import of matches was 3,300,000,000 boxes, almost entirely from Japan, a number sufficient to give eight boxes to every man, woman and child in the Chinese Empire. Kerosene had not been discovered in 1837 ; in 1906 the import was 129,000,000 gallons, of which 49 per cent. came from the United States, 30 from Sumatra, and 21 from Borneo ; in 1903, before the Russo-Japanese War, the percentage had been American 43, Sumatran 35, Russian 21, and 1 per cent. from Burma and Borneo together. Sugar in 1837 was an article of export ; in 1906 the import was 875,000,000 pounds. In 1837 China had a monopoly of the supply of tea, but in 1906 a quantity of nearly 8,800,000 pounds of tea was imported into China from India, Ceylon, and Java, all of which

have derived the industry from China within half a century past, and have almost driven Chinese tea from many of the markets of the world.

The total imports in 1837 were valued at \$38,200,000. In 1906 this had increased to 410,000,000 taels (\$328,000,000). To this must be added treasure amounting to 30,250,000 taels (\$24,200,000), liability for payments on loans and indemnities, 38,500,000 taels (\$30,800,000), and other invisible liabilities amounting, it has been estimated, to about 32,000,000 taels (\$25,600,000), making a total sum of 510,750,000 taels (\$408,600,000) to be provided by China commercially to meet her international obligations.

The total value of the exports from Canton in 1837 was \$36,074,860, to which tea contributed 61 per cent., silk and its products 33 per cent., and all other commodities together 6 per cent. Tea was the great staple, and of it China had then a natural monopoly. Chinese statesmen then considered that, through it, they could coerce the world into acquiescence with their pretensions. In state documents of the period it was repeatedly declared that "our products, tea and rhubarb, are essential to the outer people; by nature, owing to their gross feeding, they are habitually constipated, and, without the tea and rhubarb of the inner land, they must fall into black humors and die." Now the situation is changed. English enterprise carried the tea industry to India, and to-day 95 per cent. of the leaf consumed in the United Kingdom comes from India and Ceylon. The Australian and South African markets, too, have been captured. In the United States the consumption of Chinese tea is now only 50 per cent. greater than in 1837, and about the same as forty years ago; the natural increase for a larger population comes from other countries. Russia is the only country remaining faithful to its love

for the softer and more wholesome teas from China. The export by sea from Canton in 1837 was 59,000,000 pounds; and, in addition, a quantity (in 1838) of 9,000,000 pounds crossed the land frontier by caravan for Russia, making a total of 68,000,000 pounds, all leaf. The export of tea reached its maximum in 1886, when the total quantity exported was 295,630,000 pounds, made up of 247,430,000 pounds of leaf and 48,200,000 pounds of brick tea, a cheaper and coarser product, used in Central Asia for making a soup. In 1906 the export had fallen to a total of 187,200,000 pounds, made up of 109,600,000 pounds of leaf and 77,600,000 pounds of brick tea; and its value was only 11 per cent. of the value of all exports. Of the total export Russia took 13 per cent. in 1837, and, measured by value 55 per cent., and by quantity 67 per cent. in 1906.

Of raw silk the export in 1837 was 2,736,000 pounds valued at \$8,155,000, of which 2,719,300 pounds went to England and 16,700 pounds to America; there was in addition an export of woven silks valued at \$3,550,000, of which 60 per cent. went to the United States. In 1906 the export of raw silk was 14,731,500 pounds, valued at 55,700,000 taels (\$44,560,000), of waste silk 137,000,000 pounds, valued at 4,750,000 taels (\$3,800,000), and of woven silks 2,070,000 pounds, valued at 10,850,000 taels (\$8,680,000); the total value was 71,300,000 taels (\$57,040,000), which was 30 per cent. of the value of all exports. Chinese silk has for over two thousand years been noted for its quality, and it is still, by nature, the best in the world; but there is reason to fear that the disease which has attacked the silk worms in all parts of the world, and which has been stamped out in France, Italy and Japan, has not been so successfully combatted in China.

Commodities other than teas and silks were exported

in 1837 (including cotton cloth, \$500,000) to a total value of \$2,250,000; in 1906, their value was 139,500,000 taels (\$111,600,000), and this total was made up by a long list of commodities which have been dragged to the light of day by traders who are now as anxious to find the means of meeting China's commercial liabilities as their predecessors a century ago were to find the means of buying China's exports. In the list we have in 1906 living animals, exported chiefly to supply Hongkong and the Philippines, to a value of nearly 4,000,000 taels (\$3,200,000), in addition to eggs and other provisions valued at 4,450,000 taels (\$3,550,000). Beans, exported for the oil to be expressed from them, and beancake, the residuum of beans from which the oil had been expressed, were shipped, the first chiefly and the last entirely to Japan, to the amount of 322,000 tons, valued at 10,200,000 taels (\$8,160,000); the oil is used for cooking and illuminating purposes, and the beancake for manuring the fields. In addition there was an export of 33,000 tons of expressed oils from beans, peanuts, etc., and of 110,350 tons of oil seeds (cotton, rape and sesamum). Essential oils were exported to the extent of 945,000 pounds, chiefly aniseed oil; the only place in the world from which this comes is a small tract lying across the frontier between China and Tonking. The export of pigs bristles was 5,564,500 pounds, valued at 2,750,000 taels (\$2,200,000). In 1837 cotton was imported to the amount of 90,314,000 pounds, valued at \$8,225,000; in 1906 the import was only 6,047,000 pounds, but Chinese cotton was exported, almost entirely to Japan, to the amount of 102,605,000 pounds, valued at 11,630,000 taels (\$9,300,000). Firecrackers in 1837 already supplied Young America with the means of celebrating the glorious Fourth; in 1906, the export weighed 10,000 tons and was valued at 3,600,000 taels (\$2,880,000.) In

fibres (hemp, jute, and ramie) the resources of China are as yet only lightly tapped; in 1906 the export was no more than 22,300 tons, valued at 3,000,000 taels (\$2,400,000). Matting was early taken to America to cover the floors, and in 1906 the export was 431,000 rolls, valued at 3,100,000 taels (\$2,480,000). The shipment of metals and their ores was not dreamed of in 1837; a beginning has now been made, and the export in 1906 was valued at 5,275,000 taels (\$4,220,000). Chinese paper was exported to the amount of 16,400 tons, but, on the other hand, 26,800 tons of foreign paper were imported. Opium, of Chinese production, appears as an export to the amount of 4,730 chests (630,700 pounds), valued at 2,000,000 taels (\$1,600,000). In 1837 furs were imported, in no great quantity, however, from America; in 1906 the export of furs was valued at 575,000 taels (\$460,000), of dressed skins (goat and kid, sheep and lamb) at 3,320,000 taels (\$2,656,000), and of undressed hides (cattle) and skins (goats and sheep) at 10,400,000 taels (\$8,320,000). The export of straw-braid in 1906 was 14,700,000 pounds, valued at 6,300,000 taels (\$5,040,000). Wool, of sheep and camel, was shipped to the extent of 20,500 tons, valued at 5,500,000 taels (\$4,400,000); it came from the plains of Mongolia over a long caravan road to the port of Tientsin, and was shipped chiefly, the camel's wool to England, the sheep's wool to the United States.

The total value of commodities exported during 1906 was 236,500,000 taels (\$189,200,000), to which must be added 31,550,000 taels (\$25,240,000) for the export of treasure, making a visible outward movement of 268,050,000 taels (\$214,440,000), with which, apparently, to meet China's international liabilities, amounting to 510,750,000 taels (\$408,600,000). China's invisible assets have been made the subject of some study, and may be

briefly summarized as follows. Foreign nations spend in China for the maintenance of their navies, garrisons, legations, consulates, evangelical and educational missions, merchant shipping and travelers, a sum which, it is estimated, cannot be put lower than 51,500,000 taels (\$41,200,000); at the time of the inquiry (1904) it was estimated that in the year there came from abroad, for the development of railways, mines, etc., funds to the amount of 27,000,000 taels (\$21,600,000); there is unrecorded trade by the land frontiers in which the excess of exports over imports is not less than 20,000,000 taels (\$16,000,000); and finally there is the stream of remittance of the profits and savings of the millions of Chinese emigrants to America, Hawaii, Australia, Japan, the Philippines, Indo-China, Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, the Dutch Indies, Siam, British India, and (since 1895) Formosa, from whom come annually an amount which formerly I put at 75,000,000 taels, but which I am now more inclined to estimate at 100,000,000 taels (\$80,000,000). Accepting the last figure, we have a total for China's assets in international exchange of 466,550,000 taels (\$373,240,000); and, in judging any discrepancy in an attempt to balance the trade of 1906, it must be borne in mind that, of the three years, 1904-5-6, the first eighteen months were a period of war which seriously affected the trade of China, and the next eighteen months were a period of expansion and over-trading from which the trade has not even yet fully recovered. On the figures of 1903, the last year of normal trade, the balance would have been closer.

Commercially China has always balanced her international accounts year by year. A hundred years ago her exports were paid for mainly by importing silver, with some moderate quantities of English woollens and Indian opium and cotton; seventy years ago each year's

exports were paid for, about a half by opium, and a half by cotton and other products. Then wants were discovered or created, and imports increased; and now the problem is to discover by what means she may pay for those imports. Up to 1895 she had no securities to offer in exchange, but since that time she has been piling debt on debt, not generally for internal improvement, but to pay the bill for foolish wars; still a certain amount, the railway loans of about \$75,000,000, have been for reproductive purposes, and have served to redress the international balance. Outside these she is saddled with a dead weight of over \$30,000,000 a year which must be paid in exports without any return. Even after the opium trade shall be entirely abolished, the one serious problem for Chinese statesmen is to devise means by which the export of commodities may be encouraged and developed, that so the international balance of exchange may be maintained without bankrupting the empire.

VI

AMERICA'S TRADE RELATIONS WITH CHINA

OUR trade relations with China began early in the history of the Republic, when the fast American clippers of 500 or 600 tons sailed from Boston, New York or Baltimore, laden with American products for the Straits and a market. But the more recent commercial intercourse between the two nations has been conducted under the guarantee of a series of treaties beginning with that of 1844, which contains the following declaration: "Citizens of the United States resorting to China for the purposes of commerce shall in no case be subject to other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of any other nation whatever . . . and if additional advantages and privileges of whatever description be conceded hereafter by China to any other nation, the United States and the citizens thereof shall be entitled to a complete, equal and impartial participation in the same." Under the treaty of 1858, concluded at Tientsin, the most favored nation clause is still more emphatically stated, as follows: "The contracting parties hereby agree that should at any time Ta-Tsing Empire (the phrase used in the treaties to describe China) grant to any nation, or the merchants or citizens of any nation, any right, privilege or favor connected either with navigation, commerce, political or other intercourse which is not conferred by this treaty, such right, privilege and favor shall at once freely inure to the benefit of the United States, its public officers, merchants and citizens." It was in the later sixties that William H.

Seward made his celebrated prophecy that "the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands and the vast regions beyond, will become the chief theater of events in the world's great hereafter." The ancient world grew around the Mediterranean and the great highway of its commerce was that inland sea. As the new civilization advanced it sent its ships to brave the perils of the Atlantic, and with the navigation of that ocean is associated the material progress and the mechanical triumphs of modern times. We are on the threshold of a new and probably greater era in which the influence of an awakened Asia is to make itself felt—in which that half of the population of the world which is grouped around the Far Eastern Pacific area will definitely take its place among the nations of the world.

With the advance of the United States to the position of a Pacific power, the integrity of China began to be clearly perceived as an American interest. The Alaskan purchase was dictated by a desire to grasp the opportunity to become the foremost among the powers of the Pacific; the acquisition of Hawaii was a testimony to the necessity of excluding foreign control from a commanding position in mid-Pacific; the taking of the Philippines was justified on the ground that we needed an emporium of trade and a place of arms to be ready against the time when other powers might be moved to dispute the right of the United States to enjoy equality of commercial opportunity in the great markets of Eastern Asia. We have made the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Panama a national enterprise, primarily because it was needed to enable the manufacturing sections of our country to have the full benefit of the present and future profit of the commerce of the Pacific. Our government has shown that it regards this enterprise as one of supreme importance to the national welfare by treating

obstacles interposed to its execution, with such uncompromising resolution as to startle a large portion of our own people, even more than it startled the governments and people of the Central American republics. If the extension of the influence of the United States has been anywhere pursued in obedience to the call of "manifest destiny," it has been on and around the Pacific Ocean. If there be one point more than another where a check to our influence would dwarf the rôle which this Republic is fitted to play on the stage of history, it would be here. Were China, with all its possibilities and opportunities, part of the continent of Africa, we might have an equally strong commercial interest in its future; but we should hardly be justified in offering to its partition a more vigorous resistance than we made to the passage of Madagascar under French sovereignty, and the consequent disappearance of a highly promising market. But, in the case of China, the commercial interest is reinforced by political considerations of acknowledged potency—by reasons of policy which are founded on an imperative regard for the free and full development of our national greatness. The place which the United States occupies in the world, and the place which it should occupy in future ages, are equally challenged by every step made toward the dismemberment of China. Let the fact be evaded or disregarded as we may, every blow aimed at the independence of that ancient empire is a blow at the prestige of this Republic—part of a deliberate attempt to make the position of the United States in "the world's great hereafter" that of a second-rate power.

In short, the policy which dictated the construction of the Panama Canal is meaningless, if it be not accompanied by a correlated policy in Eastern Asia. As President Roosevelt remarked, the Canal when made is to last for the ages; "it is to alter the geography of a Con-

continent and the trade routes of the world." The possession of a territory fraught with such peculiar capacities as the Isthmus, carries with it obligations to mankind; and it is equally true that the existence of such an entity as the Chinese Empire imposes peculiar obligations on the rest of the world, and notably on its neighbor, the United States. It is long since the preservation of the integrity of China was recognized as a world necessity; all that has happened in the last ten years, and all that is going on before our eyes, only accentuate the truth that the dismemberment of China would bring disaster to no nation more swiftly and surely than to this Republic. President Roosevelt characterized the Panama Canal as "a project colossal in its size, and of well-nigh incalculable possibilities for the good of this country and the nations of mankind." But the construction of this great waterway was surely not entirely dictated by the necessity of furnishing the speediest and easiest means of communication between two great sections of our country. If it does not also place the Atlantic and Gulf States in closer touch with the great Pacific area, already half girdled by American territory, it will have failed of the larger part of its usefulness and be robbed of the greater part of its potentiality for profit.

Twelve years ago when the process of the alienation of Chinese territory began to assume threatening proportions, it was argued with some force that the encroachments made by Russia and Germany on Chinese sovereignty called for a protest from the United States, because every "lease" which the Chinese Government makes of a part of its territory to a foreign power, contracts the area within which our treaties with China can be operative. That is to say, when a foreign sovereignty takes the place of the Chinese at any given point, the treaties become to that extent non-existent, and our

right to trade there on equal terms with all other nations is wholly dependent upon the will of the foreign government. It was considerations like these which underlay the efforts made by Secretary Hay to preserve the "open door" in China. In a circular note to the powers cooperating in China for the suppression of the Boxer rising, dated July 3, 1900, the policy of the United States toward China was thus briefly stated: "To afford all possible protection everywhere to foreign life and property; to guard and protect all legitimate foreign interests; to aid in preventing the spread of the disorders to other provinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disorders; and to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed by treaty and international law to friendly powers, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." The disinterested character of American policy toward China lent special force to the memorandum of March 1, 1901, in which Secretary Hay protested against the confirmation of a bargain then reported to be pending between Russia and China in regard to the Russian occupation of Manchuria. It was pointed out that since all the powers then engaged in joint negotiation over matters Chinese had recognized the necessity of preserving the territorial integrity of the Empire, it was obviously advantageous to China to continue the existing international understanding upon this subject. Accordingly, the Secretary added: "It would be unwise and dangerous in the extreme for China to make any arrangements or to consider any proposition of a private nature, involving the surrender of territory or financial obligations by convention with any particular power." Our diplomacy on this occasion went to

the utmost limit of peaceful protest in expressing on the part of our Government its sense of the impropriety, inexpediency and even extreme danger to the interests of China of considering any private territorial or financial arrangements, at least without the full knowledge and approval of all the Treaty Powers.

A year later, a still more emphatic protest was addressed to the Russian and Chinese Governments, and the whole purpose of our diplomacy in China was frankly avowed to be the furtherance of our trade. In this note of February 1, 1902, it was declared that any agreement whereby China gives any corporation or company the exclusive right or privilege of opening mines, establishing railroads, or in any other way industrially developing Manchuria, could only be viewed with the gravest concern by the Government of the United States. The reason alleged was that such an agreement would constitute a monopoly involving a distinct breach of the stipulations of the treaties concluded between China and foreign powers, and thereby seriously affecting the rights of American citizens. Such an agreement would restrict their rightful trade, exposing it to be discriminated against, interfered with, or otherwise jeopardized. It would, moreover, strongly tend permanently to impair Chinese sovereign rights in this part of her Empire, while seriously interfering with her ability to meet her international obligations. Mr. Hay perceived very clearly the far-reaching consequences of the struggle over China, which was then in progress, and while he was perfectly aware that the United States would never resort to war on any such issue as the arrest of the Russian advance in North China, his protests and his warnings lack nothing either of frankness or decision. He bluntly informed the Russian Government that any such concession as it was then seeking to extort from China

would undoubtedly be followed by demands from other powers for similar equally extensive advantages elsewhere in the Chinese Empire, and the inevitable result must be the complete wreck of the policy of absolute equality of treatment to all nations respecting trade, navigation and commerce, within the confines of the Empire.

There are critics of our Far Eastern policy who insist that, commercially speaking, we have been sowing in a barren field. Mr. Morse has clearly expounded, with all the authority which comes from intimate knowledge and long experience, the history and economics of the foreign trade of China. Of the future of that trade it is possible to indulge in the most sanguine or in the most pessimistic expectations, according to the point of view of the observer. There is the broad fact of a people numbering some four hundred millions, whose rank and file are recognized as the most capable industrial units in the world, occupying a territory, including Mongolia, of four million square miles, possessing all the resources that go to make nations rich, but whose foreign trade amounts to only a dollar per head of the population. There is surely a tremendous margin for increase here, and it is perhaps natural to expect, with China's new hospitality for Western ideas, that her trade should grow by leaps and bounds. In the case of China's eastern neighbor, the development of commerce under the stimulus of a more progressive type of civilization, has been sufficiently remarkable. The new era in Japan is less than forty years old, and as recently as 1878 the foreign commerce of the country amounted to less than 60,000,000 yen, or \$30,000,000. But in 1898 it was over 440,000,000 yen, and by 1908, which was a bad year in Japan as elsewhere, a total of 814,500,000 yen was attained. The average foreign trade of Japan for

the last five years has been equal to about \$10 per head of the population. Japan is a much poorer country than China, but, obviously, were the combined exports and imports of China to be in proportion to those of Japan, it would be able to show a foreign trade of \$4,000,000,000.

After listening to Mr. Morse, you will begin to understand why it is too soon to expect the experience of Japan to be duplicated in China, and you will appreciate the necessity of keeping the expectations of China's foreign trade within modest bounds. But the increase in the foreign trade of the Middle Kingdom is not without its impressiveness. In 1864, its total value was \$153,000,000; in 1874, \$198,000,000; and by 1890, it had gone to \$270,000,000. In 1901 this trade was valued at \$310,000,000, and last year, albeit business was depressed, it amounted to \$436,000,000. There are two considerations adverted to by Mr. Morse which must be borne in mind in dealing with these figures. One is that the Haikwan Tael, in which the value of all imports and exports is stated, is merely a given weight of silver, and therefore varies in value with the fluctuations in the price of silver. But if the actual increase in commerce may not be so great as the increase in value, measured by Haikwan Taels, would indicate, the further fact is to be taken into account that many articles, both of import and export, have decreased materially in value during the period covered by our comparison.

The share of the United States in this trade has been a steadily growing one. It amounted to \$21,000,000 in 1888, \$30,000,000 in 1898, and \$48,000,000 in 1908. In other words, in the ten years in which the trade of China has grown 40 per cent., our American share of it has increased 60 per cent. In the decline of the value of imports into China last year, all countries shared except

the United States and Russia. The objection is sometimes made that with the development of manufactures in China, our possibilities of selling her the products of our own looms and factories must diminish. But it happens that our share in the foreign trade of Japan has steadily increased side by side with the development of Japan into a manufacturing nation. Our proportion of Japan's foreign trade in 1881 was 5.72 per cent.; by 1898 it had grown to 14.57 per cent., and reached 24 per cent. in 1908. According to the Financial and Economic Annual of Japan, the United States takes the lead among the countries participating in its foreign trade with exports and imports amounting to 211,000,000 yen, followed at almost equal distances by China with 144,000,000 yen and Great Britain with 138,000,000 yen.

These figures may at least dispose of the common but no less transparent fallacy, that the growth of our exports to any given nation may be injuriously affected by the material development and growth in the wealth of that nation. This fallacy was dealt with in his characteristically direct and vigorous fashion by President, then Secretary Taft, in a notable speech delivered on his visit to Shanghai in October, 1907. He declared on that occasion that he was not one of those who viewed with alarm the effect of the growth of China, with her teeming millions, into a great industrial empire. He believed that this instead of injuring foreign trade with China would greatly increase it, and while it might change its character in some respects, it would not diminish its profits, and he added that "a trade which depends for its profits on the backwardness of a people in developing their own resources and upon their inability to value at the proper relative prices that which they have to sell and that which they have to buy, is not one that can be counted upon as stable or permanent." Nor did

it seem to Mr. Taft that the cry of "China for the Chinese," should frighten anyone. As he regarded the matter, that merely signified that China should devote her energies to the development of her immense resources, to the elevation of her industrious people, to the enlargement of her trade, and to the administrative reform of the Empire as a great national government. Since our greatest export trade is with the countries most advanced in business methods and in the development of their individual resources, changes of this kind could only increase our trade with China.

But the fact remains that neither our trade with China nor that of any other nation can be placed on a satisfactory basis while China neglects the internal reforms that are needed to enable her to hold the place which belongs to her among the nations of the world. As Professor Jenks will tell you, there can be no real progress in China while the currency of the country remains in its present demoralized condition. At no point can division of authority be more fatal than in determining the standard of a nation's coinage and providing the basis of security for its circulating notes. The most serious problem at present confronting China, is how to bring about the subordination of Provincial to National interests; how to secure for the Government at Peking sufficient power and resources to enable it to discharge the obligations it has assumed by treaties with the other nations of the world. On the success with which efficiency, responsibility and authority become recognized attributes of the Central Government of China, must depend the future history of the Empire. As Mr. Taft put the case at Shanghai: "A nation of the conservative traditions of China must accept changes gradually, but it is a pleasure to know and to say that in every improvement which she aims at she has the deep sympathy

of America, and that there never can be any jealousy or fear on the part of the United States due to China's industrial or political development, provided always that it is directly along the lines of peaceful prosperity and the maintenance of law and order, and the rights of the individual, native or foreign. She has no territory we long for, and can have no prosperity which we would grudge her, and no political power and independence as an empire, justly exercised, which we would resent. With her enormous resources, and with her industrious people, the possibilities of her future cannot be overstated."

VII

MONETARY CONDITIONS IN CHINA

THE present conditions in China from many points of view are most encouraging; and yet in many instances the encouragement seems to come from the fact that conditions appear most desperate. There is no doubt that for most of the time during the last six or eight years there has been a steady progress toward the adoption of Western ideas. Western education is making progress; there is a considerable extension of railways; the telegraph is much more generally used; there is a real beginning of a modern post-office system; and perhaps best of all, the temper of the officials and of the people seems to demand progress. And yet the problems are very grave; so grave that they must soon be solved, and China can solve them. Most noteworthy of all, perhaps, is the financial weakness. Foreigners resident in China, who seem to be close in touch with governmental affairs, and newspaper writers who are generally very well informed, do not hesitate to predict disaster unless improvement is made in the near future. I may perhaps venture to quote a few words from letters.

“The new government is not being such a great success as was hoped for. . . . The whole government is drifting toward trouble. . . . Besides the drifting do-nothing policy of the government, the greatest danger to China to-day, in my opinion, is the ease with which she can borrow foreign capital. They are at it all the time; the imperial government, the provincial governments, the different boards in Peking, etc., and but little

of this money is used for the object specified when the loan was made. God knows where it goes to and where the interest will come from. . . . All of the revenues are much less than at any time during the last fifteen years, and with the reduction in the opium crop, will be much smaller. I do not see how the result can be anything but the appointment in the end of an international financial board to take charge of the revenues and administer them the same as was done in Egypt. It will surely come to this unless the Chinese Government gets some reliable financial adviser and follows his advice. Whatever they do, affairs were never in a more critical and serious condition and the imminence of a revolution was never greater. The army is not being paid, the discipline is slack and more slack, and the soldiers boast that Yuan Shih-kai is the only chief who paid them one hundred cents to the dollar. All of the above is not a scare-head of my own. The better class of Chinese and most of the legations feel the same and talk about it."

The same prediction regarding an international financial board appeared in the *London Times*, accompanied by statements showing how almost impossible it seemed to be for the Government to meet its obligations. There can be little doubt that if China should fail to meet the interest on her foreign debts when it was due, the question of control that would amount to a financial receivership, would immediately be raised. Nothing could be worse for China than any result of this kind, and everything possible should be done to prevent it.

In the opinion of most people, no single step could be taken which would tend so strongly toward placing the Government on a financial basis, and removing also many administrative difficulties, as the reform of the monetary system. The state of chaos in which that remains, and which seems to be getting worse as time

goes on, increases the temptation for the officials to make use of the "squeeze" in their dealings with the people, while at the same time the varying exchange lessens the revenue that is received into the government treasury. It is therefore well worth while to consider seriously the monetary conditions and to study somewhat the methods to improve them.

The evils of the system are so well known that one need not give many details. It is perhaps sufficient to say for the benefit of those who are not familiar with Chinese conditions, that the so-called unit of the system, the tael, means merely a certain weight of silver: that this weight varies in different provinces, and even in different districts and cities, so that there are scores of them in China, there being no single standard. Usually in making payments in taels, they must be weighed out as so much butter would be. In certain localities, however, particularly where there are many foreigners, instead of these weights of silver, the taels, coins called dollars are used. In some places these are the Mexican dollars; in others, they are dollars coined by the different provinces at a weight substantially equal to that of the Mexican dollar. Many of the mints, however, have not maintained the standard accurately, so that the coins of some provinces are not received in other provinces except at a discount; and in all cases these coins depend for their value largely upon the value of silver bullion.

For small transactions cash, that is, copper coins, are used. These also differ greatly in kind, and the system of counting them varies in different localities. A few years ago several of the provinces started the coinage of ten cash pieces in order that they might make a profit from the coins. Finding this business was adding to their revenue, they issued more and more, until they

have been very greatly depreciated, with the usual disturbance to prices and wages.

There are very many banks, foreign and native, and small cash shops that make their profits from changing these various kinds of currency from one to the other. Bank notes are issued in both taels and dollars, and even in the small cash, some of the little cash shops issuing private notes for sums of only a few cents. With no inspection in many cases, little care is taken to keep a reserve of specie back of these bank notes, so that beyond the immediate locality in which they are issued they have little currency. The only way in which the matter can be summed up is by the use of the word "chaos."

The ill effect of this lack of system upon business can be readily appreciated. The Chinese Government must pay its foreign obligations in gold. Its revenues are largely collected in silver or in copper at some rate of exchange with silver. Of late silver has been much depreciated in value as compared with gold, so that there has been a steady lessening of the revenues in terms of gold, and at the same time the Government has assured the people at various times that their taxes would not be raised. The result is that the Government is continually striving to find some means of raising revenues which seem to be different from a regular increase in taxes.

Besides the Government debt payments, however, imports from foreign countries must generally be paid for in gold, while the products of China which are to be exported, though paid for in silver within the country, are to be sold abroad at gold rates. The result is that all international trade is highly speculative, and the thought of the merchants must be largely upon the rates of exchange, rather than upon the quality of their goods and the normal prices.

The internal trade also is greatly hampered by the

varying kinds of taels and of cash, and the changing rates of exchange among them, to say nothing of the tolls that are taken by the cash shops and the bankers.

For the last few years the price of silver has been falling, so that now the rate of exchange is much lower than it was in earlier years. Some writers and business men are of the opinion that a declining rate of exchange or even a low rate of exchange, stimulates the export trade, and in consequence is a good thing for a country. One man who seemed to think that he was a friend of China, stated not long since that he would like to see China on a silver basis, but all other countries on a gold basis, inasmuch as China would profit thereby, apparently for the reason given above. This view that a declining rate of exchange benefits a country because it stimulates exports, is mistaken. Doubtless as the rate of exchange lowers so that more silver dollars are required to equal in value one dollar in gold, prices of products in the silver country would tend to increase slightly in terms of silver; but the stimulus to export comes also in part from the added foreign demand caused by the fact that the gold price is declining. To pay for a fixed quantity of products produced in the gold country, it will take a steadily increasing quantity of the products produced in the silver country, if the price of silver steadily depreciates. This doubtless increases the exports, but the trade, looked at in terms of living, is less profitable for the silver country nevertheless. Although the wages in the silver country may remain the same, or may even slightly increase in terms of silver money, if reckoned in terms of purchasing power of products produced in the gold country, they are declining. It can hardly be said that the stimulation of the export trade at the expense of a steady loss in quantity of products received for a fixed quantity exported, is a gain to the country.

A careful statistical study of the exports and imports of the leading products of Mexico for a number of years during the time that the value of silver or gold as compared with silver was declining, establishes this fact beyond question so far as Mexico is concerned; thus experience seems to tally with reason. Some careful studies were also made by Mr. Hippisley regarding the imports and exports of China at various periods when the price of the tael was changing rapidly. The results seem to show that it is impossible to establish the fact that China has made any real gains from the declining value of silver. The implication is clearly the other way. And yet it may possibly be that individual merchants have increased their export trade to a considerable degree, and it is possible that they also have made larger profits.

It is also possible that a low rate of exchange in a country where wages are low, may in some degree, tempt foreign capital to come into the country. This in itself is a good thing, provided there is no compensating loss. It is clearly a better thing, however, for conditions to be such that real wages in terms of purchasing power will be increased, and the general standard of living of the people raised, rather than that foreign capital be tempted into the country to exploit it by sending out increasing quantities of exports for a fixed quantity of imports.

Enough has been said perhaps regarding the evils of the present system on the silver basis with the fluctuating rates of exchange. The question remains, what can best be done?

(1) All authorities are agreed that the most important step to be taken is to secure one uniform system so that everywhere throughout China, the various coins, from the smallest in value to the greatest, shall be interchangeable at fixed rates. The only people who would be op-

posed to such a reform would be the owners of the cash shops, and possibly of the smaller banks who are making their living from exchanges in money due to this lack of uniformity, and certain officials and traders who can more easily make dishonest "squeeze."

(2) In spite of what has been said of the few people who advocate the permanent retention of the silver standard by China, most authorities agree that it would be best for China to be placed on the gold basis as soon as that is practicable. There is, however, an important difference of opinion as to whether China should endeavor first to establish a uniform system on the silver basis and then later, as opportunity offers, go from the silver basis to the gold basis; or whether it would be wiser to establish the new monetary system on the gold basis from the beginning.

Those who favor the establishment of a uniform system on the silver basis urge two reasons for this policy: first, that China is poor, has not the gold necessary to establish a gold system and cannot secure the gold without incurring a heavy debt; and second, that even if she were to secure gold at the present time, it would probably not be possible for her to keep it, as they think the balance of trade is against her, and the gold would be certainly exported to pay for the excess of imports over exports.

The Commission on International Exchange, the American Commission that investigated this subject when the Government of China, requested that of the United States to assist in giving to China a gold standard currency, recommended a monetary system on what it called the gold exchange basis instead of the gold basis. In brief, the difference between the two systems is this: A country on the gold basis regularly has gold coins for the standard currency, which are regularly in circula-

tion among the people. As fractional currency these countries have silver, nickel and copper coins, these usually being token coins circulating at a value considerably above their bullion value.

A country that has a gold exchange system such as the Philippines, or India, or the Straits Settlements, does not coin gold and place it in circulation within the country. It has instead a standard silver coin of full legal tender, a token coin, circulating at a value considerably above its value as bullion and maintained at this value on a fixed parity with gold. The fractional coins are likewise all maintained at a fixed parity with one another with the standard silver coin and with gold. The gold standard unit is not a coin for circulation, but a fixed quantity of gold with which the value of the silver coins can readily be compared, and with which they are maintained at a fixed rate.

In a country that is accustomed to the use of silver and particularly in a country where the standard of living is low, and many of the transactions are on a very small scale, silver is more convenient for circulation than gold, and the people in the Far East are, generally speaking, accustomed to that. Gold under those conditions is not needed at all for domestic use, but is needed only to pay for products imported from gold standard countries, or to pay obligations due to gold standard countries. Under those circumstances, it is sufficient if a resident of the country wishes to secure gold from the Government or from a national bank, to which has been given the general oversight of the monetary system, to furnish him, instead of the actual gold, a bill of exchange payable in gold in the foreign country where the obligation is due. The standard silver coins can be paid in to the treasury or to the bank at their par value, and the bill of exchange sold for the usual commercial rates or for a charge

slightly above those rates, if it is thought best for the Government not regularly to intervene in ordinary business transactions, but to take part in such transactions only when it is necessary to maintain the parity of the silver coins. It will readily be seen that this selling of gold exchange at a fixed rate, to be paid for in the silver coins, would have the same effect toward maintaining the parity of the coins with gold as would the delivery of the actual gold for shipment, provided the rate of exchange charged were the same. Even if it were a fraction of one per cent. higher, this would not be sufficient to affect in any way the value of the silver coins in local trade.

There are several advantages for a country like China of the gold exchange system as compared with the gold system. In the first place, as has already been intimated, a silver currency is better adapted to the standard of living and the ordinary customs of trade of the country. Second, it is very much cheaper, and in a country constituted as is China at the present time, this is very important. Not nearly so much gold would be needed to maintain the parity of the silver coins in this way as would be needed for circulation within the country itself. Third, there would be much less likelihood of the gold reserve, which in either case is necessary for the maintenance of the parity of the silver coin, being exhausted if the Government maintains the absolute control of its reserve through this system of selling exchange. Moreover, in case there should be a drain on the gold reserve, it is much easier to replenish it. The rule in the countries maintaining the gold exchange standard is to withdraw from circulation the silver paid in to the government treasury to purchase gold orders on a foreign country, in order that any tendency toward over-issue of the silver coins may thus be checked and their parity be

maintained in part by a normal adaptation of quantity in circulation to the demand. In this way the treasury adds to its stock of silver whenever it depletes its stock of gold, and although if the coins are token coins the amount thus collected in the treasury would be less in bullion value by the amount of seignorage of the coins, it would still be more than ample to cover any possibility of the exhaustion of the gold reserve. By selling the silver itself abroad as bullion if necessary, the country could thus replenish its gold reserve abroad. It would never be possible for the business of a country to go on satisfactorily with any considerable proportion of its standard coins withdrawn from circulation. Their value would surely go up so promptly as to prevent any serious drain on the gold reserve.

Another very great advantage in the establishment of the gold exchange standard from the beginning, is that a very large profit, amounting to scores of millions of dollars, would be made by China if the gold exchange standard were adopted at once, which would be lost entirely if the system were established first on a uniform silver basis which afterward was to be changed to gold. When the system is fully established on the gold basis, the silver coins in either event will be token coins of a value presumably from 20 to 40 per cent. below their face value. If issued at that rate, in the case of a country so populous as China, this means, of course, an enormous profit. Most, if not all, of this profit should be used to purchase gold to maintain the parity of the coins, although eventually, when the system is thoroughly established, it is possible that not all of this seignorage would be needed for that purpose.

Moreover, if the coins when issued, were issued at par, there would be no disturbance to the business of the

country such as that which comes from a shifting of the monetary standard. On the other hand, if they were issued at their bullion value and then afterward gradually raised from 20 to 30 per cent. above that value, it would certainly produce the business depression that regularly comes from a contracting currency and falling prices, an effect upon business which would probably need to be continued over a period of years, and which, beyond doubt, would be a serious blow to industry. If one wishes to get the benefit of experience in this direction, let him compare the relatively little disturbance to business in the Philippines of the introduction of their new monetary system, and particularly the total absence of disturbance of business from the change in the monetary system, when new coins of lighter weight were introduced, with the disturbance in India and especially in the Straits Settlements when their new systems were placed on the gold basis. The experience of these countries, as well as reason, seems to make it clear that it would be much wiser for China in establishing the new system, to adopt the gold exchange system, and especially to issue her new silver coins from the beginning at a parity with gold.

There are, of course, certain difficulties in the way of the establishment of this new monetary system, and these difficulties must not be under-estimated. In the first place, some of the foreign countries, the business of whose banks might be affected somewhat, might need to be dealt with, although all of the leading countries have already agreed at the instance of the Commission on International Exchange that they would welcome a gold standard for China. If, however, in order to establish such a system on a firm basis it should be necessary for China to restrict rather carefully the provisions re-

garding the importation and exportation of silver or gold bullion or coins, there might be some further question.

In the second place, beyond doubt many of the Chinese officials who have made large profits from the fluctuations and uncertainties in the values of the different coins, might be unwilling to see these chances removed. The cash shops and some of the smaller bankers would probably also object because their exchange business would be gone. On the other hand, the larger banks would probably not object to the change. They might well expect that their loss in exchange would be more than offset by their increased business in loans and discounts. Such seems to have been the experience, at any rate, of the foreign banks in Japan upon the establishment of her new monetary system on the gold basis.

There are also some people who delight in speculation and whose interest in other mercantile business is largely dependent upon its speculative aspects. These also might deplore the change. On the other hand, all those people, Chinese and foreigners alike, who have the real welfare of China at heart, certainly wish the establishment of the best monetary system possible, and those who have given most study to the subject are agreed that as soon as it is practicable that system should be established on the gold basis. It is the belief of the writer that the establishment of a gold exchange system would be practicable immediately from the economic point of view. He also hopes that from the political point of view there need not be a long delay before the establishment of such a system.

VIII

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN MANCHURIA —COMMERCE, TRADE, AND INTER- NATIONAL POLITICS

THE history of the Far East for some years to come depends upon the fate of Manchuria. Shall China here be allowed peacefully to develop, to consolidate her strength and to work out her own salvation free from alien interference, or will Japan, poor in resources but rich in disciplined efficiency, be successful in her endeavor politically to dominate and to direct the commercial growth of her continental neighbor? That is the Eastern Question.

In the old days when Tartars fought Koreans in the mountains north of Tumen and Yalu, when the valley of the Sungari was ruled by the Kin Dynasty before the conquests of Genghis Khan, history was made in the region now known as the "Three Eastern Provinces." Later, when the last of the Mings ruled feebly at Peking, Nurhachu, first with but a small band, then with an army of sturdy mountaineers, defeated the Chinese forces east of the Liao and set up his standard at Mukden. His sons, sweeping all before them, occupied the Dragon Throne. Nearly three hundred years passed by during which the conquerors, fearful lest they lose their prize, were scattered throughout China, and the fertile but war-blighted plain of the Liao settled afresh by immigrants from "within the wall."¹ During this period

¹ Points to the south and west of Shanhaikuan where the Great Wall of China meets the sea are called "within the wall."

little was heard of Manchuria, and though a "second capital" with its five "great Boards," Rites, Works, Treasury, War, and Punishments was maintained at Mukden, the three provinces were loosely administered by Tartar Generals—military governors—with more regard for the purses of the officials than the welfare of the people or the development of the country.

During the Chino-Japanese War in 1894-5 there was some fighting about Haicheng and Newchwang in southern Manchuria, and Japan after her victory received a grant of territory embracing the Liaotung peninsula and its hinterland. Through the intervention of Russia, France, and Germany, however, this was ceded back to China in return for a handsome indemnity. Japan ousted, Russia took her place first, in 1896, securing the concession for a railway through Central Manchuria, then the lease of Port Arthur, and the right to build a line from Harbin to Dalny. During the unsettled years that followed the Boxer uprising of 1900, Russia's influence was extended, and her failure to complete the evacuation of Chinese territory—Newchwang and neighboring towns—in October, 1903, brought on the crisis which culminated in the war with Japan.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the history of that struggle. Russia desired an ice-free port. More than that, she wished to retain under her control the northern portion of Korea. In this Japan refused to acquiesce, for it was imperative that she break the strategic line between Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Japan to-day holds Korea while her railway from Kuangchengtzu to Port Arthur gives her a splendid political and commercial *pied a terre* in southern Manchuria. Russia, on the other hand, still has her line from Manchuria station to Progranichnaya, with its southern branch from Harbin to Kuangchengtzu, and China has now undertaken the diffi-

cult task of attempting to establish an efficient administration in a territory over whose most important communications she has no control.

The three Manchurian provinces, Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungchiang, contain respectively 60,000, 110,000, and 190,000 square miles. Fengtien, the southernmost province, is the best settled and most fully developed of the three, with a population of about 8,000,000; Kirin having but 4,000,000; and Heilungchiang only 1,500,000 inhabitants; a total population of 13,500,000, in a region which, if the Chinese provinces of Chihli and Shantung may serve as a criterion, should support at least 130,000,000 persons.

Only the southwestern, central southern and eastern portions of Manchuria are at present under cultivation, the valley of the Liao being well tilled and the banks of the Sungari fairly so. The annual grain production, however, has been roughly valued at about \$40,000,000 gold. The principal crops are beans, sorghum, millet (kaoliang), small millet, maize, and barley. Hemp and tobacco are raised to meet local needs, and the latter is now used by the British American Tobacco Company in its Mukden cigarette factory.

Wheat has been grown along the Sungari and used to a certain extent by natives, but principally by Russian flour mills at Harbin and Blagovestchensk. There remain vast tracts of good wheat country in Kirin and Heilungchiang, where the climate differs little from that of our own State of Dakota.

The forests of Kirin, covering between 10,000 and 20,000 square miles, have not been exploited. The Japanese-Chinese Joint Timber Company, organized under Article X of the Chino-Japanese Agreement of December 22, 1905, will fell the timber along the Yalu River, in southeastern Manchuria, but the wooded tracts to the north,

on the watersheds of the Sungari and Mudan, and on the Chinese bank of the Ussuri River, are still practically in their virgin state.

Coal has thus far been given the most intelligent attention. The Fushun colliery, operated by the Japanese South Manchurian railway, and the Penhsihu mine, on the Mukden-Antung route, are now worked by modern methods. The Yentai mine, opened by Russians, has been left untouched thus far by Japanese. There are native workings near Liaoyang and Tiehling in Fengtien, at Heilungchiang, and in central and southeastern Kirin, and near Mergen, on the main road to Aigun in Heilungchiang province, with small Russian mines near Kuangchengtzu and at one or two other points.

Gold has been discovered along the streams of southeast Kirin, on the Tumen and upper Yalu, on the banks of the Mudan and Sungari, and on both the Chinese and Russian sides of the Amur, as well as along the Nonni River, which runs generally southward through Heilungchiang to join the Sungari.

Copper and silver mines have been roughly worked by Chinese, and tin, lead, asbestos and other minerals have been discovered.

Statistics of Manchurian trade are unsatisfactory, owing to the extraordinary conditions that have prevailed since 1900, with the Boxer uprising, the Russian occupation, and the Russo-Japanese War. The total trade passing through the Imperial maritime customs houses in Manchuria during the year 1907 amounted to \$37,015,808.25 gold. The customs houses at Dalny, Antung and Tatungkow were opened, however, for only a portion of the year, and, taking this into consideration, and including a rough estimate of the very extensive native overland traffic between the "Three Eastern Provinces" and China proper and Mongolia, and the important,

though by no means negligible, frontier trade with the Russian Far East, the figure would probably be doubled.

The principal exports are beans and bean cake, of which 15% of the former and 85% of the latter used to go to Japan. During the past year, however, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, a powerful Japanese concern, has created a considerable European trade in bean products. The heaviest imports are American, Japanese and English cotton goods, American kerosene and flour, British-American cigarettes, and general merchandise.

Under the treaty of Aigun of 1858 navigation on the Sungari, the Amur and the Ussuri Rivers is reserved to Russia and China. The Chinese up to the present time own nothing but a few junks on these streams. Russian companies, however, have a fleet of over two hundred steamers and four hundred barges, drawing from two to five feet, which ply between Harbin, Habarovsk and Blagovestchensk. Smaller steamers are operated on the Sungari between Harbin, Petuna and Kirin, and on the upper Amur and Shilka to Stretensk, and on the Argun.

On the Sungari are the cities of Kirin, Petuna, Harbin and Sansing, and the prosperous towns of Peituan lintzu and Heilampo.

The Liao River, which debouches into the Gulf of Pechili at Newchwang, is navigable for vessels drawing up to two feet for about 150 miles from its mouth, and fleets of junks annually carry a large portion of the bean crop to the coast. The river passes not far from Faku-men and Hsinmintun, while Tungchiangtzu and Tiehling are located on its banks.

Smaller streams belonging to these three great river systems are navigable at certain seasons of the year for light draft vessels.

Before the railways came Manchuria depended principally, however, upon her roads for the transport of

produce to the coasts and of imports into the interior. The winters are cold, but there is comparatively little snow. From November until March therefore the highways are beaten hard by the wheels of countless vehicles which, dragged by from two to six or seven animals, ply between the main trade marts. Perils of the road there are, but with the presence of well-disciplined troops and the perfection of rural police organization the "hung-hutse," or bandits, have gradually disappeared and ceased to prey upon the cart trains and to levy blackmail on the merchants as of yore.

The largest cities on the *Russian railway system* in Manchuria are Kuangchengtzu, Harbin, Ninguta and Tsitsihar, the first being commercially the most important.

At Kuangchengtzu the *Japanese railway system* meets the Russian line and will eventually connect with the proposed Chino-Japanese railway from Kirin to this point. The South Manchurian railway runs south from Kuangchengtzu to the ice-free port of Dalny, with connection to Newchwang and Port Arthur and a narrow gauge, commercially useless, branch line from Mukden to Antung, at the mouth of the Yalu. The principal cities touched in addition to those mentioned are Kai-yuan, Changtu, Tiehling and Liao-yang.

The earnings for the year ending March 31, 1908, during which period the road was gauged at three feet six inches and the rolling stock was insufficient, amounted to \$4,740,387.96 gold.

The *Chinese Imperial railways of North China* join the Japanese system at Mukden, running from that city through Hsinmintun to Kaopantzu, whence a branch line runs to Newchwang, and thence to Tientsin and Peking. The line touches the important city of Chen-chow.

The earnings for the Manchurian, *i. e.*, the Shanhai-kuan, Hsinmintun and Newchwang section, amounted in 1906 to \$6,095,544.40, and, in 1907, when the Hsinmintun-Mukden section was taken over, to a considerably larger figure. The exact amount is not obtainable.

The people of Manchuria have largely emigrated from the two northern Chinese provinces of Chihli and Shantung. Pioneers themselves, they are sober, industrious, well-to-do, and comparatively intelligent. They are fond of travel, and, like their fellow-provincials in the south, would readily avail themselves of improved transportation to develop the hitherto uncultivated areas in Kirin and Heilungchiang, while the merchants are anxious to make connections with reputable foreign firms and stimulate the import trade.

The present Manchurian administration was inaugurated in June, 1907. For the first time in the history of the "Three Eastern Provinces" there is a single Viceroy with authority over the three Governors, chiefs of the provincial organizations. An effort has been made with satisfactory results to remodel the old administrative machinery. The first Viceroy and the Governor of Fengtien province, who were responsible for this endeavor, were, however, greatly hampered by the lack of well-trained and progressive men. There was, undoubtedly, speculation and waste, even under their administration, and a close investigation would probably reveal numerous instances of corruption and incompetence. An honest and sincere effort, however, is now being made to overcome these defects and it is safe to say that Manchuria to-day is more efficiently governed than any other portion of the Chinese Empire.

The last Tartar General of Fengtien, predecessor at Mukden of the first Viceroy, gave his Province probably the first two years of fairly honest government in the

history of Manchuria. His Treasurer admitted the collection of over 3,000,000 taels, or about \$2,000,000, for the year from August, 1906, to August, 1907,—probably about one-half the sum paid in by the people to the local officials. This fact that such a sum could be raised in one province immediately after the war and during a military occupation proves the potential wealth and possibilities of the country, which, it is estimated by competent authorities, should yield about \$7,500,000 per annum, if the revenues were properly administered.

Aside from the customs duties levied at the open ports and the "native customs" returns at Newchwang, which go to the central government, the Manchurian administration collects for its own use two taxes, "consumption," practically an import, and "production," an export tax, on all native trade and on foreign trade at unopened cities, together with a tobacco tax, wine tax, cart tax, live stock tax, and certain other imposts.

These revenues have scarcely sufficed to meet the heavy demands for construction of Government buildings and other public works, the general opening of schools of various grades, and the equipment of military forces.

The financial situation in Manchuria is unsatisfactory, owing to the numbers of circulating media in use and to the elaborate exchange and credit systems which have prevailed in but are now disappearing from the principal trade centers. The provincial authorities of Kirin and Heilungchiang, moreover, have issued large quantities of notes, against which they had no adequate reserves, with the result that government paper in these two provinces is now at a heavy discount. A similar condition which existed a year ago in Fengtien has been relieved by careful administrative measures.

The Russo-Chinese and Yokohama Specie Banks are

the only foreign institutions generally operating in Manchuria. The former has recently closed its branches at Mukden, Kirin, and Hailar, and, according to late information, intends doing likewise with the Kuangchengtzu and Tsitsihar offices.

In marked contrast to Russian retrenchment has been Japanese extension throughout southern Manchuria. The Yokohama Specie Bank has opened offices at Newchwang, Dalny, Port Arthur, Liaoyang, Mukden, Tiehling and Kuangchengtzu and contemplates an installation at Kirin and Harbin. It is difficult, however, to ascertain whether this rapid expansion has been justified by actual profits or been the result of deliberate government policy.

There are provincial banks at the three Manchurian capitals. At Kirin and Tsitsihar, and, to a certain extent, at Mukden, they have been highly profitable to the officials interested therein, but at the two former places they have complicated rather than relieved the financial situation.

The Chinese Imperial Government, or Hu Pu, Bank has branches at Newchwang, Mukden, Tsitsihar, Antung and Kirin, but has confined its activities thus far chiefly to operations in exchange.

The activities of Japanese and of British and American firms in Manchuria have proven that the present trade of the country is but the beginning of what may be expected if transportation facilities are extended, fresh immigrants brought in to people the fertile but now uninhabited tracts to the north, and intelligent selling methods adopted. For American interests, the Standard Oil Company has now branches in charge of native agents in practically all the principal Manchurian cities. The British American Tobacco Company, with a factory at Mukden, has Europeans or Americans at the main trade centers, and both these concerns have inspectors

who regularly visit the various branches to study the demands of their business. At the agricultural experiment stations maintained by the Government, American farming methods are being practically demonstrated with American machines for the benefit of special students and for such farmers as may care to take advantage of the opportunities thus afforded them.

It is because Manchuria's trade is still but a fraction of what it may become and because its growth must depend upon the manner in which, and under whose auspices the country is developed, that the immediate problem is political rather than commercial in character.

There are four chief factors in the situation, sometimes with similar, sometimes with conflicting interests. They are:

(1.) Russia, who desires to preserve the influence that has survived the war;

(2.) Japan, who has already profited largely but who desires to obtain a permanent and increasing influence;

(3.) China, who wishes herself to administer the territory recovered for her from Russia by Japan, without commitment to either, and

(4.) The other trading powers who desire equal commercial opportunity and to whose interest therefore it is to preserve the "open door" and a fair field for their merchants.

Russian interests are now practically confined to the so-called "Railway Settlements" on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and to her steamship lines on the Sungari, Ussuri, and Amur. The merchants established at Harbin, Hailar, Tsitsihar and elsewhere depend for their living largely on the railroad, its traffic and the thousands of employees it has brought to Manchuria. From Hailar there is a considerable trade in Mongolian wool and in fur. Harbin is the purchasing center for Chinese wheat,

which is ground into flour either there or at Blagovestchensk or Habarovsk on the Amur. The beef supply for the railway towns and for the Russian cities on the Amur is also largely secured from Mongolia and during the summer months large herds of cattle are driven north over the highway from Tsitsihar to Aigun. Barring cigarettes, cheap spirits and a certain amount of cotton prints, locally made flour, and some hardware, however, the Chinese buy little from the Russians, receiving cash rather than exchanged products for their wares.

Since the war Russia has transferred to China the telegraph lines which she formerly operated in northern Manchuria, made an equitable arrangement regarding the transmission of messages over the Chinese Eastern Railway Company's wires, and reached an equally satisfactory understanding concerning the handling of Chinese Imperial mails. The only important point of difference with China at present is that dealing with the administration of the "railway settlements." The question is most acute at the largest of these, Harbin, but after two years of negotiation it seems likely that the Railway Administration, which has heretofore insisted on retaining control of the city, will consent to the establishment of an international settlement modeled on that of Shanghai.

Japan, on the other hand, has shown little inclination to meet China's wishes in her Manchurian negotiations. Where Russia has not unnaturally been reluctant to recede from, Japan has constantly endeavored to better, the position in which she found herself at the close of the war. She has seized large tracts of land at Antung and Kuangchengtzu and other cities along the South Manchurian Railway, paying the owners thereof at a rate below the market price if at all. With a questionable

title she continues to work the Fushun coal mines. The operation of the collieries at Penhsihu, near Mukden, has been carried on despite the Chinese protest, and the methods employed by Japanese officials in charge of the Yalu Timber Bureau would long ago have caused serious friction had China been in a position to resist. The occupation of Chientao, a region in southeastern Manchuria, and the actions of the Japanese gendarmeries in that district, the recently terminated competition of Japanese, with the Imperial Chinese Telegraphs, the disregard of China's postal rights, and the present determination of Japan, without China's consent, to commence the construction of a broad-gauge road between Mukden and Antung where her treaty provisions only entitled her within a period which terminated April 15, 1909, to improve a "military railway" built during the war, are the more important of the many incidents which taken as a whole, and without sufficient evidence to the contrary, must be regarded as giving the keynote of Japan's Manchurian policy.

These occurrences, it is true, are perhaps of direct concern only to China and Japan. That Japanese action, however, is not wholly consistent with the spirit certainly of her "open door" declarations may be seen from her prohibition of the Hsinmintun-Fakumen Railway, a road which China desired to build with British capital, and which would have opened a country now only served by cart roads and the river Liao. Mr. Asakawa in his able discussion of Japan's position in Manchuria has failed to touch upon some of the really vital points at issue. Mr. Adachi Kinnosuke in the "World's Work," however, has frankly virtually stated that Japan would dominate Manchuria by right of conquest and has then endeavored to prove that such domination would be beneficial to American and general trade.

This may or may not be true. The fact remains that while Japan drove Russia from Manchuria for the avowed purpose of restoring the Three Provinces to China and in order to preserve the "open door," she now holds to all intents and purposes the same influence and position which in Russia's possession she found so irreconcilable with her ideas of international equity. So much for the theory. Practically Manchuria to-day affords a better market than ever for foreign goods. The communications are better. The people are awake, and the officials stimulated by the danger of foreign encroachment are progressive and intelligently striving to improve and develop the country.

It has been to Japan's interest to bolster the Russian position in the north, for by so doing she preserves precedents which she may turn to her own advantage. Russia has to choose between one of two courses; either she must stand firm and thus add to the strength of her possible future enemy in the south or, as she has seemed not disinclined to do, unite with China to check the growing power of Japan. China must if possible secure Russian support and endeavor also, while strengthening her own administration, to encourage general foreign trade.

To a certain extent this is now being done. The situation in Manchuria, however, is peculiar. In other parts of China, the "treaty ports," cities where foreigners may reside and establish their commercial bases, are located either on the sea coast or on the banks of the great navigable rivers. But few interior cities have been "opened to trade." In Manchuria there are eighteen open cities, of which but two, Newchwang and Antung, are accessible from the sea. All the principal trade marts have been put on the same footing with the ports of entry throughout the Empire. Imports from abroad having paid the regular customs dues are under the

treaties entitled to exemption from local taxation at treaty ports. An attempt was made by the Manchurian authorities to set aside certain limited areas outside these open cities as "foreign settlements" within which foreign goods were to be permitted to enter free from all save the generally uniform five per cent. import duty. Once the goods should leave the settlements, however, the officials were to hold them liable to the "consumption tax," virtually a likin levy. This point was long contested by the consular body at Mukden, which finally in theory won its case. Foreign goods in foreign hands are no longer subjected to the "inland" imposts. Once they enter the charge of the native agents maintained by the foreign firms at the smaller treaty ports, however, these levies are often made. Complaint at the Yamens is generally of little avail, for the Government is not yet strong enough to substitute direct for indirect taxation, and without the revenue derived from the "consumption tax" at these cities, it would be unable to meet running expenses.

It is particularly in regard to these imposts that foreign trade generally is obliged to meet unfair Japanese competition. Japanese merchants, it is true, and particularly the Cotton Exporters Association, which is the most formidable rival of the American mills, receive special consideration from the Government. Their goods are borne to Dalny on subsidized steamships, are carried into the interior on the South Manchurian Railway, which gives rebates in a manner which has hitherto proved of little benefit to foreign shippers, and are handled on long credits and small interest through the assistance of the Yokohama Specie Bank. This Government policy has greatly assisted Japanese trade, but as Mr. Millard, who analyzes Manchurian conditions with great skill in his "America and the Far Eastern

Question," has pointed out, the benefactions of a paternal government can scarcely be considered just grounds for complaint by those competitors whom they place at a commercial disadvantage. Real cause for protest, both to China and Japan, however, as mentioned above, is to be found in the fact that many Japanese merchants, and the same condition would probably be found in the north among the few Russians there doing business, rightfully in the treaty ports, but wrongfully in the interior, refuse to pay the "consumption" or "production" taxes. These traders are settled in towns unopened to trade along the line of the Japanese railway, and have frequently established themselves in other non-treaty ports as well. Chinese protests against their presence have been of no avail, and attempts to dislodge them have been followed by demands for indemnification from Japanese consular authorities. Such merchants compete directly with Chinese dealers who handle non-Japanese foreign goods, and in one case even offer to carry the agency for a foreign firm, claiming as a special advantage to be gained, should the connection be made, that there would be no "consumption tax" to pay.

Popular resentment against Japanese actions and lack of confidence in the quality of Japanese goods are steadily increasing, however, and these facts as well as the Japanese lack of capital, even in the face of government subvention, will in the long run tend to lessen the menace of Japanese competition to general foreign trade. From Russia there is little to fear.

Manchurian trade development to be rapid, and profitable to those concerned, however, must remain unhampered by interference from abroad. China's sovereignty must be conserved and her power strengthened, for an alien domination of Manchuria would but precede the extension of the same influence throughout the

Empire. To create a substantial foreign commercial interest, and by so doing secure a political safeguard for the "Three Eastern Provinces," is as necessary to China's welfare, as the maintenance of her integrity and the preservation of the "open door" are essential to the full realization of the well-warranted hopes for the future of our Eastern markets.

IX

THE OPIUM PROBLEM—ITS HISTORY AND PRESENT CONDITION

It is as difficult to date exactly the beginning of the rise of the opium problem, as we understand it to-day, as it is to date exactly the discovery of the narcotic properties of the poppy. It may be inferred, however, from references made to the poppy in classic literature, that, coincident with the first uses of the poppy in medicine, an abuse of it began. Its lethean qualities were sung by the early Greek and Latin poets.

It is in the more recent times that opium, or the extract of the poppy capsule, came to be widely used as a stimulant or euphoric, and the poppy deliberately cultivated on a large commercial scale for such purposes.

Such a use of opium seems to have coincided with the rise of Islamism. For as Mohammedanism spread over the Near and Far East, the opium problem took shape and fastened itself not only on strictly Islamic communities, but on their neighbors of other faiths. While it was inchoate, both in production and traffic, a great trading company (the East India Company) appeared in the field, and for revenue purposes shaped the production into a firm monopoly, and mortised and tenoned it into the trade, commerce and politics of the Far East. On so firm a rock was that monopoly founded, that it has lasted to this day, and its control of the production and traffic in opium has become so intermixed with the

morals, economics and politics of the Far East that nothing short of the conjoint action of the countries concerned, would seem to be able to blast it.

Within the past few years a determined, international effort has been made to shake the foundations of the opium vice. It will be the purpose of this paper to trace, briefly, the birth and growth of the problem, and the measures now contemplated for its dissolution.

To the Greeks we undoubtedly owe the discovery of opium. They long had a knowledge of the medicinal value of the poppy plant itself, and on the discovery of opium they soon learned of the narcotic properties of the drug. Hippocrates, in the fifth century, B.C., first mentions the juice of poppy capsules, and informs us of its properties and uses. By the first Christian century, the drug had been generally introduced to the Near East, and its qualities made known. The only opium known to commerce at this time was produced in Asia Minor, and the distributors of it to Persia, India, the East Indian Islands and even China, were the Arabs.

On the founding of Islamism, and especially after the founding of the Caliphate and Bagdad, about 763, A.D., we begin to learn of commercial transactions in opium, this traffic being between Arab merchant adventurers and peoples farther east. The traffic extended as far as China.

In the course of trade to China the Islamic traders touched at the Malay Peninsula and East Indian Islands, and no doubt acquainted their peoples with a knowledge of the poppy and opium.

By war as well as by trade the Arabs spread the poppy and opium over the Far East. It is a matter of common knowledge, the rapidity of the spread of Mohammedan power and influence over the Near and Far East after its first establishment in Arabia, early in the seventh

century. That the use of opium as a stimulant or euphoric should have spread with it, appears to be due to the fact that alcohol was strictly forbidden to the adherents of the new religion. The great majority of the followers of the Prophet have fallen into the use, or countenance the use of opium, and even the hemp drugs.

With the cry, "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his Prophet," and we may add, "If you do not accept this dogma, a little opium will improve it," the Mohammedan Arabs, Persians, and Turks overran India. By the eleventh century they had the larger part of that continent under Islamic rule or influence. Under this rule the growth of the poppy and the manufacture of opium became widespread.

But until Europeans began to flock to the Indian Ocean, we have little authentic information as to the exact extent of the production and trade in Indian opium. When we get to the end of the fifteenth and beginning of the sixteenth centuries, we are on more solid historic ground. From Portuguese writers and adventurers of those times, we learn that the use of opium as a stimulant had become an inveterate habit of large numbers of Persians and Indians. We become aware also, that there was a brisk export of the drug from India, Persia and even Egypt, the producing countries, to peoples farther east.

After Vasco de Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope in 1497, Europeans sprang with avidity into the opium traffic which they found firmly established in the hands of Arabs, Turks, Persians and even Chinese.

It is reported by Vespucci that opium and many other drugs too numerous to detail were sent from India to Lisbon in Cabral's fleet. That was in 1501. "Arfium, for so they call opio thebaico," was taken in the capture of, "eight Guzzurate ships." So we are informed by

Giovanni da Empoli in a letter of the year 1511. Then we have the great Don Alfonso de Albuquerque writing the following remarkable passage to his King in a letter from Cananor. On December 1, 1513, he says:

“I also send you a man of Aden, who knows how to work afyam (opium), and the manner of collecting it. If Your Highness would believe me, I would order poppies of the Açores to be sown in all the fields of Portugal and command afyam to be made, which is the best merchandise that obtains in these places, and by which much money is made; owing to the thrashing which we gave Aden, no Afyam has come to India, and where it once was worth 12 pardoes a faracolla, there is none to be had at 80. Afyam is nothing else, Senhor, but the milk of the poppy; from Cayro (*sic*), whence it used to come, none comes now from Aden; therefore, Senhor, I would have you order them to be sown and cultivated, because a shipload would be used yearly in India, and the laborers would gain much also, and the people of India are lost without it, if they do not eat it; and set this fact in order, for I do not write to Your Highness an insignificant thing.” It would seem that “Senhor” did not follow this advice. For the poppy has not been cultivated in Portugal for opium.

A keen observer of conditions on the coasts of East Africa and Malabar was Duarte Barbosa. In 1516 he found the trade established at Aden and on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts of the Deccan. Also at the port of Pegu and at Ava in Burma. At Malacca on the Straits of that name, he found the Chinese busy in the traffic between Malacca and Canton.

These observers found that, according to native sources of information, the cultivation of the poppy and the manufacture of opium had been of many years' standing in India, before Vasco de Gama anchored off Cali-

cut, May 20, 1498. That is, during the time that had elapsed between the Mohammedan conquest of India and the appearance of Vasco de Gama, the poppy had been firmly planted in Indian soil.

When the East India Company's servants began to know the continent of India, all this was confirmed. William Fitch, a merchant connected with the Company, tells us that in the Malwa region especially, the opium trade was an established one long before Western peoples found their way for trade or war to the Indian Ocean. Fitch, who landed at Surat, August 28, 1608, and crossed India to Agra, furnishes a good description of the Indian method of producing opium from the poppy head.

The London East India Company was incorporated in 1698, and immediately began to trade to all points between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan. From the records of that Company, which later did so much to develop the opium trade, we learn much on the subject. In a list prepared by one, John Chamberlain, for the Company in 1699, opium is mentioned as one of the commodities of the East Indies imported by Holland and Portugal.

From the first letter book of the Company, we find that the General Lieutenant and Captains of the fourth voyage (1606), had instruction to buy the best quality of opium. Such opium, however, was not considerable. It was for use in England, and not for exchange in countries farther east than India. The Indo-Chinese opium trade of the Company, which grew to be the largest single factor in the opium problem, was of a later day, and will be referred to directly.

It is clear from these records that there was a brisk commerce in opium between India, the chief source of supply, and Europe, the East Indian Islands and China.

Further that it was carried on by Arabs at first, but later by Portuguese, Dutch, French and even Danish traders. Later, when the Company entered into the traffic, it soon became a monopoly.

But here we must retrace our steps for a moment. When India opened out to European travelers, merchant adventurers and the agents of the large European trading companies, it was found that the Mogul Government had established a loose monopoly of the production and sale of opium wherever its authority ran in India. The exact period when this monopoly was founded is in doubt; but it seems to have been in Akbar's time (1556-1605). It is clear from the remarks of a certain Captain Hamilton, that there was an opium emporium at Patna early in the eighteenth century. In a published account of some thirty years' travel and traffic in India, Hamilton observes, "Patana (Patna), is the next town frequented by Europeans, where the English and Dutch have factories for saltpetre and raw silk. It produces also so much opium that it serves all the countries in India with that commodity." Patna was one of the chief opium manufacturing centers of the Mogul opium monopoly. To-day, as under the Moguls, Patna, along with Benares, is the chief agency of the British Indian opium monopoly.

Just what the early relations were between the East India Company and the Mogul monopoly which it found established in Bengal, it is difficult to state. But it was inevitable that the Company, with its vast commercial and political power, should have to decide either to continue the monopoly as it was found in India, or to discountenance it. The Company's opportunity came when Clive won Plassey in 1757. For its success in that affair gave it control of Bengal and of the Mogul opium monopoly, centered at Patna.

It will be seen that we are approaching critical ground, that we should see the fall, but are about to see the rise and establishment of the opium problem as it confronts us in the Far East even to this day. For we are now face to face with the path taken by an organized trading machine, somewhat conscienceless, where returns counted, and with the armed forces of England behind its commercial schemes.

Before following this new turn in the rise of the opium problem, it will be well to look from the East India Company and India of 1757, and see what has happened in China since its contact with Arabs and those European traders who leaped into the Indian Ocean on the heels of Vasco de Gama's voyage.

It has been mentioned that we have clear evidence that the Arabs visited China during the Caliphate, but there is some evidence that they had traded at Canton a hundred years at least before Mohammed's mother's brother built himself a tomb in that city, and was buried there. The Chinese seem to have known the poppy and the medicinal value of its capsules from early times, but there is unquestionable evidence that their acquaintance with opium, or the extract of the capsule, was made known to them by their Arab visitors.

What we certainly know of the poppy in China is contained in the "Article on the Poppy," contained in the 122d book of the "Lexicon of the Vegetable Kingdom," which again is the fourth division of the "Category of Science and Inanimate Nature," the whole being the fourth category in the "Compendium of Literature and Illustrations, Ancient and Modern," drawn up by Imperial Chinese authority, and published October 23, 1726.

In this "Article on the Poppy," we find that the plant was first mentioned under the name, ying-su, by those

who wrote prior to 819 A.D., that is, during the T'ang dynasty (618-905 A.D.).

From the T'ang dynasty onwards, there are many poetic and other references to the poppy plant, and of its value in medicine. About the year 983 A.D., it entered the Chinese Pharmacopœia, and in the *Materia Medica* of the eleventh century, compiled by Su-sung and others, on the order of the Emperor Jen T'sung, it is stated: "The poppy is found everywhere. Many persons cultivate it as an ornamental flower. . . . When the capsules have become dry and yellow, they may be plucked." The writer goes on to describe the uses of the capsules in medicine.

The first mention in Chinese literature of the extract of poppy heads, that is, opium, is in the fifteenth century. A writer of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), who died sometime in the year 1488, says that opium is the product of the ying-su flower. The writer, Wang Hsi, relates that "Opium is produced in Arabia from a poppy with a red flower. . . . The capsule, while still fresh, is pricked for its juice." It will be observed that this author died ten years before Vasco de Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope.

During the first half of the Ming dynasty (1360-1644), frequent raids were made by the Japanese upon the Chinese coast. This led, in 1523, to an Edict which closed the ports of China to all foreigners. It has been supposed that this closure made opium as well as other foreign drugs, scarce in the Empire. As a consequence, we find contemporary, native writers giving precise directions for the manufacture of opium. Another consequence must have been an increased sowing of the poppy in China and a wider knowledge of the plant and its properties to the Chinese.

Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the Chinese

knowledge of the poppy had grown from the poppy plant and its properties to opium, there is nothing in any authentic document to show that up to the end of the Ming dynasty, they regarded either the plant or opium as other than a medicine.

When we get to the end of the Ming dynasty, a change occurs in the Chinese method and object, in the use of opium. We stumble rather than walk on the rise of the opium-smoking habit, the habit that is China's opium problem to-day.

There is some obscurity in the history of the rise of this habit. Kaempfer, the Westphalian, had noted as early as 1639 that the Javanese combined opium with tobacco and smoked it. The rise of the opium-smoking habit in China seems to have followed the introduction of tobacco smoking to that Empire. The tobacco plant had been transplanted by the Spaniards to the Philippine Islands. From here it appears to have been introduced by way of Formosa to Amoy and its neighborhood, in the Province of Fukien. This was towards the end of the Ming dynasty (1620). 1628-44 were the years of the last Ming Emperor. During this reign the habit of tobacco smoking tended to spread throughout the eastern portion of the Empire. The result was a prohibitory Edict against it. But in vain; the habit could not be checked by law.

The Manchus followed the Mings and in the year 1641 an Edict was again published which prohibited the smoking of tobacco.

The prohibitory Edicts issued by the last Ming and first Manchu seem to have been just as ineffectual against tobacco smoking as were the later Manchu Edicts against opium smoking. During the seventeenth century the spread of the tobacco habit was as rapid and as difficult to control by Edict as the spread of the opium-smoking

habit in the nineteenth century. The prohibitory Edicts emanated from Emperors who it cannot be gainsaid were moved by a deep paternal interest in their people. The common sense of the better classes and the propriety of the Confucian mind were shocked by both practices. But Edicts and shocks to the Confucian mind were powerless on the people as a whole. As Edkins remarks: "Tobacco was a less evil than the Emperor and people supposed. Opium smoking was a far greater evil than they feared. . . . The habit of tobacco smoking became national and went on extending itself for a century, till the attention of the Government was drawn to opium smoking as a thing found in Formosa and at Amoy. It grew up in the same part of the country where tobacco smoking had been introduced."

In 1729 the Chinese Government found itself face to face with a rapidly spreading and alarming vice. Native opium was being diverted from medicinal uses to pander to an evil. The opium poppy began to flourish all over China, while imports of the Indian drug began to move upward. Alarmed, in 1729, the Emperor issued an Edict prohibiting the sale of opium and the opening of opium divans. The penalties imposed on those who disobeyed were severe, the most important being on the sellers of the drug. In 1730 another Edict was aimed at the practice amongst the Chinese colonists in Formosa.

Since these Edicts were promulgated, it may be said in truth that the ruling authorities of China have steadfastly regarded opium smoking as a crime. These two Edicts are the earliest legislation we know of on opium smoking, and they were necessitated by an evil practice which, growing, has in our day almost shackled the people of China. Unfortunately they had but little effect. The trade in Indian opium remained as before or grew. Two hundred chests of Indian opium were annually received

at Canton, and by 1767, just before the East India Company assumed the old Mogul monopoly, the Canton importation had risen to 1,000 chests.

It should be clearly understood before we proceed that the increase in the importation of Indian opium at Canton was not the result of undue pressure by Western merchants or trading companies. The simple truth is that the Chinese had discovered a new and alluring vice, and, like most peoples, had pronated to it. The deep-seated ills attaching to the vice had not come home to the common people, and the history of this opium problem will show that it was only when the Chinese people as a whole began to suffer from the effects of the new vice that they lent their moral support to the restrictive Edicts of their rulers.

During the growth of the opium cancer and even though Edicts had been directed against the sale of opium for smoking purposes, the drug as a medicine could still be imported into China on the payment of three taels a chest, duty. Though the sale of opium for smoking purposes was prohibited, there is no proof that it was refused at the customs as a medicinal drug. Edkins states that, "The minor portion only of the opium imported into China about the time of the conquest of Bengal by Clive, was devoted to smoking. The Superintendents of Customs still continued to take the duty on opium as a drug. . . ." But that a contraband trade in the drug was coming into existence about 1782, that is, after the taking over of the Mogul opium monopoly by the East India Company, seems evident, although there is only indirect evidence that the importation of the drug had been forbidden by the Chinese. This may be shown by a quotation from a letter of Mr. Thomas Fitzhugh written from China to a Mr. Gregory in London.

Mr. Fitzhugh writes: "The importation of opium to China is forbidden under very severe penalties; the opium on seizure is burnt, the vessel in which it is brought to port is confiscated, and the Chinese in whose possession it is found for sale is punishable with death. . . ."

In spite of official ban there can be no doubt that by the last decade of the eighteenth century, what with home-grown opium and the contraband Indian article, the opium-smoking habit had spread widely in eastern and southern China. By 1799, the year in which the East India Company finally saddled itself with the old Mogul monopoly, the smoking habit was recognized as a menace to the Peking populace.

This was too much for the Peking authorities. When the Capital of the Empire and the Metropolitan Province were menaced by the new vice, it was time for the Son of Heaven to cast what to him seemed a deadly bolt. That he did. The Emperor, Kiaking (1798-1821), issued an Edict forbidding the importation of opium to China. The Edict, as well as Mr. Fitzhugh's letter, shows that for some time previously opium had been excluded from the commodities in which trade by barter was permitted. The drug had therefore, it would seem, been contraband before the Edict was promulgated. In the Edict opium was spoken of as "remarkable . . . for a quality of exciting and raising the spirits. The use of opium originally prevailed only among vagrants and disreputable persons . . . but has since extended itself among the members and descendants of reputable families, students, and officers of Government. . . . When this habit becomes established by frequent repetition, it gains an entire ascendant, and the consumer of opium is not only unable to forebear from its daily use, but, on passing the accustomed hour . . . he . . . cannot refrain from tears or command himself

in any degree. . . . The extraordinary expense of this article is likewise to be noticed . . . which the fortunes of the bulk of the community are unable to satisfy . . . and are therefore wholly dilapidated and wasted away." Then follow directions for the enforcement of the Edict. The entire Edict is worth reading, and may conveniently be found in the "Journal of International Law."¹

We see that by the year 1799 the terrors that hung over China from the misuse of opium had been recognized by her rulers, and the most respectable means, an Imperial Edict, had been issued against the further importation of the drug. Undoubtedly, the ever-enlarging Indian opium traffic was aimed at. It is time therefore to pass back to India and see what had been the cause of the issue of this Edict. We will find the East India Company deliberately assuming the monopoly of the production of Bengal opium and of spawning the drug over the fair Far East.

We left the East India Company in possession of Bengal and the old Mogul opium monopoly, as the result of Clive's victory at Plassey, 1757. Without going into much detail it may be stated that, on the 23d day of November, 1773, Warren Hastings, who was then Governor General in India, together with his Council, after a full discussion of the question, deliberately voted to assume the old Mogul opium monopoly. In the resolution passed there was not a word about the evils of the abuse of opium, an evil that, it will be shown directly, Hastings was fully aware of.

Hastings was undoubtedly responsible for the fixing on the Far East of what had hitherto been an irresponsible trade. That he was cynically possessed in the affair may be best shown by the dicta which follow, dicta

¹ July, 1909.

which have been the guiding policy of the British Indian administration up to quite recently.

Dane has recorded that "Hastings urged that it was undesirable to increase the production of any article (opium in this instance) not necessary to life, and that opium was 'not a necessary of life,' but a pernicious article of luxury which ought not to be permitted, but for the purpose of commerce only, and which the wisdom of Government should carefully restrain from internal consumption."

Here in part, there is stated a wise moral principle, and in the whole a discrimination in ethics that is almost singular. A pernicious article of luxury should not be produced. Opium is such an article. In effect the Government of India should carefully restrain the use of the drug to the Indian people. But export this pernicious article to other peoples, and so enhance the revenue of the East India Company. No harm in that. In pursuance of this policy, Hastings, was responsible for the shipment, on account of the Company, of several cargoes of opium to China and the Straits Settlements. The Directors of the Company in London condemned the transactions. It was known to them that the Chinese Government had prohibited the sale of opium for smoking purposes, and they plainly told their representatives in India that it was beneath the dignity of the Company to venture into a clandestine traffic. The export of the drug to China in the ships of the Company was therefore prohibited.

They saw no objection, however, to official ventures in the drug to the Straits of Malacca. In regard to such ventures, the London directors thoughtfully remarked, "Whatever opium might be in demand by the Chinese, the quantity would readily find its way thither without the Company being exposed to the disgrace of being

engaged in an illicit traffic." No hindrance was placed in the path of independent shippers who wished to embark in the carriage of the Company's opium to China. When it is noted that these shippers were licensed by the Company, and could only carry the Company's opium, we shall see that, altogether, the Company shielded the contraband opium traffic with its whole power.

One cannot jump to the year 1799, which was as important a year to the revenue derived by the Company from its opium monopoly as it was to China's opium problem, without recording some of the reasons which led Hastings and his successors to burden the Company with the old Mogul opium monopoly. In 1825, or thereabouts, the Chinese were accused by British apologists of the opium traffic, of wishing to prohibit the importation of opium because it resulted in the export of silver from China, the balance of trade being against that country. As early as 1785, one of the forceful arguments urged by the Company's representatives in India, in favor of the opium monopoly, was that it would preserve the balance of trade to the Company.

In 1785, under Sir John Macferson, Hastings' successor, the principle was accepted that the proceeds of the opium monopoly should be applied at Canton to the benefit of the Chinese trade.

The Governor-General in Council was commended by the Directors for putting the opium trade upon a beneficial footing to the Company, and for supplying the supercargo of the Company at Canton with specie without draining the Indian Provinces. Later, July 29, 1789, Lord Cornwallis, the then Governor General, adduced three reasons why the opium monopoly should be retained by the Company. The third is as follows: "The opium now serves as a remittance to China to answer the bills drawn upon Canton for the provision of the in-

vestment (*i. e.*, the general Chinese trade). Were the trade (opium) to be laid open, it is probable that this reserve might in some measure fail, and occasion the exportation of large sums in silver from this country (India), already too much drained of its circulating specie."

Under the guiding principles worked out by Hastings, Macferson and Cornwallis, and sanctioned by the Company's directors in London, the opium monopoly was finally established in India by Bengal Regulation 6, of 1799; that is the same year in which a humanitarian Emperor of China, knowing of the growth and evil consequences of the contraband opium trade, and realizing the wreckage caused by the smoking of the drug, issued his famous Edict forbidding its entry to China.

Thus it will be seen that the year 1799 was the crucial year of the opium problem. The Emperor of a great people had taken a wise step to preserve the morals of his people. A trading company had deliberately embarked on the production of an "Article not necessary to life. . . . A pernicious article of luxury which the wisdom of Government should carefully restrain."

Neglecting Hastings' economic principle, and accepting his moral dictum, and along with this accepting the wisdom of the Chinese Emperor's Edict, it is almost nonsense to consider the pros and cons of the opium problem from 1799 onwards. The evils of opium were plainly recognized by both parties to the dispute, and the traffic ought to have been suppressed. That was the opinion of many wise Englishmen of that day. But as the pros and cons of the question, after 1799, led to war, the opening of China and to an enlargement and steadier fixation of the opium evil on the Far East, something more must necessarily be said.

No good purpose will be served to detail the British-

Chinese bickerings on opium, and the diplomatic questions that sprang from them, during the years from 1799 to the breaking out of the so-called Opium War in 1839. Those years have been analyzed in a most masterly way by Brinkley,² while nearly all later writers, as well as the trend of events for the solution of the opium problem, place the Chinese almost wholly in the right and the East India Company, and afterwards Great Britain, almost wholly in wrong.

Suffice it to say that the higher Chinese authorities never wavered in their opposition to the spread of the opium evils and the contraband opium trade, although minor Chinese officials connived at it. Contraband traders bought freely of Indian opium at Calcutta and by hook or crook got it on shore, chiefly at Canton, and did not hesitate to introduce it too at other Chinese ports higher up the coast. The exportation from India to China grew enormously, from 1,000 chests in 1800 to 18,000 chests in 1839.

In the year 1839 the Chinese Emperor and his advisers determined to make an effective stand in the moral and economic interests of their people. To this end, one of the most remarkable characters in Chinese history was sent to Canton with special powers to stop the contraband trade in opium—Special High Commissioner Lin, to give him his full title. Mr. King, an American merchant at Canton, has given an impression of him: "From the whole drift of his conversation and inquiries during the interview, it seemed very evident that the sole object of the Commissioner was to do away with the traffic in opium, and to protect that which is legitimate and honorable."

It is a Chinese fashion to issue proclamations broad-

² In House of Commons Resolution, May, 1906. *Journal of International Law*, July, 1909.

cast. On his arrival at Canton, Lin proceeded to do so, intending that there should be no mistake as to his object. To the foreign merchants he said: "Why do you bring to our land the opium which in your land is not made use of, by its defrauding men of their property and causing injury to their lives? I find that with this thing you have seduced and deluded the people of China for tens of years past; and countless are the unjust hoards you have thus acquired. Such conduct arouses indignation in every human heart, and it is utterly inexcusable in the eye of Celestial reason."

Lin not satisfied with appealing to the Canton merchants, and be it understood that there were Americans amongst them, and the Chinese people, composed an address, which he meant to have forwarded to Queen Victoria, then on the British throne. The following is an extract from it: "Your honorable nation, though beyond the wide ocean, acknowledges the same ways of Heaven, and has a like perception of the distinction between benefit and injury. . . . But there is a tribe of depraved and barbarous people, who, having manufactured opium for smoking, bring it hither for sale, and seduce and lead astray the simple folk, to the destruction of their persons and the draining of their resources. Formerly the smokers thereof were few, but of late the practice has spread. . . . Hence those who deal in opium, or who inhale its fumes within this land, are all now to be subjected to severest punishment, and a perpetual interdict is to be placed on the practice so extensively prevailing. . . . Doubtless you, the Honorable Sovereign of that nation, have not commanded the manufacture and sale of it. . . . We have heard that in your honorable nation the people are not permitted to inhale the drug. . . . But what is the prohibition of its use in comparison with the prohibition of its sale and

manufacture, as a means of thoroughly purifying the source? . . . We would now then concert with your Honorable Sovereignty, means to bring to a perpetual end this opium, so hurtful to mankind, we in this land forbidding the use of it, and you in the nations under your dominion forbidding its manufacture. . . . Will not the result of this be the enjoyment by each of a felicitous condition of peace?"

Strange that in the year 1907 Great Britain and China should enter into just such an agreement. For beginning with the year 1908, Great Britain undertook to cut down her production and exportation of Indian opium by one-tenth per annum, China agreeing to a *pari passu* ten per cent. per annum reduction in her own production and abuse of the drug. Lin must have turned in his tomb when this agreement was signed.

To continue our narration: Complicated and angry relations soon developed between Commissioner Lin and Captain Elliott, who as Superintendent of Trade represented England in China. The result was that Lin placed guards about the factories at Canton. Later, suspecting that Elliott was about to withdraw the whole foreign community, Lin "doubled the guards, and drew around the factories a cordon of troops and cruisers marshaled in menacing array."³ In the face of this demonstration, foreign merchants of all nationalities, with few exceptions, signed a document pledging themselves "Not to deal in opium or to attempt to introduce it into the Chinese Empire."⁴ But Lin wanted more. He wanted all of the opium in the factories, and bonds placing the lives and properties of future smugglers at the disposal of the Chinese authorities. To the former demand Elliott acceded. He issued a circular calling upon the British merchants to "surrender to the service of Her Majesty's Government," all the opium in their

³ Brinkley.

⁴ *Ibid.*

possession, and he officially accepted "the most full and unreserved responsibility on account of the property thus handed over." Twenty thousand two hundred and eighty-three chests of opium were delivered to him. It was valued at between two to three millions. Lin promptly destroyed it. Undoubtedly it was one of the happiest days of his life.

After the surrender of the opium, there were several defiant cases of smuggling. Later, in April, 1839, a riot occurred at Hong Kong in which a Chinese was killed; yet later there was an exchange of shots between the parties and the war was precipitated.

The British Government determined to support Captain Elliott in carrying on war, but repudiated the financial responsibility he had assumed on the delivery of the opium to him by the foreign merchants.

I need not describe the actual conflict that now took place; as the so-called Opium War it has its place in history. All that need be said about it here is that it was ended by the Treaty of Nanking. That Treaty was signed in 1842. When it came to be examined it was found that the great cause of the war was scarcely mentioned. There was not a word in it that compelled the Chinese to receive Indian opium. No attempt was made by the Treaty to legalize the opium trade. However, Article IV. of the Treaty pledged the Chinese as follows: "The Emperor of China agrees to pay the sum of \$6,000,000 as the value of opium which was delivered up at Canton in the middle of March, 1839."

As to whether the Treaty of Nanking ended a war that could be fairly called an Opium War, has been discussed *ad nauseam*. This is certain: By compelling the Chinese Government to pay for the destroyed opium, after the agent of the British Government had assumed

the financial responsibility, it fixed in the Chinese mind and in all defenders of the Chinese, that it was indeed an Opium War.

There is a popular misconception that the Treaty of Nanking legalized the Indo-Chinese opium traffic. This is a mistake. The traffic was and remained a contraband traffic until the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858. But there is no doubt that Article IV. of the Nanking Treaty broke down any effective resistance which the Chinese authorities had brought against it, and the traffic, though still officially contraband, was openly and without hindrance pursued. Chinese officials connived at it. It grew apace, and from an importation of 18,000 chests in 1839 there was a growth to 50,000 chests in 1858, when the Arrow War, or second British war with China, broke out. The result of this war was the Tientsin Treaty of 1858 and the legalization of the opium traffic. For the Chinese Government, being wholly unable to command the contraband trade, permitted opium to enter the country on the payment of 30 taels duty per picul. No doubt Indian financiers smiled, for they saw the Indian opium revenue entrenched, it would seem, for all time.

By the end of the last century, as the result of a two hundred years' struggle against the debasing habit of opium smoking, China found herself bound hand and foot by treaties⁵ legalizing the traffic, and some sixty thousand piculs of foreign opium—chiefly Indian—pouring in on her, and an internal production of the drug that had grown to the enormous total of three hundred and twenty-five to thirty thousand piculs, all used for smoking purposes. So much for the effect of the Indian

⁵ France, America, Russia and other powers accepted the British treaty of 1858 as the basis of their future relations with China.

opium traffic on China. What has been the effect of that traffic on other Eastern peoples?

Turning to India first: did the East India Company, and after the oblivion of that Company in 1834, the British Government, in accepting Hastings' advice that opium was for commerce only, accept his dictum that the wisdom of the Government should carefully restrain its use by the people in its immediate charge. Certainly not. An excise system was organized in British India, through which to this day the people of India, under British rule, are supplied with what opium they want. The main object of this system is to prevent the use of opium, except that produced by the Bengal opium monopoly. The British Royal Commission on the opium question practically pronounced in their 1895 Report that the use of the drug by the Indian people was, on the whole, beneficial. Until recently that idea has dominated the British Indian administration.

Now turn to Burma. "Formerly there was a strong religious feeling among the Buddhists (the Burmans are Buddhists), against the use of opium, as there is in Japan, one of the cardinal commandments of Buddha being interpreted to forbid the use of opium as well as intoxicants. As Buddhism continues to lose its power, this feeling continues to diminish in intensity. On the other hand, wherever there is a strong Buddhist feeling, there is a religious and social denunciation of the opium vice. In such places a Buddhist who smokes opium is classed with thieves, liars and outcasts; and the term 'opium smoker' is regarded by the Burmese as the epithet 'liar' is by the Anglo-Saxon. Buddhism was once so strong a force as to keep the Burmese from the use of opium; but this force became weakened by contact with English influence. As a people usually passes from one religion to another through a period of ethical

disorganization, during which evil influences are likely to triumph, so the Burmese, passing from Buddhism towards Christianity, have reached the ethical condition in which opium, morphia and cocaine can do the greatest harm."

So state the Opium Committee appointed in 1904 by the Philippine Government to study the opium problem as it then appeared in the Far East. British contact with Burma was the cause of the spread of the opium habit amongst that people, and this at the time when the moral force of Buddhism began to lose force.

In British India the British found the opium habit established before their entry, and they have done little or nothing to check it. On the other hand, when they entered Burma they found the Burmese, on the whole, opposed to the habit. But it soon spread with direful consequences. Yet it is to the credit of Indian administrators that as soon as the evil effect of the habit was observed on the Burmans, strenuous attempts were made to check the sale and use of the drug amongst them.

In Ceylon, where before British influence there was little or no use of opium, there has been an enormous growth of the habit. It would be dangerous to state that the habit in this island was deliberately fostered in the interests of the revenue-producing opium monopoly of British India proper. In 1840 there was an importation of the drug into Ceylon, amounting to 1,562 pounds. In 1900, 23,000 pounds. These figures tell only too truly of the rise of the opium habit amongst the Singalese.

The Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States of the Malay Peninsula contain a large Chinese population. They have therefore been large fields for the exploitation of Indian-produced opium. So also in Hong Kong. In this Island as well as in the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States, the sale of opium is

farmed to the highest responsible bidder, and all three administrations derive a large revenue from the sale of the farm.

In the Philippine Islands it was the custom under Spanish rule to farm the sale of opium, and fully thirty per cent. of the Chinese population were addicted to the habit. It began to spread to the Filipinos themselves, threatening moral and economic disaster. The importation of opium is, however, now forbidden except for medicinal purposes.

In the United States, Canada and Australia⁶ fully thirty per cent. of the Chinese population were addicted to the habit of opium smoking, and it is beyond doubt that the habit has tended to spread to the undesirable elements of the white people of all of these countries.

It should be remembered that this enormous use of opium, either internally as in India, or for smoking amongst the Chinese, depends primarily on the opium produced by the British Indian opium monopoly. A small part of it is lower grade Turkish and Persian opium. But the chief beneficiary is the British Indian Government through its opium monopoly.

It should not be thought that this opium problem has grown without protest. Statesmen, humanitarians, British chiefly, but those of other nations, have inveighed against it. Active movements have been set afoot to counteract it, and in 1894 it seemed that the Indian opium traffic was in for its quietus when the friends of the movement, both within and without the British Parliament, succeeded in having a Royal Commission appointed to study and report on the problem. But the sympathizers of this movement were doomed to disappointment, for the Royal Commission's Report nullified

⁶ In all these countries the importation and manufacture of smoking opium is now prohibited.

the efforts that had been made to bring the Indian opium traffic to an end. Despondency reigned for ten years.

Then the American Government in the Philippines found itself confronted by the fact that opium smoking was on the increase in the Islands. Not only were the Chinese becoming demoralized, but the habit of opium smoking was spreading to the native Filipinos themselves. A Committee appointed by the Islands Government studied the opium problem as it appeared in the Far East, and in 1905 reported against it. As a result restrictive measures were taken and finally a prohibitory law was made effective March, 1908, which forbade the importation of opium into the Philippines, except for medicinal purposes.

There can be no doubt that Chinese statesmen, the foreign mission body in China, and those members of the Chinese community who took an interest in external affairs, were deeply interested in the effort of a great friendly Power to eradicate the opium evil from its recently acquired territory. When it was seen that, and we may use the words of Lord Morley: "The United States so regarded the evils of opium smoking that it would not even passively assent to its citizens engaging in the traffic," there was great joy in China. Her statesmen took heart and before long a movement was on foot to suppress the opium evil in China. To this end an agreement was made with Great Britain that the export of opium from India to all countries should be reduced per annum by one-tenth of the then average import of the Indian drug into China. This was determined to be 52,000 chests. Therefore, the total export from India, or 67,000 chests, was to be reduced by 5,200 chests a year. This agreement is for ten years, beginning January 1, 1908. China on her part agreed to reduce her internal production of opium by one-tenth per annum, *pari*

passu with the Indian reduction in production and export.

At this point the United States intervened by inviting the Powers with material interests in the Far East to join her in an International Opium Commission whose duty it should be to study the opium problem in all its aspects, and report as to the proper means for its solution. This invitation the Powers accepted in a most gracious spirit, and on February 1, 1909, delegations from America, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Italy, Japan, Austro-Hungary, Persia, Portugal, Russia, and Siam met at Shanghai and entered upon their labors.

The result was a thorough exposé of the opium problem, its condemnation, and certain unanimous Declarations as to the best means of solving it. Except for their moral effect these Declarations had no binding force. But it was recognized from the first day that the Commission met, that if a unanimous verdict against the opium evil could be achieved, it would be incumbent upon the American Government to take a step that would convert the Declarations of the Shanghai Commission into international law. Some dissatisfaction has been expressed because the Shanghai Commission did not finally settle the opium problem. But that Commission was from the first a Commission for study and report. It had no powers beyond these. Having little, or comparatively little, material interest in the opium question, and having convened the Commission, it became the duty of the American delegates, in their leadership, to work for harmony and unanimity. Should the Commission break up with a majority and minority report, the entire question would again be in the melting pot; the earnestness that undoubtedly lay behind Great Britain's entry into the Ten Year Agreement with China

would have been chilled, and the reform movement in China would have received a fatal blow. Further, it would have been impossible for the United States to have retained the initiative in the international movement.

Fortunately the Shanghai Commission moved harmoniously, and adjourned after adopting unanimous Declarations. This left the field clear for the American Government to call an International Conference with full-powers to conventionalize the Shanghai Declarations and such questions as grew out of them. This the American Government has done. It would be out of place to dilate on the proposed Conference at the present juncture. But there seems no reason to doubt that by the co-operation of those Powers with the United States, who have large financial as well as moral interests in the opium problem, it will be but a short time when that problem will be solved by international law. Too much praise cannot be bestowed on Great Britain, who after a hundred years' stubborn fight to retain her Indian opium revenue, is now showing her ability to dispense with that revenue, and her willingness to join with China in suppressing her opium evil.

X

THE CHINESE ARMY—ITS DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT STRENGTH

A COMBINATION of great events, coming in quick succession, is responsible for the awakening of China. The events were the Boxer rebellion, the capture of Peking and the Manchurian War. As generally occurs at such times also, a man was ready in the person of Yuan Shih Kai, the Viceroy of Chihli, who possessed the necessary ability and force to give direction to events.

From 1903 to 1906 he formed six divisions of troops, armed, equipped and disciplined them, brought them together for grand maneuvers. From every point of view it was a great event to raise a modern army of 80,000 men in three years in the land which was well known to be the most backward in the world in military matters.

The influence of Yuan Shih Kai went into other hands soon after his first great performance. Four of his divisions were taken from him and placed in the hands of a Board of War, but the trained men of his battalions have been scattered abroad to form the nucleus for others soon to be raised throughout the Empire.

The first plans for an Imperial army, formed in 1907, were grand enough. The scheme was for thirty-six divisions of troops, or two for each province of the Empire, to be formed in five years. The model was the armies of Germany and Japan. Each of the thirty-six divisions was to consist of two brigades; each brigade of two regiments; each regiment of three battalions; making 432 battalions in all. The divisions were to be each

a small army in itself, numbering about 13,000 men, including, besides the two brigades of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, a regiment of artillery, a battalion of engineers, a battalion of transport troops and a company of sanitary (or hospital) troops. In time of peace this would give about 460,000 men.

The term of service in the peace army was fixed at three years. Service was to be voluntary so long as the necessary contingents could be gotten in that way. In the course of time it was contemplated that the ordinary form of compulsory military service would be adopted.

With a three-year term of enlistment it would be necessary to discharge one-third of the army each year and to replace them by new men. The new men would be taken from the great mass of youths who reach the age of twenty years during the year. In a country as large as China at the least calculation this annual class would be a million and a half men, and to keep up an army of 460,000 it would only be necessary to use one in ten, or half the proportion used in Japan. When discharged the men would go to their homes, and three years would be passed in the first reserve, three years in the second reserve, and three years in the National army, making twelve years of obligation of military service, for those who had been called to the colors. This would mean 150,000 trained and drilled men added to the reserve each year.

It was planned that the last of the new army was to be ready in 1912. In nine years more (in 1920) nine classes of trained reserves would be available. Thus a military force of a million and a half of men are counted on and provided for by the far-reaching schemes of the War Board of China. In time of war each of the peace divisions of 13,000 would be raised with reserves to 25,000, making 900,000 men, and a reserve di-

vision for each regular division would take up the balance of the instructed men. The head of the army is Tieh Liang, formerly a supporter of Yuan Shih Kai, but now a rival. He is without military training, but seems to have executive ability.

In addition to this, plans for military schools were made, and machine shops and cartridge factories were ordered in each province. Three new arsenals for the manufacture of guns, rifles, equipment, and war material of every kind were to be established. A general staff of approved model, along the well-known lines of the German and Japanese, was ordered.

With such plans every officer would in the course of time be a graduate of a national military academy, all war material would be manufactured within the country itself, and the higher duties of command would be in the hands of specially trained officers.

Sir Robert Hart, the distinguished Englishman who has for many years been in charge of the customs service of the Empire, estimated that with a logical revenue system based on a land tax the revenues of the Empire could be raised to six hundred million dollars a year, affording ample funds for the support of the army, for building of a navy and leaving a large reserve for internal improvements. So far his recommendations have not been approved. Here lies the greatest difficulty to success. The Empire practically consists of a number of sovereign states, each one governed by a Viceroy. The Viceroys are charged with the raising of revenue within their own jurisdictions and are practically independent of the general Government. As a result the aggregate revenue of the Empire seems to be absurdly small, and will remain so until some national system of finance is adopted, following the general plan of Sir Robert Hart, or some other plan suited to its needs and resources.

The thirty-six divisions were by no means the limit of China's ambition. Still other schemes for an Imperial Guard Corps and for forty-five divisions have been approved. As, however, the scheme of thirty-six divisions is still incomplete it will be well to ignore the others and to consider how far those plans have progressed up to the present.

Two years have now passed out of the five years which were fixed as the time for the formation of the great Chinese army. The scheme itself might well have been beyond the fondest dream of the greatest soldier who ever lived. The armies of Alexander, Cæsar, Hannibal, and Napoleon were not made by the men who led them to victory. They are always the product of many years of national aspiration, or lust of power or hope of revenge. It is entirely too soon to judge of such a mighty task as the formation of a modern army in such a country as China, but we can tell what has been done.

Of infantry about 220 battalions out of the 420 required to make up the thirty-six divisions had been formed at the beginning of the present year. The formation of the remaining 200 battalions was to be distributed over the current year, 1909, and the next three years at an average rate of fifty battalions per year.

The cavalry and artillery have not gone so far as the infantry, and less than half of the organizations have been formed. Special troops of engineers, telegraph, transport and medical services are somewhat further behind.

On the whole the Chinese army now numbers 200,000 men of all arms, of which probably 120,000 may be said to be well instructed, armed and equipped and able to give a good account of themselves in a war.

As the system has only begun, there has not been time to accumulate large reserves of instructed men. This, as

I said before, will not be done completely until 1920, even if the present plans are not delayed. At present only two of the divisions have reserves—two of Yuan's original divisions have discharged enough men to raise them from a peace to a war strength and to provide the additional reserve brigade, which is added in time of war to each division.

To arm these masses China has been obliged to use weapons that are considered somewhat out of date. There are four types of rifles, mostly Mausers and Japanese Murata rifles of old pattern. They are, however, breech-loading, small-caliber weapons, not to be despised, even if they do not reach the ideal which some nations set. In fact they are the weapons which have been used in the great wars of most recent date.

It is so also with the artillery where even a greater difference of types is to be observed. This is, undoubtedly, a serious drawback, owing, of course, to the great difficulty of providing ammunition.

The scheme is to furnish arms and artillery of the latest and of a uniform type to the entire army also by the close of 1912, when the army is complete. It is doubtful if this will be done, but certainly a steadily increasing number of new weapons will be furnished. For the manufacture of war material there now exist the great arsenals at Hankow and Shanghai, which have a capacity of perhaps 30,000 rifles and 100 guns per year—but it is planned to build three additional arsenals, so far in the interior as to be safe from outside enterprises. At present they have to depend upon foreign workmen to a considerable extent. In addition each province has now already formed or in process of formation repair shops and powder cartridge factories.

For the education of officers for this great army many schools are necessary. In each province a cadet school

is established. There are four officers' schools for a more advanced course and a war college is to be established for the special instruction of a general staff. One of the most illuminating results of this military policy is the establishment of a special military school for the sons of the nobility and the royal family.

For these schools there are a number of Japanese instructors and some German, but the majority are Chinese who have studied in Japan and abroad.

The number of students in these military schools is now seven thousand, a number that is to be gradually increased to almost double in 1912, when it is expected that the annual output will be 2,000 graduates, which will be the number needed to provide officers for the new army.

For special services, such as engineers, telegraph, medical corps and supply corps, there are in addition twenty-one schools.

About seven hundred Chinese are now in the military schools of Japan, a number which is now to be reduced to fifty each year. There are about fifteen in Europe and two graduated at the Military Academy at West Point a year ago.

The school is also one of the most important parts of the soldier's life. In addition to his four hours' drill per day, he is required to spend two hours at school. The schools themselves have broken away from Chinese precedent and tradition of thousands of years. Western learning is taught and Western methods are used. Instead of the classics we find them studying writing, arithmetic, history, physiology, geography, and hygiene. A special importance is given to cultivating ideas of patriotism and honor.

Each year a portion of the troops are concentrated for maneuvers. At first the maneuvers were marked by the

presence of a number of Japanese advisers; they have now disappeared.

When a new brigade is formed it is to be remembered that much money must be expended and much planning done. Large barracks and storehouses must be built for the thousands of men and the arms, clothing and equipment. Well-instructed officers and non-commissioned officers must be ready to proceed without delay to the instruction and discipline of the new levies.

When a new division is formed, therefore, a number of officers taken from the previously raised commands are sent to the new district. They take charge of the necessary preliminary arrangements for enlisting, housing, clothing and equipping the men. They then form one or more school battalions as a nucleus. After a year of hard work the members of these corps are able to act as non-commissioned officers in the instruction of the balance of the brigade which is then formed.

The Chinese troops in Manchuria have been borrowed from other provinces. The idea is to replace them by new organizations at home and to form permanent divisions in Manchuria. One division is kept in Kirin province, where the Russians also have a dual possession. Another division is in the vicinity of Mukden, where the Japanese have also possession.

The Japanese have in Manchuria, including Port Arthur and the Kuantung peninsula, an entire division of troops and six companies of railway guards. This is under the provisions of the Portsmouth Treaty, permitting a guard of fifteen men for each kilometer of the railway. This dual occupation presents many anomalous conditions.

So far the Japanese appear to confine themselves quite carefully to the railroad, and the Chinese troops seem to have considerable occupation outside in hunting the

bands of "hunghutse," or robbers, who have always infested the country. It is probably impossible that the arrangement will be satisfactory to either party. It cannot last many years longer, but the result is difficult to foretell.

Since the annihilation of her navy in the war with Japan in 1894, China has done very little in the way of replacing it. Beyond a number of small ships which are employed mostly as river police there is no navy.

Coincident with the raising of the army is the expansion of the railway system. Probably in a short time a railway will be completed from Hong Kong to Mukden, by way of Canton, Hankow, Peking, Tientsin. Such a system with the other roads now existing and the great river lines will bring fourteen out of the eighteen provinces within easy reach of one another, and will solidify the offensive or defensive power of the Empire.

Upon the question of the efficiency of this new Chinese army widely different opinions prevail. A general line of pessimism runs through the accounts of most of the observers who have written about it. Some say that this army which has now been raised is no better than that which opposed the Japanese in 1894 and the allies in the advance on Peking in 1900 at the time of the Boxer outbreak. It is declared that the generals are incompetent, that the junior officers have no initiative, the troops no enthusiasm, and that it will be utterly impossible to procure the money necessary to complete the arrangements now in view.

There is good ground for all of this criticism. The army seems to lack a strong directing head. We do not see the influence of a Meckel or a Von der Goltz, which so strongly marked the beginnings of the Japanese and Turkish armies. The chief of the army is said to be a man without military training. The development of the

army since 1906 has fallen far short of what was accomplished by Yuan Shih Kai before that. The absence of a national budget makes it necessary to turn over the support of the divisions to the Viceroys of the provinces in which they are raised. As there are many provinces and many Viceroys, there is a great variety in methods and efficiency.

On the other hand, the critics seem too eager to measure the Chinese army by the high standard of Europe and Japan. They do not give sufficient credit to the fact that this national movement is in its infancy. They forget that the creation of an army out of nothing has always taken years of patient endeavor.

I have pointed out briefly what has been accomplished and what is hoped for in the future. The army may not be armed with weapons of the best model, but it has several hundred thousand rifles and seven or eight hundred guns which are not to be despised and which have stood the test of great wars. We see the temples of Buddha turned into public schools in a nation which for centuries has lived only on tradition and which has steadily refused to believe that it was possible to learn anything new. In this introduction of Western thought and learning the army is perhaps the greatest factor. Thousands of young men are studying to be officers. The battalion schools of the army of 200,000 men are spending two hours of study to six of drill. The military profession is now honored where formerly it was despised; it is realized that it can only be learned by building a new educational system upon the ruins of the old; it is sought by the most favored youth of the land. The psychological condition of the masses seems to be changing; a feeling of patriotism and pride is taking the place of indifference.

Whatever shortcomings we may find in this Chinese

army, we cannot forget that in many respects it is ideal. The Chinese soldier has few needs, is obedient and is a fatalist by nature. His daily life would be a trial and a hardship to almost any other soldier. He subsists on little, travels long distances, and seems to be immune to those common diseases which have destroyed many armies. Moreover, it is no small accomplishment to have worked out a military organization for an army suited to national needs and capable of indefinite expansion; to accompany it with drill books and regulations which follow approved ideas.

Conclusion

In 1906, just before the present military scheme was adopted, Tieh Liang memorialized the Throne, and he quoted from some long-forgotten Chinese classic in these words: "Though all under Heaven is at peace, if the art of war be forgotten there is peril." It looks as if these words had now sunk deep into the heart of the whole nation.

XI

CONDITIONS, FAVORABLE AND OTHERWISE, IN CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT

THERE has been a disposition on the part of writers and speakers in dealing with the Oriental to resort to what might be called literary demagogy. At the present time, with a keen interest in all that pertains to an awakening country, American audiences and readers demand an all-romance Chinaman, and even missionaries and consuls, normally a truthful and judicious folk, have yielded to the temptation. The result is a country bursting with good things and especially a people faultlessly dressed in silk gowns, who never fail to provide for their aged parents "in the village," a people who divide their time between telling the truth to their own hurt and making pretty lacquer boxes to give to friends, preferably Americans, with no thought of a return gift next "Chinee New Year's." It is a useful antidote to this pleasing picture—though it reflects most creditably on our human nature—to recall the "hurry calls" from foreigners in the interior on the consul for a gunboat, when our fellows of the Middle Kingdom are restless. At such a time we realize that perfection does not yet dwell among men; and incidentally we discover that the Chinese have qualities unrevealed on the Chautauqua circuit and omitted in the latest "big sellers" of the book market.

The Chinese are an admirable people and can teach us some things, notably the simple, non-competitive life, but we will not too soon surrender the institutions, at-

tainments and viewpoints of Anglo-Saxon civilization. The Chinese Empire is old and its 400,000,000 live in comparative peace, but the question is, What have they done with their time? for mere age is little. They are credited with revealing gun-powder, the compass and other discoveries, but the nations of earth do not go to China to buy these things—they are there not very well made. Perhaps the modern test of a civilization would be what it does, not for individuals, but for the rank and file of its people; and China does not do much for them. It has not brought out the powers of the individual. Not one in ten can read and write—the proportion is likely much smaller. The people are not well nourished; great numbers live on the margin of famine. As one sees an army of coolies at work, he feels that among them are potential artists and painters, inventors, captains of industry, intellectual and spiritual leaders—men who, if their powers were unlocked, might confer benefits, not only on their own people but on humanity; but Confucianism and the other factors in Chinese civilization have not furnished the dynamics. Neither are their material resources developed; China is almost exclusively an agricultural country, though it is rich in mines and has the raw material, the labor and the markets, that, energetically exploited, might dot the Empire with centers of manufacture and production. It is significant of the wealth of the country that by agriculture alone is supported a population five times our own on an area equal to the United States east of the Rocky Mountains.

It is unlikely American friends of China realize the poverty of the Chinese people. There is wealth in the coast ports; and in the eighty or ninety walled towns of each of the eighteen provinces one sees in the stocks of goods in the stores and in the dress of the people some evidences of prosperity; but the mass of the people have

only the bare necessities, and a walk from village to village reveals an unprogressiveness, a pinching poverty that depresses one—for though the needs of the Chinese are small, they yet find it difficult to earn enough to secure the essentials of life. Twenty cash are equal to a cent; eleven of these cash will buy a bowl of rice. But often the two or three cents a day are hard to get.

One does not realize the far-reaching usefulness of the "right of property" as a civilizing force until he lives in a country where property must hide its head. Where a man is protected in his invention, in coöperative industry, in getting rich—under such auspices men are free to do things industrial; capital gathers, resources are developed; all the blessings of material prosperity follow. But in a land where the man with a dollar is a marked man—where the resident in a handsome home is subject to a compulsive demand to build a bridge or loan to the magistrate, or perhaps to a visit of bandits by night, with no efficient police to protect the citizen—the forward movement is checked. It is not worth while to amass wealth if one may not enjoy it or to establish a factory when it merely becomes a target for interference and exaction. The coast ports of China have many wealthy Chinese; they load their women with diamonds and own many of Shanghai's two hundred and fifty automobiles. These Chinese are frank to say they live in Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Tientsin because of foreign auspices and protection. They would prefer to live on the soil of their birth. So the first need of China is some material prosperity. No man can do much until his stomach is full; until he has a dollar in his pocket. But there can be no material prosperity until property is protected—and this calls for more efficient government. I traveled a thousand miles in the interior, but saw only one or two smoke-stacks; no signs of coöperative, am-

bitious industry; no manufacturing, little mining—agriculture almost exclusively. One can think of scarcely a large producing concern in China that is not shared in by officials; and those on a pure citizen dividend basis are not unhampered as are the shoe factories, knitting mills and power plants of the United States, England and Germany.

Until the wars of 1840 and 1860 the Chinese really believed their country was the dominant kingdom of earth in point of arms; indeed this idea lingered, as shown by the purpose in the Boxer uprising, to expel once and for all the foreigners. At last, however, the Chinese know they are weak in comparison with the powers of the earth. But this is weakness only in the department of armaments; it would not occur to any Chinese to envy the civilization of the foreigner. The advanced ones see and recommend to their fellows some of our inventions and institutions; they lament the unprogressiveness of their Empire. But no Chinese apologizes for being Chinese. He is rich in native dignity, in race pride. It is in national pride that he is defective. He has local, family pride; sometimes villages war with each other over some clan insult until the fields are dotted with dead, slain with blunderbusses charged with nails and stones, or killed with mattocks and crude field implements. The Chinese is willing to die for a cause that appeals to him. But to organize and march to die for the Empire—even to get interested and excited—is not in him, at least it has not been until of late. Love of the Empire is not a concept that is real. Clan, neighborhood, dialect, to an extent religion—these are live things to him, but the average peasant has no national appreciation, enthusiasm or purpose. Indeed, the next province and its people may be as uncongenial to him as at times is the foreigner—may be more so. The hostility between re-

gions is often veteran and deep. When I took my personal attendant on a trip up the China coast, I was cared for by American consuls, but my "boy," turned over to the kitchens, nearly starved; he did not speak their tongues, he was a barbarian among his own people. The country of China is so big, the people are so varied in language and traditions, and so unacquainted; they have so little to do with the Imperial authorities, they feel so little gratitude to the Government, a gulf separating official and citizen, that there is but the beginning of a real patriotic love of the country as a whole. It is for this reason that it has been said a well-equipped invading force of 40,000 men could march from one end of the Empire to another. There is a modern army forming of Chinese, and their efficiency will increase with organization and a developed patriotism; but for thrills over the Dragon flag or under the strains of the national air—(and there is a Chinese national air arranged in our own musical code)—for a willingness to sacrifice and lose, one must look to the student class, the Chinese educated in Japan or abroad, or in the colleges under foreign auspices in China, where in the beauty and loftiness of youth they have learned of well-ordered states, of efficiency and integrity of administration, of public moneys scrupulously administered, of health and fortune and future gladly laid on the altar of public service. Do not misunderstand me—unselfishness and self-sacrifice were at work in China before modern states emerged from barbarism, but they operated in personal, family and local relationships. The concept of the nation as something majestic, embodying the hopes and fears of all the people, as something beautiful in its ends and perfect in its efficiency and terrible in its splendid wrath—this concept is new to a people for whom Government has done so little that is constructive—a Government to which the

Chinese appeal only as a last resort, preferring the crude and inadequate administration by a handful of one's neighbors to the uncertainties of a visit to the yamen.

Again, the conservatism of the people is only partly broken. We speak of "an awakening China," and rightly so. It is true that the development in the last decade is epochal. But Americans are not to think of an eager China, as Japan was and is eager to get the best things of modern life. That contingent in every Chinese community which has come under the influence of outside impulses, educational, commercial or religious, is ready and usually eager for betterments, and when leadership is once set up among any people, the mass follows; but the bulk of China—the hundreds of millions away from the coast and treaty ports—are going on in much the same old way. Great numbers of them never saw a white man, and beyond an occasional hint of changes in the posted Edict or local manifesto do not know that anything is happening.

The strange idea prevalent among many of our people that Japanese and Chinese civilization walk with equal step is absurd. Japan is not much different from our own country in the equipment of communities; the people all speak the same language; they have efficient schools, sanitation, Western trained medical practitioners, a town hall, a municipal budget, roads and comfortable inns in the most remote districts. But in China all is crude as yet; save in rehabilitated Peking and other bright spots governmental efficiency is feeble; decentralization is the rule. The Chinese have worked out an admirable system of self-rule, but the criticism of it that it does not make for progress is undeniable. It leaves the people industrious and peaceable, but also poor, ignorant, unambitious. The absence of clear, conceded authority at Peking is another condition that makes regeneration

difficult. The outside world knows certain Manchus and Chinese of rank and rejoices in those who would face China on the new path, but back of them are officials of greater authority, in some cases unfamiliar to the onlookers; and these love the old order. There are many to consult in Peking. Japan had this advantage, that the Government was strong and authoritative; the nation was unified and schooled to follow implicitly under the daimio system. The regeneration of China cannot be automatic as was that of Japan, for the provinces and communities have been largely self-governing. It will be rapid enough to gladden those who love their fellow men, but it must be slow. For one thing there are ten times as many people to be moved.

The docile spirit of the Japanese is lacking in the Chinese. The former emptied themselves that they might learn, though in it was nothing of abjectness. It was rather a self-controlled pride for the time being. The Anglo-Saxon had the knowledge. We could teach the Japanese how to build bridges and refine sugar and heal the sick and establish courts and install banks, railroads and steamship lines, so the Japanese took all we offered with eagerness until they attained a proficiency much like our own. On a recent walk in Japan my days were made a burden by the passion of my Japanese companion to learn English; he would not let me alone. This eagerness characterized the whole nation from throne to ricksha. It is duplicated in China only in spots, and then often in the form rather than in the substance. A few months' study in Japan is regarded as sufficient to equip a Chinese teacher in Western learning. Foreigners were imported to build railroads; when the latter proved profitable, the Chinese assumed they could do the work, and there are some faulty roadbeds to show for their premature action. This unwillingness to put

themselves in the attitude of learners is likely a reflection of the traditional conceit of the people.

I have spoken with frankness of the conditions that block progress in China. Let us touch briefly on some of the facts and conditions that suggest what a good medium for improvement this remarkable people constitute. In the first place there is nothing decadent about the Chinese, absolutely nothing. There are countries across the Atlantic that depress one, for decay and degeneracy are obvious, but the Chinese are full of power, of capacity. They give the impression, whether official, merchant, student or coolie, of a people that could do anything—not merely industrially, but intellectually. It has been proved that one may take children from the streets, from the boat population, from the dirty and diseased villages, and with education and sympathy make men of power. They are physically strong, virile, forceful. As four chair-bearers, perspiring, panting, yet exulting in their humble task—with no vision of higher employment—as they bear their white burden home from the club luxuriously asleep, up steep inclines at better than four miles an hour, one has an uncomfortable feeling that all their labor may mean storage of power against some day when the law of compensation shall reverse conditions. The Chinese are happily free from caste; they are the most democratic of people. The millionaire contractor and his retainers may eat from the same rice bowl and the humblest worker in the street may ask his way from the magnate. It is only in officialdom that barriers are put up. The Chinese are a responsive people; their humor is more marked than is that of the Japanese. The American has an advantage in dealing with the Chinese by reason of the former's hearty ways; the two peoples understand each other. While learning is not as common as our home people infer, to be wise is the thing

desired by the Chinese, and the scholar is the envied one and honored by all classes. The only aristocracy in China is that of learning, and the poorest may enter the door. Industry is so universal a trait that only the opium sot is lazy, and he is despised; and contact with the foreigner explains insolence when it rarely occurs. The Chinese are free from alcohol poisoning. It makes one thoughtful to see coolies carry burdens of from one hundred to three hundred pounds hour after hour with no thought of more than weak tea to stimulate them; and when a crowd of natives follows a drunken foreign sailor swaying to and fro in his ricksha, it would be less embarrassing for us if they would laugh; but their faces rather betray marvel and inquiry. The Chinese are not a vindictive people, but friendly. Their religions sit easily on them, so there are no barriers to enlightenment on that score. In normal times you may stand up in any city and have your say; they do not fear the undermining of cherished beliefs. It is a land of free speech except as the Government may have a local issue to deal with. The Chinese use reason instead of violence in the main; they meet over a feast to adjust differences, and there are professional peace-makers instead of lawyers.

The study of modern topics in the schools under the Edict of 1905 in place of an exclusively classical curriculum, and the introduction of railways—these, with the leaven of Christian missions, constitute the major definite forces for a regenerated China. One can point out a variety of needs: I have spoken of the necessity of protection of property and of the growth of a true patriotism. One might add to the list, and say an incorruptible judiciary. But how shall a country improve her judges by a proclamation? A judiciary that commands the respect of all the people is one of the finest and one of the last fruits of perfected civilization. There cannot be a

purser judiciary in China until there is a better Chinaman. However, it is cheering to reflect that twenty years ago foreigners in Japan scoffed at the proposal to entrust their lives and property to the courts of Japan, yet this has come about with only occasional complaints. It must be a longer time before Chinese ideas can be conformed to our views of disinterested justice and to Western legal principles; yet if China will throw a general enthusiasm into a movement for regeneration in place of the present partial trend, one may well hesitate to place limits on the achievements of such a people.

XII

THE CHINESE STUDENT IN AMERICA

WE hear much in these days of the "awakening of China." The phrase means, as I understand it, no more than this: A growing and spreading recognition by the Chinese of the fact that they must learn and adopt, to a much greater extent than hitherto, the ways and methods of modern civilization, must acquaint themselves with the progress and continuous advance made by thinkers, students and inventors of the Western World, in the fields of political and social economy, practical science and the industrial arts; and must learn to apply the knowledge thus acquired to the reforming and strengthening of their own Government, the improvement of the material welfare of their people and the development of their country's resources. Not all the advocates in China of the adoption of the ways of modern civilization are such from a conviction of the intrinsic superiority of the new ways over the old: many there are who would, if they could, keep their country in its ancient and traditional isolation, or rather in the self-centered exclusiveness of a nation to which intercourse with the unimportant corners of the earth lying outside its boundaries, is neither necessary nor desirable; and to which its own ways and beliefs are all sufficient, and better than anything which the outside world can give. There are many, I say, who honestly believe that their country was better off, and would continue to be better off, without the foreigner, but who yet advocate the acquirement of Western knowledge and the adoption of Western meth-

ods, because they see that since the foreigner cannot be got rid of; since intercourse with the outside world and the residence of foreigners in China are inevitable; the only way for China to hold her own against the intruder; to maintain the integrity of her Empire and the unhampered exercise of sovereign rights by her Government, is by acquainting herself with the principles and methods which are the source of the foreigner's superior strength—by 'stealing his thunder and turning against him his own weapons. These would fain have China left alone in the peaceful enjoyment of her old ways; but since that cannot be, they advocate the learning and adoption of the foreigner's ways in order that China may be able to hold her own in the inevitable intercourse and competition with him.

There is another party which favors the adoption by China of Western methods from a conviction of the superiority of these methods, and of China's need of them for the actual good they will bring to the Government and the people. They believe in the ways of modern civilization and in the benefits which follow free intercourse with other countries. They would not revert to the old aloofness, but would have China take her place in the councils of the nations, on even terms with the countries of the West.

Which of these two kinds of advocates of modern progress in China are the more numerous I am not prepared to say. It is enough to say here that both wings of the Progressives, if we may call them so, are rapidly increasing in numbers, and that they are the dominating factor in the existing Government. However different the underlying motives of the members of the two wings may be, they are united in their advocacy of the learning and adoption of the ways of modern civilization; and, to a great extent, in their ideas as to the steps to be taken

and the means to be employed to accomplish this end. On one point in particular there is unanimity of opinion between the two factions of the Progressives, that is in the conviction that the Chinese official of the present day needs an equipment for his position quite different from that based on the standard set by an examination in knowledge of the Chinese classics. As a result of this conviction, we have seen the old form of examination for public office quietly, though suddenly, superseded by a test which requires of the candidates some knowledge of what has been done, and discovered, and accomplished, and what is now going on, in the larger world. This important change in the nature of the examinations for the civil service naturally led to an immediate change in the methods and curriculum of preparatory schools; and to the establishment of schools of a new kind as fast as teachers, with even a smattering of Western knowledge, could be found to instruct the Chinese youth in the subjects a knowledge of which is required by the new standard of examination. The few good schools already in existence, whether established by the Government, by private individuals, or under the auspices of the foreign missionary societies, were eagerly sought by ambitious pupils, and soon proved inadequate to meet the demands. The necessity for more schools, and more and better teachers, under purely Chinese management and control, became everywhere apparent, and it was the provision of teachers for such schools, as well as the equipment of selected young men for positions of usefulness in various departments of the Government during the early stages of the introduction of changes, reforms and improvements, that led so naturally and logically to the policy of sending students to Western countries to study under the best teachers, the principles and products of Western civilization. Many of the students thus sent abroad have

been sent at the expense of one or other of the Provincial Governments; while others have been sent, and are supported by parents or relatives, or have come at their own expense. England, France and Germany have been the chosen destinations of many of these students; but a greater number have come to America to seek education; and this number promises soon to be very substantially increased by the sending hither by the Imperial Government of one hundred students every year for the next four years, and a minimum of fifty students each year thereafter up to the year 1940—the students thus sent to be supported out of the portion of the Boxer indemnity returned annually by the United States Government to China.

There are now in the United States, east of the Missouri River, about two hundred and seventy-five Chinese students (including with these twenty women), while on the Pacific Coast, in universities and colleges, there are about one hundred and twenty more. Those in the Eastern States have, in almost every case, come to America especially for study; while of those on the Pacific Coast many are the children of long-time residents in this country. The two hundred and seventy-five students in the Eastern States are distributed amongst sixty-two universities, colleges and schools, some of which, however, have only one or two representatives. There were last year thirty-three Chinese students at Harvard, thirty-one at Cornell, thirty-one at the University of Pennsylvania, twenty-three at Yale, twenty at Columbia, twelve at the University of Illinois, and seven each at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the Massachusetts Agricultural College and the University of Chicago. Some are taking courses in government and political science, others in chemistry, metallurgy, engineering, law,

medicine, agriculture and finance. With very few exceptions they have taken creditable standing in their classes; and not a few have distinguished themselves in competition with their American fellow students, in spite of the handicap of having to work in a language not their own. One student received his degree at Harvard *magna cum laude*, and three students attained to membership in the Phi Beta Kappa at different universities during the past year. There is no lack of ability and ambition on the part of the students; and there can be no doubt that China is going to get an ample return for the expenditure incurred in maintaining these young men here; but the return will be greater or less, according to the wisdom and foresight exercised in choosing subjects and courses of study, and to the degree in which opportunities for close observation outside the academic curriculum are availed of by the students.

During a long residence in China in the service of the Chinese Government, I have had some opportunity to observe, and to form opinions, as to what are the most pressing wants and defects in China, and how far study and observation in America, and in European countries, can give students the equipment they need to enable them to go back to their own country and render efficient aid in supplying those wants and remedying those defects. May I be allowed, then, to set forth what, in my opinion, are some of the principal objects to be kept in view by the Chinese students in this country—the kinds of good work for which they ought to try to fit themselves?

The introduction of reforms in administration and of improved methods furthering the material, moral and intellectual welfare of the Chinese people cannot be accomplished without a heavy expenditure of money. The provision of funds is a necessary antecedent of, and therefore underlies, the whole programme of improve-

ment. I do not hesitate, therefore, to place first in importance amongst China's needs—*equitable methods of taxation*, which shall be as easy and convenient of application as possible, and productive of an adequate revenue—the collection of which revenue must be undertaken by *an honest, efficient and economical machinery*. The difficulty of fixing upon methods of taxation is not so great as that of replacing by a properly constituted and administered revenue service, the over-staffed and under-paid tax bureau now so generally existing. A staff far beyond the reasonable requirements of the work to be done is gathered around each office. The official at the head of the office has perhaps many needy relatives and dependents to whom he gives a "chance" by appointing them to subordinate positions with very small salaries, or enrolling them amongst the runners and hangers-on with no regular pay at all, but with an opportunity to make a meager living by irregular exactions, made possible by their power to delay and obstruct the business of those who have dealings with the office.

The principle of fixed fees for definite services, or fixed duties on definite varieties and quantities of merchandise, is the only principle on which business can be carried on with security and satisfaction. But unless this principle is joined to the principle of fixed and adequate salaries to Government servants, and a business-like adjustment of the size of the staff to the amount of business to be done, the former principle cannot, in practice, be adhered to. If the staff were fixed at the proper strength and its members paid fair salaries, there would be no excuse for, and need be no toleration of irregular exactions; but when from highest to lowest, the employes are either very inadequately paid, or not paid at all, resort is naturally had to irregular exactions for private benefit, or to bargains and compromises through which

some favor is shown to merchants, or other persons concerned in the matter of classification of goods, weights and measurement, or rates of duty or taxes, whereby the merchant saves in the payment of his legitimate dues about as much as he gives in fees to employes; so that the Government treasury is the only loser, and the official in charge, with his staff and his hungry horde of hangers-on, is the only one benefited. Such a system of "squeeze" being countenanced, and excused by the apparent necessity arising from no regular pay to the staff, so long as it does not bear too heavily on the taxpayers there is practically no limit to the extent to which it may be carried,—unless the Government receipts fall off to such an extent as to cause the higher officials to take strenuous action and resort to investigation and wholesale dismissals, when things become better for a time—but only to revert, by degrees, to the same state. But with fixed and adequate pay, and a staff just large enough for the work to be done, there would be an immediate end of this great evil; for the Chinese people are not more dishonest or grasping than other peoples. They are content with a modest income which will enable them to live in moderate comfort, and are willing to do a full day's work for their pay, when properly paid. In an adequate and properly paid staff each member would do his own work; there would be no place for supernumeraries and hangers-on, and these would not be tolerated by the regular staff. So, as there would be no excuse for irregular fees and exactions, there would be no toleration of bargains and compromises with taxpayers, to the loss of the Government revenue. The immediate dismissal and further punishment of employes guilty of such irregularities would soon put a stop to them.

This reform I place first amongst the needs of China.

We trust that every student who comes to this country, will, on his return to his native land, do his best to help bring this about; and let his experiences and observations in this country—whether they be of models to be copied or of bad examples to be shunned in this connection—be fully utilized in his efforts to this end.

Next in importance to the reform of the civil service I am inclined to place *a reform of the currency and finance*. The existing confusion in this respect is the cause of immense loss not only to the Government but to traders, merchants and organized industries of all kinds. With a different unit of value in every considerable city, and sometimes several such units in use in the same place, not only is there more or less uncertainty as to the amounts of debits and credits, but the laborious and vexatious calculations of exchange necessitate the employment of a vast number of expert accountants and clerks, consume an immense amount of time, and seriously hamper trade. So, too, the clumsy method of settling debts by weighing out silver ingots of various standards of fineness,—which, for lack of a trustworthy and universally acceptable guarantor, have to be assayed for quality as well as weighed for quantity,—wastes time and labor, causes immense expense, and leads to vexatious disputes—so much so as to be a recognized obstruction in commercial dealings, as well as a source of serious loss to the Government revenue. All these evils could be done away with by the adoption of a national unit of value and a national coinage, to be used throughout the Empire to the exclusion of all others. Whether the unit of value selected should be the tael or the dollar is a matter of less importance than that there should be one fixed standard for the whole Empire, and that the Imperial Government alone should mint the standard coins and be responsible for their weight and fineness. China is al-

most the last of the nations of the world to stick to a silver standard; and having such extensive and ever-growing commercial transactions with gold standard countries she is feeling more and more, all the time, the drawbacks and inconveniences arising from an adherence to the silver standard. The fluctuations in the gold value of silver, often sudden and great, and seldom foreseeable, introduce a great speculative element into trade with foreign countries. The importer cannot tell what will be the silver equivalent, on the arrival of his goods, of the gold price at which he has bought them—so that in a competitive market, where it is important to quote as low a price as possible to his purchasers, he may find a prospective profit turned into a loss by a fall in exchange after he has fixed his price to the purchaser. This uncertainty must curtail transactions and restrict trade. Moreover, the Government, in making foreign loans, must always agree to repay a fixed amount in gold; and the great fall in silver which has taken place in the past few years, and may still take place, results in the payment of vastly larger amounts in silver, both in principal and interest, than were originally calculated upon.

It is of the utmost importance, therefore, that China should reform her currency and finance, by establishing a fixed unit of value, based on a gold standard, and by the Government issue of standard coins representing convenient fractions or multiples of that unit which should become the only legal tender throughout the Empire.

The third great need of China is *a separate judiciary system*, with definite and uniform laws and established principles of interpretation; with courts of justice accessible equally to all, presided over by trained judges, able and impartial. This is an absolutely essential antecedent of the abolition of extra territoriality in China. Under existing conditions the hearing and decision of

cases, both civil and criminal, is only a part of the manifold duties of an *administrative* official, who brings to this part of his work, in most cases, no special training, no thorough knowledge of laws and precedents; and whose court is generally so hedged about with officious underlings and greedy clerks, that the poor man has little chance of getting his case properly brought before it, or fairly decided. It is greatly to the credit of the honest magistrate in China that, in spite of the drawbacks under which he works, he so often decides cases, when properly brought before him, according to their merits, by the exercise of common sense and keen insight—unhampered, as well as unaided, by fixed and definite laws and established precedents. But such righteous decisions depend too much upon the character and personality of the judge, and cannot be counted upon with such reasonable certainty as could a just decision in a court presided over by trained and experienced Judges, whose reasoning must flow in a channel bounded by certain fixed and well-known laws and established principles of interpretation. It is unnecessary to say that the Judges and lesser officers of the courts must be carefully selected and above suspicion; that access to the courts should be accompanied by the least formalities possible; and that such formalities and observances as are absolutely necessary should be published for the information of all. The creation of such separate judicial system, the establishment of courts, the training of judges and other law officers, the making of rules of legal procedure, the making, revision and codification of laws of general applicability—all these offer a vast field for useful work, for which many of the students here are trying to fit themselves.

The next field for effort to which I shall refer is that of *public sanitary works* and *municipal improvements*.

Already much has been done in this regard in some of the great cities of China—notably in Peking and Tientsin, where the present condition of things shows a startling contrast to that which prevailed ten years ago. But apart from these few cities the want of care for the health, safety and convenience of the public is as complete as it ever was. Drainage, scavenging, street cleaning, lighting, policing, fire prevention, a pure and adequate water supply, public parks and recreation grounds—these are either primitive and inadequate or altogether wanting in most of the towns and cities of China. All of the students, whatever their special line of study may be, can learn by observation something of these—and, profiting by our mistakes as well as by our successes, will be able to describe to their countrymen in China some details of the progress which has been made in American and European towns in public sanitary and kindred works, and to create a sentiment for such works in China—while some of the students are giving special study to the problems of municipal administration, sanitation and public utilities, so that they may have the knowledge and ability to take charge themselves of the carrying out of such improvements as may be decided upon.

In the matter of *transportation facilities*, great strides have already been made in China. The rapid increase in the railway mileage during the past few years, and the number of railways now building, or projected and sanctioned, show that progress, in this direction at least, is fast overcoming the opposition of the more conservative element of the population. The traveler who has once had the experience of making in twenty-four hours, and with comparative comfort, the journey which in other days has taken a month to accomplish—a month of weariness and hardship, and at an expense twenty-fold greater than that of the railway—will never again be hostile to

the fire-wheel wagon; and his experience will influence the opinion of his friends and neighbors who have not yet tried it. We may say that already, except amongst people making their living by the old methods of transportation, hostility to railways has practically disappeared; while the advantages of steamer transportation have been fully appreciated for a generation past. And even those who make their living as carters, boatmen, packmen and porters are finding out that, though their field of operation has been curtailed and they are now coming to be employed more in transporting goods to and fro between the shipping points on the railways and the country not yet reached by them, the great increase both in passenger and freight traffic which has followed the introduction of railways has given the old-style transportation equipment as much employment in its smaller field as it formerly had in the larger. But railways and steamers are not enough. For the feeding of these good roads should be constructed and good bridges built, making possible the employment of larger and more economical carts; while the streams and canals should be deepened and improved to facilitate and expedite boat traffic.

I have said that hostility to railways has practically disappeared in China; but, while this is true, it is also true that there is a strong, in some places a violent, sentiment against the employment of foreigners, or rather the control of foreigners in railway construction. The aim of the Chinese, which has lately become increasingly manifest, to develop their country's resources and to construct and operate its railways and transportation lines as far as possible by the work of their own people is one which must meet with sympathetic recognition, so long as it does not lead to a too hasty cutting adrift from foreign aid in the establishment and conduct of industries and undertakings for which China is still a new

field. In this connection, the preparation of Chinese by sound technical education in foreign countries, to fill, when thoroughly fitted, the more responsible positions in the railways, mines and other undertakings, is a work of the utmost importance. When a sufficient number of Chinese are thoroughly fitted for the work, the aid of the foreign experts need no longer be called in; but until that time comes we must be of opinion that the agitation against the participation of foreigners in Chinese industrial enterprises is premature and must have bad results. Two railways have been built in China by Chinese engineers unaided. Amongst the students now in America we hope that there are a goodly number who will return to China in a few years, thoroughly competent engineers, capable of carrying out every detail of railway construction and maintenance; and others well versed in the details of administering and operating railways, who can take complete charge of that branch of the service. But prudence and modesty must modify the ambition of the new-fledged engineers; and a too hasty discarding of foreign expert assistance may lead to disaster.

Closely bound up with the improvement of transportation facilities is the general introduction of the best modern methods in the *development of China's mineral resources*; for it would be folly to open mines without providing easy and economical means of transporting the mineral products to market. The extent of China's mineral resources is unknown and can hardly be estimated; for thus far there has been hardly more than a scratching of the surface, which, however, has revealed possibilities, nay certainties, of vast stores of coal, iron and copper, besides considerable quantities of other minerals. This mineral wealth has naturally attracted the attention of foreign capitalists who have made numerous attempts to acquire the right to develop it. In some

cases concessions have been too hastily granted by the Chinese Government, by the terms of which practical monopolies for the opening of mines in immense territories have been given to foreigners. Recognizing its mistake, on repeated outbursts of local public hostility to the concessionaires, the Government has done its best to cancel, at a heavy expense, the obnoxious features of concessions already made; and has made regulations insuring the maintenance of adequate Government control and a substantial Government excise in all future mining undertakings. There will be an ample field for the activities of Chinese mining experts and skillful business managers in the development of China's mineral resources; and these must come largely from the ranks of the Chinese students abroad.

The improvement of *public education* comes peculiarly within the range of the possible advantages which the returned students may bring to their country. It is manifestly impossible for China to send abroad for education enough young men to fill all the important technical positions and places demanding expert knowledge which the carrying out of reforms and improvements will require. The students educated abroad must, on their return to China, not only practice what they have learned, but must teach it to their countrymen at home. They will, perhaps, in many cases, devote themselves exclusively to teaching what they have learned of the principles of government; of the technical arts and sciences; of law and medicine; of the methods of commerce and transportation; of public utilities and sanitary measures, and of educational methods. They will be the chosen agents of the Government in the general establishment of common schools, and in the shaping of the curriculum and methods of study in those schools, to the end that the youth of China may get the best training for the new conditions

of life into which their country is rapidly passing—and the best fitting of the colleges and professional and technical schools with which the common schools must be supplemented. And in the scheme of education the education of the girls will not be neglected. For even if woman's most important work lies in the home, we know that the home is a better and a happier place for husband and children as well as for herself when the mother has a trained mind and an intelligent knowledge of things above the humdrum detail of the housewife's daily life. It is for this reason that the increasing number of women students who are coming to this country is a specially pleasing fact—for it indicates a change in the attitude towards women in China and presages an improved position for them. We may assume that the principal object of the women students now in this country—on their return to China—will be to promote the cause of female education, and we may rest assured that their part will be well done.

In *agricultural methods* it may be thought that China has not much to learn from other countries. It is certainly true that patient industry and careful fertilization and cultivation produce from the minutely subdivided farms of China about the maximum crops they are capable of; and in the thickly settled regions, where farms are so small and laborers so plentiful, there is little need of the labor-saving and time-saving devices and implements which alone make farming in America profitable. But in the vast and sparsely settled regions of Manchuria and other outlying parts of the Empire there is a great field for modern agricultural implements and for the scientific cultivation of large farms. And everywhere there are floods and droughts to be contended against by extensive systems of drainage and dikes, forestry and irrigation, where engineers and agriculturists must work together.

Then, too, the scientific selection of fertilizers adapted to different soils, the breeding and improvement of all kinds of live stock, and the application of the latest methods in horticulture, which have produced such wonderful results in the Western world, are almost unknown in China—while dairy farming, strictly speaking, does not exist there. There is, therefore, even for the student of agriculture, a great field for useful work in China.

And now I shall make brief reference to certain functions of government generally recognized in Western countries as important and essential to the public welfare, but which in China are either altogether neglected, or most inadequately attended to—I mean *Government provision for the care of the poor, the insane and feeble-minded, the blind, the deaf, the disabled*. It is recognized in all countries that the first resort of the unfortunate victims of such afflictions should be to their near relatives, who should keep them and care for them, or provide for them to the best of their ability; and nowhere in the world is duty towards relatives, even those not of the closest consanguinity, more fully and practically recognized than in China. For this reason the lack of Government provision for these unfortunates is less keenly felt in China than it would be in countries where the claims of kinship are less freely recognized. But in China, as in every country, there are innumerable families for whom existence is a hand-to-mouth struggle from day to day—who with long days of hard work by every member of the family can just manage to get the bare necessities of life. To such families the support of disabled or afflicted relatives, even the nearest kindred, is a burden taxing their utmost resources, and testing their sense of duty to the limit; and in many cases it becomes an impossibility—the victims must be left to beggary, charity or death. There are, of course, also, instances in which

the claims of kinship when costly are not acknowledged even by well-to-do relatives; and except in the case of the closest relationship, such as parents and children or brothers and sisters, it is practically impossible, either by force of public opinion or by official intervention, to bring about such practical acknowledgment, and provision for the wants of disabled or afflicted kindred. It is this vast number of helpless poor for whom their relatives either cannot or will not provide, that in Western countries become the inmates of institutions founded and maintained either by the Government or by corporations endowed by private gifts and bequests or by public subscription. Institutions of the latter description are not unknown in China, but they are comparatively few and their equipment and arrangements are meager. In America we find everywhere institutions for the blind where children and youth born blind or who have lost their sight are not only comfortably lodged, fed and clothed, but are made to learn useful work by which, without the aid of their eyes, they are able to earn a living, or at least to contribute towards their own support; and they are taught to read with their fingers, are instructed in music, encouraged to take part in games and amusements, made to take regular exercise, and have provided for them concerts, lectures and other entertainments which help to light the darkness of their perpetual night. Contrast the lot of these with that of the poor blind in China—sitting all day at the street corners waiting for meager alms; or going from house to house with their apologies for music—the blind leading the blind—collecting a pittance to keep them alive in their wretched lodgings, where perhaps they are robbed of the greater part even of that pittance by the padrones, who exploit them. So, too, we find but rarely in China counterparts of the asylums for the insane, institutions for idiots and

feeble-minded, hospitals for incurables, and for patients afflicted with various diseases, homes for the aged or disabled poor, institutions for deaf mutes, orphan asylums, bureaus of organized charity and the many similar institutions which in this country and in Europe are doing so much to alleviate the misery caused by poverty and affliction. I do not mean that there is nothing of the kind in China, for charity and benevolence are as common there as in other parts of the world; men of means do, in many cases, devote special time and attention to some particular form of charity; and the provincial and trade guilds often maintain establishments for the support of the poor and disabled of their own particular people. But rarely does the Government, general or local, recognize responsibility in these matters; and the few institutions which are maintained by contributed funds are crude and incomplete, aiming at nothing more than the provision of bare shelter and food to the inmates. In the establishment of Government hospitals, indeed, considerable progress has been made—owing to the general appreciation of the excellent work done by the many missionary hospitals which have existed in constantly increasing numbers for a generation past.

A careful study of all these different institutions for the care and treatment of the poor, the disabled and the variously afflicted might well engage exclusively for a time the attention of a large number of the students; that they may be prepared to take an active part in introducing to their own country the great blessings which these institutions have brought to the poor and unfortunate in Western countries.

In the *fundamental principles of commerce* China has not very much to learn from Western nations. In the great requisites of success in mercantile business the Chinese merchant is generally acknowledged to be well

equipped. He is quick to see opportunities and bold in seizing them; he is economical, wasting nothing in useless display; he is shrewd in furthering his own interest, but wise enough to see that he does that best when he serves well his customers and deals fairly with competitors; and he *keeps his word*. It is these characteristics that have made the Chinese merchant so generally successful and so worthy of respect. But great changes have taken place in recent years in the scale on which business is carried on in the Western world; and the tendency towards combination in the many great industries which have grown so rapidly of late, has made necessary new business methods to meet new conditions; and only those who adopt the up-to-date methods can hope to succeed. These great combinations have not yet been introduced to any great extent in China. I am one of those who would like that they never should be—but their introduction is probably inevitable, sooner or later; and we can only hope that in the hands of the Chinese business man they will be so managed as to yield the benefits which are unquestionably derivable from them, unaccompanied by the evils with which the unscrupulous greed of their promoters and managers has associated them in this country. The careful study of these great commercial enterprises and industries should be undertaken by some of the Chinese students in America, that they may thoroughly understand the principles on which they are run, and the details of management on which their success depends; while endeavoring to distinguish between the legitimate advantages in them and the abuses which too often spring from them; so that when these great combinations begin to invade China, these students may be in a position to point out how they may be so conducted by their promoters, under proper Government control, as to bring more good than ill to the country.

Banking methods and clearing house procedure, fire, life and marine insurance, may be studied with profit, and the Chinese business man will be quick to see and to adopt any features in all these which would be an improvement on existing methods in China.

In what has been said I have outlined a few of the opportunities for usefulness which are open to Chinese students in America on their return to their native land. The list is by no means complete; it is intended to be but an outline of what seems to me the most important of the subjects which should engage the attention of students. It could be added to and enlarged upon almost indefinitely; and perhaps I have not mentioned some subjects which may justly seem to many of you to surpass in importance some of those which I have specified. But is not this a programme sufficiently large and lofty to justify, a thousand fold, the policy which has sent students here, and to fill with ambition and enthusiasm the young men to whom such opportunities are offered? The students of law, political science, history and methods of government will devote themselves especially to the reform of the civil service, and the establishment of a separate judicial system; the students of practical science will have for their special work the improvement and extension of ways and means of transportation, the development of mineral resources, the introduction of public sanitary works and municipal improvements, and of effective means of contending against China's ancient enemies—flood and drought. The students of finance and commerce will have to deal with the reform of the currency, and the management, regulation and control of trade and industries. The students of agriculture must attack the problem of afforestation, and introduce new branches or improved methods in agricultural and horticultural industry, besides working hand in hand with

the engineers in matters of drainage and irrigation. Students of medicine must devote themselves to the establishment of hospitals, and devising measures for the preservation of public health. And all students, whatever their special studies and aims may be, will work together to create a public sentiment in favor of general education on modern lines; of public measures for safeguarding the health, comfort and security of the people; and of systematic provision, by the Government and by organized charities, for the poor and the variously disabled.

And now, having said so much about what benefits the students may take back to their country from us, I want to speak a few words on the other hand concerning certain respects in which China is already in a happy condition and needs not to learn of us; and to urge the careful cherishing of these advantages, lest, in the movement toward modern material improvements, the good of the old ways should be discarded with the bad. What has China, then, which is better than what we can offer her in its stead?

In the first place the Chinese have *simplicity of life*. The Chinese people are patient, industrious and frugal, content with a simple life, earning by daily toil the means of subsistence, and not looking for or coveting luxuries beyond their means. Their food is simple, but there is enough of it and in sufficient variety (I speak of the ordinary middle-class people), their clothing is sensible in its shapes, and adaptable to the seasons, but without cheap and not subject to the vagaries and whims of fashion causing garments to be discarded long before they are worn out. Their houses are generally comfortable, and, if the income permits it, have some accessories and adornment beyond the bare necessities of life; but there is rarely any extravagant display. Economy and frugality are the rule; and many of the necessities and comforts

of life are home-made—spinning, weaving and the making of clothing and shoes being not yet lost arts in the Chinese household. Hence the cost of living is small, and a Chinese family can be maintained in comfort (according to their standard of comfort) on an income which would not begin to pay the rent of a family in a similar position in America. Now the introduction of modern material improvements is bound to create new wants, and to change the standard of living in China, as it has in Western countries. When we see our neighbors enjoying some new addition or improvement to the household economy, some labor-saving or comfort-increasing innovation, or some new means of amusement, we want it too—although we never missed it before; and if we can afford it, it is good that we should have it. But such improvements and innovations have been so numerous and comprehensive in recent years, that to avail of them entails a cost which is burdensome if not prohibitory—the old income will not suffice for the new ways; and the old ways must be followed; no longer contentedly, but too often with bitter feeling and jealousy. And so, I think, the introduction of modern improvements into China is not going to be an unmixed blessing. In so far as these improvements cheapen the necessities of life, or add to its *simple* comforts, they will do nothing but good; but in so far as they minister to luxury, ease and pleasure and create new wants and set up new standards in this respect, while they may still be good for those who can afford them, they may be a bane to those who cannot; for the increased diversion of capital to the creation of luxuries must result in an increased cost of the necessities of life. I merely call attention to this probability not with the belief that anything that I can say or that anybody could say, will avert the issue—for the evil must be taken with the good; let us hope

that the evil will not be more than the good. At any rate China must be prepared to lose much of the simplicity of life and the contentedness of her people; for these are inconsistent with the attempt to keep pace with the rush of modern civilization.

Again, China has a more even distribution of wealth than is found in this country. Great fortunes there are in China, but they are comparatively few; and there is no restless striving for great wealth. They only add to the material wealth of the world who take some useful product from land or water, or devise and operate the ways and means of preparing it for use and of getting it to the consumer—he who gets wealth for himself by adding to the wealth of the world—by intelligent industry, or by discovering and operating new and improved methods in any of the numerous paths and processes through which all products must pass before reaching the consumer, deserves his wealth; and his possession of it ought not to excite envy and discontent. But he who adds to his own wealth only practicing clever and often unscrupulous schemes for transferring to himself the possessions of others, is of no benefit to the world—the greater his fortune the less is his merit; and vast fortunes thus made cannot fail to excite a sense of the injustice of things in the minds of the struggling masses, and arouse apprehensions of serious trouble in the future. Colossal fortunes and extravagant display of wealth are extremely rare in China—may they ever remain so!

Next—and best of all—China is a peaceful and a peace-loving nation. That she may be kept so is the fervent wish of her truest friends, and should be the aim of her students in this country, so far as their efforts and influence will help. There are many who honestly believe that the only way to insure peace is to expend annually the cost of a small war, in the creation, equipment and

maintenance of a powerful army and navy. The picture of a magnificent navy, well-administered, officered, and manned; and a great army, well-disciplined, trained and equipped and efficiently commanded, is, no doubt, one which is lodged in the minds of very many of our Chinese students—as an ideal to be striven for, in the interest of the security, integrity, dignity and glory of their country. And if we were convinced that only by the possession of such an army and navy could China's integrity be maintained and her full sovereign rights recognized, we should heartily advocate the policy of display of force. But the world is coming to believe that war is not a necessity, and that the scope of diplomacy and of international arbitration will gradually, or perhaps even suddenly, be enlarged so as to include all matters at issue between nations; or that war may become impossible through the operation of an international pact, whereby every signatory nation shall bind itself to submit its own disputes, after diplomacy has done its best, to the decision of the Court of Arbitration, and to join with all the other nations in upholding the decisions of that court, and in helping one another by turning their united forces against the nation which refuses arbitration, or makes war upon another nation which has declared its willingness to submit its case to the court. Such a consummation may yet be far off, but at least its possibility is recognized—it is no longer generally regarded as a chimera. A want of confidence in the ability and impartiality of the tribunal is the only sound reason any nation could have, believing fully in the justice of its case, for refusing to submit it to an international court of arbitration, but surely that tribunal could be chosen from the ablest and best men of all nations. Let not China be in a hurry, then, to create a great army and navy; let her rather be the first—lead the van—in subscribing un-

reservedly to an international pact for compulsory arbitration; and thus shall she preserve her traditional character as a peace-loving nation. The cost of a great army and navy is an enormous drain on the resources of a country; and China's finances are in no condition to stand it. The strongest and richest nations of the world are finding the burden of "maintaining peace by preparing for war" almost too much for them—new and heavier taxes have to be laid year after year, and the voice of discontent is ever growing louder. Moreover, it is an open question whether the possession of a powerful army and navy does not in itself increase the danger of war, through the awakening of a desire to use them for glory or aggrandizement. It certainly puts the weaker of two nations in any dispute at a hopeless disadvantage with the stronger, without regard to the rights of the case. A well-equipped, well-disciplined and well-drilled force sufficiently large to maintain internal peace, and a fleet of well-found and well-commanded gunboats to suppress piracy on the coast, are all that China should try to maintain at present. In her relations with other nations an invariable adherence to strict right, the exercise of great care as to agreements, but the strict discharge of obligations once entered into, will put her in a stronger position and be a surer guarantee against aggression than would the possession of a great army and navy.

Other advantages which China does not have to seek abroad consist in the possession by her people, in a marked degree, of certain good qualities and characteristics which I can only briefly mention here, without enlarging upon or illustrating them.

The Chinese are orderly, law-abiding and well-behaved; they have a strong sense of right and justice—are fair-minded; they are reliable in commercial dealings—pay their debts, and keep their agreements whether verbal

or written; they are dutiful to parents, fond of children, and mindful of the ties of kindred; they are courteous and polite, mindful of etiquette, and punctilious about returning courtesies or favors; they are respectful to elders and superiors; they honor and respect character and intellectual ability, and do not recognize an aristocracy of wealth. This list might be largely extended, but it is enough to show what I have undertaken to show—that China has not, by any means, to seek abroad all the requisites for national greatness and popular welfare; some of the most important are hers already. It would be too much to say that we in America are inferior to the Chinese in all these characteristics which I have just mentioned—and I do not believe that the Chinese students are going to suffer materially in any respect from their close contact with us during their stay in this country—but I venture to say that the high standard of conduct and practice in some of the respects named, which is recognized equally in both countries as the one to be aimed at, is more generally attained to in China than in America.

The benefits that China can get from us are many and great; the advantages which she has already are hardly less important. How much of the new shall be adopted and how much rejected—how much of the old shall be cherished and how much discarded—these are questions in the determination of which a very important part is to be taken by the Chinese students in America.

XIII

THE NEW LEARNING OF CHINA—ITS STATUS AND OUTLOOK

CHINA has already passed the initial stages in a great transformation, political, industrial, social, educational, and is destined in the near future to set itself free from its age-long bondage to past ideals and institutions, and to place itself by the side of Western nations in their search after truth, and effort to better the conditions of life. Happily China does not need to lay new foundations for its political and social reconstruction. Chinese civilization is the outgrowth of the great maxims which her sages propounded setting forth their conceptions of the duties of life under the conditions of ancient society. These maxims are not mere germinal intuitions; they are ripe judgments upon social polity, capable of entering into the ethical substructure of modern life. What higher end of learning could be proposed than that announced by Confucius in the opening passage of "The Great Learning": "The end of The Great Learning is to make lustrous the innately lustrous virtue, to renovate the people, and to rest in the highest good"? This ornate, Oriental language means, when translated into modern English, that the end of education is ethical rather than intellectual. It aims to rightly develop the moral powers of the individual, who in turn should live to ennoble the lives of the people, that all may attain to the true goal of life, which is that of mutual right living. We can further accept without serious criticism the great sage's

enumeration of the cardinal virtues: "Benevolence,"—or active good will towards others,—"Righteousness," "Propriety,"—or conduct befitting the varied relationships of life,—"Wisdom," "Sincerity." So again we may accept the sage's resumé of the basic social relationship, that of "Prince and official, parent and child, husband and wife, elder and younger brother,—including kinship in general,—and that of friend and friend." We may admit that Confucius saw only dimly the great truth that all men are brethren, but he clearly apprehended and gave expression to the truth that human life is subject to a moral order, a law pervasive and unceasing in its action, rewarding virtue and punishing evil. The ancient sages named this law "The Law of Heaven," since they conceived it to be the outward expression of the nature of Heaven. Thus the Christian teacher finds ready at hand certain foundation truths, both of ethics and religion, which he can appropriate for use, needing only to enlarge and enrich them with the conception that moral law expresses the nature not only of Heaven, but of the God of Heaven, since its source is in the beneficent character of God, which is the unchanging standard for right human conduct.

Thus China in entering upon the acquisition of the new learning does not need to break rudely with the old learning in which her sages canvassed the capacities of human nature, the relationships of life, and the laws which bind society into a moral and spiritual organism. Chinese students may still regard the sages as sent of Heaven to be the great teachers of their fellow men. They do need, however, to break with the past in regarding the teachings of the sages as ultimate truth beyond which it is sacrilege to attempt to pass, and learn the lesson which Western scholarship has been slow to learn, that all truth is best apprehended when regarded as formative in its

nature, as directing thought ever onward into higher realms of truth.

We need to guard against the misconception,—which has its source in ignorance,—that ancient Chinese learning is without present value, that while it has, perhaps, answered some good purpose in the past, it has nothing to contribute to the present or the future. Such is not the estimate of the scholarship of China. China is taking her place among modern nations with a literature of which she is justly proud. She is willing, under the influence of modern Western thought, to modify, indeed to revolutionize, her methods of study, and to use new material from without to broaden and perfect her educational structure; but she has no thought of wholly breaking with the past, of turning her back upon her ancient sages, and committing herself blindly into the hands of her new teachers. There is danger of such results, it must be admitted, among Chinese students who have neglected the old learning in their zeal to acquire the new, especially among those whose education has been chiefly acquired abroad; but such men soon discover that they are seriously handicapped in competition with men who have added a knowledge of Western learning to a scholarly knowledge and use of their own language and literature. The leaders in the renovation of China now being inaugurated are to be men able to transmit the best of their ancient tradition, enlarged and vitalized by the best that can be contributed by the new civilization of the West. It is, perhaps, not possible to arrest the world-leveling process in matters of dress and the general externals of social intercourse, but it is to be earnestly hoped that the old learning of China, while it will be powerfully influenced by the new, will not be set aside in accepting the new, and that the youth of China will continue to study the great thoughts of the sages, and with

a more fruitful reverence than have their fathers, since they seek both to know those thoughts and to give to them a greater efficiency in the affairs of life.

Confucian learning constitutes the warp and woof of Chinese civilization. The teachings of the sages are the constitution of China; they are the bed-rock upon which all laws are built. To disregard these teachings in the administration of government would be to antagonize conduct essential to the principles of right. But while Confucian thought contains so much of valuable and permanent truth, and has exerted so powerful an influence on myriads of people, we must confess that it is narrow in its scope, and if not shallow in its view of human life, it is certainly shallow in its view of nature and of man's relations to nature. Chinese scholars all down the ages have been singularly indifferent to any rational interpretation of what their eyes have seen and their ears have heard of the ongoings of nature. They stop at the very threshold of the study of the external world and are satisfied with a crude interpretation of its transformations. They have been content to say that things are as they are by the law of their being. The forces of growth and decay, of life and change, act spontaneously and to their necessary ends, and it is idle to ask concerning the how or why.

Confucian scholars have seriously lacked in their power of logical thought, the ability to infer, to think to a conclusion. Confucius has won his high place as the great teacher of China by the clearness with which he apprehended, and gave expression to, important ethical truths, that ought to be regulative in human life, and yet he was content to go back 2000 years to find the highest patterns of the social virtues, and undertook to bind the society of his times to the ideals of those early ages. Mencius, who showed greater ability than his master to think

articulately, contributed much to illustrate and emphasize his teachings, but little to help men to apply them to new conditions, and so to prevent that social petrification which soon set in and put an end to all vital and progressive thought. This lack of logical quality which characterizes the teachings of the sages of China has stamped itself on the thought of the people and has proved to be the arrest of all science and of all invention in their initial stages, and has held Chinese thought in the grasp of the dead hand of the past.

Chinese scholarship has produced a marvelous system of word-signs, and a literature of a far higher order of excellence than Western scholars have as yet appreciated. It has given to the literary class surprising skill in writing these word-signs, making difficult and complicated groupings of pen-strokes into real works of art. And yet it has failed to train and discipline its students in the important art of speech. Many of the Chinese scholars have never learned how properly to talk. Their minds and fingers have been educated, but their tongues have been neglected. They have recently created a new word for a new thing—"yen shuo"—"Lecture," now being introduced from the West, where a man stands on his feet and addresses an audience on some theme in an orderly and progressive manner.

But what are the forces that have operated in recent years to set free the scholars of China from their bondage to the old learning, and to turn their faces towards the learning of the present and future?

(1) It may seem strange to mention first in this enumeration the wars in which China has engaged with Western nations. The resulting military campaigns, though of limited magnitude, were sufficient to inflict a succession of humiliating defeats upon China, and drive home to the people the conviction that these Western

racés, whom at first they had regarded as mere "red-haired barbarians," had a civilization comparable to that of China; that by their learning and cunning they had gained possession of powers of nature that made them easy victors when they measured strength with the Chinese. The inference was inevitable: "We must study the Western art of war to protect ourselves against Western aggression." Thus it is as true of China as of Japan that the thunder of Western guns first awakened the people to a sense of their weakness and need in the presence of Western power.

(2) Military invasion was followed by political demands. China must come out of her seclusion and accept a place in the family of nations. She must enact treaties, must receive and send ministers and consuls. Here again, she must not only match strength with strength, but intellect with intellect, and she slowly discovered that she was dealing with nations with many centuries of experience in mutual intercourse, and that this experience had been codified into principles of international conduct, which the rulers of China must set themselves to study if they could hope to hold their own in the intricate and difficult game of diplomacy.

(3) Through international intercourse Chinese youth found their way to the Western world and studied in Western schools, to return in due time to give their new knowledge to their countrymen. These young men at the beginning of this movement, and well down to the present time, found themselves with their new learning and habits and tastes out of joint with Chinese thought which was still running in traditional lines. What they possessed of real value was unappreciated by Confucian scholars, who had not yet awakened to a realization that the Western world had anything of good to give to China. But while these men found themselves disappointed in

that leadership for which their wider knowledge fitted them, they did a necessary and important work in sowing their new ideas in their circle of relatives and friends, ideas that were certain to bear fruit at no distant time.

(4) Mercantile intercourse has increasingly widened the acquaintance of the Chinese with the Western world and forced upon them the conviction that Westerners are possessed of a wide range of knowledge and of inventive skill wholly unknown to themselves, by which they have produced a long list of valuable products that minister to the pleasures of life; indeed when known soon take their place as necessities of life. By intercourse with the West they possess themselves of clocks and watches, which mark time for them better than the stone sundial, and tell their story both in shade and in sunshine, at night as well as in the day. They substitute glass windows for paper and enjoy the light and warmth of the sun in their homes. They purchase fabrics spun and woven from wool which they can make into warm and elegant garments. They purchase coal oil which in their cities and villages adds some hours to their business day, and widens the range of social enjoyments. These and many other commodities of value are obtained by interchange with the West. Slowly the desire is awakened not only to possess these articles but to acquire the art of producing them, and this desire in turn begets the wish to master the sciences which give such knowledge and skill in achievement.

(5) The Chinese are a race of utilitarians. They are apt pupils in learning to make the earth yield her ministry to their physical needs. The Chinese have discovered the industrial value of steamships, of railroads, of telegraphic and telephone communications. They have long known something of the value of their coal and mineral deposits. They have now discovered the vast su-

periority of Western methods and machinery to make the rocks yield up their treasures to the hand of man. They have come to realize that the Western world has new knowledge and new methods to gather from both land and water a more abundant ministry to the needs of man. Here again is a new set of benefits to be acquired by the new education, and Chinese students desire to enter into the laboratory to learn concerning the laws that operate in physical transformation; they wish to study engineering that they may have a hand in building and superintending the railroads now multiplying in China, and in developing the coal and mineral resources of the country. They wish to study telegraphy to meet the increasing demand for competent operators; to study economics to fit themselves for the customs and consular service. They wish to study scientific farming, horticulture, forestry, etc., that they in turn may become teachers of these new sciences to their countrymen.

(6) For two generations foreign physicians in continually increasing numbers have been entering China, and with their superior medical and surgical knowledge have saved multitudes of lives. Chinese physicians of the old order hardly deserve the name. Their ignorance of the nature of disease made them about as dangerous to their patients as the disease itself. Happily in their total ignorance of surgery they seldom dared to use the knife. Under such conditions the contrast with Western medical learning and skill was startling and convincing, and in due time the desire was created for modern medical knowledge, which could be secured only as the reward of patient, orderly study.

For many generations China has been the teacher of Japan. For the past generation conditions have been reversed, and China has been the slow and, until very recently, the reluctant learner of Japan; but the influence of

Japan upon China in its marvelous political and social awakening, though slow in the beginning, is being felt with cumulative power. This influence is directly operative in arousing the Chinese to an appreciation of the value, indeed the necessity, of a knowledge of Western learning.

(7) Christian education at the hands of missionaries must have its place in this outline enumeration of the forces that have operated to produce the new education in China. Christian missions have had as the end of their activity the implanting of the Christian life in the hearts of the Chinese people. With this end central in thought they have put forth their chief effort to influence men and women of mature life, but as their work has enlarged they have increasingly realized that to make it indigenous and permanent it must be committed to the leadership of native men and women of wise heads as well as of true and earnest hearts,—and this means the education of children and youth under the best Christian conditions. Again, the Church does not lose sight of its central aim in broadening its educational activity and seeking to bring an ever-increasing number of non-Christian students into its institutions of learning, thus making Christian thought and life a pervasive influence in Chinese society.

The following is a conservative estimate of the present status of Christian education in China: sixty thousand boys and girls are studying in three thousand schools of the primary grade. Their time is divided between learning to read and write the Chinese language, learning the outline history and teachings of the Christian religion, and the usual studies acquired by children of their grade in Western lands. Twenty thousand boys and girls are studying in five hundred Christian schools of the intermediate grade. They are carrying forward

their Chinese and Christian studies and are taking up the more important Western studies of academic grade. Probably the majority of these students have already begun the study of the English language. Five thousand young men and women are studying in thirty Christian colleges. They are studying Chinese history and literature, and are learning to compose in the literary form. They are studying ethics and psychology, political science and international law, mathematics and physical science. The knowledge of English is being increasingly emphasized in Christian schools, and probably one-half of the students in these schools are acquiring Western learning through its medium.

Christian education had operated as a leaven in the life of China for a full generation before the general educational awakening set in, so that now the Chinese Government, while in no mood to acknowledge indebtedness for the new learning to the Christian church, does so indirectly by levying heavy tribute upon Christian schools for its most competent teachers.

Missionaries in China especially engaged in education have organized themselves into an Educational Association, now four hundred strong, and have held a series of triennial conferences with papers and discussions on educational themes. These papers have been widely read and have had a far-reaching influence. One important aim of this Association is to stimulate the production of an educational literature which shall be sympathetic with Christianity. This work of producing worthy text-books for the use of students and teachers, while it will never be completed, is already well past the beginning stage, and the new secular learning of China, whether or not it make due acknowledgment, is indebted to the missionaries for the pioneer work in making Western learning accessible to Chinese youth in the use of the Chinese

language. The work of making the Chinese language give adequate expression to Western thought throughout its wide range of learning is confessedly one of much difficulty. It requires a high order of scholarship to rightly combine characters to give expression to the desired thought. In this work the missionaries are exerting a formative influence, and the Chinese Board of Education will do well to give respect to their contribution to the new terminology.

There is another line of influence of great educational value through the awakening literature missionaries have produced and widely circulated among the officials and people. Drs. Williamson, Richard, Allen and Faber have been pioneers in this work, and many others have contributed to it. Through books, magazines, papers and leaflets they are teaching history, science, ethics, religion. They have discussed social and political problems, and in many ways have opened up to the Chinese mind new treasures of knowledge, and quickened in them a hunger for things concerning which they were wholly ignorant in the past.

We have above enumerated as contributing to the educational awakening of China (1), the superior military power of the Western world; (2), political intercourse; (3), Chinese students returning from abroad with Western education; (4), mercantile intercourse; (5), the Western methods for the material improvement of the conditions of life; (6), the medical practice of foreign physicians; (7), the influence of the new life of Japan upon China; (8), the influence of Christian education. These influences operating for the past two generations upon the political and social life of China are sufficient to account for the new educational awakening. It is important to note that these influences have been pervasive and cumulative. They have operated on all

classes and conditions of society. The new learning has not first been accepted and set in order by the head, the Chinese Government, to be imitated later by the members, the various strata of society. Rather have these influences operated first upon the members, and later through the members upon the head. The majority of the officers of government are the product of the learning of the past, and they have been literally beaten into a reluctant recognition of the value of Western learning by the new conditions thrust upon China, and by the din and concussion of new ideas. This explains why the new learning seems to be haphazard in its inception, to be superficial in its scope and to be lacking in wise leadership. Schools rise and disappear like mushrooms without provision for their permanent support. Every viceroy and governor, indeed every official of the rank of Tio T'ai and above, must be a patron of this learning to meet the public demand. Thus they are developing university schemes and erecting buildings in nearly every provincial capital before they have produced teachers to give instruction, or qualified students to receive instruction. But it would be false to represent everything as still in a superficial and haphazard stage. Not all interested in the new education are beginning at the ridge-pole and building downward. More and more permanent beginnings are being made in real education, in multiplying primary and intermediate schools as fast as school-rooms can be provided and proper teachers secured. Already many of the Government schools have passed the experimental stage, and from this time the quality of teaching promises to steadily improve. It is to be regretted that the Chinese are seriously retarding their educational progress by too often placing imperfectly equipped native or Japanese teachers in responsible positions, when by a more liberal policy they might secure

competent teachers from Europe and America to set for them a much-needed standard of thoroughness in their educational work.

In the Boxer uprising of 1900, the attempt was made to cast out of mind and sight all Western thoughts and things, and continue to live on in the old order of life, undisturbed by the events of the outside world. Following the collapse of this mad effort, two years later there spread a wave of interest both in the results and in the methods of Western learning. Here we contemplate two movements in mutual antagonism, and yet they are not without a causal relationship. Many of the leaders of China thought something as follows: "If Western learning has hidden in it power that we cannot contend against, and will ultimately crush us if we continue in our old social status, we must master that learning that we may wield the new power for our own protection." That this was the exclusive motive in the new movement, or that it is still dominant in the thoughts of educational leaders, we neither assert nor believe, but we are confident that it was powerfully active in inaugurating the new movement. As the youth of China drink more and more deeply at the fountains of the new learning they will more and more value it for itself, for its new outlook upon life, and for the pure delight of knowledge.

We noted above that this educational movement has thus far lacked in efficient guidance, but the spontaneity of the movement makes for expansion and permanency. A new order of learning destined to revolutionize social conditions must at first be but superficially contemplated, fragments of knowledge must be gained as to its scope and utility, and these fragments as they multiply become inspiring thoughts, a necessary preparation for the advanced movement. Thirty years ago Chinese scholars were well nigh deaf listeners when one undertook to talk

with them as to any department in the wide range of Western learning. They had no basis of knowledge to be able to listen intelligently to what was told them. One "nibbler" after Western learning once asked me as to the latitude and longitude of the source of the Yellow River. The questioner had no notion of the meaning of the learned terms he had picked up, and when an answer was attempted he replied: "But how about the traditional teaching that the Yellow River has its source in the Milky Way ('The Heavenly River') and flowing to the East again pours its waters into the Milky Way?" A Chinese astronomer accepted the Copernican theory of the revolution of the earth around the sun, but made an addition to that theory which he regarded of vital importance. "The earth is surrounded by a sphere of 'Ch'i' (primordial matter), and this sphere of 'Ch'i' with the earth as a hub rolls on the floor of the Universe, and so is kept in its orderly circuit!" We now meet in increasing numbers an advanced type of scholars, men who can talk with you intelligently on a considerable range of Western subjects of knowledge. A Tao T'ai from his general reading talked with the speaker on social science, and spoke of the teachings of John Stuart Mill on this subject. Chinese periodicals are being multiplied which scatter a wide range of information as to Western thought and themes, and are slowly leavening the thought of the people. That which has found a superficial lodgment in the minds of the leaders of thought is certain through their encouragement to find a fuller lodgment in the minds of their children, and so later of the youth of China.

But we would not give the impression that the Chinese Government is not putting forth serious effort to have a guiding hand in instituting the new learning in China. The abolition in 1905 by Imperial Edict of the old order

of provincial and local examinations, and substituting in place the Western system of examinations, was a radical step of far-reaching consequence, as it not only introduces new methods of education, but adds a new content to such education. From ancient times the Chinese people have regarded the supervision of the work of education as an important function of government, and with only occasional exceptions men of learning have been leaders in the administration of government. A new Board of Education has been established in Peking whose important duty it is to unify and supervise the education of China. This Board is not yet composed of men who are masters of the new learning, but more and more they are commanding the help of such men. Already they have proposed in outline a great national scheme of education. Children under seven are to be given their training in kindergartens, followed by lower and upper primary schools. These schools in theory must be provided by the Government throughout China in sufficient numbers to accommodate the needs of students. Intermediate schools are being opened in prefectural cities. Colleges are being established in each of the provincial capitals. A university is to be organized in Peking, at the outset to teach engineering, law, political science, pedagogy, etc., and to advance the range of studies to meet conditions as they develop. The Board has designated Bureaus to supervise specific departments of learning, to be in charge of men of special training. Several important special examinations have been held in Peking in which students holding diplomas from Western colleges and universities have been awarded high literary degrees. These examinations have proved creditable to both examiners and students, showing as they do that the Chinese Government is beginning to command the service of men of a high order of attain-

ment in Western learning. Provincial superintendents of education are also appointed who, along with viceroys and governors, are active in developing schools of the various grades. These men in turn appoint examiners to give diplomas to student graduates, and, in general, to advance the standard of education.

A movement is in preparation to establish in Peking a depot of educational supplies—text-books, maps, apparatus, etc., for the use of schools. Similar depots are being built up in provincial capitals. In Tientsin, and doubtless in other centers, a large building is devoted to an educational exhibit, a sort of educational information bureau, where both information and assistance are given in securing needed books and other supplies.

This educational activity on the part of the Government is greatly assisted by the activity of individuals. Many of the officials contribute of their own means, or from some source of income, to establish schools of primary or secondary grade. In these secondary schools English must always have a place, though too often it is taught by men with only a smattering of knowledge. Many of these schools without a permanent source of support have a rather precarious existence, but they bear witness to the spirit of the new times, and prepare the way for more permanent schools. Many men of means, not officials, are founding schools as witnesses to their sympathy with the new movement. One such school built up by Mr. Chang Po Ling in Tientsin deserves special mention, since it is typical of a class of schools certain to increase in China. He has built up a school of the secondary grade with three hundred pupils. The instruction given bears creditable comparison with the instruction given in the best grade of mission schools. Mr. Chang, though related to the highest rank of officials, has united with the Christian Church, and freely urges

the need of Christian ethics for the right regulation of conduct.

The strength of this new educational movement is strikingly witnessed to by the School of Nobles now established in Peking. It includes both Chinese and Western lines of study, and is almost military in its regulations. Prince Ch'un, the present Regent of China, was a pupil in this school. His seat is still preserved in its place and the head instructor visits him from time to time to discourse to him on problems of government.

The influence of the Commercial Press of Shanghai upon the new learning of China is deserving of special mention. This is an enterprise conducted wholly by the Chinese and for commercial ends, but the proprietors have shown a correct judgment of the demands of the times, and have given to the public an abundant and varied educational literature, which has been steadily absorbed by the wide demand, and has rewarded their enterprise with great prosperity. It is interesting to note that the new demands are not exclusively for helps in acquiring Western learning. Many new books are appearing setting forth better methods for learning the Chinese language and mastering the ancient literature. The suggestion is often heard that the Chinese would some day set aside their language as cumbersome and effete, and adopt some Western language, but it is a suggestion made in ignorance of the Chinese people and of the power of growth and adaptation hidden in their language. It is, however, important in adding a vast range of new learning to their course of study that better methods should be devised for mastering their language. In this as in other things it has needed the sharp concussion of Western thought to push the Chinese out of their deep traditional ruts and lead them to the discovery of new and better methods of study.

Perhaps nothing proves more emphatically the radical nature of this educational awakening than the new interest in the education of women. In the old order of society, women were not the companions of men on terms of equality. Possibly one or two per cent. of the women could read and write, but the wife is called "the inside man," and education is thought to have for her no manifest value, indeed may prove an element of unrest and disturbance. No thought was given to education for the value of knowledge in itself, and the new springs of happiness thus opened up to give quality to life. But China has been profoundly impressed with the educated Western woman, not a toy in her husband's household, not a servant, but a companion standing by his side in their varied social relations, and an intelligent mother to her children. Already the new Chinese woman is beginning to appear, a true sister to the Western woman. She has, perhaps, been educated in some mission school, or has returned with a yet wider education from Europe or America. Such women—as yet all too few—are in demand as leaders in the new education for women. In Peking and in many other cities the attention of the visitor is attracted to groups of students in modest students' uniforms going to and from their various schools, and you note that many of these students are girls and young women. A delightful description has just come to hand of the graduation exercises in a kindergarten school in Peking, in which a flock of forty little people went through with faultless accuracy their prescribed evolutions and received their diplomas. This school was founded by high Chinese officials, the Prince Regent being the largest giver. Truly a new day has dawned on China when such things are accomplished by the Chinese of their own initiative.

In attempting to speak on the theme of the New Edu-

cation in China, I had no hope of doing more than to give an outline impression of the vast movement now setting in and gathering force on every hand. This movement is destined more and more to be fed from the springs of Western learning. Chinese students are going abroad in increasing numbers to Japan, to America, to Europe, to return in due time to become educational leaders among their countrymen. I have recently learned an interesting fact, that fifty Chinese students born in Hawaii are now studying in colleges in Shanghai, Nanking and Wuch'ang, to fit themselves for a life career among their own people. This new type of leaven in the old lump is certain to increase. Again, Western institutions of learning are awakening to the opportunity now presented to give a helping hand in this Chinese educational renaissance. Oxford and Cambridge in England, and Chicago University in America, are already maturing plans to give efficient assistance. Yale has an incipient university setting itself in order in the heart of China, and other universities are moving in the same direction. We are at the beginning of a movement of unprecedented promise for China and for the world.

The interests of truth compel me to add in conclusion, that there is a serious danger lurking in the new education of China as it is taking form. Education has its highest ends not in knowledge, but in character, not in ability to master the forces of nature, but the forces of the human passions and affections. Thus far the majority of Chinese students desire to acquire Western learning for the sake of the power it will give in bettering the external conditions of life, and slight thought is given to the acquisition of moral power to improve the internal order of their life, also. I have already expressed high appreciation of the ethical thought

embodied in the teachings of the sages of China. These teachings have been the great conserving power in Chinese civilization for three thousand years, and yet they have lacked dynamic force to make them more than partially realized in society. In China—probably not less than in other non-Christian countries—there is a sad divorce between knowledge and conduct. Ideal conduct is everywhere praised, but social habit moves along a distinctly lower plane, and hides much that is evil under a cover of conformity to custom. In the old order of society, students lived for the most part at home, and were taught in small schools by local teachers. Under these conditions, moral restraints were at their maximum, and the foundations of a self-respecting manhood were laid. But in the government schools not only does the new learning come to the pupils carefully divorced from Christian ethical or religious teaching, but Confucian learning in the thought of both teachers and pupils occupies a secondary place. Students with undeveloped characters are separated from their homes, are thrown into a promiscuous companionship, with temptations to evil lurking on every hand, resulting too often in moral degeneracy. This has been the painful outcome of the flocking of Chinese students by thousands to Japan. The Chinese Government has been justly alarmed at the output of education under such conditions, but it is not yet alive to the evils hidden in the new government system of education.

The Christian Church believes that it can give to the youth of China an education that supplies the lacking ethical element, that it cannot only set before Chinese pupils the right ideals of conduct, in many of which the teachings of Confucius and Christ are in essential agreement, but can present in Christian teachers examples of men and women who are living toward these ideals in

their life relations. Mr. Chang Po Ling, above spoken of, recently presented a copy of the New Testament to a friend belonging to the Board of Education, and added the remark: "This is the only hope of China."

The superior ethical element in Christian education is widely recognized by non-Christian Chinese, and yet their valuation is superficial and inadequate, so that in spite of the failure of Confucian ethics to build up robust moral character, they cling to the traditional estimate of its value, with a pervasive suspicion that, notwithstanding the high ethical standard in Christian education, there is hidden in it a lurking element of danger. It gives expression to the moral thought and erects the standard of living of an outside civilization, which threaten to overturn their old system of thought and transform the old ideals of life. It is true that Christian ethics is destined to work great changes in the Eastern world, as it has already wrought in the Western world. The spirit of Christianity is that of benevolent aggression. It does not cease in its efforts to do good by reason of encountering mere indifference or opposition. Christian education in China, though a generation in advance of the new government education, is still in its initial stage, and its influence is certain to be vastly widened and deepened in the near future, if the educational work now begun is allowed to have its normal development. Christian men and women will more and more occupy positions of influence in the various orders of society, and Christian ideals of life will increasingly assert themselves.

We have been in the habit of thinking that great political and social changes require long periods for their accomplishment, and this has been true in past history, but we need to remind ourselves and give emphasis to the thought, that in this age of steam and electricity, of swift

and easy intercommunication, political and social changes move at an equally rapid pace with physical changes. The great thoughts of individual rights, of liberty, of reciprocity, of giving to others for the enrichment of the common life, required in the Western world many centuries of conflict before they were permitted to take their place as motive-forces in society; but these thoughts are already well advanced in securing acceptance in China—at least as a theory of human rights and duties. China may yet for a brief period continue to misunderstand the altruistic motives in Christian education, to treat her own sons and daughters as semi-aliens because they have committed the offense of choosing for themselves the better things of the Christian faith, but this period will swiftly pass, and the Chinese will learn that the hand of help in educational, social and political renovation stretched out to her from Christian lands is a hand that is directed by the same beneficent Spirit that wrought in the teachings of the sages, and is together with those teachings the gift of Heaven to this people.

All who have wrought for the Chinese believe in their race capacity. They will, with proper training and experience, match the Anglo-Saxon at his best in the varied activities of life. They have the instincts for law, for order, in the family, in society, in government, that only need to be strengthened and directed by steady moral purpose, to make of them a great industrial, intellectual and moral force in the world, making returns a hundred fold to Western nations for the help they have extended to China in this period of adjustment to the new and better order of life opening up before its people.

XIV

THE HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN MISSIONS IN CHINA

FACTORS entering into the uplift of that fourth of the human race resident in China cannot fail to interest every broad-minded man and woman. As the discussions of the past few days have made very evident, the increments of recent progress in the Far East are manifold and have affected different peoples variously. It would be most profitable to study the comparative influence exerted by all those external forces and ideas affecting a given nation—the Chinese, for example—which during the last half century in particular have so largely reshaped the Orient. Time limitations make this impossible even when our thought is concentrated upon a single empire, so that only incidental references to politics, commerce, etc., will be made in our treatment of China this morning. This preliminary word is intended as a warning against a prevalent tendency among Christian people interested in missions to suppose that the only forces entering into the national regeneration of China are those exerted by godly and energetic missionaries. Even more prevalent among Protestants who have heard much about the centenary of Morrison's arrival in China, celebrated so profitably in 1907, is the impression that all the religious progress of the past century is the sole result of Protestant labors. If we would know the truth as to this supposition, we ought to be catholic enough to ask what all the branches of the Christian Church—Nestorian, Roman, and Greco-Russian, as well as Protestant—have

accomplished and, except in the case of Nestorianism, are accomplishing to-day for the social, mental, and religious betterment of China's more than 400,000,000 inhabitants.

Manichaeans in China

Little need be said concerning this stadium of Christianity in China. Still less shall I say of those traditional labors of earlier apostles in the Land of Sinim. Stories of St. Thomas, the doubter, have been an interrogation point in Christianity's Asiatic traditions, both in India and China. We may dismiss those referring to his preaching in the latter country as groundless, even if any should be disposed to give credence to the Indian traditions. Within three centuries of our Saviour's ascension, Arnobius speaks of Christian deeds done among the Seres, which may be those of Christian missionaries in China. More probable are the traditions as to the propagation of a heretical form of Christianity by Mani, also in the third century. Before Manichaeus had been crucified and flayed alive in 276 of our era—we follow the Oriental account of Mani, rather than the less trustworthy Western traditions—he had in all probability carried his eclectic faith, quite as much Chaldeism and Buddhism as Christianity, to the confines of China, north of Turkestan. Here it was that in his rock cave, whose rough walls he adorned with mural paintings, he gained his name of Mani, the artist or painter. Whether his stuffed skin, hung *in terrorem* over the gates of Persepolis, had a neutralizing effect upon his Far Eastern preaching or not, the fact remains that though in 500 A.D. the Manichaeans were found in Hsi-an Fu and later had temples in that city, in Ho-nan Fu, Tai-yüan Fu, and Ningpo, their beliefs had little influence upon the Chinese. To-day no trace apparently remains, though

some¹ hold that their doctrines are the root whence sprang the White Lotus sect, whose members are so obstinate even now in adhering to their religious faith. More certain is it² that Manichaeism entered materially into that form of Buddhism carried back to Japan by one of her most famous sons, the supreme teacher, Kōbō Daishi, whose body after many centuries is supposed to rest in dreamless trance beneath the hazy summit of beautiful Koya San.

Nestorianism in the Empire

Nestorian influence in China may be more accurately traced. In a proclamation of the real, not nominal, founder of the glorious T'ang dynasty, dated the seventh moon of 638, we read: "Tao has no constant name, holiness no constant form; cults are established according to place for the unobtrusive salvation of the masses. The Persian bonze Alopên has come from afar to submit to Us at Our capital his scriptural cult. Examining closely into the significance of that cult, We find it transcendental and quiescent; that it represents and sets forth the most important principles of our being, just as much as it tends to the salvation and profit of mankind. It may well be carried over the Empire. The executive will therefore forthwith erect in the I-ning ward of the city a monastery, with twenty-one qualified priests."³ A tolerably full account of the entrance and fortunes of the new faith, known in China as the Ta Ch'in Ching Chiao, the Great Western Illustrious Religion, or

¹ See, for example, Richard, *Conversion by the Million*, Vol. II., p. 120.

² See Prof. Lloyd in *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. XXXV, Part II., pp. 193-211.

³ Parker, *China and Religion*, p. 121.

Church, is found on this same coarse marble monument—possibly the oldest Christian inscription in Asia—from which the proclamation has just been quoted.

Though erected in the year 781, its record goes back to 635, the time of Alopên's arrival at the Chinese capital of Hsi-an Fu. We thus have here one hundred and fifty years of Nestorianism's authenticated history. It would appear that in the eighth century, the Illustrious Religion had been preached in ten of China's provinces and that Imperial favor had been frequent and helpful. Indeed, like the early Jesuit propaganda, the attempt seems to have been made to gain royal favor rather than to win the masses to the new faith. In order to conciliate the higher classes, their statement of doctrine was very diplomatic. The British Sinologue, Prof. Parker, of Victoria University, Manchester, writes:⁴ "It will be noticed that no stress is laid upon damnation, the sacraments, confession, repentance, the sanctity of marriage rites, the immaculate conception, the crucifixion, passion, resurrection, life everlasting, and many other things inseparable from the belief of most Christians of the present day. Of course it is very possible that King-ting [Ching³ Ching⁴], the author of the inscription, endeavored to compose a record which would not shock Confucian prejudices more than was absolutely necessary, and that he may have deliberately chosen to state only half the truth, leaving out all dogmas involving apparent departure from the ordinary course of nature. It is also likely that, as he was bound—in the absence of any other ready-made phraseology—to draw upon Taoist and Buddhist terms, he felt it prudent to avail himself also of accepted Taoist and Buddhist ideas, so far as they did not clash with his own teachings. Even Manichaeism is, or seems to be, conciliated."

⁴ China and Religion, pp. 125, 126.

In this ecclesiastical diplomacy, some writers find a partial explanation of Nestorianism's failure to widely influence the Chinese people. One of them, Dr. George Smith, who represents a totally different school from that to which Prof. Parker belongs, expresses his deep conviction in these words:⁵ "While Pantaenus stands at the head of the evangelicalism which has ever since carried to Asia the missionary message that God is in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself, Nestorius is the representative of those who preach a Christ who is less than Divine, and who have therefore ever failed to convert mankind. Nestorianism became such a compromise with heathenism as led to Mohammed's teachings. . . . This fact of compromise must be remembered when we proceed to look at the otherwise bright missionary progress of Nestorian Christianity in Asia, Central, East, and South."

Doctrinal accommodation and curtailment do not alone explain why this form of Christianity, entering China in the seventh century, gradually fades from view, until after the close of the fourteenth all reference to it ceases.⁶ During these seven and a half centuries, the Chinese Court had been touched with the Christian influence, fifteen provinces had heard the word of God in a limited way, the Bible had been translated in part at least, and the lives of priests and ordinary Christians had been so comparatively pure that even in Marco Polo's time they were generally respected. Besides propagating a partial view of Christianity, what they had failed to accomplish, was to make no earnest effort to establish a self-propagating church, enter into no determined

⁵ *The Conversion of India*, pp. 15, 16.

⁶ Cordier says (*Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. III., p. 669), that traces of them were found by the Jesuits at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

effort to teach the Bible which they had partially translated, and taken no pains to educate native leaders. On this latter point a recent writer on Nestorianism in China, Rev. W. S. Walsh, says:⁷ "I should like to point out one other cause to which the overthrow of the work may be traced—I mean the neglect of school work and the training of Chinese pastors and teachers. Nowhere have I been able to find any trace of Nestorian Christian schools. Marco Polo speaks of churches, the Nestorian inscription tells of tonsured monks and orderly worship, and had there been a good school at the capital or elsewhere, we may almost certainly say that it would have been mentioned. But no effort seems to have been made to use and develop the Chinese Christians as teachers, speakers, doctors or pastors, and in China any mission which neglects this branch of the work is foredoomed to failure." It is but fair to add, that had the Nestorian Church been open to none of these criticisms, it would nevertheless have suffered partial if not entire extinction during the troublous centuries, when owing to Moslem strength in Central and Western Asia, the Church was cut off from supplies and men that could not be sent from the home base, and when persecution and Government disfavor blotted out the early and successful work of the Roman Church also, which had entered the China field.

Roman Missions and Missionaries

The first Christian force to influence China's religious life permanently proceeded from Rome. It was in that time of dreadful fear, occasioned by the looming up on the eastern European horizon of conquering Mongol hordes, that Pope Innocent IV. in 1245 dispatched to the

⁷ The East and the West, April, 1909, p. 217.

Tartar chieftain, to ascertain his intentions, an ambassador, John of Plano Carpini, a Franciscan. He returned to Avignon from the Mongol Capital of Karakorum in 1247. Though another Franciscan, William of Rubruck, was later sent to the Mongol Court by St. Louis, King of France, the real founder of this first Roman mission to China was John of Montecorvino, who reached China via India in 1292. He was kindly received by the great Kublai Khan—whose mother was a Christian, a niece of Prester John—and shortly he had erected in Peking a church “which had a steeple and belfry with three bells that were rung every hour to summon the new converts to prayer.”⁸ Though opposed by the Nestorians, at the end of eleven years he had baptized nearly six thousand persons “and bought one hundred and fifty children, whom he instructed in Greek and Latin and composed for them several devotional books.”⁹

The story of this devoted missionary is most interesting. A hint of it may be gained from an extant letter of his written when he was nearly sixty. “It is now twelve years,” he writes, “since I have heard any news from the West. I am become old and gray-headed, but it is rather through labors and tribulations than through age, for I am only fifty-eight years old. I have learned the Tartar language and literature, into which I have translated the whole New Testament and the Psalms of David, and have caused them to be transcribed with the utmost care. I write and read and preach openly and freely the testimony of the law of Christ.”¹⁰ He believed in making the great facts of Scripture vivid in the imagina-

⁸ Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, Vol. II., p. 287.

⁹ Quoted by Williams from *The Chinese Repository*, Vol. III., p. 112.

¹⁰ Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, Vol. II., p. 288.

tion of believers, and for that reason, and that he might "captivate the eyes of the barbarians," he had the mysteries of the Bible pictured in all his churches. It is not surprising after such a life to read in one of the old records of his decease, which occurred in 1328,¹¹ after he had converted more "than thirty thousand infidels," that "all the inhabitants of Cambaluc [Peking], without distinction, mourned for the man of God, and both Christians and pagans were present at the funeral ceremony, the latter rending their garments in token of grief, . . . and the place of his burial became a pilgrimage to which the inhabitants of Cambaluc resorted with pious eagerness."¹²

Though under Montecorvino's successors the work was continued and extended as far south as the province of Fu-chien, it was not destined to continue. With the dissolution of the Mongol dynasty and the accession of the Ming emperors, persecution and other causes speedily wiped out all remnants of Roman and Nestorian Christianity, so that Prof. Parker can write:¹³ "During four-fifths of the native Ming dynasty (1368-1644), it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the very idea of 'Christian,' not to say the word, or any word for it, does not once occur in the Chinese annals."

It is at the close of the Ming dynasty that Romanism's second and very successful entrance into the Empire is recorded. If, as the French savant, Prof. Cordier, suggests,¹⁴ the Dominican friar, Gaspar da Cruz, was actually the first modern missionary in China, where he remained but a short time, it was the Jesuits under Matteo

¹¹ Dr. Hoffman (*Lives of the Leaders of Our Church Universal*, p. 219), says in 1332.

¹² Williams, *Middle Kingdom*, Vol. II., p. 288.

¹³ *China and Religion*, p. 189.

¹⁴ *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. III., p. 670.

Ricci who were the first to lay a solid foundation for missions in the Celestial Empire, thus realizing the longing of that flaming member of their order, Francis Xavier, whose wish when dying on the threshold of China his successor Valignani so forcefully voiced, "O, mighty fortress! when shall these impenetrable brazen gates of thine be broken through?"¹⁵

Arriving in China, this foremost among Roman missionaries "for skill, perseverance, learning, and tact," gained a foothold on the mainland in 1583. But Ricci was not content to remain at Chao-ch'ing Fu, even though it was then the capital of the "Two Kuang" provinces. The Jesuits had besought the Governor for permission to build on the mainland on the ground that "they had at last ascertained with their own eyes that the Celestial Empire was even superior to its brilliant renown. They therefore desired to end their days in it, and wished to obtain a little land to construct a house and a church where they might pass their time in prayer and study, in solitude and meditation."¹⁶ Ricci was more ambitious than his comrades and would rest content with nothing less than the Imperial city and the Dragon Throne. That vision was finally realized for permanent residence during the first year of the seventeenth century, after nearly eighteen years of study and toil and service, and, it must be added, not wholly without guile. From 1601 this active propagandist was tireless in his varied activities until his death in 1610. Ricci's literary gifts were extraordinary, and not a few of his writings are still in use; one or two even by Protestants. His topics were well chosen to attract the literati, and scarcely any foreigner has succeeded so well in clothing Christian ideas in an alluring garb. But in addition to

¹⁵ Encyclopædia Britannica, Vol. XVI., p. 517.

¹⁶ Williams, Middle Kingdom, Vol. II., p. 290.

such labors, as head of a mission with four stations a taxing correspondence was carried on, besides that which was necessitated by inquiries coming from all parts of the Empire as to the doctrines taught and the books which he had written. Visitors in great numbers were always made welcome; new converts were to be received as true brothers; and grievous burdens arising from his relations to officials and to the Court pressed upon him heavily. Even in his demise, his final service to the cause was foreshadowed in his words:¹⁷ "My fathers, when I reflect by what means I may most efficaciously propagate the Christian faith among the Chinese, I find none better nor more persuasive than my death," a belief which materialized, as Huc remarks, in his public interment with the Emperor's official sanction, thus legalizing Christianity in a way.

For a century and a half after Ricci's entrance, the Empire was open quite generally to Western influences, mainly on the religious and educational-literary side. Brilliant men followed him to the Court who commended Christianity by their scientific attainments which they were ever ready to place at the Emperor's service. The names of two of them are well known in China: the learned German Jesuit, Adam Schaal von Bell, made "President of the Mathematical Tribunal," and at one time tutor of the famous Emperor K'ang Hsi; and Ferdinand Verbiest, a most famous astronomer and maker of some of the superb astronomical instruments whose beauty attracted many to the old Peking observatory, until the looting of them by foreign powers in 1900, a man of whom Medhurst writes:¹⁸ "His character, for humility and modesty, was only equalled by his well-known application and industry. He seemed insensible

¹⁷ Marshall, *Christian Missions*, Vol. I., p. 66.

¹⁸ *China: Its State and Prospects*, p. 193.

to everything but the promotion of science and religion. He abstained from idle visits, the reading of curious books and even the perusal of European newspapers; while he incessantly employed himself, either in mathematical calculations, in instructing proselytes, in corresponding with the grandees of the Empire on the interests of the mission, or in writing to the learned of Europe, inviting them to repair to China. His private papers are indicative of the depth of his devotion, the rigor of his austerities, his watchfulness over his heart amid the crowd of business, and the ardor with which he served religion. His sincerity was attested by the endurance of sufferings in the cause which he had espoused, and his disinterestedness and liberality by the profusion of his gifts to others and the renunciation of indulgences to himself."

Yet this period of one hundred and fifty years, though it saw the wide extension of Christianity, the erection of a noble church within the precincts of K'ang Hsi's palace, and the accomplishment of perhaps still the best survey of the Empire, executed by the missionaries during the years 1708-1718, was nevertheless a time of frequent reverses and even persecutions. "The venerable Adam Schaal at the age of seventy-four was loaded with chains and cast into prison, together with a crowd of converted mandarins, of whom five were martyred. Schaal was sentenced to be strangled and chopped in pieces; but it is related"—I am quoting a Romanist historian of their China mission^{18a}—"that whenever the judges assembled to read the decree, they were forced by earthquakes to fly from the tribunal." Though he did not meet so dreadful a fate, he sank under the outrages received and died in 1666. It was the eminence of a little circle of missionaries at Court which once and

^{18a} Marshall, *Christian Missions*, Vol. I., p. 69.

again stilled the threatening storm. Had it not been for the virulence of the inter-order controversy which arrayed Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans in opposing and bitterly hostile camps—a battle royal which was partly political also, as different orders were under the protection of unfriendly European powers, and which caused successive Popes to rule against each other in a way that imperiled the later dogma of Infallibility—Roman missions might have escaped the eclipse which began with the order of Yung Chêng, K'ang Hsi's son and successor, issued in 1724 and strictly prohibiting the propagation of the T'ien Chu Chiao, or Lord of Heaven Church, as Roman Catholicism is denominated in China.

During the thirteen decades of persecution, extending from the issuance of the prohibitory order just mentioned until the treaties of 1858 inaugurated a new era for missions, exile, imprisonment, and death were common experiences, and some of the most heroic deeds are recorded of both missionaries and their converts, thus disproving the untrue criticism of the Protestant Gützlaff that the Roman missionaries had “converted thousands without touching the heart.” At risk of life converts stood by the Church and its leaders most nobly, and in spite of all opposition, 400,000 Chinese were enrolled as Romanists in 1846, and eighty European missionaries ministered in great peril to their scattered flocks.

In the view of some Roman authorities, even more inimical to the Church than outlawry and bitter persecution was the strife within the Church already alluded to. It culminated with the Bull “*Ex quo singulari*” of Pope Benedict XIV., issued in 1742, which condemned the Chinese ceremonies as idolatrous and finally established T'ien Chu, Lord of Heaven, as the exclusive designation of God, thus putting an end for Catholic missionaries to

the "term question," which has been until recently a bone of contention among Protestants. So acute a scholar as Henri Cordier, like a faithful son of the Church, only last year had this to say of that decision:¹⁹ "Rome having spoken, no more can be said here on the question; but it may be noted that the Bull *Ex quo singulari* was a terrible blow to missions in China. There are fewer Christians than formerly and none among the higher classes, as were the princes and mandarins of the Court of K'ang Hsi." Indeed, the professor might have gone back to that Emperor's predecessor, whose mother, principal wife, and eldest son had been baptized by Father Koffler, and who had dispatched a letter to Pope Alexander VII. upon which high hopes were built, though in vain. Such converts as Paul Hsü, the famous mandarin, and his daughter²⁰ Candida, who according to Du Halde founded thirty churches in her own part of the country, and caused nineteen to be built in different provinces of the Empire, were won even earlier by Ricci himself, and they have no parallels to-day.

The course of Roman Catholicism since the treaties of half a century ago has been one of steady progress, despite the temporary set back to missions of every Christian name which occurred at the time of the Boxer outbreak in 1900. A hint of the extent of their operations may be had from a few statistical items taken from the latest German Catholic statistical work, issued last year.²¹ According to Krose, there were in China and its dependencies, 1,026,168 Catholics, including 14,000 of European extraction, most of them presumable at the Portuguese settlement of Macao. Ministering to them

¹⁹ The Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. III., p. 672.

²⁰ Marshall, Christian Missions, Vol. I., p. 65, says she was his granddaughter.

²¹ Krose, Katholische Missions-statistik, p. 79.

were 1,261 European and 550 Chinese priests, 291 lay-brothers, and 3,846 members of various sisterhoods.²² The conquering sign of the Cross marked 6,070 churches and chapels in 13,069 stations and outstations scattered all over the Empire. Schools to the number of 4,857 instructed in the faith and in other useful learning 118,013 boys and girls, while 23,380 pupils received the Church's fostering care in their orphanages. Streit,²³ another trustworthy Roman statistician, informs us that three years ago the orders and sisterhoods, roughly corresponding to Protestant societies, represented in the foreign force comprised eleven of priests, two of lay-brothers, and eleven of sisters; so that one item of supposed Roman advantage, namely, the multiplicity of sending organizations, is not so great as would appear. It must be added, however, that the Church has so located the different orders and so carefully co-ordinated their activities, that there is less appearance of disunity among them than among Protestants.

It may be of interest to note some of the items in the Roman policy and practice which have characterized the missionary efforts of that communion during the past three and a quarter centuries. Not all of them have been continuous, though there has been less change of program among Romanists than among Protestants who have labored in China less than one-third as long.

As they began under Ricci's guidance to seek to influence those in high positions, and to hold themselves in seclusion from the rabble in dignified aloofness, so they have largely continued to the present time. One indication of that desire, though it also had other motives, is their demand, recognized by the Government in a

²² According to Streit, *Statistische Notizen*, p. 14, 659 are Europeans.

²³ *Statistische Notizen zum katholischen Missionsatlas*, p. 12.

decree of March 15, 1899, for a status corresponding in rank with Chinese officials—bishops being in rank and dignity the equals of viceroys and governors, vicars-general and archdeacons, of provincial judges, and so on down the line. That ruling was extended to Protestants in accordance with the “most favored nation” clause of early treaties, but they refused such questionable and compromising honors—honors which the Government revoked a year or two since in the case of Romanists. In their contact with the people they have always been more or less open to the criticism of Père Ripa, who long ago wrote to his brethren:²⁴ “If our European missionaries in China would conduct themselves with less ostentation and accommodate their manners to persons of all ranks and conditions, the number of converts would be immensely increased. Their garments are made of the richest materials; they go nowhere on foot, but always in sedans, on horseback, or in boats, and with numerous attendants following them. With a few honorable exceptions, all the missionaries live in this manner; and thus, as they never mix with the people, they make but few converts.” But there is another side to this Romanist’s criticism. The Chinese are accustomed to precisely this aloofness; and when, in their estimate of the dignity of the teacher and scholar, a missionary holds himself cheap in their esteem, he loses much influence. Not a few native criticisms of Protestant missionaries contrast unfavorably their bustling activity and disregard of dignity with the reserve and seclusion of Catholic fathers. In my own opinion, Protestants may learn much of their Roman brethren in this respect, though they would certainly never go to the extremes of 1899 or of Père Ripa’s picture.

This suggests the question, How, then, do they reach

²⁴ Williams, Middle Kingdom, Vol. II., p. 305.

so large a number of Chinese and win them to the faith? The old method described by the Catholic authority just quoted is the main answer:²⁵ "The diffusion of our holy religion in these parts has been almost entirely owing to the catechists who are in their service, to other Christians, or to the distribution of Christian books in the Chinese language." These catechists and lay members of the Church are ever on the watch to find and introduce to the missionaries men of prominence, either among the crowd or in high places; and in the privacy of an attractive home furnished in orthodox Chinese style, where they are treated individually and as guests, not a few of them are won for the Church. Another large item in Krose's statistics—one never appearing in Protestant tables—is the baptism of infants and children "*in todesgefahr*," in articulo mortis. How many such are at the point of death brought into salvation and within the pale of the Church one cannot say. The statistics of last year are not full on this point,²⁶ but as they stand, in China and its dependencies 167,478 moribund infant baptisms are reported. A more commendable source of supply is the large number of boys and girls in Catholic schools, and especially the 23,380 pupils in orphanages in 1907 or 1908. The loving care of the Sisters, the emphasis of religion at that susceptible age, the provision for a helpful religious life on leaving these institutions, such as a Christian marriage for the girls, makes the orphanage a principal door into the Church. Another attraction which Rome has for the Chinese, in addition to the stately ceremonies of the sanctuary which contrasts favorably as against the barrenness of Protestant chapels and a somewhat barren service, is the aid which catechumens and members can secure in the case

²⁵ Williams, Middle Kingdom, Vol. II., p. 305.

²⁶ Katholische Missionsstatistik, pp. 56-58.

of lawsuits. Missions of every Christian name have recently been sought for the same reason; but if one cares to consult the records of Chinese courts, it will be found that in comparison with the numbers receiving encouragement in litigation from Roman missionaries, those so aided by their Protestant brethren constitute a negligible quantity. Moreover, the lack of intimate acquaintance of individual inquirers is far greater in the Catholic Church than in Protestant missions, so that the chances of being misinformed as to the merits of litigants is greater in that communion. It must likewise be added, though at the risk of the charge of the *odium theologicum*, that in the disputes between Chinese Romanists and Protestants which have aided the Catholic cause very often, their followers have in the great majority of instances taken the initiative, and been in the wrong. The same is true of the charge of proselytism brought by each against the other.

Yet when all has been said, and when the official attitude is acknowledged to be more unfavorable to the Romanists, mainly because of their participation in politics and their use therein by Western diplomats, there remains the fact that three centuries of Roman missions have greatly benefited China. It was through their representatives that the Occident first gained an adequate conception of China and the Chinese; it was they who first instructed the Empire in the Western sciences; they cast the cannon, reformed the calendar, mapped the provinces; they, in early times, had a grip on the Court which no mission nor legation has since possessed—a grip which was religious enough to win not a few of the Imperial family, some of whose members at the time of the prohibition of 1724 willingly endured exile and chains for the sake of their new faith. In works of charity they have been eminent; in the creation of Christian literature they

were the pioneers; in scientific ministrations to the Empire, Roman fathers are still benefactors, as witness the work of the eminent meteorologists of Sicawei, the ancestral home of Ricci's first great convert, Paul Hsü. If their Chinese followers lack in spiritual strength and in Biblical knowledge, remember that they have been left largely to the care of catechists with no Bible in their hands, and to a régime whose traditions cause the convert to know far more of the Church's ceremonial than he does of its doctrine. As for our Protestant representatives in China, one could wish that they were all worthy of the estimate passed upon certain Roman missionaries by an early Protestant apostle, Dr. Milne, which is approvingly quoted by Dr. Medhurst:²⁷

“The learning, personal virtues, and ardent zeal of some of them deserve to be imitated by all future missionaries; will be equalled by few, and perhaps rarely exceeded by any. Their steadfastness and triumph in the midst of persecutions even unto blood and death, in all imaginable forms, show that the questionable Christianity which they taught is to be ascribed to the effect of education, not design, and affords good reason to believe that they have long since joined the army of martyrs and are now wearing the crown of those who spared not their lives unto death, but overcame by the blood of the Lamb and the word of His testimony. It is not to be doubted that many sinners were, through their labors, turned from sin unto holiness; and they will finally have due praise from God as fellow workers in His Kingdom.”

Russo-Greek Missions in China

When Pope Innocent the Fourth's ambassador reached the Mongol Court of Kayuk Khan in 1247, he was astonished to find that two of the Khan's ministers were

²⁷ China: Its State and Prospects, p. 203.

Greek Christians who were maintaining a chapel at royal expense. This discovery led to the coming of other Christians from Syria, Babylonia and the Aral, the most learned of whom became the Khan's physicians and astrologers. Some at least were men of conviction, for John of Plano Carpini himself witnessed the execution of Michael Chernigoff for refusing to worship the Mongol gods.²⁸ Later Mongol histories speak of Russian regiments, of a Russian camp of 10,000 men, and of Russian guards even in Peking. It is also clear that in the fourteenth century there were many Greek priests and at least one Russian deacon in Mongolia and China.²⁹ From the time of the Mongol overthrow until the advent of the Manchus in 1640, Chinese documents are silent as to Russia and her religion.

It is with the capture of Albazin on the Amur River by the Manchus, which occurred in 1685, that the Russian Holy Orthodox Church became fairly established in China. A little party of twenty-five Russians, who had the option of going free if they preferred, accepted the Emperor's offer to settle in Peking. A priest, Vasily Leontyeff,³⁰ went with them carrying his ikons and his Christian faith to China's capital, almost a century after Ricci's advent there. Indeed, had it not been for the opposition of the Jesuits, Peter the Great would have sent an archbishop to Peking. As it was, those Russian priests who were allowed to come to the Capital nearly cost the Jesuits their posts on the astronomical board,³¹ and doubtless would have done so had not Romanist in-

²⁸ Parker, *China and Religion*, p. 232.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

³⁰ Cordier (*The Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. III., p. 679), says that the date is 1684, the number of Russians thirty-one, and the "pope," Maxim Leontieff.

³¹ Parker, *China and Religion*, p. 234.

trigues and promises been more subtle than the Russian advances. In the years 1727-1734 China built a church for the new religionists in the Nan Kuan, or southern hostelry, the model being the same as that of the French church built by Louis XIV. and the Emperor K'ang Hsi for the use of the Jesuits. At the same time it was stipulated that one lama—they called Russian priests by that Buddhistic name, as their vestments and rites closely resembled those of the Buddhists—and three assistant lamas should dwell there permanently at China's expense.

What the Russian mission was at this time, it has since continued to be—primarily a ministry to the descendants of the original Albazin colony of Russians and a chaplaincy to the Russian legation, and in a very secondary way a mission to the Chinese. It has had among its Archimandrites ecclesiastics of considerable erudition, conspicuously Father Hyacinth, one of the foremost authorities on China's social life, who took back with him to Russia several tons of Chinese books, and the even more eminent Archimandrite Palladius, whose literary productions are helpful to students of Buddhism and Christianity and of the Mongols, though they are largely locked up in the Russian tongue. In point of winning converts, they probably never enrolled as many as a thousand Chinese, and these have been obliged to so thoroughly understand their religion that they have come in at the rate of not more than a dozen or two a year. For their use the Bible and other Christian books have been translated into Chinese. Beyond the Capital there is little work, though services are held at Tientsin and at two towns not far from Peking. It is said that since the Boxer uprising, when most of the old Albazin colonists were killed, they have instituted a new policy. They are translating fresh Christian books and are extending their lines beyond the immediate neighborhood of the Capital.

If it be supposed that this inactivity, which, after more than two centuries of occupation, has led to such meager results, is due to inherent apathy of the Holy Orthodox Church, the phenomenal success of Archbishop Nicolai in the Capital of Japan should be remembered. In a single lifetime, not yet at its close, he has, practically unaided by Europeans, built up a church with almost 30,000 members,³² more than one-half as many as the communicants of Protestant missions in Japan, with their nearly eight hundred missionaries. The explanation is rather to be found in Russia's policy in China. From Peter's time onward it has been inconsistent with that policy to entrust priests with any power which might conceivably compromise the State, and the winning of numerous converts might disturb diplomatic relations. There certainly has never yet been a Russian "missionary disturbance." Indeed, until fifty-one years ago the cost of the mission was defrayed by China herself, so that friction would mean a division of her house against herself. Prof. Parker remarks:³³ "Down to the very last post-'Boxer' days, no word of reproach for intrigue has ever been breathed against a Russian priest, notwithstanding the slippery repute of latter-day diplomats."

Protestant Missions in China

Turning from the labors of Russian missionaries, the least helpful to China's uplifting, we now consider the Protestant missionary enterprise, which any impartial student of recent progress in that Empire will acknowledge has been the foremost educational and moral force in China's recent surprising evolution.

As the later history of Roman and Russian missions to

³² The Christian Movement in Japan, 1908, p. 344.

³³ China and Religion, p. 241.

that Empire was incarnated in Ricci and foreshadowed in the fortunes of the Albasin colony, so Protestant missions find in their pioneer, Robert Morrison, the embodiment of their later program. Arriving at Canton one hundred and two years ago the seventh of September, this English last- and boot-tree maker accomplished, or attempted, during the remaining twenty-seven years of his life—Ricci's missionary career, by the way, was likewise twenty-seven years—almost all that his successors have done after celebrating his centenary there. As I stood two years ago in the corner of the little God's-acre in Macao, I read the summary on the flat slab which shelters his remains. A representative of the London Missionary Society, yet, as Chinese translator of the East India Company, earning his bread and additional thousands of pounds lavished on his varied missionary enterprises, he had in addition done these monumental acts. He had translated with the assistance of Milne the entire Scriptures into Chinese; he had prepared unaided the most extensive dictionary of the Chinese that has ever appeared in any Occidental tongue, comprised in six great quarto volumes, containing 4,595 pages; he had published other linguistic helps which greatly aided early missionaries to that Empire; he founded and quite largely financed the famous Anglo-Chinese College; he established the forerunner of what might have given the keynote of the great Morrison Centenary Conference of two years ago, "The Ultra Ganges Missionary Union," whose objects were, in part:³⁴ To unite the missionaries of Southeastern Asia and cultivate mutual fellowship, to strengthen and perpetuate the missions connected with the Union, to establish and support a general seminary, to carry on a periodical work, etc. He was pur-

³⁴ Mrs. Morrison, *Memoirs of the Life and Labours of Robert Morrison*, D. D., Vol. II., Appendix, p. 1.

chasing agent and general adviser for all the missionaries of the world. The first work for medical missions in China was the result of his investigation into the needs of the poor, seconded by a dispensary which he opened with a native practitioner at its head and eight hundred Chinese medical books as its library. He was chaplain to the foreign community and spiritual adviser and pastor to a little company of Chinese who dared to come in secret to his Bible expositions. If you will read his memoirs and his published works, you will find it hard to think of any important development of the past half century which he had not experimented upon, or thought of and discussed as a possibility.

Dr. Williams, one of the earliest missionaries to go from America to China, who knew personally Dr. Morrison and his great work, writes:³⁵ "As he had expressed himself—when leaving New York twenty-seven years before—sure that God would make an impression on the idolatry of the Chinese Empire, he now saw that his work had not been in vain. His work had indeed been far different in its details from what he had planned in his mind, but the aim had been unwavering and the results promising. . . . His name, like those of Carey, Marshman, Judson, and Martyn, belongs to the heroic age of missions. Each of them was fitted for a peculiar field. Morrison was able to work alone, uncheered by congenial companions and sustained by his energy and sense of duty, presenting to foreigners and natives alike an instance of a man diligent in business, fervent in spirit, serving the Lord. His life was mostly passed in the midst of those who had no sympathy with his pursuits, but his zeal never abated, nor did he compromise his principles to advance his cause. His translations and his dictionary have been indeed

³⁵ Lives of the Leaders of Our Church Universal, pp. 836, 837.

superseded by better ones, built on his foundations and guided by his experience; but his was the work of a wise master-builder, and future generations in the Church of God in China will ever find reason to bless Him for the labors and example of Robert Morrison."

In discussing the work of Protestant missions in China we have to do with an enterprise which is tolerably familiar to you, more so probably than missions in any other country, and vastly more so than the work of the Roman and Russo-Greek Church discussed at considerable length. Permit me, therefore, to remind rather than inform you, of a few salient facts in the missionary history of the last hundred and two years in China.

And first, let us look at the three outstanding periods of Protestantism's occupation. The years from Morrison's landing until the revision of treaties in 1858-1860—a little more than half a century—constitute the period of preparation and entrance. During seven-tenths of this time most of the workers had been compelled to labor outside China proper in the Malay peninsula and on adjacent islands where Chinese colonists were accessible. The few who were on the mainland worked under the greatest restrictions, and often in considerable peril. Even after an entrance was effected by the treaty of 1842, it was the right of a hated might wrenched from unwilling China by a great Christian power in so unrighteous a cause as opium selling. Only five cities on the coast of the southern half of the Empire were nominally open, and the openness of even these may be judged from the description of the old Baptist veteran, recently deceased, Dr. Ashmore: "We were mobbed in the fu city, mobbed in the district cities, mobbed in the large towns. We got so used to being pelted with mud and gravel and bits of broken pottery that things seemed strange if we escaped the regular dose. . . . We went out from our

homes bedewed with the tears and benedictions of dear ones, and we came back plastered over, metaphorically speaking, with curses and oburgations from top to bottom. . . . It went badly with our chapels that we rented. They were often assailed; roofs were broken up, doors were battered in, and furniture was carried off. There was nothing else to do but to keep at it. Driven out of one place, we betook ourselves to another according to instructions. But we did not leave the country as the literati desired, and we did not intend to. We wore them out, as an anvil sometimes wears out a hammer."

But during this period much was being accomplished. The preparation of grammars,—falsely supposed then and by later authors to be helpful in acquiring the language,—dictionaries, and other real linguistic helps; the work of Bible translation and the publication and wide distribution of Christian books and tracts, one of which, Milne's "Two Friends," is still perhaps the most widely useful publication of that class of literature; the beginnings of Western Christian education, culminating in the Anglo-Chinese College; faithful itineration within the prescribed limits, save for the surreptitious peregrinations of Burns, Medhurst, and others, extending to within a hundred miles of Peking in the case of Gützlaff; an intensive work of teaching little groups the Christian religion by word and life; the entering of Dr. Peter Parker's skillful lancet into the bodies and affections of the people in such a way that China has ever since welcomed the Christian physician and surgeon—these are some of the achievements which should be placed over against the pitifully meager showing of converts, who numbered only six at the signing of the treaties in 1842, and whose number even in 1860 averaged only six Chinese believers to each of the one hundred and sixty odd male missionaries then laboring in the Empire. To be sure this little band

was made up of men who had counted the cost and who were often stalwarts in the cause. Such a man, for instance, as Milne's first convert, Liang A-fa, would count as a host in any age; and when we recall that it was through him that the leader of the famous Taiping Rebellion—a movement which cost the lives of twenty millions and which was Christian in its first and hopeful stage—derived his early aspirations after a holier life, from which, alas! he later so grievously departed—we can see that statistics are often misleading.

The second period may be roughly called that of continuous, though slow, progress, when most of the policies to-day obtaining were tried out and improved upon. It extends from the throwing open of the entire Empire to missionary effort through the treaties of 1860, to the beginning of China's real awakening, eleven years ago. During these thirty-eight years Roman and Protestant missionaries went openly and with little opposition to the remotest parts of the eighteen provinces. Hence, instead of Protestantism's five lighthouses on the south-eastern coast in 1860, in 1898 its representatives were holding forth the lamp of knowledge and of life in four hundred and sixty-nine main stations, whence they went out to regular appointments at 1,969 outstations scattered throughout the entire Empire. The one hundred sixty odd representatives of nineteen missionary societies had increased to 2,458 missionaries of fifty-three boards.

These nearly four decades saw a very wide development of educational and medical effort, the practical inauguration of woman's work, the establishment of several strong churches in place of the isolation of believers in earlier days, and the entrance of the principle of the China Inland Mission, as well as of the organization itself. During the latter part of this period, famines and consequent relief, administered mainly by missionaries, and

the emergence and growth of self-support, were prominent features of the enterprise. The former did much to dispel the old feeling that missionaries were mere preaching machines with little heart and this-worldliness to their credit; self-support, even though limited in its prevalence, sounded the awakening bugle of independence and indigenous growth. Yet the greatest gain to Christianity of these years was the work of the Christian school, as has been made evident since 1900. Even as late as 1898, Western education was so belittled and despised that the Government practically would have none of it; and as altruism does not impel unbelievers to contribute money and life even to so important an object as a great nation's enlightenment—if it is in Asia—Christian schools had a monopoly of this indispensable leaven for post-Boxer day use. Another agency which came into prominence at the end of this period, and in a way occasioned the rise of New China, is the Christian Literature Society, then glorying in the cumbrous name, the Society for the Diffusion of Christian and General Knowledge. Its publications were eagerly sought after especially between 1894-5, the date of China's war with Japan, and the *coup d'état* of 1898. In the latter year the Emperor was eagerly devouring many of its publications,—an appetite for Christian books which seems to have had its inception in 1894, when China's Christian women gave the Empress Dowager a sumptuous, specially made copy of the New Testament which strongly attracted his attention.

The third period of Protestant missions in China, in which the Church is now laboring, began on September 22, 1898, when in consequence of the *coup d'état* Kuang Hsü left the throne for virtual, though temporary, confinement. Six days later six martyrs to reform in a more sanguinary way followed their Imperial master, protest-

ing as the sword deprived them of their heads that though the grass might be cut, the roots still remained and would shoot forth again in a more favorable time. They were true prophets, and the past eleven years have seen more progress than is recorded in all the earlier pages of China's millennial history.

What has this period meant for our missionaries to that land of supreme opportunity? It meant, at the very outset almost, such a baptism of blood as Protestant missions have not seen even in sanguinary Madagascar. You vividly recall the gruesomely fascinating stories of martyrdom that make Boxer year epochal in the Chinese churches of all the great communions. The siege of the legations was only an episode in a movement which reproduced in North China the varied details of horror visited upon the heroes of the faith as depicted in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews. And then we learned for the first time in our generation that the blood of faithful witnesses is at once the seed and the fertilizer of the Church. But surely the loss of one hundred thirty-five Protestant missionaries and more than fifty of their innocent children, the slaughter of no one knows how many thousands of Chinese Christians, many of whom suffered untold agonies under the horrid torments of their enemies, and the scattering of the Church through nearly a year of persecution, must have been an irreparable calamity to the Christian cause.

Yes, and no. Most helpful missionaries and Chinese Christians can no longer further the work they so much loved—at least in the flesh; not a few who bore the Christian name did just what you and I might have done with similar horrible certainties facing us—what the rocklike Peter did with vastly less excuse—and this denial saved the lives of witnesses to the supposed weakness of Christian professions; a natural

fear came upon many—and will remain with them perhaps till death—of connecting themselves with an enterprise which holds faith of more worth than an easy life bought by its denial; innumerable difficulties, threatening the peace of the Church and the integrity of its members, were the aftermath of the year 1900; in the new openness to the progress unwillingly thrust upon China, temptations to materialism have taken from the Church's service some men who were its pillars in 1899.

On the other side of the ledger are many compensating gains. God was in the siege in Peking, and His right hand was manifest in all that northern tier of provinces; and when men and women and children have been forced into His very presence and have come to know Him as deliverer and friend, higher criticism, lower criticism, infidelity, pagan attacks on Christianity's God, and every other creature, fail to shake the foundations. Again, the Chinese have always been sceptical as to the reality of their Christian neighbor's religion. "Is it any different after all from our three religions?" A Christian student pointing upward with his finger after the testimony of the faithful tongue has ceased through its excision and just as he draws his last agonized breath; the calm serenity of a Peking pastor as he comes forth to meet his doom, dressed in his best garments that he may be worthy of his crimson coronet; forgiveness of enemies who have slain his wife and little children before taking his own head, symbolized by a preacher's knees bent in the prayer attitude when his remains were disinterred months later; the songs of gladness with which even a woman may go to her watery grave; the bold confessions of schoolboys under fourteen who gladly die rather than deny their loving Saviour; the unquenchable witness of dying maidens, quite as wonder-

ful as those of early Church heroines; these are familiar stories among unbelieving Boxers, now humble followers of the Christ they persecuted in the persons of His little ones. Yes, Christianity certainly is a religion of a totally different genus. And finally, the necessity of caring for their own religious life during the year of terror, the rehabilitation of half-destroyed church buildings, and the care of the unshepherded flock when the storm was overpast, together with the new opportunities for earning a livelihood in certain sections, have been a very decided help in the direction of self-support and independence.

Do you ask the characteristic American question, Will figures prove progress during these eleven years, after such a calamitous *sturm und drang* period? I regret to say that I have not completed the statistics for the World Missionary Conference for next June, but these are the best available and will not fall far short of those that I shall have to offer at Edinburgh. I give you only a few items from the China tables for the years 1908 and 1898 with the percentage of gain during that decade.

	1908	1898	Gain
Number of missionaries.	4,059	2,458	1,601= 65.1%
Number of native workers, both Sexes	9,784	5,071	4,713= 92.9%
Number of communicants.	191,985	80,682	111,303=137.9%
Stations having foreign mis- sionaries	527	469	58= 12.4%
Outstations	3,703	1,969	1,734= 88.1%
Pupils in day schools.	50,910	30,046	20,864= 69.4%
Students in higher institu- tions	14,258	4,285	9,973=232.7%

No comment is needed with regard to these figures, and they fairly represent items of advance in other directions.

If you would know the program of our Protestant

brothers and sisters in China, you can find it in the illuminating discussions of the great Centenary Conference held two years since at Shanghai. The Chinese Church stands at the forefront of their deliberations, followed by such vital themes as the Chinese ministry, education for young men and women, as well as in lower schools and for special classes like the blind and the deaf and dumb; evangelistic work, which is to be enlarged instead of minimized, woman's work in widening variety as befits the advent of China's new womanhood, the vastly important topic of Christian literature, the perennial problem of ancestral worship, medical missions, including China's first insane asylum; the translation and distribution of the Bible and the newer promotion of its rational understanding and more profitable study; comity and federation, the missionary and public questions, and, lastly, important memorials in which the united body of missionaries endeavored to influence China and Christian lands as well.

But this does not tell the whole story. Those who, like myself, can compare the China of twenty-five years ago with the China of this year of grace can scarcely believe our senses. Steam navigation extending to shallow streams; railways, telegraph lines, and telephones even in the Imperial Capital; silk filatures and miniature South Bethlehems belching out Occidental pillars of smoke; groaning presses pouring forth books by the million and periodicals without number; waterworks and sanitation for many great cities; a modern army and a nascent navy of Occidental type; old examination halls, where within five years as many as 25,000 students have competed for degrees in a single center, demolished to make room for colleges of the modern sort; hundreds of thousands of boys and girls, many in natty uniform, attending the lower schools, from the kindergarten up; opium dens under the ban and footbinding about to leave the home;

thousands of students back from Japan and the Occident to leaven the new nation; the tortures of the old law court disappearing while new codes are evolving; great numbers gathering in orderly lecture halls night by night to hear politics, history, education, and reform discussed; a constitutional government promised for a near date—and what else? Thank God, in the midst of all this well-nigh unbelievable life we see missionaries, not idly gazing, but respected and consulted by officials who ten years ago would have scornfully refused to receive them, had they called. They are more than ever the educators, where thoroughness is called for, despite the multitudinous schools established by the Government and the opportunities offered by near-by Japan. When the new day dawned, China found herself without modern teachers, and as the only source of supply was the mission school and college, a surprisingly large proportion of the best Chinese teachers are men who have been under Christian influence, or are earnest believers, this being preëminently true of woman's education. Through the Young Men's and Young Women's Christian Associations young disciples are being organized into a compact force for national regeneration under the guidance of missionaries. Assuredly the Protestant missionary is in the kingdom for such a time as this, and God is giving him more opportunities than he can embrace. And missionaries are no longer isolated units, or even segregated denominationalists. Shanghai, 1907, made unity and cooperation the watchword of the hour; so that henceforth, much as one deprecates the martial phase of the figure and its numerical falseness, we can truthfully sing of the Protestant missionary body in China,

“ Like a mighty army, moves the Church of God,

We are not divided, all one body we,

One in hope and doctrine, one in charity.”

XV

THE PROGRESS OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN CHINA

As I studied the subject suggested to me, I found myself forced to assume that the movement of religious education in progress in the Orient is, primarily at least, a Christian movement. I mean, that it is the moral and spiritual aspect of a culture which had its point of departure in the impulse of Western, and dominantly of Christian, men and institutions. When I first said this to myself it made me uncomfortable. I know the Orient in some measure. What I know has taught me reverence for the character and faiths of the races of the East. It seemed to me, for a moment, incongruous that I should not take the ethical and spiritual aspect of the education associated with the religions of the East, as my central theme, and deal with the Christian education as only the fringe of the problem, since the Christians are only the fringe of the population of the nations of the East. What right have I, if I would speak with insight and in generous spirit, to choose the other course?

Let me explain, then, as briefly as I may. There is some inculcation of the tenets of Buddhism and again of Confucianism in Japan. But this would be parallel to specific instruction in the dogmas and rites of Christianity as carried on for convinced Christians among us in America. There is instruction in the mysteries of the Hindoo faiths for Hindoos. There is at Cairo, and at other centers of Mohammedan enthusiasm, a preparation

of propagandists for Mohammedanism. There is vast expenditure of intellectual energy all over China in the teaching of Confucian ethics. And I am very far from saying that this will not play a part in the development of the character of the China which is to be.

But all this is specific education in the Confucian system, in Mohammedanism, in Buddhism and the rest. It is not education at all, in the larger sense in which we use that word. It is not the effort to impart to men the whole complex of knowledge on the basis of reason and of induction from experience. It is not the effort to teach the facts of the sciences of nature and of society, the rational criticism of history and literature, the principles of medicine, of economics and government, of philosophy and of religion itself, such as we mean when we talk about education. It is not the effort to find the relation of this knowledge to faith, and to vindicate for the ancestral faith its proper place in the midst of this knowledge. It is not the effort to appropriate this knowledge for the transformation of the faith.

But that is what we do mean when we speak of Christian education. When we speak of Christian education as conducted in Clarke University, or in Harvard University, we do not mean merely instruction in the traditions of Christianity. We mean a real education, in which the historical fact and the personal experience known as religion constitutes an integral element, and over which religion exerts a subtle, characteristic, and, as we think, immeasurably valuable influence: producing a certain kind of educated man, namely, a man who is both educated and religious—the one as much as the other.

I am not unaware that there are some among us who still think that the zeal for religion is inhibitive of real education. We do not believe that for a moment. Nor

am I unaware that there are religious persons among us who view real education somewhat askance, and shrink from some of its consequences, just as a Mohammedan might. But more and more these people hide themselves. The ideal, followed, in the large, in splendid fashion, is that which I have endeavored to describe.

Now if you ask me whether there is any such endeavor in the nations of the Orient, which has had its origin in the faiths of the Orient, the answer is that there is not. There are some persons educated in the schools of Western learning, which all had their origin in the Christian missionary movement in those lands, who are ardent for education and not at all zealous for Christianity. These see the effects of an education purely secular. They would endeavor to imitate the combination, above described, of real education with their own faiths. But that is an imitative, a derived and secondary movement, as, also, the education is almost entirely derived. It is a very interesting effort, possibly some day it will be potent. But it is following in the wake of what men have learned from the Christian West. But, if you ask me whether there is any Mohammedan, Buddhist, Confucian education, original, I mean, and native, which is parallel to the Christian education I above described, the answer is that there is not.

I am, therefore, shut up by the facts to the view which at first, to me myself, seemed to be a kind of treason to a liberal view. If we are going to speak here of education, I am forced to take my departure from a real education. It is only very recently that this education in a large way has been introduced into China. It may be open to us to say that there are more faiths of men than one. But it is not open to us to say that there is more than one science of the heavens, or more than one set of the laws of nature, as these are given us in

physics, or of the fundamental principles of the action of men in society, or more than one ordered set of observations upon the life of the body such as those upon which the practice of medicine among us rests. And if we are to speak of religion, we have to take our departure from that religion which, though it has been sometimes justly reproached for its slowness in this regard, yet has shown immeasurably greater power of adaptation to the advance of modern learning than has, thus far, at least, any other religion which prevails among men. That is the Christian religion. Judaism among us has shown the same power of adaptation to modern learning. But Judaism is not a missionary religion any longer. And Judaism has not made itself responsible for the introduction of learning to the East.

That the beginnings of modern education among the nations of the Orient were Christian, as I have implied, does not admit of question. The Jesuit fathers, in the first generation after Francis Xavier, for their knowledge of astronomy, of physics, of the arts and crafts, attained a position at the court of the Ming dynasty, and later, under the Manchu rule, which made them the honored teachers of the leaders of the natives, even among those who cared nothing for the Jesuit's faith. The Jesuit education suffered in the decline of the Christian influence and with the antagonism to things foreign which soon set in. But the impulse was never wholly lost. The fathers in the greatest observatory in the East, the one just outside Shanghai, are the direct inheritors of Ricci and Verbiest. The Halle Pietists, who went out in the thirties of the eighteenth century to Danish and Dutch and English colonies, were, most of them, university men. They placed Europe under obligations for the observations of the East, as truly as they placed the East under obligations for the learning and the Gospel of the

West. Morrison at Canton and Macao could teach, translate, make grammars and dictionaries, when he could not preach. He waited seven years for his first convert, but he laid a foundation in knowledge of the language and of the people upon which the labors of all foreigners in China must rest. You may search the annals of the British East India Company in its palmy days in vain for a trace of the slightest interest in education. It had no more interest in education than it had in evangelization, and that was none at all. It was the missionaries who, often under the most trying circumstances, had dotted all the land with little schools. One reads the life of Alexander Duff and realizes that if he had not been the great educational reformer and creator in the English empire of India, he would surely have been equally great in some like task in Scotland, America, Australia, or whithersoever he had turned his steps.

It was an American missionary, Verbeck, who first moved the Japanese Government to send youth of family and prospects to be educated in Europe and this country, with all the consequences that that foreign education of Japanese youth has had. It was a boy educated in a little missionary school in Kyoto, Neesima, who was so fired by what he had learned that he ran away, when it was death to be caught leaving his country. He was educated at Amherst and Andover, and went back to found the college, the Doshisha, which exerts unmeasured influence upon the Christian education of Japan to-day. Time would fail me to tell of Lockhart, and the beginnings of medical work in the midst of the unspeakable miseries of China, and of all the Chinese youth whom foreign physicians have trained under the old tutorial system, until now, at last, the demand has grown loud for a true university school of medicine of the first order in some place of vantage in that land.

Such were typical beginnings of the connection of education, philanthropy, charity, reform, with the Christian religion in the lands of which we speak.

Concerning China one may begin by saying that in many respects China stands to-day where Japan stood fifty years ago. The awakening has come. The realization is abroad that if China is to maintain her national integrity at all, she can do so only by pursuing a policy exactly the opposite of that policy of exclusion of things foreign which has been the policy of a thousand years. She must have all that the foreigner has to teach, and put herself, in things relating to war and diplomacy, in those of administration and commerce, in general education and many other aspects of civilization, squarely upon the basis upon which the great powers of the world stand. In no other way can she endure the competition, or escape virtual subjection or dismemberment. She must follow the course which Japan has pursued. Little as Chinese love the Japanese, they are willing for the time to learn from the Japanese. And, for obvious reasons, the Japanese are more than willing to be the teachers of the Chinese, although the relations between the two powers are likely to be often strained. The progress of China will be slower than has been that of Japan. The vastness of the territory, the inferiority of the means of communication, the lack of race-unity and of the intense national sentiment which the Japanese have displayed, the fact that there is no common language, the practically autonomous rule of the viceroys in their several provinces, the fact that the central Government is felt by large parts of the Empire to be an alien government, will necessarily have this consequence. Above all, there is in China no such minority of the population with the instinct of leadership as that which even the fallen feudalism furnished to Japan. The instinctive at-

titude of the Chinese is rather that of the repudiation of leadership. And the despotism has, until recently, pursued the policy of eliminating leaders, so soon as these began to assume prominence.

But perhaps the most significant aspect of the present situation in China is the most complete discrediting, for the time at all events, of the traditional education in which the Chinese have been so confident and of which they have been so proud.

We do well to remind ourselves that perhaps there never was a nation in which purely intellectual pre-eminence, according to the accepted standards, was held in such universal esteem as in China. The absence of a landed and feudal nobility was made good by this leadership of the learned. In China the upper classes of public functionaries have for fifteen hundred years been chosen by competitive civil-service examinations in the branches of learning held in reverence in the land. The learned were the aristocrats. Any village boy might become the honored man of the village, and put his foot on the ladder which led to the highest position in the state—if only he learned enough. Though China is, in proportion to its population, so poor a country, there has always been great wealth in China. But there has been no aristocracy of wealth, as we should use that phrase. Officials have, indeed, with some consistency, added wealth to their learning when office-holding gave them chance. The mere possession of wealth was as nothing to the possession of knowledge. That the knowledge was not generally of the sort which was of specific use in administration was indeed true. But that is not now my point. This tradition concerning learning, this reverence for the intellectual life, is the one thing which I here assert. And the effect of this upon Chinese life has been exalting. The ambition for education has been

wonderful. The labor of youth in pursuit of education was amazing. The attainments of men, particularly the feats of memory, were nothing less than stupendous. I have heard it said by those who know China that the colossal mental toil of the scholar-class, being the sort of toil that it was, has actually dulled the perception and broken the power of intellect of some men of this type.

But the attainments were, as I have intimated, generally of the sort that yielded little for the practical life. They had almost no application to the technique of administration. They led to no discoveries, or to no new applications of discoveries when these had been chanced upon. It bound men to the old round instead of giving them keenness to set forth in new ways. To say that the civil-service examinations of a nation demanded knowledge of the morals of Confucius and of the poetry of the golden age, of the opinions of the commentators upon literature, and never touched on sciences or arts or trades, never asked questions about principles of taxation, theory of government, languages, geography or history, is almost to turn the thing into ridicule. That a man could be a viceroy, practically absolute in power, in a province periodically inundated, who knew nothing about engineering, and who could not in the wide realm lay hands on a man who did know anything about engineering, has in it something pathetic. One is fain to say that the contrast of all this labor of the mind with the sufferings of hundreds of millions, through conditions which could easily have been remedied by a little application of the mind, is perhaps the most extraordinary contrast which the Chinese Empire presents.

The leaders of China, and the people, in no small part, have discovered this state of things. They have turned against the old system of education, as it were, in a fury of resentment for its practical ineffectiveness, despite

all the toil and honor given it. No one of us could speak of the old régime with more biting ridicule than does the Chinaman himself. To us the thing arouses pity, but his heart is on fire. The spirit of the practical possesses him. And the Chinese is a very practical man. You might not think so from what I have just said. But he is. That he could be so practical, so outward and present in his view of things, so little of an idealist and dreamer as he seems to be, and that he could, nevertheless, so long have endured and revered an education which led to so little that was outward and practical—that constitutes one of the enigmas of which China, to the mind of an Occidental man, is full.

For the present, therefore, the Chinese have overturned the old system as a thing disgraced. Edict after edict has gone forth since 1898, inaugurating revolution in this sphere. The queer little sheds, in rows of hundreds, in which the candidates used to wet their brushes and rub their shaven heads to think what Mencius had said, in order that they might get petty posts of chance to squeeze the rice transportation up the Pei Ho from Tientsin, are rotting. The children in China will soon begin to wonder what they had been for. The blue-mantled scholar, now in middle life, must look out upon the ruins of his world much as the inhabitant of Messina looks upon the new Pompeii which Aetna has just made. Young China cries for the sciences of nature and society, for the technique of industries and crafts. Young China knows that the wealth of China is as nothing compared with what will be the wealth of China when the youth of China who know how to get that wealth from fields, mines, factories and commerce, have but had the time to be bred up. He proposes that the foreigner shall no longer get that wealth as heretofore. An old China merchant in Boston told me a few days

ago, that in his youth it was the normal thing for a New England man to spend five to eight years in China, and then to retire, his fortune made. That has already ceased. It will soon be difficult to be believed. Young China calls for the knowledge of military and naval matters, that it may no longer be a prey to invasion and sign away its national soul in treaties under the muzzle of European guns. Young China asks for sciences of government and theories of taxation, principles of administration, to put an end to the reign of universal graft. It demands constitution, codes, laws which will put an end to the curse of extra-territoriality. It demands modern languages, particularly English, which is everywhere now the language of banking and of trade.

It demands everything at once—or nearly everything. For it is not just now demanding religious education. One of the things which gives us food for reflection in this abandonment of the ancient education is just this, that, after all, Confucianism was a moral system, though hardly a religion, as has often been said. But it was a system of ethics. It dealt with conduct and life. It taught character. And no one can live in China without realizing that the people have character. Everywhere you go, and from the highest to the lowest, you are impressed by it. They have had ideals of life and stood for them. Of course there are criminals, but then so there are in Boston. I know that the governing classes are bottomlessly corrupt. But let us not forget Pittsburg and San Francisco. And the corruption in China is so antique and universal that the true thing to say about it may be that it has not been drawn within the range of their moralizing, as slavery had not come within the range of the moralizing of George Washington. I know that they are largely polygamists—that is, those are who can afford it. But then, some things are worse than

acknowledged and public polygamy, and one of these is unacknowledged and private polygamy. I say the people have character, they have integrity, they have honor, they have gentleness, they have love of peace. They love children and home and fathers and mothers, and know much about happiness, though not much about comfort. The most of what they know in these regards they owe to Confucianism. And if in the future they know more about comfort, they may know less about happiness, like some of the rest of us. Particularly will this be the case if, having repudiated the ethics of Confucius, as not leading to comfort, they neither recall him nor put anything in his place. I have used the word practical. But nothing is more practical than morals. And this is a lesson which the Chinese may be in the way of learning. Deeper spirits among the Chinese themselves are now profoundly concerned at the lowering of the moral tone of China through the new ideas which now prevail from the breaking up of the old ties, without the forming, as yet, of new ones. If we could get to the bottom of it, I suspect that we should find that the decree of 1906, conferring divine honors on Confucius and commanding his worship—an edict which many Chinese themselves ridicule as utterly inconsistent with Confucianism—is an effort to regain in the sphere of religious sentiment that influence which Confucius has lost in the sphere of ethical instruction. If that is the right interpretation, then this curious anachronism by which a government decrees a man a god is, at all events, a very interesting thing.

But for all purposes except those of religious and moral instruction, schools, colleges and universities, schools and colleges for women, public instruction even down to the primary grades and kindergartens, are springing up on every hand. Foreign learning is every-

where the vogue. These institutions are supported by the state and from private munificence. There seems to be plenty of money, although for four hundred millions of people, in the end it will take a good deal. But there is a fatal paucity of teachers. How should it be otherwise? The old system bred none of the sort who are now in demand. The new system must have time to breed up its own. The Japanese teachers in China are declared to be generally of poor quality, and distrusted. The truth is, the demand is still too great at home. The Americans and Europeans are only a drop in the bucket; though if the youth who haunt our teachers' agencies would only make up their mind to spend even a few adventurous and interesting years in a foreign land, they might just now almost have their choice of subjects and location, and earn a good salary. The good of them might do a vastly important work. I say even only a few years, because most of the instruction is done in English, so impossible is it to get those who know Chinese, and, incidentally, so eager are the Chinese youth to learn English as well.

But here lies the great opportunity of our missionary schools. For a half century there has been more or less teaching done by the missions. There are missionary colleges, and a whole system of Christian preparatory institutions, and schools both for boys and girls, up and down the land. There are theological seminaries and medical schools. There are two hundred thousand Protestant communicants in China, and it is claimed that there are a half million Roman Catholics. Mission schools would have had some pupils from the families of the Christian Church. But the Chinese converts have been the great proportion of them, poor. But the number of children of non-Christian parents who attended these schools has always been very small. What should

a Chinese youth have done with a Western education, so long as the old system held unbroken sway? It is remarkable only that the mission schools were so numerous and so good as they were. But now, as in a moment, the attitude of the Chinese is changed. The young men who can do the things which the Government and the corporations now demand, are those who have graduated from the Christian schools. They are for the most part Christian youth, because, otherwise, they would not ten years ago have graduated from those schools. The education which ten years ago was nearly useless, now commands the highest places and can dictate its price. It is said that the postmasters under the postal system which the maritime customs is raising up are, almost to the proportion of one-half, throughout the whole area yet covered by that system, Christian men, though the Protestant Christians (and there are ten, only, missions in which there has been much care of education) are hardly a tenth of one per cent. of the population of the land. As for teaching, youth whom the mission schools thought quite incompetent are called to positions of a responsibility which may easily prove far beyond their powers. The mission schools which ten years ago were small and struggling, to-day could be filled with the best youth of the land, had they ten times the accommodation which they have. In the Peking Christian girls' schools, girls of princely Manchu families are kept on a waiting list, when ten years ago the daughters of peasants received everything gratis if they would come at all. It will not always be thus. But, I repeat, it is a great opportunity while it lasts.

Nor can this state of things be said to be entirely due to the fact that the Christian schools furnish an education of the desired sort and of a quality far better than that which, as yet, is generally given in the state school

or by the endowed schools. In part also, Chinese parents of standing appreciate the moral perils of this period of transition through which their country is passing. They understand that the hold of the old moral teaching is, whether rightly, or only wrongly and unfortunately, weakened, and they are glad to have their youth come under the influence for character which the Christian schools represent. It is not necessarily true that they wish them to become Christians, though some will even go so far as to say that they are willing to take the risk of that. Two nieces of a former high Chinese official well known in Washington were sent two years ago to a mission school. This man has defended Confucianism in a public address in this country, and has said things against Christian missions some of which were probably true. He has made remarks about the morality of the United States, in spite of Christianity, which were beyond any question true. Yet he said that he did not care if the girls did become Christians, so long as they were under the moral influence of the lady whom he named, who conducted that school. The significance of this situation could hardly be overrated. One may speak in absolute respect and reverence of the influence which Confucianism has exerted upon the character of the Chinese in times past. I do not see how anyone can help doing this, though he may also see its defects. But he must recognize that for the moment its influence, especially upon that part of the vast population in whose hand is the future, is disastrously impaired. He may hope that that influence will be recovered; that Confucianism will yet show that power of adaptation to modern life and culture which, as yet, it does not show. He may believe that it will be improved by its contact and competition with Christianity, as religions do gain by their contacts one with another. All this may be true.

Yet it remains that the power of Confucianism, as the source of moral education in China, for the present, at all events, seems broken.

But it must be remembered that Confucianism is not a religion in the same sense with Christianity or even with Mohammedanism. It is on its own showing and in the experience of many of its devoted adherents a system of ethics rather than a religion. There is no reason why Confucian elements should not enter largely into the new and original Chinese interpretation of Christianity which we must have before Christianity can mean much to the Chinese. Elements of Hellenic moral speculation entered into the classic interpretations of Christianity which became authoritative after the patristic age. On the other hand, Confucianism might be independently deepened, widened and transformed by the truly religious element which is so strong in Christianity. The recovery of the power of Confucianism may be imagined in this way. For no person of insight imagines that Christianity can ever become the religion of China in the Western forms in which missionaries have brought it to the Chinese.

Taoism in China is in much the same position with Shintoism in Japan. It has nothing to do with education. In so far as it is a nature-religion, it can have nothing to do with education. So soon as education has anything to do with it, it will vanish away.

And concerning Buddhism so generous a spirit and so true a scholar as Estlin Carpenter has said: "It has profoundly transmuted the ancient popular religion. It has had its areas of reform, its protests against unspiritual worship, its efforts at rationalism and simplicity, its attempts to realize a philosophic mysticism. But it is stricken now with a colossal decrepitude. Other forces have entered the field. Buddhism and Western culture

cannot be maintained together. The Western scholar will study Buddhism for its profound intellectual and moral interest. He will investigate its origin and its transformations. He will admire much of its ethical teaching. He will follow its efforts after social and political reform, and its splendid enterprises of apostolic toil. But he will perceive that its view of life cannot be combined with modern knowledge. He will be convinced that the future of religion—if he admits that it has a future—must be sought elsewhere.”

Mohammedanism is a great and growing power in China. But it is no less an alien faith in China than is Christianity. But upon the particular point of its power of adjustment to modern culture, and of assimilation to that which seems to be the coming universal basis of civilization, it can hardly be said to hold a comparison with Christianity. Recent events in Turkey raise this question in most interesting form, Can Islam be so transformed as to become, or remain, the religion of a modernized, civilized, educated Ottoman state? So good an observer of the Moslem world as Lord Cromer denies that the combination is ever in Arabia or Africa impossible. However that may be in the lands where Islam is native, there is no reason to suppose Mohammedanism will thus transform itself in China.

When all is said it would appear that it is the Christian movement in China which must be looked to, and which by many of the Chinese themselves is now looked to, as the source of that ethicizing and spiritualizing of the education which, for its own sake, is so ardently sought. That education is in resistless advance. It must work incalculable change, and without any ethicizing and spiritualizing element, it must be of mingled good and evil just as the same education, without moralizing influence, has so clearly been with us. Again let

me ask you to observe how far I am from saying that Christianity is in the Celestial Kingdom the only moralizing force. Such an assertion would seem to me to be the essence of bigotry. But I am profoundly moved as I perceive, with new clearness, how much Christianity stands in the forefront, how transcendent an opportunity is given it, how great a responsibility is laid upon it, and how great would be the disaster should it fail.

But the ease and naturalness of the rôle which Christianity in China is now called upon to play, may be gathered from the fact that the Chinese man has characteristically no notion of the exclusiveness of any one religion. Not merely is he used to the fact that there are many religions, each with many adherents in his own land. But, more than that, he has looked upon them all with a certain expectancy, asking for the particular virtue each may have, and seeking to appropriate those virtues to himself. A great lesson is the Chinese man to most Christians here. It has been said that he is a poor Chinaman who has not already the elements of three religions in him. He would never surprise himself if he saw what he needed in a fourth. There are probably few families in China which do not, on occasion, practice Buddhist rites. The state religion is Confucianism, and there are few men the law of whose conduct is not Confucian maxim. The masses of men join everywhere in Taoist practices, and even the more learned have Taoist superstitions at the back of their minds. One recalls that charming tale from the "Travels" of the Abbe Huc. "When strangers meet," he says, "it is our custom for each to ask his neighbor: 'to what exalted religion do you belong?' The first is perhaps a Confucian, the second a Taoist, the third a disciple of the Buddha. Each of them begins a panegyric on the religion not his own. After which they repeat in chorus:

'Religions are many. Reason is one. We are all brothers.' " The Christian will need only to see the good in other religions to have that in his own perceived. He will need only in himself to possess, to illustrate, to impart the superior good, to have that good received and gratefully adopted. But a religion which intends to make earnest with the fiction of its own exclusiveness, is an affront to the noble courtesy of the Chinese man. A form of Christianity which lacks power of adaptation to modern culture, and does not mean to be the spiritualizing power of the newest civilization, and of that which will be newer than the present new, had better stay in America, where its traditions may keep it alive for a while. In old China there is no such tradition. In new China there will be still less place for it.

XVI

THE CHINESE IN HAWAII—AN EXAMPLE OF SUCCESSFUL ASSIMILATION

Introduction

GEOGRAPHICALLY and politically, Hawaii has little in common with the peoples who are the subject of study in this conference. The map shows that Hawaii is in the center of the North Pacific, but she faces towards the Occident. All of her political affiliations are with the United States, of which she forms an integral part.

In comparison with India with her starving people, with the Philippines whose future rises to vex us, with China and her awakening millions, with bewildered Korea governed by an alien hand, and even with Japan who leads the Orient, Hawaii has no problems. Even though the little territory with her 170,000 people has approximately 72,000 Japanese and 18,000 Chinese as well as many Koreans, Indians and Filipinos, more than 55 per cent. Orientals, there is no race question.

Hawaii, rather, is a laboratory in which experiments in race combinations and development are being conducted on a large scale and in a variety of ways. It may be said that these experiments, carried on as they are by that master of science—Nature—have been most successful. Perhaps Hawaii's place in this conference is to call attention to the solution—successful solution as we think—of some of the problems which are now harassing our statesmen and administrators in the Philippines. Certainly a study of the methods and the results of our

treatment of the Oriental would throw a strong light on any policy which has in view the "benevolent assimilation" of any people.

This paper deals only with the Chinese, the conditions of whose residence in the Islands have made a study of them particularly profitable. They have been in the Islands in considerable numbers for about a half century; in many cases, though possibly not so many as we would wish, they brought their wives with them, thus establishing families; their children have attended the schools in large enough numbers and for a sufficient length of time to give a basis for a satisfactory judgment of them; and finally for about ten years further additions to their numbers from the home country have been prohibited by Federal law, so that there is a happy absence of those disturbances caused by the influx of newcomers who not only bring raw material into the crucible, but also help to keep alive the customs and traditions of the fatherland.

Hawaii affords a good example of the "family of races." Here on these small islands of the sea are gathered in numbers, people from more than a dozen different nationalities. Here not only do they live quietly and happily without any "burning issues," but also they give in their family life sociological and ethnological suggestions which the wisest may profitably study. It is possible that, in spite of her diminutive size and the consequent smallness of the numbers of people who may be studied, Hawaii may have a lesson for the nations to heed.

First Coming

It is probable that there were Chinese in Hawaii in very early times. In Vancouver's Voyages there is mention of an American trader named Metcalf who in

the *Elcanor*, with a crew of fifty-five, forty-five of whom were Chinese, touched at Maui and Hawaii in 1789. In Vancouver's memoirs is also a record of one Chinaman among the foreigners in the Islands in 1794. Eight years later in 1802 came a Chinaman with a stone sugar mill, the farsighted forerunner of a great industry. His attempt to establish a sugar plantation was a failure largely owing to the unfavorable natural conditions of the Island of Lanai, where he first set up his mill.

But the earliest connection of importance between these small islands of the sea and the great Empire came through trade. Hawaii sent the sandalwood, much sought for by the fastidious Oriental, and received in return the more necessary furniture and clothing. Tan Heong San—sandalwood country—as the Chinese called Hawaii, had many attractions for them. They found many products which had a ready sale in China; they saw much land that they could cultivate, for the taro patches of the native Hawaiian were admirably adapted to the raising of rice.

Up to 1852, fifty-five Chinese had come to the Islands; some of these intermarried with the natives; some had been admitted to citizenship possibly in large measure due to the law which forbade the natives to marry foreigners who had not taken the oath of allegiance and declared an intention to remain on the Islands permanently. Before 1865 the number of Chinese had not largely increased, and this number fluctuated considerably, for, while there were a few arrivals, a relatively large number were among those who went to California in 1849-1850 in search for gold.

But in 1865 as a result of the growth of the sugar industry and the demand for labor, Dr. William Hillebrand was commissioned as Royal Commissioner of Immigration and sent to China and the East Indies in a

search for laborers. After an exhaustive study of the sources of labor supply, Dr. Hillebrand made most of his selections at Hong Kong. He used great care in picking eligible laborers and went so far even as to try to learn the character and fitness of each individual whom he was to bring to Hawaii. As a result, in September, 1865, 199 men, 43 women and 8 children arrived at Honolulu as agricultural laborers. As far as is known, this is the first assisted immigration of Chinese to Hawaii. As, in attempts to solve the ever-vexing labor problem in Hawaii, the policy of assisted immigration has been carried to an extent hardly attempted in any other place, it may be interesting to note in passing the terms on which these original immigrants came. They were to have free passage from China; four dollars per month wages; comfortable lodgings, food, clothing and free medical service and Sunday and three Chinese holidays. They were bound to service for five years, but at the expiration of that time they were free to return to China or to stay under a new contract or leave the plantation. It was understood that under the Hawaiian laws the immigrant laborer might appeal to the courts if the employer treated him with cruelty and that he was in a sense under the protection of the government which had been instrumental in bringing him to the Islands.

Numbers

From these beginnings the Chinese population grew until the census of 1900 recorded 25,762. Up to 1900, this growth had been quite steady. In 1866, there were 370; in 1872, 1,938; in 1884, 17,937; in 1890, 15,301. From the figures of 25,762 for 1900 there has been a steady decline in the last decade. An unofficial count taken for the use of the United Chinese Society, June

30, 1903, found only 21,961. The estimate of the number of Chinese now in Hawaii, based on the most reliable sources of information, in the Governor's report for 1908, is only 18,000. This decrease is due to the exclusion of Chinese by Federal law and to departures, particularly of the older Chinese. From 1900 to 1908 the number of Chinese children in the schools increased from 1,289 to 2,797. Unless then there is a large increase in the number of those who go home to China, which is not to be reasonably expected, the number of births will offset the departures.

Economic Value

The Chinaman's economic value has always given him a privileged position in Hawaii which his obedience to law, adaptability to existing conditions and probity in business have done much to sustain. He has always had a high place as a laborer on the plantations. In the lowlands and the valleys he reclaimed unproductive lands and made them yield incomes to the native owners and taxes to the government. He converted into rice fields the taro lands, gradually going into disuse through the disappearance of the native. He brought with him a constitution inured to this arduous labor in the wet rice fields. He used at first the caribou and primitive instruments of agriculture of his native land, but these among the more progressive are giving way to modern methods. The dilapidated fish ponds he restored. He established small stores both in the remote and in the settled districts and gained the confidence and the trade of the natives.

This picture of industrious contentment has made many a visitor from California exclaim over the contrast between the Chinese in Hawaii and the kind that has settled in California. But the man is the same, often

coming from the same village and district, and even from the same family, but the difference is that the best has been drawn out in Hawaii, while the sister Commonwealth, by repression and cruelty, has developed his baser qualities. While he has been subject to revilings and physical abuse in California, in Hawaii he has had opportunities for labor and self-improvement, spiritually and intellectually, as well as materially and financially. The generous treatment given him by missionaries in private schools was continued in the public schools. Under conditions favorable to his best development, he has lived on terms of pleasant amity, both receiving and giving in return.

Under their diligent and shrewd management, the rice industry prospered. Many Chinese became wealthy planters. At one time more than 5,000 of this nationality were at work in the rice fields. But the industry fell on evil days. Rent went up and owing to the unwillingness of the Japanese to eat any but the Japan-grown rice, the demand went down.

Nearly all the vegetables are grown by the Chinese. The "pake" vegetable man, carrying an almost unbelievably heavy load on his yoke and pole with his bobbing and swaying motion, comes every morning to the kitchen door to the great convenience of the house-wife. He has made the ideal servant, and now in the days of the less reliable Japanese house servants, those families that still retain their faithful old Chinese cook are much envied by their neighbors.

The plantations have been quite generally strong in their expressions of approval of the Chinese as a laborer. He is steady and reliable. In this as in everything else, he is absolutely honorable. He seldom throws up a contract however unprofitable. On account of their gregarious instincts, they are willing to live in barracks,

roomy but lacking in domesticity, which other laborers refuse to have. But now not more than 5,000 Chinese work on the plantations. They have gone into other labor or have left the Islands.

Restriction

In the '80's, doubts as to the wisdom of the continued large importation of Chinese arose in the minds of some who were made apprehensive by the diminution of the native population and by the small number of resident whites. In 1887 a law was passed, subsequently amended in 1888, which permitted the admission only of (1) Chinese women and children with relatives in Hawaii, clergymen, merchants and teachers residing in the Islands. (2) Under a special permit, merchants and travelers who were allowed to remain six months under bonds. (3) A limited number of field-hands and domestic servants who had a fixed residence and whose employers deposited a certain portion of their wages each month with the government to make up a fund for their return passage after the expiration of their contract. The number of Chinese, however, in spite of these regulations, increased, absolutely and relatively to the Japanese, up to 1896. By the Constitution of 1887, Chinese were prohibited from voting for members of the Legislature.

By the organic act for Hawaii, Congress applied to the territory the Chinese exclusion act as well as the Federal immigration and contract labor laws. On account of the difficulties and expense of importing Caucasians from Europe under the labor law, there was, especially a few years ago, a very strong feeling in Hawaii that the planters should be allowed to import Chinese field-hands, for agricultural purposes only, under

the restrictions imposed by the local laws of 1887-8. It was urged that this would not affect the mainland in the least, as no Chinese are allowed to land there anyway, and that it would benefit Hawaii without injury to any other commonwealth. This was favored by the planters who would gain financially by the cheap labor, and who needed the presence of other laborers to discipline the assertive and somewhat unmanageable Japanese laborer and by those who reasoned that cheap field labor, bringing prosperity to the chief industry, would bring prosperity to the Islands as a whole; it was opposed by some natives and by some whites who were opposed to any measure to increase the Oriental population, by the artisans and mechanics, many of them on principle, and all on the fear that the coming of the Chinese would release Japanese at work on the plantations who would increase the competition in trades and semi-skilled occupations with the cheap-working and cheap-living Asiatics.

A compromise has been suggested in the shape of a law which would admit a restricted number of Chinese for a limited term of years as field-hands, and which would at the same time restrict the competition of Orientals with white men in certain skilled occupations on the plantations. It is pointed out that this arrangement, by reducing the number of Japanese laborers, would also reduce the number of Japanese in secondary pursuits as store-keepers, mechanics and similar occupations, while the Chinese secondary population would not increase.

But the difficulties of framing any law that would be satisfactory to both parties, and the practical impossibility of getting such a law passed by Congress, are now generally recognized. As far as inducing labor to come to Hawaii is concerned, the whole attention of the Territory and of the planters is directed towards getting

Filipinos or white laborers from Europe or Asia who will become "Americanized."

Sociological Influences and Results

As members of the community, receiving impressions from the religious and social forces and reacting upon them, the Chinese in Hawaii are an interesting study. The experience of the island Territory has been so different from that of California, whose vigorous denunciations of the Chinaman have so molded opinions of him quite generally, that this experience is worth giving, for it puts the much-abused Celestial in a pleasanter light. It has to be remembered too that the proportion of Chinese in Hawaii has always been larger than in California, for, while the Chinese in California probably never exceeded 100,000, which made their proportion very small in that populous State, Hawaii with her 170,000 people has had 27,000 Chinese at one time. A few years ago when there were about 10,000 Chinese in San Francisco, that hot-bed of Chinese opposition, there were only 149 Chinese children in the public schools.

A well-known Californian voices these practices and characteristics of the Chinese as grounds for their exclusion:

"Traffic in human flesh, domestic life which renders a home impossible, a desire for only that knowledge which may be at once coined into dollars, a contempt for our religion as new, novel and without substantial basis, and no idea of the meaning of law other than as a regulation to be evaded by cunning or by bribery."

This view of him is not borne out by a study of him in Hawaii, where he has had the opportunity to develop and encouragement, born of kindness and consideration, in the development. Hawaii flatters herself that she has

formed the correct estimate of this mysterious man from the East.

It is doubtful if the Chinese traffic more in human flesh than other nationalities. Americans do not have far to go to find illustrations of the sale of human beings, body and soul, in a nefarious traffic. The Chinese may not thus be freely indicted. It is certain that other nationalities have shown in Hawaii greater looseness of living. Chinese women in general bear a reputation for strict virtue and chastity which is hardly approached by any similar nationality.

It cannot be denied that he lives by himself. But he has been driven to it in self-protection. Wherever he goes he is greeted with jeers if not with stones. One of the first sights that I saw on my first visit to Worcester several years ago was a crowd of boys chasing and stoning a fleeing Chinese laundryman. Convenience too demands that they live together until they can become fully acquainted with Occidental ways.

In Honolulu a part of the city is known as Chinatown, where are most of the Chinese stores and lodging houses. But it is unlike the Chinatown of San Francisco. The homes of the Chinese are scattered over the city and country. A dip into statistics shows that by the census of 1900 for the 25,762 Chinese in Hawaii, there were 3,247 homes, of which 393 or 12 per cent. were owned. There were 6,482 homes for Caucasians, with 1,840 or 28 per cent. owned. This showing compares favorably with that of most foreign nationalities in this city or any other city. Many of these homes are mere shacks, but many of them, on the other hand, are among the best in the Islands. In fact, the Chinaman has a reputation as a home-builder and provider that makes him a popular husband among the Hawaiian women.

The marriage records show that he is cosmopolitan in his marital relations. He has married into many nationalities. The children of the Chinese-Hawaiian marriages seem to combine the industry, frugality and perseverance of the Chinese stock and the good nature and physical characteristics of the Hawaiian. They rank high among mixed peoples. The Chinese parent stock noticeably predominates.

The pure-blooded Chinese children have made fine records in school and labor. The Chinese parents want their children to have the very best education that they can afford, and the children of the poorest families are diligent searchers after knowledge. They show such industry and perseverance in their study as to place them in the front rank of pupils in the schools. Teachers are unanimous in praise of them. The chief difficulty is to restrain them to such moderation in their study as good health requires. They lack possibly in originality.

Statistics, showing 2,096 pure-blooded Chinese pupils and eight teachers in the public schools and 701 pupils and 12 teachers in the private schools, do not begin to tell the story. Its full significance is appreciated only when there is complete understanding of their great desire for knowledge, for which they will make any sacrifices, and their ambition for higher education, which is a goal calling forth almost superhuman efforts. The schools give every encouragement to those who have ability and the means to advance. The Mills Institute, a missionary school for Orientals, has had a large influence which it hopes to continue and expand under the name of the Mid-Pacific Institute, in a new building now being erected for it. Other private and church schools have had large numbers of Chinese. Another significant factor which has been potent is the Chinese Students'

Alliance, an organization of Chinese young men and women who have attended schools of high school grade, and a branch of the Chinese Students' Federation. A large number of Chinese boys and girls after carrying off scholastic honors in the local schools go to the mainland colleges, where they do well, in comparison with the students educated in China and Japan, being especially noticeable for their English, both spoken and written. In employment outside of agricultural pursuits, they show the same qualities. They perform with fidelity assigned tasks, but they have not yet shown the disposition and the power, except possibly in one or two instances, to rise to positions requiring breadth of conception and initiative. These may come with greater training and experience.

The view of the public school official is well expressed by Principal Scott of the Honolulu High School in a report on the subject prepared for and printed in a recent report of the Governor to the Secretary of the Interior, from which I quote:

"Making American Citizens"

"According to the report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the past year, there were over 4,000 Japanese and Chinese children in the public schools of this Territory, nearly equaling in number the Hawaiian children. The male children of these two races born here will be American citizens if they choose to remain after their majority, and will become voters and officeholders. The question is, What instrumentalities can be brought to bear upon them that will make them good American citizens? Is it possible for the State and society to take the children of races so diverse from Americans as are the Japanese and Chinese and

by some educational, social, and political crucible, fuse them and turn them out homogeneous Americans?

"This is the practical and very interesting problem that presents itself to the people of this Territory, the solution of which is sought by both statesmen and social philosophers. There is no better place than Hawaii for an experiment of this kind. The country is small in area. The population is limited. The Orientals come into daily contact with Americans, men and women, of light and leading in every relation of life. The old missionary set the example, which the man of business and of industry has, to a large extent, followed. The Chinese have always been treated here in decided contrast with the treatment they have received in California. By the advice of the early missionaries and through their organizing power, the King and Legislature made provision for an excellent system of public schools. That system, modernized and improved, is the fundamental agency by which the children of the diverse nationalities of Hawaii are to be trained, and transfused into American citizenship.

"Can it be done? The most thoughtful educators of this Territory answer, emphatically, yes. It is being done now. It has been done. Both Chinese and Japanese born and nurtured in Hawaii are among our best citizens. They hold and exercise the franchise. They are industrious, accumulate property, are charitable and law-abiding."

The high estimate in which the Chinese students are held is sympathetically and vigorously expressed in a symposium of opinions of them, by the principals of the leading public and private schools, taken from an article by Francis W. Damon in the *New York Independent*. The article says, in part:

"The following statements from the principals of the

leading public schools of Honolulu, men and women of experience and careful judgment, are of much interest and value." One writes:

"In our school of over six hundred pupils, the influence of the Chinese boys and girls, who comprise one-fourth of our enrollment, is most beneficially felt. They set a high standard in faithful scholarship, earnestness of purpose, gentleness of demeanor toward their fellow students and respectful and grateful appreciation toward their teachers."

The statement from another is as follows:

"The Chinese children from six years old to sixteen are satisfactory to the teachers in every way. They are studious and attentive, very rarely making an infraction of discipline. Certainly the virtue of gratitude prevails among them more than in any other race and their habits are an incentive to the progress of their fellow students. In this particular school the Chinese children have decreased in numbers in the past few years and those who attend are assimilating with the others in so rapid a manner that individuality is not noticed to the degree it was formerly."

Still another statement runs as follows:

"In the schoolroom the Chinese girls and boys show a thirst for knowledge and an enthusiasm which is most encouraging to the teacher. They especially like any study which has definite results, as mathematics.

"On the playground the boys show a decided interest in sports. The girls, who are still handicapped by the restraint of their mothers' narrow lives, are shy about entering games. However, when they do throw aside their natural bashfulness and decide to have some fun and enjoyment as the boys do, the teacher feels that they are taking great strides toward freedom."

In the more advanced schools their record is equally

satisfactory. In the High School of Honolulu, where there are a number of Chinese students at the present time, the principal gladly pays them this fine tribute:

“As students I find the Chinese young men truthful, persistent, courteous to their companions and deferential to their teachers. I believe that their average capacity is equal to that of their white brethren. Their power of application far exceeds that of American youth. This power, coupled with their good conduct, makes them favorites with all teachers.”

The principal of the Normal School, one of our most important and progressive institutions, says:

“Since the organization of the Normal School in 1895 there have been enrolled fifty-seven pupils of Chinese or part Chinese extraction. Of this number, not more than 10 per cent. have failed either in the academic or professional work of the school. There are at the present time nineteen Chinese or part Chinese connected with the Training School.

“In the work of teaching, the Chinese cadet is thorough in the preparation of his work, prompt in the discharge of his duties, but possibly a little harsh in his bearing toward the pupils under his care. This fault, however, largely disappears with training. The Chinese Hawaiian cadet does good work in all departments of the school, but has a special aptitude for teaching. His appearance before the class is good, and the children give him a willing obedience. In nature study, music and drawing he is especially strong. As an assistant teacher he is willing and capable.”

My own judgment of them, given at that time, I am now glad to emphasize by repeating it here:

“For many years Oahu College, which is primarily a school for white children, but which accepts students of other nationalities who are able to meet our standards,

has had a limited and somewhat selected number of Chinese young men and young women among its students. They have taken the regular courses, and, on the whole, they have acquitted themselves well. A large percentage of them have been above the average in scholarship. They excel in scientific and mathematical subjects requiring accuracy rather than breadth of view or imagination. In English, without the inheritance of generations and without practice in good English in their home life, they make the poorest showing by comparison. But even in this subject the marvel is, not that they do no better, but that they do so well. They soon master the grammar and make a very creditable showing in oral and written expression and in the use of the English idiom.

“In conduct they are exemplary. They are industrious, eager, earnest seekers after everything that will improve them in body or in mind. There is rarely any question as to their ambition and willingness to work; when there is a failure it is usually due to conditions beyond their control—to lack of ability or training sufficient for the task, or to inherited tendencies too strong to be overcome.

“Among our students it is now generally conceded that in every competition, whether on the athletic field, in the class-room, or in contests in speaking, they are factors to be reckoned with.

“The change of conditions in China has been reflected considerably in the attitude of our Chinese students. There has come an increased zeal for a training, either along commercial lines or in broader academic courses leading to admission to Eastern colleges, that will better fit them for a place in the great progressive movement of the awakened Empire.”

The old Chinese adapted themselves to our customs

and practices; the Chinese of the younger generation are adopting them and making them a part of themselves. The young Chinaman in the schools is learning to speak and to write English fluently. He of course has lost his queue and has adopted American clothes which he wears with a grace and nonchalance not paralleled by many other peoples. He has learned to dance and has blossomed out as a society man in a way to surprise even those who are sanguine enough to expect the adoption of any Anglo-Saxon practice. He excels in such games as foot-ball, base-ball and track events, and has taken up tennis and similar pastimes not merely because he wants to do what the American boy is doing, but also because he gets out of them the same enjoyment as does the young American.

A full-blooded Hawaiian-born Chinese boy has equalled the world's record for the fifty-yards dash. The best school and league athletic teams number Chinese among their members. They sing the best music. Chinese students in private and public schools have given meritorious public musical performances. Two or three years ago in a concert given by the pupils of the largest school for white children in the Territory, a young man, born in China, after only a few years in school sang a tenor solo.

The charge of irreverence cannot be made against him. Missionary work among the Chinese was particularly fruitful. As individuals they have listened respectfully to the message of Christian workers and many have deserted the religion of their fathers for the more vital and satisfying creeds of Christianity. As organizations the Chinese Christian churches have shown capacity for growth and have in addition been able to contribute to the carrying on of the work among other peoples. The combined testimony of Christian workers

among the Chinese, not only in Hawaii but also in the home country, is so emphatically to the contrary, that it is idle to charge them with supercilious unwillingness to listen to the teaching of the Christ.

The Chinaman is a property owner and a good taxpayer. He was brought to the Islands under a contract system which practically held him a laborer on the plantations for a period of years. But by native energy he overcame these barriers and became a considerable property owner. By 1901, 1,115 Chinese in the Territory owned property whose assessed value was \$1,320,084 and 12,926 Chinese owned \$3,287,802 worth of personal property. Among the older Chinese are several who have made fortunes.

The Chinese is a good spender. In matter of clothes and food he is something of an epicure. When he puts on his best he dresses in silks and costly shoes, and for himself, and especially for his wife and daughters, he buys an amount of expensive jewelry which astonishes his white brother. His dinners to his friends, which he gives on slight provocation, have course after course of delicious and expensive viands. The Chinese are masters of the culinary art, and he who is invited to a Chinese dinner may regard himself as most fortunate.

The testimony of the planters is to the effect that he spends half again as much for his provisions as a Japanese. He eats meat and vegetables and has a fondness for sweets. On his days of celebration, particularly on Chinese New Year's, he keeps open house and serves wine and food to whomsoever calls. Even the poorest of them is an open-handed giver; he is most grateful for any favor or act of kindness and in return he often gives so lavishly as fairly to shame the recipient.

He is a law-abiding member of the community, probably the most law-abiding immigrant that comes to our shores. If he understands what is required of him he is

fairly sure to do it to the best of his ability. Laws which are administered fairly and justly he is disposed to carry out to the letter. He is quick to resent injustice and not easy to turn from a course of action to which he has made up his mind. He has the inflexibility of the "slow to anger." Their offenses against the laws of sanitation are due for the most part to ignorance. He leaves the barracks and the hovels as soon as he feels safe away from his fellows and knows the advantages of better quarters.

Out of 883 arrests for drunkenness in 1907 in the Territory, there was only one Chinese. Of misdemeanors, aside from gambling, only 119 arrests of Chinese, or seven and one-half per cent., were made during that year, and of these sixteen were for insanity; only three and seven-tenths per cent. of the felonies were among the Chinese. He is a user of opium, a curse placed upon the race in large part by Anglo-Saxon hands, and he is by nature a gambler. Experience in Hawaii has shown that this trait which amounts almost to a national weakness can be decently kept in check by a vigorous police force, free of graft.

Many Chinese are citizens and have the right to vote. These rights have been secured in two ways; first, persons born or naturalized in the Hawaiian Islands prior to June 14, 1900, became citizens on that date; second, persons born or naturalized in the Territory of Hawaii subsequent to June 14, 1900, are citizens, subject to the limitations of a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States (*United States vs. Wong Kim Ark* 169 U. S. 649) which recites that a child born in the United States of Chinese parents who are subjects of the Emperor but who have a permanent residence in the United States and are there carrying on business, but who are not members of the diplomatic corps becomes a citizen of the United States and of the State wherein he resides.

In the period from 1842-1893, 731 Chinese and one Japanese were naturalized. Since 1893, no Chinese or Japanese have been naturalized. Most of these naturalized Chinese have either died or left the Islands. In the period 1893-1900, certificates of Hawaiian birth were issued to 1,479 Chinese, but these certificates are not generally accepted as *prima facie* evidence of the facts stated. But since 1900, certificates, which are made *prima facie* evidence of Hawaiian birth before any registration or election board and in all the courts of the Territory, have been issued to 2,088 Chinese and 149 Japanese. It is estimated that there are now in the Territory about 9,000 Chinese, Hawaiian-born and naturalized. How many of these are now or ever will become citizens under the constitution it is not possible to say. Some will leave the Territory while young. The number of voters at present, or likely to come in the near future, is not a source of alarm in an electorate of about 14,000. The following table shows both the Chinese and Japanese voters in the last four elections:—

	1902	1904	1906	1908
Chinese	143	175	220	271
Japanese	3	2	0	6

Competent observers who have studied the situation say that the Chinese have made conscientious and conservative voters.

Conclusion

The presence of the Chinese and Japanese in large numbers in Hawaii has a significance beyond the measure of their economic value, the purpose for which they were brought there. It raises the question of the final Orientalization of the Islands. Hawaii at present is absolutely

American, not only in its affiliations, but also in the very fiber of its thought. By aggressiveness and cohesion in thought and action, 10,000 Americans have absolutely dominated a Territory with 170,000 people. Immigrants have been assimilated. Through the medium of the public schools, children of foreigners have been made into patriotic sons and daughters of Uncle Sam. The Asiatic has not affected the political or social fabric. He has been in, but not of, the life of the Islands. He has lived side by side with the dominant race, which has not yielded or given way.

So far as the Chinese are concerned, the conditions in the last decade may well be taken as indicative of what the future will bring forth. Unless there is an unexpected change of sentiment no more Chinese will be allowed to come. The temper and tendencies of the present body of Chinese will continue to be characteristic of the race in the Islands. From our experience in Hawaii, there need be no fear that the Chinese will impose Oriental civilization, standards of living, or methods of thought upon the country.

It is not necessary to say more to show that these people have settled in Hawaii with the idea of becoming Occidentals. It has been shown that the older Chinese under considerate treatment can throw off the conservatism of ages and in a few years adapt themselves to an Occidental civilization, and that the younger Chinese in a generation through the instrumentality of the school and the church have quite completely adopted American ideals and ways.

Hawaii has demonstrated that the Chinese in the proper political, social and educational environment will become American citizens whose stability, patriotism and obedience to law will give them an honored place under the Stars and Stripes.

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XVII

JAPAN'S RELATION TO CHINA

As one contemplates the great future of China, he is convinced that, of all the foreign Powers having diplomatic relations with her, none will henceforth exert a more controlling influence upon her national life than the United States and Japan. Each of these two Powers stands in an absolutely unique relation toward China, and derives therefrom incomparable advantages. The peculiarity of the American position consists in the two-fold fact that the United States has, alone of all the Powers, been free in the past from any act or desire of territorial aggression, but has in the main been engaged in commercial expansion in the Oriental Empire, and, for the future, looks confidently forward to the development of an economic relation with China of greater volume than that of any other foreign nation. These points have been fully discussed during the present Conference. Attention has not, however, been directed to the even more peculiar and more important relation that exists and will develop between China and her neighbor Japan. Already the general sentiment in this country regarding the Chino-Japanese relation is in the danger of falling into certain conventionalized ways of thinking, which are unfortunately guided by largely misconstrued events of temporary nature, with little regard to permanent forces irresistibly shaping the destinies of the two nations. It is the aim of this paper to point out, if possible, some of these great forces in the Chino-Japanese relation, and to suggest that an American policy toward China formu-

lated without due consideration of these forces would be liable to be disastrous to all parties.

In the discussion of this great theme, one must first of all remember that the relation of China with Japan is at least sixteen centuries old, and, what is more, has during this long period been of much more intimate nature than the relation of any one of the Occidental nations with China has been at any time since their first contact with her.

In the Middle Ages, at the same time that the western European nations were slowly evolving their great unity in variety, that is, their common culture and their individual characteristics, in eastern Asia, also, China and Japan gradually developed a striking contrast of character within the same family of race and culture.

You know that the peoples of China and Japan had migrated to their present habitats neither at the same time nor from the same origin. You know, also, that they had brought with them languages which were further apart from each other than English is from Russian. Nor is it less well known that their physical surroundings and their political and social history were radically different, and contributed to the formation of their very divergent moral characteristics.

Despite these fundamental points of difference, however, the two nations belonged to the same large stock of the human species. Here was a powerful bond of kinship which circumstances might obscure but which nothing could efface. Moreover, the continual relations existing between them gradually bound them together in a common life of culture, China being, in these cultured relations, a generous teacher, and Japan an eager pupil. It would require volumes to describe the growing closeness and depth of the relations of the teacher and the pupil during the Middle Ages. In her long march in

civilization, Japan hardly took a forward step without receiving an impulse therefor from China. Thus, the language of Japan came to be written, as it is to this day, by means of Chinese ideographs and of syllabaries simplified from them. The form of the Japanese government was remodelled in the seventh century after the pattern of Chinese institutions, and this great reform continued to affect the political life of Japan in one way or another for more than a thousand years. The Confucian ethics exerted a profound influence upon the code of morals in feudal Japan. Especially interesting is the manner in which Japan received through China Buddhism and Buddhist art and literature. These came to Japan in different forms in different periods of history. A vast variety of cultural elements, Indian, Hellenic, Byzantine, western and central Asiatic, as well as Chinese, contributed to make the composite body of culture known as Buddhism and Buddhist art. The wonderful blending of these elements took place in China, and, out of this grand thesaurus, Japan selected, in each period of her history, those phases as best suited her spiritual and artistic needs. It is not implied that the culture of the two nations was identical. Far from it—for Japan had a pronounced individuality, and never accepted foreign elements without assimilating them in the end. It is none the less true that no important part of Japanese culture—politics, philosophy, religion, morals, or art—could have been what it was but for its immense indebtedness to the continental civilization received from China.

Sixteen centuries of this intimate relation and natural sympathy of China and Japan have been followed by thirty years of temporary antipathy between them. It was an apparent misfortune to humanity that these brothers of the same race and common culture should, as they did, part hands as soon as they entered their

modern international careers. When their doors were open to foreign nations, Japan at once awoke to the conviction, but China refused to admit it, that her sovereign rights could be upheld only with adequate national strength, and that her real strength lay in the path of reform. This difference in attitude created a gulf between the two nations—a gulf which must, from its very nature, disappear when China enters, as she is now beginning to do, the same path of reform as Japan has been pursuing ahead of her. In the meantime, however, to China's unwillingness to set her house in order, and to her consequent inability to take care of her own affairs, enforce her own rights, and perform her own duties, are directly traceable the ultimate causes of the Opium and Arrow wars, the Chino-Japanese War, the Boxer War, the Russo-Japanese War, and other disastrous events. Let us now briefly follow the story, at once pathetic and happy, how the awakened Japan and dormant China came to a short period of conflict, and how this conflict has contributed to the awakening of China.

In this period of thirty years, there are three great events which may serve as landmarks in our discussion, namely, the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the Boxer War in 1900, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5.

The war between China and Japan was a direct result of Japan's resolution to reconstruct Eastern politics on the modern basis and China's persistence in the old methods. There was born a natural antipathy between the two Powers as soon as the divergence of their policies became evident. And these opposing policies came to a clash when they were applied to Korea. For it was to Japan's interest to reform and strengthen Korea, and to China's interest to keep the Korean government corrupt and weak. The war ensued, the result of which, as is well known, came as a clear evidence of

the superiority of the modern methods which Japan had adopted.

The effects of the war upon the situation in the Orient were far-reaching. Japan's rise as a modern nation in the estimate of the world may be said to date from this time. For China, the effects were two-fold.

In the first place, her defeat exposed her feebleness, and this revelation invited a sudden increase of the pressure of the Powers for concessions of all kinds in China, which was powerless to resist the demands. As has been pointed out in several papers during this Conference, pieces of land highly important from the strategic or commercial standpoint were leased out, the rights to build railways and work mines were granted, and large divisions of territory were marked out as spheres of interest and of influence; moreover, these leases, concessions and spheres were generally regarded by the Powers as bases for further aggrandizement. There is no other period of five years in the modern history of China in which her sovereign rights were so seriously encroached upon by the rival Powers as between 1895 and 1900. These were evil days of the Old Diplomacy in China, that is, the diplomacy by which nations of the West struggled for a balance of power among themselves, in China, and at her expense. Americans, also, joined the other nations, though without aggressive intentions upon territory, to wrest railway concessions from the unwilling China. Their attempts in 1886, 1896, and 1897, to secure the right to finance a part of the Imperial Railway of North China, the Tientsin-Chingkiang railway, and the Peking-Hankow railway, failed, but in 1898 they succeeded in getting temporarily the concession to build the Hankow-Canton railway.

It is a significant fact in Eastern history that out of this "battle of concessions" among the Powers were

slowly evolved the two great principles of the new diplomacy in China: the principle that the independence and the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire should no more be encroached upon than they already had been, and the principle that all nations should henceforth be allowed to compete in China commercially and industrially with no more unequal opportunities among themselves than might hitherto have obtained. That these fair principles of the *new* diplomacy were born out of the questionable practices of the *old* diplomacy was due to the very fact that the craze for concession and aggrandizement in China among the Powers had risen to such fever that none of them could feel assured that the gains they had already made would not be outbalanced at any moment by the gains other Powers might secure from the feeble China. It was for this reason that the new principles as working theories for all the Powers were first clearly conceived and insisted upon by Great Britain, the Power which had the largest vested interests in China and was therefore the most eager to preserve its interests and to prevent other Powers from acquiring further discriminating favors for themselves. Whatever the motive, however, the principles were apparently just, and, as such, commended themselves to the United States, which had asked and obtained a railway concession but was never inclined to be territorially aggressive in that particular part of the world, and to other Powers, which had little pretext to oppose the just principles.

It should not be forgotten, however, that these were lame principles. The so-called independence and integrity of China meant, not that the territorial and judicial sovereignty and the financial autonomy of the Empire, which had been and still are being seriously menaced or eclipsed at the treaty ports and leased districts and by means of concessions of various kinds, should now be

restored and respected in entirety, but merely that no more of China's territory than had been ceded should be permanently acquired by any foreign Power. Likewise, the so-called equal opportunity meant, not that any of those concessions which the Powers had acquired individually or in common from China, in the former case with the clear intention that they should afford better economic opportunities to the concessionaires than to others, should be repealed, nor even that no new concessions should be sought in China, but simply that no further discriminating arrangement than had been made should be effected between any Power and China. The past gains of the old diplomacy remained intact, and might even be, as we know that they still are, duplicated under certain conditions. What were these conditions? What constituted an infringement of the first principle and a violation of the second? It is a remarkable fact that no clear answer to these important questions has been made by the Powers in common. There perhaps is little difficulty in determining whether any given act by a foreign Power may be construed as encroaching upon the independence and integrity of China, for no one can fail to perceive such complex a matter as the passing of a piece of territory from one State to another, but it seems less easy to define what makes up an unequal opportunity. Real facts go to prove that any of the following hypothetical arrangements would be regarded as creating unequal opportunities and an infringement of the "open door" principle: namely, that, within an area, no new treaty ports should be opened to the world's commerce and residence, and no mining or railway concession should, without consulting the wishes of a foreign Power, be made at any time to any other Power; that a railway or mining concession within a large district should be exclusively and permanently granted to a Power; that a

Power should, on the railway which it builds and manages on the strength of a legitimate concession granted for a definite term, impose freight rates specially low for the merchandise shipped by its own subjects or specially high for that of other nations; and that, at any maritime customs stations, a nation should be allowed discriminating import or export duties (in overland trade with China, however, special arrangements of rates not being absent). On the other hand, the United States and all the other Powers having relations with China enjoy and still eagerly seek some or all of the following kinds of advantages from China: (1) a concession for the working for a definite period of time, or the mere financing, of a railway enterprise, often accompanied with the right to work mines along the proposed line, and almost always coupled with the agreement that, within the stipulated term, no other railway prejudicial to the interest of the present line should be built in its neighborhood without the consent of the foreign contracting party; (2) a concession for a mining, manufacturing, or other industrial enterprise at a specific place within a specific length of time; (3) the right of protecting, with police or military forces, either a river-course exposed to pirates in which the foreign nation has a predominant interest, or a railway passing through a region infested with dangerous robbers, the latter case obtaining only until such time as Chinese forces may be capable of protecting the line, and otherwise terminating with the term of the railway itself; (4) the right of exercising limited municipal control over the land belonging to a railway during the time in which the concessionary Power manages the line; and, finally, (5) the right of police and general municipal administration, as well as extra-territorial jurisdiction, by foreign Powers at treaty ports and marts, within specified areas, but for an indefinite period of time. This last

right is a substantial breach of the principle of the independence and integrity of China, and the reasons why no Power deems it a violation of the principle of equal opportunity must be that all the Powers equally share the benefit arising from it, and that it is one of so-called "treaty rights," or rights secured by virtue of apparently *bona fide* agreements to which China is declared to be a voluntary party. Now, looking over all the five classes of privileges enumerated above, what general definition of the "open door" may we be justified in deducing from them? To my knowledge, the clearest definition on this important question was given by Count Serge de Witte during the peace conference at Portsmouth, and I believe that his definition coincides with the view held tacitly by all the Powers in China. The Count said that no rights which were acquired lawfully from China within a limited space of her territory, and which did not exclude a third party from securing similar advantages from her, could be considered a monopoly, or a violation of the principle of equal opportunity. It will be seen at once that the definition is negative. It is, indeed, to be expected that any definition of this principle should remain negative, so long as the principle is discussed among foreign Powers as one binding upon themselves individually in their dealings with China. It would assume a positive aspect only when she becomes sufficiently strong to regulate the extent of the opportunity which she would grant impartially to all foreign nations. Until that happy time arrives, the Powers would continue to cherish such competitive favors from China as they individually regard as, not necessarily conforming to the principles of the new diplomacy, but not exactly contrary to them. Nor is it clear that these favors are not to a large extent due to China's still serious inability to enforce her own rights and protect legitimate foreign in-

terests. It is even possible to find a partial consolation—not justification—in the thought that, when China resumes all the concessions at the end of their terms, she will find that the success of her reformatory measures had been very materially insured by the railways, mines, and treaty ports, and by the general development of the country consequent upon them, in which foreign nations had contributed money and skill, as it will then be evident, largely to China's ultimate good. To this felicitous result should conduce a real observance by the Powers of the principles of the new diplomacy, imperfect as they may be.

Even the imperfect principles may, then, be regarded as an immense advance from the old diplomacy, which had created a continual disturbance and readjustment of the balance of power among rival nations in China at her greater and greater expense. This latter process, as we have seen, increased its pace so suddenly after the Chino-Japanese War, that the combined sense of self-interest and fairness on the part of a few Powers reacted against the old diplomacy in the form of the apparently juster principles of the new diplomacy. It is, therefore, safe to conclude that the war served to bring about a situation which contributed indirectly but powerfully to a clear conception of these progressive principles.

Attention is called to another important effect of the war upon China, namely, the dawn of her period of reform. The many reverses she had sustained in the past at the hands of European Powers did not impress upon her mind with the need of a reform so strongly as did the defeat inflicted by Japan—a nation which had formerly been her pupil in culture, but which had parted company with China, to her great disgust, and entered on a road of reform. However, the reformatory measures adopted by the Chinese Emperor were too radical

for the time, and resulted in the rise once more to power of the late Empress Dowager and her ultra-conservative advisers.

The reactionary movement thus inaugurated in 1898 was fanned by political passions of certain factions in China, and finally broke out in the Boxer uprising in 1900. The forces of the allied Powers invaded the Capital, and the Imperial court had to flee to Sian. This sad event, however, proved a blessing in disguise for China, for it caused both the reform movement and the new diplomacy to make an important progress.

1. The reform movement which was nipped in the bud in 1898 was now revived after the convincing lesson of 1900, and was approved by the Empress Dowager herself, who had been considered its arch-enemy. A decree of 1901 frankly reversed the historic idea of the incomparable superiority of the Chinese Empire to all outside barbarian states, and admitted in the clearest terms that its subjects had always lacked public spirit and its laws and institutions were antiquated and impractical. Japan's strength through reform was again cited in the decree as the example to be emulated. Opinions on the methods of reform were extensively sought. The central government was in a measure reorganized, with the new Board of Commerce and the remodelled Board of Foreign Affairs. A system of national education and that of metropolitan police, based largely upon Japanese models, were framed and put into force. Time was, however, not yet ripe for a more thoroughgoing reform.

2. The new diplomacy. During and after the Boxer War, their common danger due to China's weakness and their mutual jealousy compelled the Powers to act in concert in their dealings with China on the basis of the new diplomacy. It is remarkable that the Powers, in

spite of their divergent interests in China, showed a sufficient degree of self-control throughout their joint negotiations with China to prevent from becoming serious what little disputes arose among them. Thus the very weakness of China and jealousy of the Powers tended to unite the latter for the time being in a manner which was on the whole advantageous to China. The principles of the new diplomacy seemed thereby to have acquired a great momentum. It was, however, in the midst of this concerted movement of the Powers that one of them began to pursue a policy in another part of the Chinese Empire which soon proved the greatest peril that has ever menaced the integrity of China and the equal opportunity therein.

It is needless to repeat the well-known story how Russia occupied Manchuria by military force in 1900, and sought during the next four years to retain it and prevent its opening to the industrial and commercial enterprise of other nations; how, in order to realize her ends in Manchuria, Russia endeavored to seize the southern coast and northern frontier of Korea; and how Russian aggression in these two countries threatened the vital interest of Japan for all time to come. Nor is it necessary to relate how Japan, assisted by the United States and Great Britain, insisted upon the observance by Russia of the principles of the new diplomacy, at first through the indifferent and impotent China, and then directly to Russia, all to no purpose; and how diplomacy passed into war, and the war ended in Japan's victory.

A little reflection will show that the war was waged largely for the common interest of China and Japan. Moreover, Japan had advised China to remain neutral during hostilities, and this was followed by the suggestion from the United States that the sphere of war-like operations should be limited to the extent of Russian occupa-

tion. It is probable that, had not Japan and the United States insisted on respecting Chinese neutrality, the vast Empire might have been exposed to grave dangers involving the interest of foreign nations and entailing additional financial burdens on China. It is even more evident that if Japan had not successfully combated Russia in Manchuria, the new diplomacy would have sustained a terrible disaster, and the 364,000 square miles of the three provinces in this part of the Empire would have been lost to China. Fortunately, Japan won, Manchuria was saved, and the principles of the new diplomacy were not only enforced against Russia through the greatest war of modern times, but were further confirmed by the demand by Japan, acceded to by China, to open sixteen new ports and marts in Manchuria to the world's commerce and industry. Japan followed her achievement in arms with diplomatic efforts, and succeeded between 1905 and 1908 in inducing Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States to make agreements or joint declarations with herself to uphold the principles of the new diplomacy in the Chinese Empire. It is a remarkable event in the world's history that these principles, which had shortly before been in imminent danger of being trampled under foot in an important section of China, are now solemnly advocated by their recent enemy and his ally, and the two great Anglo-Saxon Powers, conjointly with Japan. If one is so skeptical as to regard these international pledges as platitudes, he would not deny that the principles have now become the watchword, the point of view, and the faith and hope of every intelligent person of the civilized world in his attitude toward China, so that no Power might again dare violate them without incurring upon itself the censure of the world's opinion—an important fact of the kind that carries human progress a stage forward. Such was not the

case at any period previous to the war. This result has been largely due, it would be unfair to ignore, to the persistence, daring, sacrifice, and diplomacy that have been used by Japan in behalf of these principles.

The effect of the war was not limited to the saving of Manchuria to China and to the enforcement and the world-wide education of the principles of the new diplomacy, but it also changed the relative position of the Powers in China in such a way as to a large extent to dissolve the spheres of influence and disconcert the plans for future aggression marked out by them in China after her war with Japan ten years before. The defeat of Russia broke the cherished scheme of herself and her ally France to control the entire railway communication between Siberia and Indo-China by way of Harbin, Peking, Canton, and Yunnan. This loosening of the bond has enabled China to restore the line between Peking and Hankow. The projected lines between Harbin and Peking, via Kalgan, and between Hankow and Yunnan via Chungking, are no longer apt to be conceded to Russian or French interest. The general disintegration has been closely followed by the invasion of German, French and American enterprise in sections part of which had been considered an exclusive British sphere of influence. Side by side with these significant phenomena should be noted the revised alignment of the Powers in China. The frank admission by Russia of her defeat and her consequent reconciliation with Japan has largely contributed to the dissipation of the traditional enmity between Russia and England, as also between her ally France and England. The agreement between Russia and England concluded in 1907 defining their policies in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, is an additional guarantee of the stability of Asia. These are some, not all, of the by-products of the great war of 1904-5.

Still more important is the effect of Japan's victory upon the reform movement in China. It is true that the movement dates after the war of 1894-5, and made a large progress after the Boxer incident, but there is every evidence to prove that the need of a thorough reform at last became national consciousness only after the Russo-Japanese War. The indifference with which the Peking authorities regarded Manchuria after the Boxer War has now changed into a widespread enthusiasm among officials and gentry throughout the provinces to resume foreign concessions and to protect China's sovereign rights. The ideas regarding reform also have undergone a fundamental change. At last the Government and the higher classes of the people have advanced beyond mere shifting in the official organization at Peking, which has hitherto seemed to have been almost synonymous with reform in their minds. They have now committed themselves to a thoroughgoing reform of all phases of political life, based upon a constitutional form of government, pointing toward a radical change in the relation between the central and provincial administration, which is the core of the whole problem of political reform. This is a departure from the traditional system paralleled only by the drastic changes made by the first emperor of the Ts'in dynasty in the third century B.C. If the student should ask what has prompted the Chinese nation at last to come to this point, he would easily perceive clear evidence on every hand that this was, not entirely, but very largely, due to the lesson China learned deeply from the unconscious example set by Japan—a nation of similar race and formerly of common culture with herself, which had risen rapidly to a position of power while China had remained dormant, and which, because of China's very impotency, had even engaged in a costly war, partly in the interest of Chinese rights in Manchuria, and won

over a colossal Power whose strength had been believed to be unbounded. Whence was this power of Japan? asked the thoughtful Chinese to themselves, and both friends and foes of Japan came to the conclusion that the secret lay in her constitutional form of government. It enlisted the interest of the people in their own national affairs, and taught them to act like one man under a common peril. It does not belong to us to judge the truth of this solution, but the fact is that it had already resulted in a comprehensive plan of national reform in China. The impartial historian cannot be blind to the close relation of this new situation to the success of Japan's reform brought home to China by the recent war.

Thus far we have seen only some of the larger effects of the war that have been produced in China. It may be imagined that as great effects have entailed upon Japan also. Her position among the Powers of the world has been materially raised, her freedom of future growth has been amply assured, and her responsibility as a nation has suddenly increased. In short, both for China and for Japan, the war has created a new world and a new atmosphere such as have seldom been paralleled in history. It could not be expected that a nation of fifty million souls, like Japan, or of four hundred million, like China, would be able to adjust itself to the new situation so abruptly opened before it without making costly blunders. It would be as unjust to ignore these blunders, as to exaggerate them. We may perhaps make an attempt to analyze the nature of the errors that have been committed by China and Japan in their mutual relation during the brief period of preparation for their respective new careers.

Let us first take Japan to task. Although she staked her fortune in the war on the issue of the two principles

of the new diplomacy, she was compelled, partly from military necessity, and partly from the imperative need of preventing a renewal of Russian aggression in Manchuria, to build a railway between the Korean border and Mukden; and to secure from Russia, with the consent of China, and with necessary modifications, all the concessions that the former had gained from the latter south of the city of Chang-chun. I have no time to enter into the detail of the complex arrangement in southern Manchuria, which I discussed rather fully in the *Yale Review* for August and November, 1908, and May, 1909, so far as was practicable at those dates. It will be seen in these articles that all the privileges Japan secured in Manchuria were essentially of the same nature as those enjoyed by all the Powers in China, including the United States, conjointly by all or separately by each one, in other parts of China. Nor has Japan's actual conduct in Manchuria been more aggressive or less justified than that of other Powers in other sections of the Empire. Yet the former has been severely criticised by the outside world, and that for very natural reasons. Japan had inculcated throughout the world the need of the principles of the new diplomacy in China by means of her brilliant warfare and subsequent diplomacy, and made them the world's point of view in regard to Manchuria. After thus inviting the scrutiny of the world upon her own conduct in this territory, she has inherited here from Russia certain fruits of the latter's old diplomacy. The world's understanding of the new diplomacy is simple and theoretical, while the conduct of special privileges is, as is evident from Mr. Straight's experience in China at this moment, always complex, at times tortuous, and often seems almost contrary to the new principles, even if it does not violate them. In this fundamental foible of Japan's delicate position in Manchuria, those foreigners

who had special reasons to be unfriendly to Japan espied the opportunity to alienate her from the jealous China and the unknowing world. In this juncture, Japan has unwittingly but straightway walked into the snare. For she had hardly time to revise her national consciousness so as to adjust it to the new rights and responsibilities that had been abruptly thrust upon her as results of the war. Few nations had been carried into so novel a situation within so short a period as Japan was between 1904 and 1905. Her subjects and officials who came to Manchuria in the wake of the war had hardly realized the new position of China and the new attitude of the world toward her. They were too full with the consciousness that China would have lost Manchuria but for Japan's terrible sacrifice, to remember that, on the contrary, the Chinese and the foreign merchants in Manchuria "expected that Japan would hand over to them the entire fruits of her tremendous effort, and claim nothing for herself," and still less to remember that her position had, because of her very victory, become all the more difficult and her responsibility increased. The Japanese in Manchuria, therefore, committed many errors, especially in their effort to secure commercial supremacy in southern Manchuria, and gave rise to criticisms some of which they merited.

Thus far we have seen the nature of Japan's blunders during her period of transition and adjustment. Let us now turn to the errors of China in her relation, not only with Japan, but with all the Powers. Every lover of justice and progress rejoices in China's reform movement, and wishes it godspeed, but no true friend of China should be blind to certain difficulties which beset it, and which, if unwisely encouraged, might not only defeat the main objects of the reform itself, but bring about serious evils upon China and the world. We refer, for

one thing, to the blind chauvinism of a large body of the Chinese. This spirit has for ages manifested itself in the historic idea that China was the center of the civilized world and all other nations having relations with her were her dependencies or tributaries. History records how this dogma stifled the Catholic mission work in China in the seventeenth century, how it brought about the disaster of the Opium and Arrow wars upon her, and how it broke out in a widespread anti-foreign movement so late as 1900. The same sentiment now takes the form of China for the Chinese—a worthy aspiration, but unfortunately accompanied with little regard to China's obligations to other nations. The advocates of this idea would enforce her sovereign rights, conceived in a surprisingly crude manner, without sufficient strength to guard them, and without remembering her duties as a nation and her special obligations as a hitherto half-independent nation. They would give no more concessions and revoke all the old concessions. They ignore that China lacks sufficient movable capital to develop her own resources, while it is evident that no measure of national reform would be effective without means of easy communication between all parts of the Empire, and without first husbanding her vast resources and energy. These men also would, if that were possible, abrogate all other so-called "treaty rights" and "vested interests" of other nations, which are no doubt vestiges of the old diplomacy, but which have their terms to run or are otherwise entitled to proper protection. The reactionary movement resembles the reform movement only on the surface, for they are both based on the praiseworthy desire to rehabilitate China, but the former is the antidote of the latter, and is at once unstatesmanlike, impracticable, and extremely dangerous first of all to China. The genuine reformers, like the Prince Regent, would

first aim at strengthening China by reorganizing her institutions and developing her great resources, and by discharging honorably all the obligations to other nations which are legitimate. Then, and then only, would China be truly independent, sovereign, and powerful, the terms of all the dangerous concessions having in the meantime expired and foreign municipalities at last restored to Chinese rule. These wise reformers are, however, unfortunately in the minority at present, and are often obliged to yield to the chauvinistic sentiment that prevails among the gentry and officials. There is not a single Power having relations with China that has not been seriously obstructed in its just dealings by this universal reactionary movement. The American capitalists who have proposed to advance a part of the loans for the Hankow-Canton and Hankow-Szechwan railways have experienced the same difficulty in the vigorous opposition made by the gentry of Hupeh and Hunan against any foreign loan. These men might have prevailed but for the resolute policy of the chief commissioner, Chang Chi-Tung, to complete and manage these lines as model railways.

The situation has been made worse by another habit of the Chinese political mind, which also is a product of peculiar conditions that have characterized the long history of this Empire. When China deals with several Powers at once, she is in the habit of setting them against one another in such a manner as to weary them with their mutual quarrel and to reap the benefit therefrom for herself. The annals of China are singularly full of examples of this practice. It is only in recent months that the press in England awoke to the fact that China had been engaged in alienating Japan from her ally and appealing to the moral support of the misguided world with every means at her disposal. The Americans have not been subjected to this sort of dealing except in the

slight instances of 1896-7, when the commissioner, Sheng, allowed British, American, and Belgian capitalists to fight among themselves in the dark, to the benefit of the Belgians and to China's own regrets in later years; and again in the present instance of the Hankow-Canton and Hankow-Szechwan railway loan, in which the Germans were allowed surreptitiously to compete with the British and French, and in which pledges of 1903 and 1904 with the British and Americans were ignored until they were obliged to protest against the breach of faith.

It is impossible to overestimate the insidious danger to China that must result from indulging in this blind policy of reaction and intrigue. It is often said that China is in a great national crisis, but it should be remembered that more crises exist within than without. The international position of China is to-day much more secure than it was before the recent war, so that the opportunity for China to reform herself unmolested by the outside world is now better than it ever has been. What seriously obstructs her reform and at the same time exposes her to any possible external danger is her own historic mental habit and lack of foresight to perceive her danger. Unless she exercised a sufficient degree of reflection and self-denial to rise above the habitual, unenlightened policy of reaction and intrigue, and build up first of all her own sources of national strength, it is safe to say that she would never be a full sovereign nation. Japan was once confronted by the same problem, and her present position is owing wholly to the resoluteness with which she then suppressed her natural reactionary feeling and has since reformed her institutions and husbanded her resources. If one pictured in his mind the worthy aspiration of one section of the Chinese nation to remodel its national life upon a modern basis, by the side of a much larger and stronger section clamoring for

crude rights guarded by no real strength and attended by no obligations, he would at once see that a sharp discrimination between them was necessary, and that any sympathy shown with the latter sentiment was misplaced and conducive to the defeat of the admirable movement for a national reform.

Now, all these unfortunate circumstances on both the Japanese and Chinese side have been enumerated with a full conviction that they are temporary, and that they herald the coming of a better age in China's relation with Japan and all the Powers. It is unreasonable to expect any historic nation with all the inertia of its past ages to adjust itself quickly to a situation so suddenly changed as that of China and Japan after the recent war. To regard their errors at this transitional age as normal and as liable to be always repeated is too much to distrust the wonderful good sense of the Chinese nation and the remarkable catholicity and self-reflection of the Japanese. Practical catholicity has been the greatest saving quality of Japan throughout the ages. If you do not know this quality, you know little of the Japanese people. Their history presents striking instances—in the seventh and ninth centuries, in their Chinese relations, and, in the nineteenth, in their European relations—in which this quality extricated Japan from grave national perils. Here is a nation which has never deceived or stultified itself for any great length of time. In the present crisis, also, time and experience will bring the Japanese to a lively appreciation of their past errors and of their new responsibilities toward their own country and China. To my mind, the signs of this second awakening of Japan seem already abundant. She is living in an inspiring period in which each half-year brings more lessons to her enlivened curiosity than would a decade in a normal age, and the Japanese of 1909 appear to me much saner

and fairer than the Japanese of 1906 and 1907 under the foreign ministry of Viscount Hayashi. As for the Chinese, they have always moved more slowly than the Japanese, and the fact has brought much misfortune upon them, but, when they are once fully convinced, they move with unerring good sense and with mighty force. The present reform movement, which has come about at last after seventy years of bitter experience, which is of the most radical character in the whole history of the Empire, but which will not again turn back, is an illustration of this quality. Dr. Headland has, in his remarkable addresses, given you many intimate examples of the innate good sense of the Chinese. Among the most recent events, I have been most forcibly impressed by the masterly manner in which the peace of the Court and the Capital was maintained at the successive demises of the late Emperor and the Empress Dowager; by the clever way in which the present Empress Dowager has quietly and with dignity been placed in a position at once exalted and too far removed from the actual government to influence it with her personal views; by the freedom with which the Government has been employing the service, without regard to their birth, of men who have studied abroad; and by the practical conservatism shown in the program of a progressive reform to be carried out in the course of ten years. Specially notable are the measures regarding national defense, communication, and judicial affairs, which, if executed, would result in greatly strengthening the central government at the expense of the provincial. It is impressive enough to see the promulgation of these measures which, in effect, contradict some of the most ancient and tenacious political traditions of the nation, but it is even more remarkable that they have so far met practically no opposition from the jealous provincial authorities. Time passes, and

China's practical wisdom seems to have grown with it. I venture to think that we may depend upon it that, after a little more experience, the Chinese will be able to free their reform movement from the blind reactionary spirit which, however worthy as a motive, invites troubles and retards progress. At present, the reform movement is weaker than the reactionary movement, but the former is the new but main force, and the latter is a historic impediment of a nature that will be finally overcome. It is in this process, rather than in furthering the thoughtless reaction, that Japan and the United States might assist China with loyal service.

When the time comes when these expectations are fulfilled, that is, when China and Japan pursue the same path of reform with the same modern spirit infused into their old common culture, the days of their abnormal friction will have ended, and those of their mutual stimulus and support will have begun. The period of transition and adjustment will have been followed by one of free competition among the two nations and their equality with the Western nations. Those who would, from whatever motive, separate China and Japan wider and longer than would be natural, seem to forget that the ethnic and geographical ties of the two Oriental nations, reinforced, as they are, by sixteen centuries of their historic and cultural relations of the most intimate character recorded in human history, are far too close and too vital to break under any temporary disagreement between them of a few decades' standing. An immediate proof of this statement is the profound influence exerted by Japan upon China's career of reform. She has not only been inspired by Japan's living example more than by any other agency, but also has, of her own accord, either modeled after the Japanese pattern or followed Japanese advice, to a very large extent, in fram-

ing her new systems of law, education, police, railway administration, army and navy, and—more important than all the rest—the very principles of a contemplated constitution. China first sent men to all the principal constitutional governments in the world, including the United States, to study their systems, and then, after deliberation, sent men only to the constitutional monarchies, Germany, England, and Japan. The results of investigation in Japan have, as was perfectly natural from the similarity of the original forms of government in the two countries, had the greatest influence upon the constitutional ideas of Chinese reformers. Again, consider such educational campaign carried forward between the two nations as that of the Japanese association known as the Tō-A Dō-bun Kwai, in training Chinese students in Japan and Japanese students in China, and in compiling monumental works on the politics, geography and economics of China, which in their thoroughness and accuracy are unrivalled in any language. In this work, as well as many others, Japan's share in China's reform could hardly be paralleled by that of any Western nation with the expenditure of any amount of money and energy, for the former is possible only with the profound affinity existing between the two nations and the incomparable advantage arising from it. Japan is thus silently aiding China more efficiently than any other nation to make her a powerful independent nation. Add to this the economic bond of the two nations, which is not only close, but is vital, and increasingly vital, as is the case with the trade relation of no Western nation with either Japan or China. These two nations will stimulate each other's power of production and of purchase, and the community of interest between them is bound to become an overwhelming element in the national life of each. There is little doubt that, with the construction of all

the railways projected in China, the world's commerce with her will assume a stupendous proportion, and she will take on a new economic aspect: the opening of the Peking-Hankow railway is already increasing the trading activity along the lower Yangtze and the export of products of North China; the completion of the Hankow-Canton railway is expected to induce the grains of Hunan to go out in greatly increased quantities and its coal to compete with Japanese coal at Shanghai; the Szechwan railway will develop the kerosene oil, rock salt and other rich resources of the Province, and open therein a large market for sugar, cotton yarn, marine products, and the like, from abroad; and the Tientsin-Pukow railway may stimulate coal mining in Shansi, gold and silver mining in Shantung, and agriculture in Honan and Kiangsu, and eventually affect the world's market of these products. In this coming economic revival of the East, the commerce of no other nation with China will compare in vitality, if not in volume, with that which will grow between China and Japan.

All these conditions point to the coming of a new era in their relation with each other. It is more than probable that they will continue to make errors in their mutual relations, and the competition is expected to increase, and no alliance or federation is imaginable between them. It is therefore no prophecy, but mere common sense, to believe that the future years will find the two nations in manly rivalry, and in an increasingly common economic and cultural bond which is closer and stronger than that of either of them with any other Power. This would be a normal state of things, and there is nothing of sufficient power to prevent its ultimate realization.¹

I cannot conclude this paper without a brief reference

¹ Nothing better illustrates the temporary nature of the friction between China and Japan and their capacity eventually to

to the imperative need, in the interest of Chinese reform and progress, of a good understanding of each other's policy between Japan and the United States. The welfare of the East would never be assured were these two nations unfriendly to each other in that part of the world, while, on the other hand, no two nations could have a larger influence on China's future than they. Without reference to persons and incidents, however, I venture to suggest that, in this connection, there are two or three circumstances which are liable to be turned to use by those who may be interested in alienating the two friendly nations from each other. First is the beautiful spontaneous sympathy worthy of a great republic which the American nation always feels for a backward nation striving for freedom and progress. It is this sentiment which was shown to Japan until the end of the recent war, and which is now beginning to be bestowed on China as she enters upon her new career. It cannot be denied that certain Chinese have been playing on this sentiment for an interest other than that of reform, and it is possible that certain Americans might use the same means for attaching China to the United States as against Japan. Enough has been said, however, to suggest that it would be disastrous to the cause of reform and to the world's ultimate interest to separate China from a nation so closely related to her in race, in culture, and in

become helpful rivals of each other, than these larger disputes in Manchuria which have been happily adjusted by a remarkable series of mutual concessions made by the two countries in their agreements of August 19 and September 4, 1909. Nor is it easy to find a better example than in the treatment of these agreements by the American press, of the manner in which light is withheld and discussion curbed by controlling interests on Eastern affairs of certain descriptions. The reader is referred to the text and an explanation of the agreements published by the present speaker in the *Yale Review* for November, 1909.

economics, and so nearly alike in the career of reform, that she is borrowing from it even her principles of the constitution.

Second is the still imperfect understanding of the Japanese history and Japanese character in the United States. The two nations possess at once qualities perfectly intelligible and those almost incomprehensible to each other. Until the latter are thoroughly mastered, it is little wonder that motives should be ascribed to Japan in her relation with China and with the United States which may be utterly foreign to herself.

Finally, the very principles of the new diplomacy might be employed for the purpose of creating a misunderstanding. This might be attempted all the more easily because of the two dogmas which the American public has been taught to believe: namely, that America alone has everything to gain by China's strength, and everything to lose by her weakness, while the interest of all other Powers is exactly the reverse; and that the principles of the new diplomacy originated with the American Department of State. A little reflection will show the impartial student the absurdity of the first dogma. To say that America has no territorial advantage in China is not to say that she does not enjoy with other nations municipal and judicial advantages at treaty ports, which encroach upon Chinese sovereignty, or that certain American capitalists do not seek concessions for railway and other industrial enterprises, some of which the reactionary Chinese resent, and bring the Chinese finance nearer and nearer to the verge of insolvency. It would be impossible to demonstrate that America would not with other nations oppose a premature surrender of the present arrangement at the treaty ports, and that any of the more important nations would not with America suffer from a continued weakness of China, and oppose the conversion of any

part of her territory into an exclusive economic sphere of any foreign Power. As for the second dogma, that the late Secretary Hay originated the two principles of the new diplomacy, and compelled other Powers to make agreements to follow them, a casual reading of his circulars in 1899 and 1900, and the responses of the Powers to that of the former year will prove that Mr. Hay neither originated these principles nor secured definite agreements regarding them from the Powers. It is not intended to detract a particle from the important service done by him in reminding the whole world, through his notable act in 1899, that the growing interest of the powerful American nation in the Orient demanded the maintenance of equal opportunity in China. My slight studies of the period lead me to conclude that the principles of the new diplomacy as working theories among the Powers, were first clearly conceived and upheld by Great Britain, have been advocated with the greatest theoretical consistency by the United States, and have been practically enforced in Manchuria against Russia by Japan with great sacrifice, and further embodied by her in her agreements and declarations with Great Britain, France, Russia, and the United States. The current ideas in America about Chinese diplomacy afford a striking example of the way in which unhistorical dogmas rise and grow in broad daylight in a civilized society of the twentieth century. It, of course, matters little that the people hold to these inaccurate ideas, but the errors assume a somewhat serious aspect when they are used by interested persons as a means of propagating the notion that America must, for the ostensible interest of the two principles, antagonize herself to the Power that has done by far the largest service in establishing them and making them the common faith of the world. The fact that a nation is working concessions

and has made temporary blunders in the process hardly constitutes a violation of the principles; and the time is rapidly coming, if it has not already arrived, when this country with her present and future concessions in China will find herself sharing the same point of view. It is also unfair to ignore the important fact that thus far America has exported nothing from Manchuria, and that this fundamental point has been the constant deterrent factor in the progress of the American import trade there; while, on the other hand, Japan, in addition to her geographical proximity, her kinship in race and culture, and her efficient control of her own economic forces, naturally enjoys a superior advantage arising from the fact that she is expending in Manchuria an enormous amount of capital and skill, buying a large majority of its exports, and otherwise developing its resources, stimulating its progress, and increasing its purchasing power and general foreign trade. If, in availing herself of her vantage ground in Manchuria, Japan is actually violating the principles of the new diplomacy, it is high time for the United States, for the interest of her and the world's commerce in the Orient, to protest. It would be better to confess, as has done our honored Judge Wilfley, that it is the interest—the political and commercial interest—of the United States that demands the maintenance of the integrity and the open door of China, than to make unfair uses of the fair principles. The interest of the same United States has dictated different policies, according to special conditions, toward Mexico, toward Spain, toward Hawaii, and now toward China. It is one of the best things in the world's history, I venture to think, that the Chinese policy of America happens to coincide largely with what the more permanent interest of all the world demands in the East. What a misfortune to humanity it would have been had

this country been obliged to pursue a contrary policy, like the one, for example, which President Polk did toward Mexico. There is no intelligible reason why Japan and Great Britain, at least, would not find their larger interest in China identical with that of the United States. It should be a lasting glory of America that, while promoting in China interests still limited to a comparatively few of her own citizens, she is enabled at the same time to subserve the common and permanent interest of the world in the Orient.

The present state of opinion in America about this momentous question seems to contain two tendencies seemingly alike but radically opposed to each other: namely, one sincerely aiming at the development of the world's common interest in China, and the other, actuated by the alarm of the grave financial condition of China, hastening to install in her territory a large American interest in anticipation of a possible crisis, but with little regard to China's own interest in case she should resume all concessions at the end of their terms, and, for the furtherance of this policy, seeking to arouse innocent public sentiment along the line of national self-righteousness. The latter tendency manifests itself, among others, in a systematic movement through various agencies to propagate a sense of distrust of Japan's policy toward China. I am constrained to observe that all the unpleasant memory of the rather unimportant Japanese immigration question which may still linger in the minds of both nations, will soon be found to be overshadowed by the profound irritation so persistently kept alive by the purposeful suspicion cast by a certain section of Americans upon a policy held with common accord and sincerity by the Emperor, the Privy Council, the Cabinet, the Press, and the nation, of a very friendly Power. It is clear that no nation can without offense continue to

extol itself on grounds ill supported by facts, and, from this pulpit, to denounce, for its own want of knowledge, and for the interest of its few citizens, another nation for pursuing a policy which it has matured with scrupulous care for justice and progress, and on which it must stake its very destiny. To say to your neighbor that he is unfit to enter your house may not be proper, but there are circumstances justifying such conduct; the offense would be infinitely greater in a persistent declaration that the neighbor is wrong in his just living, since it is superficially supposed to interfere with your social interest and comfort. If the offense is fortunately not yet felt by him, the fact forms no reason why the disillusionment, when it does come, would not be all the more keen. It is astonishing how few people realize the colossal issues of such an affront. Intelligent Americans should squarely meet this great problem, and weigh the consequences of a misguided policy, or else they might find too late that the public sentiment regarding the Eastern Question, which appears still indefinite, had fallen into dangerous channels from which it was difficult to extricate it. It is not implied that such a grave situation actually exists, but it would be unwise to ignore that the present moment is full of potentialities for good and for ill. It is to be sincerely hoped that, whatever the present degree of perversion, neither the Americans, nor the Japanese, nor the Chinese, will long be blind to the imperative need of studying the complex Eastern Question in all its world-wide bearing, and of understanding the common and lasting interest of humanity in China.

I have enumerated some of the vulnerable points in the relation between the United States and Japan in regard to China. But I again take the liberty to record my abiding faith in the practical and humorous turn of the

average American mind, as I have already done in regard to the good sense of the Chinese and the catholicity and clear vision of the Japanese. It is likely that all attempts to set the United States over against Japan and the rest of the world on the Chinese issue, will not seriously commend themselves to the Americans. It is still possible that the Japanese-American relations in China will return to the normal state of manly competition and sympathetic criticism. That would be the only safe basis of co-operation, and it is probable—there can be no question that it is urgent—that the entire future relation of Japan and America may be based upon that basis: namely, I repeat, their manly competition and sympathetic criticism in the East.

In order to bring about this wholesome state of affairs, the one thing necessary above all else is: more light, greater freedom of knowing facts, about the Eastern Question. The American public should insist on having it.

XVIII

THE RELATION BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

IN the course of the last fifty years, the traditional friendship of the two nations on either side of the Pacific Ocean has continually grown and strengthened. And the long list of incidents which gradually cemented this inseparable relation, has so often been reiterated and is so familiar to you all, that any attempt at recounting it is out of place at this time. My only excuse for reviewing the past as briefly as possible, is because the present and the future can be interpreted and guided only in the light of historical antecedents.

Under the feudal régime, when our government was making treaty after treaty with nations of Europe and America, it was your official representative in Japan that warned us of the national danger of opium-smoking. When the United States legation interpreter was murdered by fanatics in our capital city, and ministers of other nations withdrew to Yokohama as a manifestation of their indignation, the same American gentleman alone remained in his post and did not even demand reparation or punishment. He simply said that he perfectly understood the difficulty of the situation of the Japanese authorities and was convinced of their sincerity and good faith. After the organization of the Imperial Government, in our long and oft-baffled efforts to revise the one-sided, unequal treaties, ratified in ignorance and inability under the former rule, the United States was the first to accept the revised treaty which abolished extra-territorial rights and the conventional tariff.

This very year, when Yokohama was celebrating the jubilee of the opening of its port to foreign trade, the whole nation was remembering with lasting gratitude, your magnanimous act of returning to us the Shimonoseki indemnity fund, with which the harbor of Yokohama was improved two decades ago, not certainly as a condition imposed upon us by your generosity, but through the wise judgment of the few men at the head of our affairs. When General Grant visited the Far East he endeared his name and the name of his country to millions of hearts by arbitrating between China and Japan, then at difference over the question of Loochoo. What President Roosevelt did to put an end to the most stupendous warfare in modern history, is almost too great and too fresh in our memory to view it in right perspective as yet.

In remodelling our internal affairs, our infant steps were guided by American teachers and advisers, almost in every branch of knowledge and activity. Large numbers of young men and women have been trained in your schools and universities, and hundreds of Japanese visitors have been given hearty reception and liberal opportunities of observing the strongest features of your public and private life. In this connection, both in sending out workers and receiving students and travelers, your New England has naturally taken the leading part, with its high culture, keen intelligence, liberal spirit, and excellent institutions. Tens of thousands of men and women from Japan are earning their living and freely enjoying the benefit of the resources and opportunities of this great Republic, whose ideals are sure to educate their minds and hearts into broad internationalism.

When Japan's altered position in world politics required reassurances of her national aim and policy, your Government jointly with mine declared its policy in

regard to the Pacific Ocean and China. It is simply a "gentleman's agreement" which shows strong evidence of mutual confidence between the two nations. An arbitration treaty is signed between the two nations, so that there could be no possible room for wicked suggestions and rumors of armed conflict. There is also a mutual guarantee of the general peace of the Pacific, and of steadfast adherence to those two great principles with regard to China which were first set forth by Great Britain, universally accepted through the mighty efforts of the United States, and finally enforced upon an offending party with the blood of the sons of Japan. Frequent exchanges of friendly visits and cordial welcomes have been going on, of noted individuals, of fleets and naval people, of parties of business men and other experts. Reciprocal assurances of warm sentiments and good will have been emphatically penned and mouthed, not only by diplomatic and consular agents, but also by able writers and speakers competent to judge the true state of things.

Set against this grand array of forces binding the two nations in the closest of friendship, all the combined attack by unpleasant impossible stories artfully created by some in some quarters, has now quieted down and is only a small fly on the back of an elephant.

What else could we add to this long list of forces and efforts to promote and cement our traditional friendship? If anything was still lacking, that deficiency is now being made good in the institution quite recently organized in the business center of the city of New York, under the name of the Oriental Information Agency. A countryman of mine well known for his journalistic career is its director, and the Agency proposes to supply individual inquirers, business firms, scholastic bodies, social organizations and so on, with accurate and trustworthy data

concerning the conditions of the Far East, commercial, industrial, political and otherwise.

It will also write to papers and magazines of this country, and address American audiences, whenever and wherever it is welcome, to give the Japanese side of the story of the Far East. This work is started on a business basis as an entirely private undertaking, but its bearing upon the commercial interest of the two nations concerned is recognized by a body of prominent bankers and business men of Tokyo and Yokohama, who pledge themselves to back the worthy scheme, if necessary, with pecuniary support. I venture to think that this will strongly appeal to those friends who were polite enough to say that silence was one of the few faults of the people of Japan.

There is nothing so effective in enhancing the friendly feeling between the two nations as a correct knowledge of each other. Some time ago representative business men on the Pacific coast visited our country, and now a party of Japanese business men is extensively traveling in the United States. I sincerely hope some arrangements may be made in the near future whereby a body of leaders in manufacture and commerce, together with a few delegates from labor, journalistic and educational circles, can take a tour of inspection from the Eastern parts of the Union to Japan and China. It would be a powerful aid for smoothing the way for practical co-operation of the two nations, just commencing their friendly rivalry in Asiatic markets. When your keen-eyed but fair-minded commissioners see at close quarters what was the real status of American trade in Manchuria, how German enterprisé is eclipsing other interests in China proper, what are the true motives and methods at work there, and how immense is the field for our harmonious action or good-willed emulation, I am confident

that it will advance materially, not only your national interest and our own, but also the cause of international friendship based upon a clear understanding of actual circumstances.

If the development in commerce and industry even of such a small country as Japan affects the interests of America, almost unbounded in wealth and resources as she is, how vastly must mighty China's rise reflect on the future prosperity of our island empire! And yet, power to produce and to undersell implies ability to buy and consume. How absurd to assume that our neighbor's gain is our own loss. Through wise adjustment and conciliatory measures, founded upon mutual understanding and genuine sympathy, I firmly believe that the increasing population of the earth may yet live in harmony and friendship at least for a few centuries to come. In the meantime, mountains may be levelled, seas and oceans reclaimed, the conquest of air completed, icy poles covered with verdure, artificial rainfall wrought at will, so that more people could find room to live and more place to apply their activity. The power of human invention is just beginning to achieve marvels and miracles.

As the powerful fleet of this country is the greatest guarantee to the lasting peace of the Pacific, so is China's national efficiency a double assurance of the safety of Japan's position. And what you are doing now to assist China, is nothing but an extension of the same noble principles that prompted you in leading Japan up to her present position. The author of "Asia and Europe" was probably right when he said in the preface to his third edition:

"If, therefore, it is one of the permanent conditions of history, as this writer believes, that Europe should not permanently occupy Asia or Asia conquer Europe, the

rise of Japan into a great Power must by degrees increase the difficulty for Europe of remaining in profitable possession of great sections of Asia."

The fair-minded American observer, I am sure, will find no cause for alarm in this possible tendency, because he believes and rejoices in universal progress of mankind, and also because his country has never taken possession of any section of the Asiatic continent. But Meredith Townsend, great writer as he is, was certainly prejudiced where he said: "Asia, strengthened by the leadership of Japan, will, as I believe, recover the independence which she will in all human probability once more misuse."

How often his race, the old continent occupied by his race, has misused its independence and power against other races and continents! Perhaps his race-conscience haunts him and frightens his diseased nerves with dreams of Tartar invasions. China and Japan as leaders, no continent, no race, and no nation need fear even of a semblance of Asiatic incursion.

However, things must go slowly to accustom our minds to an altered situation. Suppose, for a moment, that Japan and China acted in perfect unison at this critical moment, what would be the consternation and dismay of some of the Western Powers, "in profitable possession of great sections of Asia"! From this point of view, we can see the hand of Providence even in the little frictions between the two Asiatic neighbors, now reshaping their mutual relations. Enough criticism and accusation we are receiving as it is, but the thunderbolt of fury and suspicion would simply clash the progress of both nations, were they to form, for instance, a defensive alliance!

The same gentleman credits the Japanese with vanity. But is not pride the backbone of a nation as well as of an individual? Our determination never to be conquered

certainly need not displease anybody. Everything is in a small scale in Japan—our own stature, the size of animals and birds, our wealth and poverty, even our virtues and vices. If we have anything really big, altogether out of proportion, that is the ambition not to be behind any nation or race in doing what is just, good, and noble to do. Huge indeed is our own opinion of ourselves! In this respect, gentlemen, I confidently believe that you Americans will grudge us no amount of sympathy. Limitless in your natural resources and energy, tall in your person and buildings, gigantic in your scientific, industrial, and commercial schemes, you set yourselves a yet higher and mightier standard, that is, of representing and embodying in your national conduct the cream and essence of Western civilization. The Greco-Roman culture, ennobled by Christianity, has been refined and crystallized, in its westward march, and its noblest expressions, such as universal brotherhood, international peace and justice, chivalrous magnanimity toward struggling weaker nations, sympathy with the oppressed and wronged all over the world—all these ideals find their staunch supporters in this most favored and most favorable land.

And thus the nation of the Stars and that of the Sun, your country and mine, as exponents of Eastern and Western ideals, should continue to co-operate with all sympathy and forbearance. That the two nations come to serious collision is as impossible to conceive as that the sun and the stars ever should clash together. With a wide zone of twilight between us, we may each supplement the other in the common work set before us of enlightening and beautifying the world. This is what our hearts prompt, our reason dictates, and to which the mighty finger of history points.

XIX

THE STRENGTH AND EFFICIENCY OF THE JAPANESE ARMY

THE lesson of military efficiency was taught by the Prussians at Sadowa and Sedan not long ago. At a later date and on a smaller scale we saw it in the brief campaign of the Turkish army in Thrace. The most recent example is the sudden importance that Japan has won for herself in the world.

About the time of our own Civil War military matters in Japan were much as they were in Europe during the Middle Ages. In one case the samurai and in the other the knights of old constituted a special military class and upheld the feudal system. Warfare consisted largely of individual combats in which the common people took no part and exerted little influence. Just as in Europe the power of the knights was broken at Morgarten and at Crécy by pikemen and bowmen, so the Japanese feudal system was broken when the common people were drilled and disciplined to fight in war. This led in the early seventies to the adoption by Japan of the great democratic principle of the nation in arms, under which every able-bodied man is held to the service of the State in time of war.

Under this idea of universal military service, which has been adopted by nearly every great nation in the world, every man is required to report for service on reaching the age of twenty years. If he is perfectly fit and if he is wanted he is enrolled in the active army; if not wanted but still fit he passes into one of the great

classes of supernumerary reserves. In Japan the annual contingent of youths who reach the age of twenty years is at least 550,000 men. As this is much too large a number to be handled under any modern system of drill and training, a relatively small number is taken to fill the active army. Another contingent are put aside for partial training in the reserve, and the balance receive no training at all, but are still liable to be called on to serve as non-combatants whenever needed.

In the active or peace army, service originally lasted for three years, but in 1906 a law was passed changing it to two years for infantry. Under this rule practically half of the army is changed each year, completing its term of service and passing into the reserve, while its places are filled by the youths of a new class. In the reserve they remain ready for call until they are forty years of age, when their liability is over. From time to time they join the colors again for short periods of training, amounting to four periods in all of two months each. The total service thus in twenty years amounts to between three and four years. In this way it is plain that in course of time an immense army is trained and disciplined and kept ready for war. The amount of time that each soldier gives to the state during his lifetime is not great in the aggregate. The loss to the business and industry of the country is not felt, for in time of peace not one man in fifty between the ages of twenty and forty is a soldier, under arms, and not one in ten goes to war when the life of the nation itself is in danger.

The army is made up of certain number of units called divisions, each of which is so constituted as to be a small army by itself, with every necessary component of infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineers, medical corps, telegraphists, and transport troops.

A division has its home in the district where it is re-

cruited, supplied and drilled. Within its storehouses are all the material needed to arm a double or treble force of reserves.

Each division is in fact so complete in every detail, so near to its depots of supplies, so decentralized in its administration, that it only waits for a word from the Emperor to report itself in a few days, with full ranks, with every button in place, every belt full of cartridges and every wagon loaded.

Nor is this an anomaly. It is not in Japan alone, but in many other countries that this may be done, following the system so carefully worked out by the Germans in the hundred years since they lost the battles of Auerstädt and Jena.

The beginnings of the Japanese army were on a small scale. It was about ten years after the introduction of universal military service that Marshal Oyama, in 1884, went to Europe at the head of a commission for the purpose of studying the military systems of the world. The result was the adoption of the German system, which had just shown its efficiency in three wars in seven years. When he returned he brought with him as adviser Major Meckel, one of the brightest of the younger officers of the German army.

An army of seven divisions was formed, having a peace strength of 60,000 men.

Ten years later a war with China gave an opportunity to test the machine. About 100,000 men were sent to China and Korea. The resistance of China was insignificant, but the war showed the high quality of the troops in a most severe winter campaign; it showed the working of the system in its multitudinous details, and it showed where improvements were needed. An indemnity of two hundred million dollars was paid by China, and as the war did not cost more than half that

amount, the money was used in betterments of every kind.

The activity of Russia in the Far East and the enforced abandonment of Port Arthur, left no doubt in Japan that another war would soon be necessary if their national ambition for improvement and prosperity should ever be realized.

Thirteen divisions replaced the seven of 1894. Although at first sight this seems to be nearly a double force, there were many ways in which it was a much greater increase than that. There was another decade of hard work, barely twenty years since the idea of a modern army was adopted, and thirty years since the first idea of universal military service. Many of the chiefs were the sword-fighters of early days, but there was no lack of enthusiasm in the way in which they adopted the new methods. No result seems to be more remarkable than this, for it has long been said and believed that military men of all others are most tenacious of existing conditions and most averse to change.

The war with Russia is another story. Japan was not entirely ready for war. The military system had not been running long enough to accumulate sufficient reserves of fully trained men. This was a great disadvantage and probably resulted in the war ending with a greatly superior force on the side of the Russians. The last great battle was at Mukden, where the Japanese had more than 300,000 men engaged and 2,000 guns—many of large caliber. They fought for two weeks over a front of sixty miles, and lost more than 70,000 killed and wounded in that single battle. The success of the Japanese was quite uniform, their losses in prisoners and guns from first to last were insignificant. They won many great battles, often with only equal or inferior forces, and pushed the Russians back past Liao Yang,

Sha Ho, Mukden and Tielin by the force of persistent and tireless attacks. The greatest tribute that they have received came from Kuropatkin himself, the Russian commander. He said: "The education of the Japanese was carried out in a martial spirit and on patriotic lines. The nation believed in and respected the army and were willing and proud to serve. An iron discipline was preserved. They responded with unanimous enthusiasm to the call to arms. There were instances where mothers committed suicide when their sons were rejected for the army on medical grounds. A call for volunteers for a forlorn hope produced hundreds ready to face a certain death, while many officers had funeral rites performed before leaving for the front to show their intention of dying for their country. Those who were taken prisoners at the commencement of operations committed suicide. This was the spirit that produced regiments which hurled themselves upon our obstacles with a shout of 'Banzai!' and, throwing the corpses of their comrades into the ditch, climbed over them into our works."

Since the war the nation has not permitted her arms to rust in the repose of a long peace, as so often has happened after successful wars. On the contrary, they have gone to work with the greatest energy to improve and increase their military establishment. The entire armament has been replaced, we are told, by a better rifle and a more powerful artillery. Additional artillery of heavy caliber has now become a permanent part of their army. Their weakness in cavalry is being remedied.

The thirteen divisions existing in 1904 were increased to seventeen during the war and have now been raised to nineteen. This means an all-around increase of a little less than one-third since the war.

These great changes evidently do not represent all those contemplated in the far-reaching plans of the

Japanese Secretary of War. On the contrary, it is evident that the lack of funds has continually held him back and that he has been forced to delay many of his propositions for improvement.

The peace strength of a Japanese division probably fluctuates according to the plans and necessities of various kinds. It has probably been as low as 6,000; it has been over 12,000, and it is now about 11,000.

The peace strength of the army, including numerous garrisons of outlying possessions, and certain cavalry and artillery and other troops who are not divisioned, is probably about 240,000 men.

To change the army of peace to its status for war it is necessary to use the great hosts of trained reserves who have been annually discharged from active service. They are brought back so as to raise the strength of the peace division to 25,000 men in each. Thus the army all told will reach about 535,000 when on a war footing.

The time necessary to make this transformation from the status of peace to that of war is the most closely guarded secret of every land. The greatest energy and care is exerted to reduce it because thereby they multiply their warlike efficiency by each fraction of a day that is saved. Judging by past history and what we know of other systems, we may say that the time necessary would be anywhere from one to two weeks.

A slight calculation will show that this army of 535,000 does not exhaust by any means the reserves of fully trained soldiers. Ever since the two-year service law went into operation, 120,000 men have been going into the reserves each year; prior to that the annual contingent was about 80,000 for several years, and then the great army of more than a half million veterans of the Manchurian campaign is still available. So it is easy to suppose that the Japanese have now at least 800,000 fully

trained soldiers, which is probably double the number they had when they entered the war with Russia.

In time of war these trained reserves, who are not needed in the active army, will probably be formed into nineteen additional divisions according to the German and Japanese system, making thirty-eight divisions in war.

In future it is only a matter of time when the present system will afford double the number of trained soldiers that it now will give. In other words, there will be more than a million and a half trained men.

If this host of fully trained men is not sufficient, another is provided from those able-bodied men who were not received into the active army. The number of men of this class is not known, and probably changes from year to year for financial and political reasons. At any rate a supernumerary reserve is formed who receive a certain amount of partial training, in three periods during twenty years, aggregating seven months in all. The manner in which they are trained is to attach one hundred and fifty of them to each infantry regiment, for three months, replacing them by a new detail as soon as their period of drill is completed.

It is not unlikely that the immense number of trained men which are now provided, will be considered sufficient and that this partially trained force will be discontinued. Its use has principally been to fill the ranks of the non-combatant troops, as transports, laborers, etc. During the Manchurian campaign great numbers of these partially trained men went to the front because the reserves of the fully trained were exhausted.

This reduction in the term of service from three to two years shows the growing simplicity of what used to be the most difficult part of military preparation. The ancient Greeks and Romans spent their lives in military

drills and exercises. The soldiers of Frederick the Great learned to fire a musket in two hundred motions. To learn to parade step it took many months. Now all the frills and embroidery are thrown away and only practical methods are used. I have no doubt that the time of service will be still further reduced. At the same time the art of war has become more difficult than before. Longer preparation and more intelligence are needed in those who prepare, direct and control the military energies of the people.

The development of the Japanese navy, like the army, seems to be marked by ten-year periods. The navy made the first attempts to adopt modern ideas.

The first warship was an American-built frigate called the *Melacca*. The first ironclad was a Confederate privateer named *Stonewall Jackson*, built in France and completed just before the close of our Civil War, without having a chance to go to sea.

Up to 1875 the Japanese had collected about twenty-five ships of all sizes, with an aggregate tonnage of about 16,000 tons. Then the true development of the navy began, under the guidance of British naval experts, ten years before Marshal Oyama made his visit to Europe.

In the next ten years the fleet had reached 100,000 tons and one hundred guns of all kinds. The war with China then occurred, and the first great battle between ironclads was fought near the mouth of the Yalu river. The war on the sea was won by the Japanese not so much by the power of their fleet as by the skill and discipline of the officers and men. The captured Chinese ships added material strength to the navy, and the war indemnity of two hundred million dollars gave an opportunity for an extended naval and military program to be carried out. The program was completed ten years later, just in time for the great war with Russia in 1904.

In that war the navy had increased many times in strength over that of 1894.

Japan had a powerful fighting fleet, 14 battleships and armored cruisers, aggregating 154,000 tons, with 55 great guns, of 8 to 12 inches diameter of the bore.

Although the Japanese were victorious, it was evident that they fought on a very narrow margin of naval strength. It was only the dispersion of the Russian fleet that saved the Japanese from confronting a dangerous superiority. As it happened, however, the Russian fleet was completely defeated. Whatever weakness there may have been in the Japanese fleet has now been remedied. Since the war the navy has been largely increased.

Five captured battleships and armored cruisers have been renovated and added to the fleet with an aggregate tonnage of 60,000 tons and 18 big guns. Four battleships have been added with about 70,000 tons and 44 big guns, and also 4 armored cruisers with 57,000 tons and 16 big guns. During the war they lost 2 ships with 30,000 tons and 8 heavy guns. At this day, instead of less than 160,000 tons of battleships and cruisers, they probably have more than 300,000 tons, and the number of large caliber guns has increased from 55 to 125. Two of the new battleships are of the Dreadnought class, but larger and more powerful. They were laid down and completed entirely in Japan.

The income of Japan has been raised to double what it was before the war with Russia by governmental monopolies and war taxes which are a heavy burden on the people. No doubt the increased opportunities for national activity in business will bring reward in time, but at present the financial question seems to be a serious one.

The great development of the army and navy carries

with it a large portion of the receipts of the Government. For this year 1909-10 it amounts to more than eighty million dollars, which is about three-tenths of the total income of the country.

The statements in this paper are all taken from published books and documents which are accessible to all. In the limited time given to a lecture, it is not possible to deal except in a general way with such great questions as the military situation in a great nation. For those who desire to investigate the subject at more length the following list of references is recommended:

- The Imperial Japanese Navy, Fred T. Jane, 1904.
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Imperial Outposts, Col. A. M. Murray, 1907.
The Reshaping of the Far East, B. L. Putnam Weale, 1905.
The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia, B. L. Putnam, Weale, 1908.
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L'armée Japonaise en 1908, par le Capitaine Bluzet.
Journal Militaire des Armées, Etrangères, 1907-8-9.
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XX

THE AWAKENING OF KOREA

WHILE Korea was never actually awakened to her opportunities as a sovereign power, such awakening as she did experience followed as a natural result of our entering into treaty relations with her, and thus ushering her from her hermit isolation into the lime-light of foreign intercourse. These relations, be it said, were entered into by her with much reluctance, and after years of persistence upon our part, and even then only upon our expressed promise to use our good offices in her behalf in case she should be oppressed by a third power:—a promise which she found to be but a poor reliance when threatened with the loss of her integrity.

In citing Korea's relations with China and Japan, I will have to make out a rather strong case for the latter, showing how she was actually forced by the action of China, and later by that of Russia, to assume the overlordship of Korea as a matter of self-protection. This can only seem all the stronger because of my well-known friendship for the Koreans and sympathy with them over the loss of their land.

Were there time to cite incidents, it would be possible to make out a strong case for Korea, since in the past the conduct of Japan, both politically and commercially, has encouraged neither trust nor neighborly regard.

Any attempt to point out the merits of the case, as viewed from the Korean standpoint, would now, however, be of little avail, for the weakness and corruption

of the Peninsular Government offered such a tempting field of operations to intriguing outside powers, that Japan was forced to take decisive action or see a stronger power entrenched in the Peninsula as a menace to her own existence.

As to the Koreans themselves, they are a docile, long-suffering and industrious people. Their country comprises nearly one hundred thousand square miles of rugged mountains and fertile valleys. These mountains contain very rich mineral deposits, which are being mined—chiefly by Americans. The northern country is well wooded.

The people, until in the early eighties, had little foreign intercourse, raising and manufacturing almost all that they needed. Some foreign trade sprang up with the opening of the country by foreign treaties, but up to the recent war it amounted to only about fifteen millions (U. S. dollars) per annum. Rice was the chief export, and cotton goods and such products as American kerosene formed the chief imports. The country presented the unique spectacle of a foreign land where American influence was mostly felt in commercial matters, and where Americans led in large financial and industrial enterprises, such as railway and trolley building, electrical development, mining, commerce and such betterments as water-works.

The people are of Mongolian stock. They have a language of their own, which is quite distinct from that of China or Japan, while in common with each of these neighboring people, the educated classes understand the written language of China.

They are a kindly people. We had no beggars in Seoul until the advent of the foreign guard, whose misplaced gratuities served to organize quite a band of beggar children. Hospitality was universal and a serious

drain on the well-to-do. They are polite and courteous, in fact from ancient times they have been known in Asia for their observance of etiquette and ceremony. Not that they are given to an undue observance of outward forms, but rather that they have a dignified manner of expressing their politeness which seems more real. I have seen a man get up and apologize to a bicyclist for being in his way and getting knocked down.

The Koreans are simple, trusting, credulous; rather inclined to look down on all not favored as themselves, Korean birth, residence and intelligence being to them the greatest consideration in this life. This leads them at times to assume an air of superiority that may be annoying to a foreigner whose sense of humor is deficient.

In commerce they have had no chance, owing to their form of government or of governmental interference.

As officials, they show great aptitude in getting into and remaining in office, and they are past masters in intrigue and a sort of diplomacy. I have known several Korean officials, however, who would compare favorably with the greatest Chinese officials I have known, and who would be quite capable of reaching the height attained of late by the Japanese.

General Hasegawa told me of some Korean young men who, after attending military school in Japan, enlisted with the Japanese for the war with Russia, and were appointed lieutenants. He said these men were equal in every way to their Japanese fellow officers, and he commended them most highly for their action under fire and under all the emergencies of the army.

The half-breeds that I have seen as a result of unions between Japanese men and Korean women, are a very fine class, seeming to combine the best qualities of the two races. Possibly we may some day see a new race evolved

in that peninsula that will take a high place among mankind.

Early History

The early records indicate commercial intercourse between Korea and Arabia and Egypt. The first recorded expedition to Japan seems to have taken place about B.C. 97. In 202 A.D. the Japanese Empress Jingu Kogo invaded Korea with a large army and compelled the Koreans to submit to Japanese suzerainty by a compact that seems not to have been abrogated until the date of the modern treaty with Japan in 1876. Korea lost the Liaotung Peninsula to China in 1012. She is said to have given to Europe in 1100 the magnetic compass, later used by Columbus in his voyage of discovery. In 1218 Korea was invaded by the Mongols under Genghis Khan, and in 1273 Kublai Khan attempted to invade Japan from Korea.

In 1250 the consort of the Korean ruler was a Chinese maid, to whom was sent from Nanking a beautiful marble pagoda, wonderfully carved in illustration of the life of Buddha. This was set up on the present site of Seoul and still remains in position.

In 1443 Japan secured a foothold at Fusan, where she has remained ever since. Yasuhiro, the Daimio of Tsushima, was sent to Korea in 1585, but failing in his mission he was killed on his return; then followed the great and memorable invasion of Korea by Hideyoshi, (1591-8), which devastated the whole land, destroying the cities and crippling industries in such a manner that they have never recovered. The Chinese allies sent to assist Korea were also defeated; Seoul was destroyed and Fusan was made a fortified Japanese port.

It was following this invasion that General Nabeshima gathered up all the Korean potters, skilled in the manu-

facture of the far-famed Korean pottery, and took them to his home on the island of Satsuma. These exiles taught the Japanese the art of pottery manufacture, and from their descendants came the delightful ware for which Japan is so justly famed to-day. In fact Japan owes much in the realms of art and letters to her ancient teacher, Korea.

In 1619 Korea joined China against the Manchus, and while both were defeated, Korea made such a plucky fight, that the victorious Manchus contented themselves with imposing various formal marks of suzerainty upon the Koreans, and excused them from wearing the queue and from binding the feet of the women, as the Chinese were compelled to do. Because of their exhaustion in this war against the Manchus, and for the reason that by virtue of Korea's opposition the Manchus could not get on to Japan, the Japanese excused the Koreans from further tribute, such as was exacted by Hideyoshi.

Europe's intercourse with Korea began in 1653, when the Dutch ship *Sparwehr* was wrecked on the island *Quelpart*. Thirty-six of her crew of sixty-four men were saved and succored, but not allowed to depart, except that eight of them finally made good their escape to Japan. Those who remained taught the Koreans much, including the manufacture of gunpowder and weapons. The eighteenth century was one of little molestation from the outside, except that several Catholic priests came into the country and on being apprehended were killed. Japanese experience with Christianity had impressed the Koreans with the idea that they should not admit it. Many Edicts were therefore issued against Christianity during this century.

In 1812 Captain Basil Hall with two British ships visited and surveyed the west coast of Korea.

French priests began to arrive in Korea in the nine-

teenth century, and the first of a number of massacres of these martyrs took place in 1839. As a result three French vessels arrived in 1846 to demand satisfaction for these outrages, but they were wrecked, and their guns were later used against the next French expedition, together with others made in Korean arsenals from these as models.

In 1860 there was much excitement in Korea over the news of the war between China and Great Britain and the reported flight of the Chinese Emperor towards Korea; also by the Russo-Chinese treaty which gave to Korea a new neighbor on the north; there was much excitement as well because of the Perry expedition to Japan.

Fearing an attempt on Korea by these restless outside barbarians, the Koreans opened arsenals and began the manufacture of guns, using those captured from the French ships as patterns. They also fortified the approaches to Seoul by erecting the forts on the island of Kangwha in the Han river, which forts we were later to silence. The attempt of the barbarians came, and we were to be the disgraceful agents, when in 1866 an American schooner, the *General Sherman*, reached Pingyang on a filibustering expedition, and getting hopelessly stranded off the city, the vessel was burned and all the crew were killed.

Then came, in the following year, the grave-robbing expedition of the German-American, Ernest Oppert, who coveted the riches supposed to be buried in the Korean royal tombs, because of the custom of the Koreans of burying specimens of the choice ancient pottery with their royal dead, and as the potters were extinct, this ware was so valuable in Japan as to sell for its weight in gold. Naturally the report got abroad that Korean royalty were buried in gold coffins.

In 1866 a French expedition consisting of seven ships and one thousand men attacked the Kangwha forts in an attempt to obtain redress for the massacre of so many French missionaries. They were ignominiously driven off, so that in the war between France and China in 1884 the latter was indignant at being attacked by a power unable to make an impression upon so small a country as China's tributary state, Korea.

The destruction of the *General Sherman* resulted in our sending an expedition to Korea under Admiral Rodgers in 1871, consisting of five ships, two of which the writer was later familiar with, the old *Palos* and *Monocacy*. These ships when proceeding up the river to get into communication with Seoul, were fired upon by the Kangwha forts. A landing was therefore made and the forts were captured after a stubborn resistance that resulted in the slaughter of all the native garrison. We gained nothing by this slaughter, and as we left at once and did not return, since our Government disapproved of the punitive character the expedition had taken upon itself, the natives naturally considered they had only been less successful with us than they had been with the French, and therefore felt quite elated at having driven off the Western barbarians, while Japan had been forced to open her land, and China had been humbled by both England and Russia. Her own prowess served to make her quite haughty.

As a result of the firing upon some Japanese naval surveyors near the Kangwha forts, the Japanese dismantled these forts, which we had already taken and supposedly ruined, but which had been partially rebuilt. Japan also informed China of her intentions in regard to Korea, and upon the advice of the Chinese, Korea made the treaty of 1876 with Japan which, though the first of Korea's modern treaties, was really of little use

to the Japanese, until after we had made our treaty of 1882, and brought about general foreign relations with the Korean Government.

Events Leading to the Russo-Japanese War

This is sufficient on the earlier history of Korea, and I do not intend to recount the later history, but will touch rather upon some of the chief events that led to the recent war and to the final loss to Korea of the measure of independence she had enjoyed through so many centuries.

When General Kuroda and Count Inouye anchored off Seoul in February, 1876, it was with the purpose of either making a treaty or beginning war. It turned out to be a peaceful mission, and the treaty was secured.

Korea was then for the first time recognized as an independent power. China, be it said, had been brought to a realizing sense of the responsibility of suzerainty, and found that such relations were apt to bring on ugly interrogations from the restless barbarian powers, for the French and we promptly appealed to Peking for a settlement of the outrages upon the former's missionaries, and for the destruction of our schooner and her crew. This realization on the part of China was the reason for the consummation of the treaty with Japan, as well as for those which followed later, as China's opposition had been the cause of the failure of the proposed missions to Korea on the part of would-be treaty negotiators from abroad; for Korea deferred to and respected her "elder brother," China, as much as she ignored and despised Japan.

That Korea was taken seriously in the eighties, is shown by the fact that she was always mentioned in a proposal much talked of in private, for the firm union

of the Asiatic Powers, while several Western Powers made persistent attempts to enter into relations with her. At last through the intercession of Li Hung Chang, we were successful in negotiating a treaty in 1882 and others followed in rapid succession.

In spite of having advised this course, China could not bring herself to loosen entirely her hold upon her long-time vassal, and compelled the King of Korea to send with each treaty a letter to the head of the Government with which the treaty was made, admitting his vassal position. It fell to my lot to have something to do in abolishing this claim, since in 1887-8 I went to Washington with a Korean legation, and in spite of the most persistent demands of China, made in an attempt to enforce these claims of vassallage, we were finally accepted as representatives from an independent power. The story of this mission to establish Korean independence will be briefly referred to later, but it is written up somewhat at length in a book of mine recently published entitled, "Things Korean."

A Japanese legation was first established in Seoul in 1877, and consulates were located in the ports of Fusan, Chemulpo and Gensan, in accordance with later trade regulations. In 1882 the Japanese legation was destroyed and seven Japanese were killed. Minister Hanabusa made his escape to a British vessel engaged near Chemulpo in making a survey.

The settlement of this difficulty involved the payment of an indemnity and the quartering of a force of three thousand Chinese troops in Seoul under General Yuan Shi Kai, who was recently deposed after having risen from this first prominence to be the foremost man in China, next to the Throne, in succession to Li Hung Chang.

A new legation was built by the Japanese, only to be

destroyed in the bloody *emeute* of 1884, when the Chinese and Koreans killed or drove out the Japanese. This affair resulted in an agreement between China and Japan, whereby the former was obliged to remove her troops from Korea, and each power covenanted not to again land troops in Korea, without first notifying the other; implying the preliminary consent of the other contracting power. It was the violation of this agreement by the Chinese in 1894 that brought on the Chino-Japanese War.

Korea first appeared in the West when in 1883 she sent a mission to Washington to ratify our treaty. To this mission was attached Mr. Percival Lowell, the present astronomer. It was sent back to Korea on board our warship *Trenton* in charge of Naval Lieutenant George C. Foulk. The chief of this embassy, Min. Youg Ik, was one whose assassination was attempted in the *emeute* in 1884, and whose life I was able to save by surgical means, thus getting my own start in Korea.

These frequent clashes with stronger powers show the stolid persistence of the Koreans in attempting to maintain what they deemed to be their rights, and indicate the reason for the struggle still going on in Korea, where newspaper accounts note continued activity of the insurgent bands, in spite of the vigilance and severity of the Japanese troops—this after the lapse of four years since the conclusion of the Russian war, and the beginning of Japanese occupation.

The Koreans may be suicidal in their attempts, and their friends may wish they would submit to the inevitable, yet it shows that they are not the miserable time-servers some superficial observers would have us believe them to be.

During the decade from 1884 to 1894 Chinese influence was all powerful in Korea. Yuan Shi Kai, already

referred to as the recent foremost official of China, until degraded after the death of the Emperor and Empress, was Chinese representative at Seoul, and as such he considered himself his sovereign's representative in a vassal state and attempted to lord it over the representatives from other powers.

While the Koreans chafed under this claim of sovereignty, they were obliged to acquiesce in the demands of Yuan, who enforced a veto on everything in the way of foreign relations. To test this claim it was decided to send legations abroad, and a minister and suite were named to represent Korea in England and Europe, and one, before mentioned, was delegated for America alone. At that time the British were in close relations with China, and they saw to it that the European embassy got no further than Hong Kong, where it remained two years and then returned from its fruitless errand.

The mission to the United States fared better, for the reason that we were willing to favor this move, which also had the approval of Japan. As stated before, I was appointed to accompany them and to attend to getting them established in Washington, and our naval vessel, the *Omaha*, was ordered to give us transport to Japan. The Chinese, acting under the advice of Yuan Shi Kai, did all they could to stop us, but the presence of a foreigner as a member of the mission proved to be an awkward complication, and we got started. As the *Omaha* steamed down the bay it was met by a fleet of six Chinese ships, sent to overawe Korea, and prevent the departure of the mission. They could do nothing but salute the American flag, and when the Korean passengers on the *Omaha* found that they were not being bombarded, but that Chinese powder was actually being burned in honor of the flag under which they sailed, they were immensely pleased.

Arrived in Washington, a firm attempt was again made to prevent the consummation of our plans, but this miscarried after much uneasiness and no little ingenuity, and a due exercise of what is well termed "American bluff." The matter did not rest even here, however, and on the return of the Korean mission to Seoul, Yuan's insistency was great enough and he had power sufficient to compel the King to banish the poor old minister. It was merely a form, however, for the decree was but for three days, and the old gentleman simply went to his country place near by for two nights, and the incident was closed. The Chinaman had saved his face—that end so necessary in Chinese transactions.

No one fretted more under existing conditions, and Chinese arrogance in Korea, than did the Japanese, whom Yuan treated with such contempt that he actually disregarded his country's agreements with Korea, and even seized the telegraph rights of the country, though these had been granted to Japan, who had in consequence laid a cable line to connect their country with Fusan.

The Japanese saw they must come to conclusions with China over the question of Korean sovereignty, and during this decade (1884-94) they devoted themselves to quiet preparation. They had Chinese-speaking Japanese disguised as natives moving about in all parts of China and sending reports and charts to Tokyo until they got to know the country and the conditions better than did the Chinese themselves. When they were all ready to try conclusions and only awaited a pretext, an excellent one arose in the serious uprising of the Koreans against their officials, which was known as the Tong Hak Rebellion of 1893 and 1894.

The Japanese wisely nursed this rebellion and induced the chief Korean official to appeal for assistance to the great elder brother, China. Yuan fell into the trap and

ordered troops to Korea without bothering to go through the formality of notifying Japan in accordance with the treaty of ten years previous, of the very existence of which he may have quite forgotten in his great idea of his own importance.

I chanced to be dining at the Chinese legation the night that Yuan received a telegram announcing the departure of the first consignment of troops; which troops were cleverly allowed by the Japanese to land, near Chemulpo, in order that the treaty of 1885 might be actually broken. The receipt of this telegram seemed to cause as much elation to the Japanese legation officials present as it did depression to the Chinese, who seemed to get a glimpse of grave consequences in store, so that we hastily made our adieus.

It is unnecessary to go into the details of this war which gave the world its first shock of surprise, because of the order and preparedness displayed by Japan in landing troops without confusion, and at once occupying the most important strategic points. A British steamer carrying a further detachment of Chinese troops to Korea, was sunk by the Japanese on July 25, 1894; war was not actually declared until August 1st.

We foreigners were much surprised by the facility and celerity of the movement of the Japanese troops, but we were so impressed with the greatness of China and her vast resources, that we fancied the Chinese would swarm over the border and drive the Japanese off the peninsula by very force of numbers. As a matter of fact, they never got further south than Ping-yang, where the undisciplined mob, following ancient methods with their jingals, tridents and dragon display, were completely routed and put on the run. That ended the war on land, and the sea fight was mere play for the Japanese.

Brilliant as Japan had shown herself in war, she was guilty of the most monumental blundering in matters of statesmanship. The lesson learned in this regard after the Chinese war induced them after the Russian war to send to Korea Japan's greatest statesman, the late Prince Ito.

But in 1895 they were content to send over to Korea little men, who attempted to force the Koreans to do in fourteen weeks what had taken Japan a half century to accomplish. They made a strong point of compelling the natives to change their garb, the method of wearing their hair, and by such petty exactions every Korean was made to hate the people who had just fought a successful war for their independence. As a result of these blunders, and the fact that her fears of the great powers had induced her to proclaim this to be a war for Korea's independence, Japan got nothing in Korea as a result of this war, except the abolishment of the Chinese claims to suzerainty. A protectorate might as well have been established then as later, had Japan been sure of her standing with the powers. The greatest blunder of all, however, was the assassination of the Queen of Korea; an act which the Imperial Japanese Court sitting at Hiroshima found to have been planned and executed by the then Japanese Minister to Korea, but for which no one has held the Japanese Government itself to blame, further than for its selection of such an old-fashioned conservative for so important a position as minister during these days of reconstruction.

This threw Korea into the hands of Russia, the King having secretly telegraphed to the Czar for aid. The remaining royal family escaped from Japanese surveillance in their palace and took refuge in the Russian legation, where they remained for a year and a half and imbibed many Russian ideas, all of which served to give

to Russia the position of paramount influence in Korean affairs.

Japan also lost the position she had acquired as a result of the Chinese war in the Liaotung peninsula, by the action of Russia backed by France and Germany, and having by her blunders in statecraft become a negligible quantity in Korea, she had only her indemnity for her trouble, while forced to see Russia occupying and fortifying Port Arthur, building a commercial port at Dalny and extending her railroad lines through Manchuria. This Manchurian line, moreover, was guarded by troops to such an extent, that when I made the journey to St. Petersburg through Manchuria and Siberia in 1903, the Manchurian stations resembled fortified camps, showing that this railroad had other than a commercial significance.

Japan was not the only one to blunder over Korea, for during the decade from 1894 to 1904, when for most of that time Muscovite influence was paramount in Korea, Russia blundered much after the style of Japan. Instead of leaving as representative the man who had made this great success possible for his country, she sent a succession of representatives, each less well adapted than the other for the delicate task of putting the Korean house in order, so that it should not invite further outside attention. Not content with the vast operations at Port Arthur, Dalny and in Manchuria, they secured a secret agreement covering the cession of the magnificent port at Masampo on the southern end of the Korean peninsula and almost in sight of Japan, which country it would menace to the death, when properly fortified and occupied.

Then they secured a concession for the timber along the northern border of Korea, and by virtue of having interested the Grand Dukes financially in this enterprise,

the so-called timber company was able to override all other interests and to obtain a military guard, and in other ways to give the matter the character of a territorial occupation. All this in Korea in addition to high-handedness in Manchuria.

While these events were taking place and Russian officials in Asia seemed to consider that nothing could disturb their tenure, Japan was secretly but feverishly preparing for the great struggle she seemed to feel was inevitable, and which came on as suddenly as did the Chinese War when the due pretext was provided. The rest you know, how Russia refused to take Japan seriously, and her Minister in Seoul was dining out with a gay party, while the Japanese troops were landing at Chemulpo and Japanese ships were turning back that minister's dispatch boat on its way to Port Arthur to carry messages which he could not send by telegraph owing to the fact that the Japanese had taken possession of the telegraph lines. How the next day the Russian ships at Chemulpo were sunken wrecks, and this Minister was a prisoner in his own legation; while nearly the same was being enacted at Port Arthur, where the swiftness of the Japanese blow found the Russian ships quite unprepared, and their officers engaged in enjoying themselves at a play on shore.

As in the case of the Chinese War, the Russians got no further into Korea than to Ping-yang, and it was only scouts who got in sight of that city. Japan made a wonderful winter march through Korea, but it was really unnecessary, as the war was soon removed from Korea to be fought in the Liaotung peninsula and Manchuria, using Korea simply as a base.

Following the Chinese War in 1894 the Japanese seemed to consider that Korea was their own, and no agreements were necessary. They actually surveyed a

railway line from Seoul to Chemulpo, but had no right to it, and I secured a concession for this necessary enterprise for an American. I may add that in arranging this I had to secure the assent of the Russians, and in doing so it became necessary to secure the reversal to a Russian of a Korean timber concession owned by the American in whose name the railway concession was obtained. This timber concession grew, until it became the one before mentioned, which involved the Grand Ducal interests and was one of the brands which started the great conflagration. In fact, I felt, after reading Kuropatkin's memoirs, somewhat as though I had been guilty of furnishing a cause, through this concession, for that war.

Following the Russian War, however, the Japanese made no such mistakes. They took agreements for everything, in fact going too far in this matter, for in their agreements of February 23, 1904, they made such promises of the preservation of Korean independence and peace, that they were obliged to stultify themselves in later acts and agreements. Here again they seemed to fear the opposition of the powers, and seemed not to realize the great successes that were to fall to their arms, and which would enable them to ignore or placate the treaty nations.

I have frequently been asked how the Koreans were faring under Japanese rule. This is a difficult question to answer; the Japanese are a friendly nation, and one that we have helped to a position where she demands consideration at our hands—the consideration due a very sensitive nature, one which is on the *qui vive* to see that nothing due her by virtue of her newly acquired importance is withheld from her.

On the contrary, while it is easy to laud and commend Japan, no credit may come from the Koreans to any one speaking a good word for their country. Nevertheless,

while I appreciate Japan, my sympathies are entirely with Korea.

When one has dealings with such men as Prince Ito, Counts Okuma and Inouye, and other of the elder statesmen of Japan, all is dignified, courteous and apparently fair, but financial and business matters must pass through other channels and cannot reach these high quarters, except on appeal through a government.

Japanese officials in conversation with me have expressed their regret that their people should assume such an overbearing manner with the Koreans. Japanese immigrants to Korea seem to think that as they represent the all-conquering people who drove the enemy from Korea, the natives owe them profound gratitude, which should be shown in the surrender of property as well as in the observance of a most obsequious and servile manner.

As the Korean is somewhat stolid, he is apt to be slow in doing what the representatives of these new overlords demand, and one of the commonest sights at a Korean landing or in the streets is to see big natives kicked and beaten by little Japanese. The strange part of it is, that when Americans chance to see this it rather heightens their admiration for the little Japanese, and they frequently express their contempt for the Korean who will tamely submit to such usages. What can the poor fellow do? Should he resist he will be beaten by a number of Japanese, and his arrest would probably follow with the loss of his property, as well as that of his family, before he could secure his release from prison. He shows great command of himself in his ability to girt his teeth and bear the ill-treatment.

As to this imprisonment and loss of property, I saw much of it before leaving Korea in 1905, and in speaking of it with my friend, D. W. Stevens, for whose coming

to Korea I was somewhat responsible, he asked me for facts regarding the matter, and I secured him full details regarding two prominent cases, which I submitted to him with affidavits.

I know he did his part, but up to the last accounts there had been no redress, the reason being given that until the establishment of courts for the common people these matters would have to be held in abeyance and much suffering would result.

I have no doubt that things will be better, providing the common Korean has access to these courts when established, and if the Japanese Government can sufficiently impress upon the court officials the necessity for impartial justice. From my last advices I am obliged to consider that Japanese nature has not changed, and that it is just as hard to-day for the lesser Japanese official to decide against one of his own people in favor of a foreigner, especially the despised Korean, as it was when I had a personal knowledge of him.

This being the case, you can readily see what the condition of the Koreans is to-day. In illustration I will cite one case that occurred before I left Korea and which was rather well known and is to the point. A degenerate son of a country family, after getting into gambling difficulties, sold his father's estate to one of his Japanese acquaintances, giving him a forged deed for it. The purchaser went to take possession, and the old man indignantly denied that he had sold or had any intention of selling property that he had inherited from his ancestors. The old fellow was therefore strung up to the rafters of his house and beaten, the treatment being so harsh that he died soon after. I have not been informed that the perpetrators have been brought to justice. Some such cases came to my personal and official knowledge, one being where a Korean under similar circumstances had

sold the house of his American employer to a Japanese who did not know that a foreigner was mixed up in the case, and very soon dropped it when he ascertained the facts.

Now, I am fully persuaded that the Government of Japan would wish this to be otherwise. They want the Koreans to have as good a chance as is possible, consistent with the due development of the Japanese interests in that land. We have every reason to believe that the Japanese Government most deeply regretted the assassination of the Queen of Korea at the instigation of her diplomatic Minister, but this remorse was accentuated by the fact that this untoward act threw Korea into the arms of Russia. At present there seems to be nothing that may accentuate any such remorse, and as it is only a Korean that is to be considered, any such official favoritism is not apt to be questioned very closely.

However, the Japanese side of the Korean situation has been ably set forth in the Annual Report for 1907 of the Residency General on Reforms and Progress in Korea. This is a very readable report and contains a mass of interesting and valuable information. While written in the interests of the Japanese, there is an evident desire to be just and fair and to create a good impression abroad, for which obvious purpose the report is published in English.

The Japanese certainly deserve and command respect for their ability. They know well how to dissemble; they are past masters in diplomacy; bringing to a quick, keen modern training the astute methods of Asia; engrafting upon the patient persistence of the unhurried Orient the immediate decisive methods of the West.

The ruler for whom they showed such contempt as to deprive him of his throne, is spoken of in the third line of this report as "Gracious Sovereign," and his of-

ficials are mentioned as "patriotic statesmen." To one who knows both peoples intimately, and the relations that have existed and are now existing, this is positively funny.

To one not posted there would seem to be nothing unfair in the report, since disagreeable matters are either passed over in silence, or glossed over with such terms as *coup d'état*, as in the assassination of the Queen, or "a foreign interference." Take, for example, the brutal manner in which the various protocols and agreements were forced upon the unwilling natives—the same being now used by the holders as the basis for the various acts of the "Korean Government," whereas it should read "Japanese Government."

The blunders in statecraft following their brilliant war with China are dismissed with the words "after a brief period of service, the Japanese advisers were dismissed, owing to political intrigues as well as to the foreign complications of 1895 and 1896." This foreign complication was the active interest in and personal daily visits to the imprisoned Korean Court by the British, Russian, French and American representatives associated to a certain extent with the German, which activity resulted from the assassination of the Queen and the consequent trial of the Japanese minister, ending in the flight of the King and Crown Prince to the Russian legation for refuge and the reversal of paramount influence in Korea to Russia. A more satisfactory statement follows, as a quotation from Prince Ito's speech of July, 1907, when he says: "The identity of Korean and Japanese interests in the Far East and the paramount character of Japan's interests in Korea will not permit Japan to leave Korea to the care of any other foreign country; she must assume the charge herself."

This rings true and cannot be gainsaid. No one can

deny that Korea was in a position where she was likely to fall into the hands of some outside power. Japan owed it to herself in very self-protection to see that no one but herself should be placed in this position. She won magnificently by the last resort of nations, and no one may at present dispute her right to control the subsequent course of the Peninsular Government.

The trouble seems to be that she promised too much, and was therefore obliged to resort to methods about which there is much dispute in order to secure the right conferred upon her by the verdict of war.

As it was possibly unnecessary to announce the Chinese War as being fought to secure the independence of Korea, so it would seem to have been unnecessary for them to promise to "guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire." This, however, was on February 23, 1904, at the beginning of the war, when the outcome was uncertain, and the good will of the powers was earnestly desired. With later brilliant military success, this article had to be controverted by subsequent ones, the methods of obtaining which were open to serious criticism, but which quite did away with the idea of independence, and made the Japanese the practical rulers in Korea; while the Treaty Powers, though still having their treaties in existence, held them in abeyance by their acquiescence in this overlordship.

It may be noted in passing that it was not Great Britain, the ally of Japan, who took the initiative in this acquiescence, but our own Government that had pledged itself by treaty to come to the assistance of Korea if she were oppressed by a third power. I understood at the time that our British friends were not well pleased with our precipitateness in thus surrendering to Japan and forcing the hands of all the other powers.

As the result of the convention of November 17, 1905,

the foreign legations were withdrawn from Seoul and upon the Japanese resident devolved the "general control of all business relating to foreigners and foreign consuls in Korea, with the exception of such as pass through the foreign representatives resident" in Japan; "the discharge of all functions of supervision hitherto devolving on the Imperial authorities," the control of the army, and, in fact, he, the resident, becomes the Korean Government.

Much land was necessary for military purposes, roads and public improvements instituted by the Japanese. This was taken in many cases in a manner giving rise to much complaint on the part of the native owners, who claimed repeatedly that they had not been compensated at all, or if so, only in a meager way. This may have been due to the method of payment through native sympathizers with the Japanese, who may have kept the major portion of the money for themselves.

I noticed, that after the war with China in 1894, the Japanese authorities made the mistake of placing themselves almost at the mercy of a few Koreans, who could speak Japanese, and were not men of the highest character. In this manner many of the mistakes were committed and much injustice was done to the natives. I understand that much the same condition prevails now in Korea, which is unfortunate. The Japanese do not acquire Korean readily, and comparatively few of them can converse in that language; naturally they are at the mercy of the interpreters, and in a land of such constant neighborhood feuds it is to be expected that the work of the informer will be overdone and much injustice worked upon innocent natives, who may be at enmity with one who has the ear of the present ruling class.

Under the caption "Sanitation" in this very readable report for 1907 it is stated, "a hospital and a medical

school to promote vaccination were first established in 1897 under the advice of the Japanese."

In pondering over this statement I wondered if it might not mean that such an institution was first established by Japanese in 1897. But in the next section it is stated, "until recently Korea possessed no adequately equipped hospital on a large scale." This is an unfortunate claim, for the Severance Hospital, built and maintained by the Presbyterian mission in Seoul, is a large brick building, fully equipped and doing an extensive work for natives and Japanese. It had from the start two male foreign physicians and one to two female doctors, besides a staff of native assistants and nurses. A Japanese doctor stated to me of this institution, that he knew of no better equipped one for its size in Japan, and he commented very favorably upon its size.

The report states that the new Japanese hospital during 1907 gave free treatment to 2,974 Koreans. I myself introduced vaccination and quinine into Korea, and in the year 1885, twenty-two years earlier than this report, I treated over 11,000 natives free in the Korean Government hospital, which was the forerunner of the Severance hospital, and which has been in continual operation in Seoul from 1885 to the present day, treating Koreans from all over the country, as well as thousands of Japanese.

I simply mention this as showing the apparent one-sided nature of this very readable report of the Japanese residency, as it covers matters that came under my personal knowledge.

The report states that "attention was never seriously paid to the matter of 'water works,' until the Japanese municipal council in Seoul held a meeting to discuss this subject on January 29, 1904, and decided to build a reservoir on Nam San for the purpose of supplying the

Japanese settlement with water at a cost of 100,000 yen. The measure was not carried out, however, owing to a protest from Messrs. Colbran and Bostwick, an American firm, which claimed the exclusive privilege of constructing water works in Seoul."

Since I made this protest as United States Minister I know something about the matter. The facts are that from the time when as Secretary to the Korean legation in Washington in 1888 I had tried to interest capitalists in the project of supplying pure water to the residents of Seoul, the necessity for which I had seen when acting in a medical capacity, and after having passed through the awful cholera epidemic of 1886, the subject was never out of my mind, even when later I was attached to the American legation. As a result, in February, 1898, the firm of Colbran & Bostwick was induced to take up the project, which they have since carried to a brilliantly successful termination. We disliked to interfere with the small project of the Japanese municipal council, as the need for a water supply for that community was most evident; but this was not the only attempt that would have resulted in leaving the American concessionaires with no field, or a very restricted one, for their product; for a British syndicate was on the ground and striving hard to obtain a counter concession; all infringements had therefore to be resisted.

Still it sounds harsh to read in this report that "attention was never seriously paid to the matter," and the fact that this, the first pure water supply, furnished by Americans and equal to the finest to be found anywhere, was completed and in operation in the city of Seoul when this report was made, might at least have been mentioned.

Having succeeded so brilliantly in their war with Russia, and Korea having dropped like a ripe apple into the

Japanese lap, it is of course annoying for them to find Americans heading great mining, electrical and development works in that land, where the Japanese naturally feel that all such enterprises should fall to them.

But we were the pioneers there and they will reap the benefit of our earlier efforts to quite an extent; why not then give us the credit for this awakening of Korea even though she failed to better herself and improve her opportunities when awake?

I am extremely sorry for Korea and the natives, with whom I spent so many years, and for whom I entertain such sincere affection. I would not like, therefore, to say anything that might seem to indicate a desertion of them in their hour of bitter trial. At the same time justice compels me to admit that their present condition is largely the result of the unbridled corruption and misrule of their own officials, and some nation was bound to take charge of them. England might have done it at one time, but she eliminated herself, and it became a matter between Japan and Russia. The former won by her brilliant feats of arms; but greatest of all was Japan's good sense in taking the psychological moment in which to stop fighting, and to sue for peace on almost any terms.

Korea's condition, even after things have adjusted themselves, will continue to be bad, since with the best intentions the Japanese Government will not be able to fully control her undesirables in that conquered land. Yet perhaps on the whole the ordinary native will not fare much worse than he did under the old régime, and many will fare better, while others may attain an affluence which was quite impossible under the former native rule.

Still they are a stolidly persistent people, with a centuries old hatred for the Japanese, and this hatred will

be increased by constant friction with overbearing individuals, as well as by acts—even of justice—on the part of their Japanese overlords, which acts will seem to the prejudiced or uninformed native anything but just and will tend to keep alive the old flames, so that when opportunity offers uprisings will recur, and if Japan ever becomes embroiled in any foreign war, Korea may be expected to take advantage of that occasion to do her utmost to cripple the Japanese regardless of what may be the result in new oppressions or new overlordship.

During my twenty-one years' residence in Korea, I saw three great decennial overturns in that land. In 1884 I saw the Chinese drive the Japanese ignominiously from the Peninsula, causing them to leave their dead to be devoured by the dogs in the streets; ten years later, in 1894, I saw the tables turned and the vast hordes of the Chinese utterly routed and put to flight by the Japanese; and in another ten years, namely, 1904, I saw the mighty Russian colossus overturned by this nation newly risen to power.

The international adjustments have been necessarily rearranged; vast sums have been expended and still are to be expended in military preparations. The nerves of the nations are set on edge, and every one seems to be groping and uncertain as to what will happen next.

The humiliation of Russia has largely destroyed her vast powers in maintaining peace, and allowed Germany to take such an aggressive stand as to have become the bugbear of Europe. Commercial lines have been obliterated; England, who depended so much upon the Chinese trade to keep her mills open and to meet her increasing budget, now sees the new power she helped create wresting this trade from her and compelling unheard-of taxes at home.

Every little while we have our own tremors and

begin to talk battleship construction and an increased army.

Korea is a very little country to have caused all this commotion among the governments, but the excitement can easily be traced to the Chino-Japanese War of 1894, and Japan's emergence as the dominant of the Oriental nations. It will be strange if that Korean Peninsula—the battle ground of the past twenty-five centuries—does not again feel the martial tread of neighboring armies, and find herself under a new lordship, or, more probably, serving as a buffer state between her great neighbors.

THE JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION IN KOREA

AMONG the present-day problems of a political character there are few more difficult than those encountered by Japan in its attempt to establish a truly successful protectorate over Korea. What has been called the "benevolent assimilation" of Oriental peoples by Western nations, but which is seldom to any considerable extent purely benevolent and which has never yet resulted in any close approach to perfect assimilation, is no easy task, even under the most favorable conditions. And there are certain reasons why in this particular case it is especially difficult, by whatever nation the attempt is made. Some of the more important causes of this difficulty are the following: The long-continued traditional imbecility and corruption of the Korean Government, and the abject poverty, total ignorance, unsanitary and immoral filthiness, the gross superstition, and generally degraded condition of the great body of the people. The low estate of the Korean populace for the past five hundred years can scarcely be exaggerated.

The difficulty of establishing and successfully conducting a Japanese administration over Korea is further enhanced by the long-standing enmity between the two peoples. I am myself of the opinion that, in the past history of their relations, Japan has treated Korea with more forbearance than would have been exercised under similar circumstances by any nation of Europe, or even by the United States. But however this may be, it cannot be denied that the attitude of the Koreans toward the Japa-

nese has hitherto been, in general, one of unreasoning and bitter hatred; and of the Japanese toward the Koreans one of scornful pride or pitiful scorn. Such feelings are plainly not favorable to successful administration, much less to "benevolent assimilation," of one of the two peoples by the other.

Again, the monarch whom the Japanese Government had sworn to protect and whose family it was pledged to continue on the Imperial throne, was, until he was forced to abdicate by his own ministry, a practically insuperable obstacle to the reform of the government and to the uplift of the people of Korea.

Another source of difficulty for the Japanese administration in Korea came from those, not Koreans, who were interested in defeating the plans of the Resident-General. Not only was there the same call by Japanese for a forceful control of Korea under the military arm, the disappointment of which led to the Satsuma Rebellion, but there was also a considerable party who were active and clamoring for the privilege of "exploiting" the now defenseless Koreans. Moreover, some of the most severe and puzzling embarrassments which Marquis Ito encountered in the earlier years of his administration came from the injudicious or selfish attitude and action of certain foreign residents in Seoul or visitors there—traders, promoters, representatives of the press, diplomats, and even, in some cases, teachers of morals and religion.

No small proportion of the difficulty accompanying the Japanese administration in Korea has also been due to the history, the characteristics, and the conduct of the Japanese themselves. During all their history they have had no experience in establishing and administering provincial governments, protectorates, or other similar political enterprises; and, consequently, they have no

large body of skilled and trained men for the different branches of service required by such administration.

To be sure, the work of Japan in Formosa, under Baron Goto, has been so successful as to excite well-merited admiration; and the same thing has thus far been even more true of the work of Prince Ito and his coworkers in Korea. But how much of this is chiefly temporary and due to the extraordinary fitness of the individual placed in supreme control? Perhaps only time and much more experience can answer this question. That the Japanese failed rather conspicuously when they had their chance after the Chino-Japanese War, can scarcely be denied; nor can it be denied that, in spite of the enormous difficulties of the situation at that time, the conspicuousness of their failure was largely due to their want of experience and of tact, and even to more serious moral deficiencies. Under the severe discipline of the past fifteen years, and with the broader outlook and saner vision which this discipline has done something important to secure, Japan has undoubtedly learned much for the relief of excessive "cock-sureness," and for the abatement of unwarrantable pride.

These sources of the difficulties besetting the Japanese administration in Korea combined to produce what the Resident-General more than once complained of to me as constituting the greatest, the most insuperable of the obstacles in the way of his benevolent plans for Korea. This was the need of a competent and trained and trustworthy *personnel*. Among all the Koreans, there was scarcely a single person to be found who could be trusted with a responsible position of any character. Such as it seemed most reasonable to select were deterred from accepting office under the Japanese, by the fear of being denounced as traitors or even made the objects of assassination.

Passing by, for the present, all minor forms of difficulty, I think it fair to say in a preliminary way, that the period from the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War to the conclusion of the Convention of November 17, 1905, and its going into operation, does not properly belong to the "Japanese Administration in Korea." It was rather a period of *military occupation*. By the protocol of February 23, 1904, the Imperial Government of Japan guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire: on the other hand, the Government of Korea placed its territory under the control of Japan for offensive and defensive purposes, as against Russia, and agreed to adopt the advice of Japan for the improvement of its own administration. As is customary and almost inevitable under such circumstances, not a few wrong deeds were committed, and some outrages perpetrated during these twenty months. These were chiefly of two kinds—unjustifiable appropriation of property, and violence toward persons. With reference to the former, I quote the words of the late Mr. D. W. Stevens. "There can be no question," says Mr. Stevens, "that at the outset the military authorities in Korea did intimate an intention of taking more land for their uses than seemed reasonable. They proceeded upon the principle that the Korean Government had bound itself to grant all land necessary for military and railway uses, and itself to indemnify the owners—an assumption which was technically correct. But the owners, knowing the custom of their own government under such circumstances, were hopeless of obtaining anything like adequate redress. This, it should be remembered, happened during the war, when martial law was in the ascendant." With the coming of peace and the establishment of civil administration under Marquis Ito, other counsels prevailed. Not only was the intention to appropriate other large tracts

of land abandoned, but the military were required to be satisfied with amounts greatly reduced from those which had been originally staked off. From this time on, in the great majority of cases a fair price, and in some cases a truly extravagant price, was paid for all lands belonging to private owners. In judging of the complaints on this score, it must always be remembered that the Koreans are traditionally and habitually given to issuing false or forged deeds, and to claiming and conferring title where no such right exists.

Of crimes of violence during this period of military occupation there was undoubtedly a large number; but they were rarely due to the action of the military or civil officers of the Japanese Government. The extreme difficulty of suppressing or punishing them is well illustrated by the reply of one of these officials to some missionaries who, justly indignant, complained to him of the way certain of their converts were being treated by the Japanese. "I know," said this official, "that I have more than forty of the worst rascals in Japan in my district; but I have prison accommodations for less than half of them. What shall I do with the remainder? I cannot very well take them into my own family." Since the proper Japanese administration in Korea began, the Resident-General has made every effort to ferret out, suppress, and punish all this kind of behavior; and in this effort he has uniformly been inclined to deal most severely with offenders among his own countrymen. In this connection two things must be borne in mind, of which His Excellency more than once reminded me, during my intimate relations with his administration. At first, the foreigners in general, and especially the missionaries, would neither themselves examine with thoroughness the complaints of the native, nor would they give him the opportunity to examine them, before spreading them all

abroad. But no one can have the most superficial acquaintance with the Koreans without finding out that, with few exceptions, they are, either unintentionally or deliberately, given to falsehood, and quite sure to exaggerate wildly even when they have an intrinsically good cause. What is even more important, but has been uniformly overlooked or forgotten by the critics of the Japanese administration in Korea, the Resident-General could no more deprive any meanest Japanese subject of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, than could the Governor of the Philippines, any member of this assembly who might happen to be visiting or resident in those islands.

About one other matter I think there will be universal agreement. This is the sincerity, devotion, and self-sacrificing benevolence of the Resident-General himself. As one who had the opportunity for a most intimate insight into his mind and heart, I do not hesitate to say that his attitude toward the common people of Korea, in their wretchedness and degradation, was as truly Christian in spirit as that of any of my missionary friends who were resident in the country.

The Japanese administration in Korea, properly so-called, should be divided into two periods: the first of these extends from the time of the original compact on the night of November 17, 1905, to the new agreement of July 24, 1907; the second period extends from the latter date down to the present time. By the terms of the original compact the Japanese Government in Korea was definitively substituted for the Korean Government in all matters affecting the relations of foreign countries and their nationals to the Peninsula. The meaning of this was perfectly clear. Neither China nor Russia nor any other foreign nation could in the future operate in any way in Korea to the injury or prejudice of the safety and

superior interests of Japan. This change of responsibility was promptly accepted without dissent or formal protest by the various governments of the civilized world. But the protocol of February 23, 1904, still remained in force; and this, it will be remembered, bound the "Imperial Government of Korea to place full confidence in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvements of administration." Moreover, the protocol signed in the following August had pledged the Korean Government to engage "a Japanese subject" as financial adviser, and a foreigner, to be recommended by the Japanese Government, as councillor on all foreign affairs. It will readily be seen, then, that the Japanese administration in Korea had an ever-present, embarrassing problem on its hands, which was due to the inevitable intermixture of cases and interests, where its rights and duties were in part absolute and in part only advisory.

By the agreement of July, 1907, however, Japan became more completely responsible for the success or the failure of all kinds of administration in Korea. This agreement established a complete protectorate of Japan over Korea. It made the Japanese Resident-General the uncrowned and untitled, but virtual, king—responsible to his own Home Government, which, in its turn, is pledged to use every effort to secure the integrity of the Korean Empire and its Imperial house, to carry out the treaties with foreign nations affecting Korean interests, and to do its best for the economic, judicial, educational, and social improvement of the Korean people. Given time enough, there is not the least doubt that the world will hold the Japanese chiefly responsible for the result. But, how long is "time enough"? Let us say: Not less than one hundred years.

And now we will take the remainder of the space al-

lotted to us for a brief and imperfect, but, I trust, accurate statement of what has been up to the present time attempted, and in a fairly resultful way accomplished by the Japanese administration in Korea. And we will begin with the important and fundamental subject of

Finance and Reforms of the Currency

It is impossible to exaggerate the deplorably chaotic condition of the Korean finances when Mr. Megata became the financial adviser of the Government. There was really no standard for the currency, and only copper cash and nickel coins were in circulation. The cash were of different sizes and weights and fluctuated in value from 100 per cent. to 60 per cent. premium. During the war, when the Japanese army bought timber to the value of 10,000 *yen*, in the interior, it was necessary to charter a small steamer and fill it full of cash in order to finance the transaction. On the other hand, the nickels were so extensively counterfeited, in China, Japan, and especially in Korea, that they lost almost all intrinsic and stable value. In addition to this coining of money as a private enterprise, the Korean Government was accustomed to loan its coining machine to so-called "promoters of the minting industry," for a money consideration. Under such circumstances the establishment of a sound and legitimate currency was inevitably accompanied by much complaining and by some real hardship. History, however, will have few more illustrious examples of the honest and skillful solution of a most perplexing financial problem than will be ultimately credited to Mr. Megata. The old nickel coins and the copper cash have been withdrawn from circulation to the extent, up to January 1, 1908, of 298,870,000 in number of the former,

and of the latter, to the value of 1,386,312 *yen*. At the same date, the circulation of the new Korean coins had reached the sum of 4,100,175 *yen*.

Until recently, the Koreans had little or no conception of the business of banking. At the time of the inauguration of the currency reforms, in 1905, various monetary systems were started, and by January, 1908, Korea had one central bank, three ordinary banks with two agencies, nine agricultural and industrial banks, with seventeen branches and agencies, seven note associations, twenty-one local associations for money circulation, and eight warehouses with various branches and agencies. In 1905 the Dai Ichi Ginko was made the Central Bank of Korea and the Government Treasury. Besides its principal branches in Seoul, Fusan, and Chemulpo, it had on July of this year (1908) eleven other branches in less important centers. In addition to these banking facilities, the postoffice treasury agencies did business to the amount of 7,394,712 *yen* in 1907 as against 77,088 *yen* in 1906.

The Dai Ichi Ginko is, however, a purely Japanese institution, and therefore under certain obvious disadvantages as constituting the permanent Government treasury of the Japanese administration in Korea. One of the last official acts of Prince Ito, accordingly, was to bring about the founding of a New Central Government Bank of Korea. The shareholders in this bank are limited to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Korea and their subjects. The terms of its founding are, as to their principal features, such as obtain in the Bank of Japan; and Dr. Ichihara, who had his education in economics and finance in this country, is its governor.

In intimate relations to, and dependence upon, the matters already considered stand

Reforms of Taxation and the Management of the Public Revenue

Before the Japanese administration in Korea, the method of collecting the taxes was highly irregular, totally confused, without any uniform supervision, and as a natural result, characterized throughout by official corruption and extortion. The state revenues had been collected either by the local magistrates or by commissioners, ordinary or special, dispatched by the Imperial household; in either case, the primary object of the collector was the plunder of the common people. By the organic regulations promulgated in September, 1906, tax assessors, principal and subordinate, were established in the various districts; the officials engaged in the duty of collecting the taxes were required to wear uniform; and Japanese financial "councillors" were attached to the Korean officials. In the sequel of the new agreement of July, 1907, the Japanese councillors were appointed to financial posts, as Korean officials, their function becoming that of actively conducting the financial administration, hand in hand with the native officials. In June of 1908, the collection of such miscellaneous taxes as had hitherto been managed by the household department was transferred to the Department of Finance.

The policy of the Resident-General with reference to reforms of taxation is thus definitely stated in his own words in his report for the year 1907: "As to amendments of the taxation system, the Japanese financial advisers, at the suggestion of the Resident-General, confined their reform measures to preventing evasions of the tax-paying obligation, and to insuring justice and equity to taxpayers as far as possible: they enacted new regulations only when necessary in consequence of some lack in the existing tax-system, and they avoided intro-

cluding any radical change or establishing any new taxes, lest these might irritate the people and bring about popular agitation."

By far the most significant item in this feature of administration, both for the Government and for the people, is the land-tax. According to ancient Korean custom, this tax is levied on the basis of a unit, the so-called *kyel*, which is divided into six grades depending upon the natural fertility of the soil, the facilities of irrigation, the lay of the land, etc. But the measuring of the land is exceedingly rudimentary and lends itself to both extortion and fraud. The surveys are five centuries old. Accordingly, the Japanese administration is having new surveys made, and new adjustments of the burdens of taxation. Of course, it encounters the opposition and complaints which belong to all such efforts at the reform of taxation. In the process it has already discovered about 1,000,000 "concealed *kyels*," or measures of land fraudulently left unregistered by the local magistrates.

The entire land-tax for 1908 is stated at 6,640,388 *yen*, or a little more than thirty cents in our money, per head of the population. Next to the land-tax in interest, as bearing on the whole body of the people, is the house-tax. According to the last reports available, this was placed at 80 *sen*, 2 *rin*, per household, or about eight cents of our money per head of the entire population. The customs receipts of Korea did not come under the direct control of the Japanese administration until after the new agreement went into effect.

In reforming the Korean finances the Japanese administration has not failed to give attention to matters of economy in expenditure. The most salutary of these economies have been connected with the reform of the Korean Court. From the horde of servants and officials, superfluous, useless, or even thievish, which surrounded

the ex-Emperor, the household department, up to June 30, 1908, had dismissed 2,166 male servants, 232 court ladies, and 317 "detectives"; six months following this date there had been added to this number 1,643 males, making a total of 4,358 persons in all. Another method adopted for conserving and increasing the future revenues of the country has been the transfer of much property from the control of the Emperor to the control of the state. As a result of a careful investigation, 75,123 *chō* (one *chō* = about two and one-half acres) of fields, fifty-four *chō* of forests, and 178 houses—all this property totaling an estimated value of 17,336,099 *yen*, besides thirty palaces and shrines which were disused and had fallen into decay, were transferred to the State.

The following table brings the data regarding the lease of the State lands up to May 30, 1909:

Petitions received:	Japanese, 56,587;	Korean, 49,832 (<i>chō</i>)
Petitions accepted:	Japanese, 1,629;	Korean, 4,194 (<i>chō</i>)
Petitions returned:	Japanese, 22,454;	Korean, 9,751 (<i>chō</i>)
Leases now granted:	Japanese, 142;	Korean, 2,439 (<i>chō</i>)

The politically significant thing about these figures is the much larger proportion of cases in which the Koreans, rather than the Japanese, have had their petitions favorably considered.

The Korean Budget for 1909, as published in the *Seoul Press* of December 31, 1908, stood as follows:

Ordinary revenues, 13,848,443; with ordinary expenditures of 15,982,434.

Extraordinary revenues, 7,586,280; with extraordinary expenditures of 6,286,221.

Total revenues, 21,434,723; total expenditures, 22,268,655; leaving a deficit of 833,932. (The figures are all in *yen*.)

The most important part to us, financially, of the financial administration of the Japanese in Korea is its present and prospective influence upon

The Foreign Trade of Korea

There is a very complete summary of the entire subject in the *Seoul Press* of February 20, 1909. In 1908, vessels to the number of 6,224, with a gross tonnage of 2,507,117 tons, entered the six open ports of Korea; of these vessels, 2,940, or nearly one-half, made port at Fusan.

For the year 1908, the total value of the foreign trade of Korea amounted to *yen* 63,687,114, including the value of goods, gold, silver and specie.

In viewing the value of the foreign trade according to countries, (A) Japan takes the largest amount of the export trade of Korea with 77% of the total value for 1908 (76% in the previous year). Next comes China with 16%, and all other countries do not exceed 7% of the whole.

(B) In the import trade, Japan also takes the first place with 59% of the total value of the imports, and Great Britain comes next with 16%, while China and the United States proper have each about 10%, and all other countries together 5% of the whole.

In this connection it is pertinent to quote the following from one of the official reports of the Resident-General. It is published under the title:

Guarantee of Alien Rights

“The so-called ‘open door’ policy in Korea has been from the beginning maintained by the Japanese Government. In both the treaties of alliance between England

and Japan, concluded on January 30, 1902, and on August 12, 1905, respectively, adherence to that policy was a fundamental key-note of the engagements. In the latter treaty especially, Japan solemnly and explicitly pledged herself to observe 'the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations,' while Great Britain recognized the right of Japan to take measures for 'the guidance, control, and protection of Korea.'" The Marquis then goes on to quote the circular note addressed to the Treaty Powers, only five days after the convention of November 17, 1905, in which the Imperial Government of Japan declared that "in assuming charge of the foreign relations of Korea and undertaking the duty of watching over the execution of the existing treaties of that country, they will see that those treaties are maintained and respected; and they also engage not to prejudice in any way the legitimate commercial and industrial interests of these powers in Korea." The Marquis then adds: "Since the establishment of the Residency-General in Seoul, the Resident-General has faithfully observed this principle of his Government, and exerted his power and influence along the line of the 'open door policy.'" I believe that this declaration understates the truth; and that, in fact, the Japanese administration has treated the doubtful and even illegitimate claims of other foreign promoters more leniently than the similar schemes of the Japanese themselves.

The plans of the Japanese administration for the economic reform and development of Korea have been greatly interfered with, and in some respects thwarted, by the INSURRECTION, which arose in the summer of 1907, and which can be said to have been only recently nearly or quite extinguished. Whatever may be thought

of the wisdom and tact of the Government, both as respects time and method, in disbanding the Korean mob of armed men, which existed under the name of "the army,"—and this was the immediate and ostensible cause of the original outbreak—there can be no doubt about the shameful fact that the affair had been for a long time fostered by the injudicious utterances or deliberate intrigues and falsehoods of a few foreigners resident in Korea—prominent among whom were certain subjects of the two nations supposed to be most friendly to both parties whose interests were supreme in favor of peace. How heavily this insurrection cost both Japan and Korea, it is impossible to estimate precisely. The military expenditures of Japan in Korea for the year 1906-7 amounted to 3,572,544 *yen*; and for 1907-8 to 3,444,628 *yen*. From the beginning of the insurrection up to August 31, 1908, they lost in killed and wounded, 423; and of the 8,126 disabled by sickness, 797 died. For the same period the total casualties of the insurrectionists were 13,014. For the second period, extending from September 1, 1908, to February 28, 1909, the losses among the Japanese soldiers were 45 killed and 157 wounded; and those of the insurrectionists were 8,719 killed and 2,230 wounded. These figures, however, by no means tell the whole of the sad story. Almost from the first the disbanded Korean soldiers were joined by that large number of bandits and highway robbers which from time immemorial have flourished in Korea; and not only so, but they speedily made bandits of themselves. The amount of suffering and loss which they have occasioned to their own innocent fellow countrymen is difficult to estimate. But the following table compiled by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce at Mokpo shows the extent of damages they have inflicted on Japanese

and Koreans during the three months between January and March this year, in a single district:

	Japanese.	Koreans.
Cases of incendiarism against...	4	2
Number of houses destroyed due to incendiarism	8	4
Amount of money taken from..	28 yen.	1,294 yen.
Estimated losses caused to build- ings of	900 yen.	1,760 yen.
Estimated losses caused to prop- erties of	3,623 yen.	1,786 yen.
Miscellaneous losses		247 yen.
	killed.	wounded.
Number of Japanese.....	4	11
Number of Koreans.....	36	16

As a most serious indirect result of this condition, many Koreans have had to have their taxes either abated or wholly remitted; and the Government has been obliged to spend considerable sums for the relief of distress, or to keep the people, where their homes have been burned, their crops destroyed, and their laborers murdered, from actual starvation.

The financial and economical side of the Japanese administration in Korea has been dwelt upon at such length because it is really the most difficult of all the problems, and indeed underlies the successful solution of them all.

We consider now

The Public Improvements, Made or Projected

Of these, one of the most important, of course, is the support and extension of the RAILWAYS. These are now nationalized under the system of government control adopted by Japan, and are being improved and extended at great expense. In the fiscal year of 1906 the sum for

improvements was given at 7,787,225 *yen*, and the profit at 219,260 *yen*. But in the fiscal year of 1907, while the appropriation for improvement rose to 11,361,375 *yen*, the profit of the year before was converted into a loss of 76,988 *yen*. In February of 1907 the Imperial Diet of Japan authorized the Railway Bureau of the Residency-General to expend during the coming four years the sum of 21,873,144 *yen* upon the construction and improvement of railways in Korea. Whether this expenditure ever becomes a profitable investment for the Government of Japan, otherwise than as facilitating its control and development of Korea, there can be no doubt of the immense benefit it is bringing to the Korean people themselves. It is also going to afford to the world a practically all-rail route between Japan and Europe. The latest report is to the effect that the Korean railways are to be made a part of the South Manchurian system. Great improvement in the through traffic may reasonably be expected on the completion of the Antung-Mukden railway; and it is to be hoped that this, together with internal developments, will speedily justify financially the expenditure of the 16,586,000 *yen* which has been appropriated to the Seoul Wiju line for the year from April 1, 1909. The Koreans are fond of traveling; and the railways of the country carried in all 141,260 passengers during the month of June last.

In close connection with the railways stands the development of the PUBLIC HIGHWAYS. Hitherto, with one solitary and not at all creditable exception, there have been no passable, not to say decent, highways of great length in all Korea. Work was commenced in 1906 for the repair and improvement of the highways; but up to last year only about forty miles were completed. This year some seventy miles more of these roads will be put in good order. The main roads are to be about four

ken (1 *ken*=6 feet), and the inferior roads two *ken* in width.

As an expensive enterprise, which is, however, absolutely demanded for the development of the foreign trade of Korea, must be considered the improvement of the harbor facilities and the building of light-houses at various points along its very dangerous coast. At Fusan, which is one of the finest natural harbors and is destined to become one of the principal ports of the Far East, extensive works are planned and are already well advanced. These include the reclaiming of ground, 43,399 square metres in area; the building of a pier 900 feet in length, the inner side of which will form an iron quay capable of accommodating two vessels, drawing nearly 24 feet, at the same time; and the building of a new and greatly enlarged custom house. By the end of 1903 there were five small light-houses on islands in the harbor of Chemulpo. Under the Residency-General the Bureau of Light-houses, after a careful survey, mapped out the Korean waters into ten navigation lines, and drew up plans for 50 light-houses, 5 light-buoys, 5 beacons, 54 buoys, and 16 fog-signals, for which 1,266,272 *yen* were to be expended during five years beginning with 1906. By December 31, 1907, 35 light-houses, 5 light-buoys, 3 beacons, 50 buoys, and 11 fog-signals were completed.

The Construction of Public Buildings

for every kind of public use has afforded another difficult problem in economy for the Japanese administration in Korea. These were not only necessary for the decent and successful administration of every department of Government, but even more necessary for the economic and educational development of the country.

The severe winter in Korea makes unsuitable for public uses buildings made of wood. In order to get at a cheap rate a sufficient supply of good brick, a station was established with the latest model of brick-making machinery, which is capable of turning out 30,000 bricks a day. As a branch of this enterprise, a factory for making drain-pipes and tiles has also been established. In this connection I will notice only the construction of buildings for the Printing Bureau, where Korean young men and girls are being instructed and employed in the various sections of the book-binding, paper-manufacturing, and lithographic works. In this establishment, at the end of the year, 1907, there were at work 256 Koreans under 75 Japanese experts. According to the *Seoul Press*, date of May 23, 1909, the plans of the Government for continuing this important branch of its work during the coming fiscal year include the expenditure of over 2,800,000 *yen*.

After Korea joined the postal union in 1901, the state lost annually from 140,000 *yen* to 290,000 *yen*, with a very poor service and without any prospect of improvement. On the establishment of the Residency-General in Seoul, the charge of the posts, telegraphs and telephones in Korea was transferred to the Bureau of Communications and placed under the control of the Resident-General. The statistics up to the year 1908 show that, while the expenditures decreased from 2,581,023, during the fiscal year beginning April 1, 1905, to 2,203,831 *yen* (estimated) in the fiscal year of 1907-8, the earnings of the system rose from 769,650 *yen* in 1905, to 1,398,923 *yen* (estimated) for the fiscal year of 1907-8. In his report of the latter year, the Resident-General announces the prospect that the postal, telegraphic and telephonic services in Korea will some day in the not distant future become self-supporting.

All these provisional expenditures of the Japanese administration in Korea are, of course, justified only as they are part of its plans for

The Development of the Agricultural, Industrial and Other Resources of Korea

Among such plans, those for the improvement of agriculture are pre-eminent; for Korea is, and for a long time must remain, a land of small farmers. To afford the common people an opportunity for improving their old-fashioned and defective methods of agriculture, a model farm and experiment station was established at Suwon, about twenty-five miles from Seoul, in June, 1906. The farm is most beautifully situated and comprises 217 acres. In April, 1907, there were attached to it seven competent Japanese experts and twelve Korean and Japanese assistants. Here experiments are made in the cultivation of rice, barley, sugar-beet, tobacco, cotton, and other staples; sericulture is undertaken; and the improvement of live stock is attempted. Since this date, a horticultural farm of thirty acres has been established at the village of Tukto, four miles to the east of Seoul. Both these farms were at first treated with suspicion and contempt by the classes for whose benefit they were especially designed—the seeds and plants that were freely distributed being thrown away by the recipients. But when the farmers saw the specimens of grains and vegetables and trees which were raised on these farms, and learned of the immensely increased profit, per acre, of such agriculture and horticulture, the applications for instruction and assistance became satisfactory. It is found that apple, pear, and peach trees grow three times as fast in Korea as in Japan; the climate is well suited for grapes, but not for oranges. This spring 7,000

young trees were eagerly sought and carried off by the former opponents of the plan; and there is even talk of making Korea the fruit-garden of the Far East.

In Korea more than half of the total area of the country is covered by mountain ranges. Owing to indiscriminate felling of trees, without public supervision, which has gone on for centuries, most of the mountain slopes, with the exception of those along the Yalu and Tumen rivers, the Chili-san range, and the island of Quelpart, have become denuded of trees. Thus the people are unable to build better houses than mere huts, and they even suffer greatly from lack of fire-wood. Worst of all is the injury to agriculture, of which this process of deforestation is now the chief cause, owing to devastating floods in the rainy season and lack of water for irrigation in the dry season. To remedy this evil three model forests were established in 1906; 17,880,000 young trees, comprising pine, oak, larch, chestnut, and cryptomeria, were imported and planted at a cost of 293,000 *yen*. In the spring of 1907 three nursery gardens were established and the seeds of a large variety of trees were sowed in them, and excellent results obtained. A school of forestry was attached to the agricultural station at Suwon; a bureau of forestry has been established; forestry offices have been established in four places; appropriation for further investigation has been made; and laws have been enacted to protect the forests in the future.

It is now known that the coveted wealth of timber along the Yalu valley was the secret but principal reason which led the Russian Government to violate its pledge to withdraw its troops from Manchuria, and which thus precipitated the Russo-Japanese War. In order to prevent this wealth from further foreign exploitation, the forestry undertakings along the Yalu and Tumen rivers

were made a joint enterprise of the Japanese and Korean Governments, with a capital of 1,200,000 *yen*, each party contributing one-half. It was expected, of course, that the earliest developments would be accompanied by a loss; but so unexpectedly successful was this enterprise that, for the fiscal year 1908, instead of an expected loss of 11,670 *yen* there was an estimated profit of 96,000 *yen*.

The climate and soil in the southern part of Korea seem well suited to the growth of cotton, and in order to settle the feasibility of its culture by the best modern methods and on an enlarged scale, an association of Koreans and Japanese interested in this industry was formed several years ago. In 1906 this association was subsidized to the extent of 100,000 *yen*, on these conditions: that American upland cotton be introduced; that the seed obtained from the crop be distributed among planters at large; and that a ginning mill be established. In one year the number of Korean planters increased from 348 to 850; but it is probably still too early to predict what the ultimate result will be.

The Japanese administration in Korea has also been compelled to do much difficult work, in its efforts to deal with the MINING INDUSTRY in the peninsula. It found the titles to this sort of claims almost inextricably mixed up, the greater number of them having been obtained either by bribery or some other form of illegitimate influence, or else at a price much below their proper value. With Korean and Japanese promoters of this class, the dealing of the Government could be comparatively simple, direct, and effective; but with those from the Treaty Powers of Europe and America, the case was not the same. The results of the attempts at reform were likely to be more embarrassing when this class of promoters tried to interest their home governments in enforcing or urging their claims. It was one

of the chief satisfactions of the Resident-General, at the time of his recent resignation, to know that all the affairs connected with this form of the country's industries seemed fairly on the way to a permanent settlement.

The following table taken from the *Seoul Press* of July 1, 1909, gives the area, in *tsubo*, covered by the different kinds of mines in the country at large (1 *tsubo*==6 feet square):

	Number.	Area.
Gold mine	53	31,908,141
Silver mine	5	924,340
Copper mine	25	10,869,763
Iron mine	36	11,797,238
Lead mine	2	1,557,821
Graphite mine	34	13,043,412
Zinc mine	2	1,574,490
Coal mine	21	13,368,094
Petroleum mine	5	4,394,694
Mercury mine	1	67,120

It has always been impossible to tell how much gold has been actually mined and exported, so persistent and successful are the devices for concealment. But the gold purchased last year by the different branches of the Dai Ichi Ginko amounted to 964 *kwan* (each *kwan*=8½ pounds), with a value of approximately 5,000,000 *yen*.

The most extensive coal mines in Korea are along the valleys of the Ta-dong river and its tributaries, in the neighborhood of Ping-yang.

The Ping-yang coal mines were taken in control by the Government in August, 1907, and by December of the same year 35 foremen and 425 miners, 90 per cent. of whom were Koreans, were employed in developing the works. Last year, from January to June, 17,292 tons with a value of 77,814 *yen*, and from July to

December 29, 195 tons with a value of 131,377 yen—making in all 46,487 tons, worth 209,191 yen—were mined there.

As a means of attracting foreign capital to Korea, under the advice of the Resident-General, the laws regulating mining concessions and claims were revised in July of last year. Under the new laws then enacted and now in force, the transfer of mining rights and the creation of their hypothecation do not require the sanction of the Government. The former provisions by which permits could be canceled or mining operations suspended by order of the Government, were either restricted or struck out altogether. In the following August an ordinance was issued exempting from duty the importation of machinery, instruments, and other necessary articles used for mining purposes. The exportation of copper and copper concentrate was already duty-free.

Another important matter for securing desirable economical and political results has been the regulation of the FISHING INDUSTRY. No more infamous scheme for robbery of the people was encountered by the Japanese administration in its earlier days than that concocted by the joint enterprise of Koreans and Japanese for getting control of the entire fishing industry over all the waters and fish-markets of Korea. Laws on this subject have now been put in force by the Japanese administration.

In addition to the schemes for increasing the revenues and developing the resources of Korea, the management of which is kept more immediately under the control of the Residency-General, there are others which are fostered by it, on conditions definitely fixed by their charters. Of these the most important is probably, the so-called

Oriental Development Company

This company is formed with the avowed purpose of assisting in the economic development of Korea.

It announces that its operations shall comprise (1) agricultural; (2) sale, purchase and renting of lands necessary for purposes of development; (3) exploitation and control of lands necessary for purposes of development; (4) construction, sale, purchase and renting of buildings necessary for purposes of development; (5) collection and distribution of Japanese and Korean settlers necessary for purposes of development; (6) supplying to settlers and farmers in Korea of articles necessary for purposes of development and distribution of articles produced or acquired by them; (7) and supply of funds necessary for purposes of development. In addition, as secondary operations, the company may engage in fishing and other enterprises necessary for the development of the national resources. It is to be under the strict control of the Korean Government.

In this connection I wish distinctly to deny the charge which has been so persistently reported by interested parties, that the Government is bent upon a course unfavorable to the coming to the country of foreign capital for investment there. On this point I will quote the testimony of our countryman, Mr. W. D. Townsend, who went to Chemulpo to open a branch of The American Trading Company in 1884 and has been there ever since. Mr. Townsend assured me that the honorable business firms were pleased with the Japanese protectorate; although unscrupulous promoters did not, as a matter of course, enjoy having their schemes for plundering the Korean resources interfered with by the Japanese administration.

Most difficult and yet important of all the tasks before

the Japanese administration in Korea has been, and I suppose for a long time will continue to be:

*The Establishment and Enforcement of a Legal Code
and the Reform of the Public Justice*

This colossal task involves three important particulars: (1) The separation of the judiciary from the executive branch of the Government; (2) the codification and precise definition of the existing customs and regulations, so far as this is possible, and the enactment of the new statutes which have become necessary under the changed circumstances; and (3) the establishment of law courts and the reform of judicial procedure—especially among the local magistrates.

In Oriental countries generally, the judiciary is not separate from the executive; and, formerly, this was especially true in Korea, where provincial governors and local magistrates regularly discharged judicial functions in their executive capacity. Early in his administration Marquis Ito became convinced that "so long as the judiciary branch of the Government was not separated from the executive, the evils and abuses of the old system, which are so deeply rooted, could not be fully removed." Accordingly at the time of the new agreement he secured the pledge of the Korean Government to bring about this separation. A beginning was made under the regulations enacted on December 27, 1907. These established a court of cassation in Seoul; three courts of appeals; eight local courts; and one hundred and fifteen district courts. In this way Korea adopted the so-called "three-trial system," which is that in practice in Japan as well as in Continental Europe. Recent measures, which will be referred to further on, have now more completely achieved this eminently desirable result.

The codification of a legal system for modern Korea would seem to be accompanied by almost insuperable difficulties. In Korea civil law guaranteeing private rights had hitherto practically no existence. To these rights the maladministration of the officials paid scanty or no attention; and the people dared not complain against official extortion. Bribery was everywhere prevalent; and especially in the palace compound itself. Although a code of criminal law was enacted as late as April, 1905, the death penalty was not confined to murder. Torture was frequently practiced.

The question at once arose, whether a wholly new code—presumably that existing in Japan—should be enacted “in the lump,” so to say, and enforced upon the Korean people; or whether the attempt should be made, so far as possible, to reduce to system and to improve the existing customs and laws. Happily, for the final result, the latter of the two plans was adopted. To this end, Dr. Umé, professor in the Law College of the Imperial University of Tokyo, one of the leading framers of the Japanese civil code, was invited to proceed to Korea. His first work was to draft an “Immovable Property Law.” The fundamental purpose of this law was to guarantee to both natives and foreigners legitimate rights of ownership in real estate. To meet the immediate needs of the new courts which were to be opened, the criminal code then existing was placed under expert revision; and a code of procedure applicable to both civil and criminal cases was compiled as a temporary measure.

But to obtain intelligent and just judges was of all things perhaps the most difficult. Until very recently in Korea there was no such thing as a barrister to defend a suspected criminal; a witness was in many cases considered a *particeps criminis*; and torture was a customary

means for procuring evidence. At first a Japanese legal assistant was appointed to each court connected with the officers of the governors and prefects; and a "police-adviser" was stationed in each district to act as assistant to the magistrate of that district. But this, although some good results followed, was found to be an irritating and insufficient remedy.

The most desperate demand for judicial reform in Korea comes from the ignorance, corruption, and extortion of the local magistrate. It therefore has become necessary to deprive him of all unrestricted judicial functions whatever.

A reorganized police system was a necessary adjunct of the measures instituted by the Japanese administration for the reform of the public justice in Korea. This reorganization took place as follows: 8 police stations, 4 branch stations and 40 sub-branch stations, under the charge of the metropolitan police board; and 20 stations, 39 branch stations, and 297 sub-branch stations, in the other provinces. The numbers of Japanese who have been appointed to the Korean police force are in all, 24 inspectors, 115 captains, 1,698 constables, 54 physicians, and 12 interpreters; while the Korean members of the force number 17 inspectors, 97 captains, 3,057 constables, and 4 interpreters. Under the present system the Koreans have one Japanese official for each 2,727 units of the population, the total Korean population being 9,781,671. In connection with this reform of the judiciary system, stand the plans which are formed and as rapidly as possible are to be carried out, for the building of new prisons, and the more sanitary and humane care of the prisoners. Already, in many places the Koreans themselves are resorting to the Japanese rather than to their own magistrates for escape from the evils

of bribery and extortion, and for the better administration of justice.

It would seem that, in spite of considerable improvements already secured by the new judiciary system, and a certain growing acceptableness of it on the part of the common people, the administration has found it necessary to the more perfect maintenance of a system of public justice, to take—at least until the Koreans themselves can be trained to fitness for it—the entire matter under its more immediate and exclusive control. The latest news from the Far East—as late indeed as the latter part of July—brings the announcement of a “New Japanese-Korean Convention” on this subject. Of this convention, the following three articles are the most important:

ARTICLE III

The Japanese courts in Korea shall apply Korean laws to Korean subjects, except in cases specially provided for in agreements or in laws and ordinances.

ARTICLE IV

Korean local authorities and public functionaries shall, according to their respective functions, submit to control and direction of Japanese competent authorities in Korea and render assistance to those authorities in respect of administration of justice and prison.

ARTICLE V

The Government of Japan shall bear all expenses connected with administration of justice and prisons in Korea.

It is evident from the terms of this “New Conven-

tion" that the successful issue of attempts to reform the public justice in Korea will henceforth more than ever depend upon the training, tact, and spirit of equity and good-will of the Japanese themselves.

Underneath and back of all the plans for the reform and uplift—economic, judicial, social, and moral—of the Korean people, lies, of course,

*The Improvement and Development of the System of
Public Education*

Up to the establishment of the Japanese protectorate over Korea, the mission schools have provided the only means for supplying, even inadequately and imperfectly, this imperative need of better facilities for both the public and the higher education.

It has been the wise policy of the Japanese administration in Korea to make primary the education of the people for the successful pursuit of those employments which should engage them in after life.

In August of 1906, general regulations for government and common schools, based on the educational system of advanced countries, were issued by Imperial Edict and by decree of the Minister of Education. A voluntary system of attendance was adopted, since the poverty of the Koreans made impracticable at present a decree of compulsory attendance; but to encourage attendance, both tuition and text-books were made free. The common-school course is limited to four years; and in this course, instruction is given in morals, the languages of Korea, China, and Japan, in arithmetic, geography and history, physics, drawing, and physical exercises. Sewing and other domestic accomplishments are added for the girls; while music, manual training, and lessons in agriculture and industry can be taken as

voluntary courses. Under this system all private schools are required to register an account of their equipment, curriculum, etc., in order to obtain recognition from the Government. Since the enforcement of the present law, up to the middle of last May, 782 existing, and 307 new schools—exclusive of 745 religious schools—making a total of 1,834, had registered; and of these the Government had been able to examine 440 and accept 337. In a speech a month later, Minister of Education Yi stated that the number of applications had already reached 1,900, of which the Government had been able to deal with only about 600.

The number of common schools up to the year 1907 was nine Government schools, including that attached to the normal school, and forty-one public schools; but this year public common schools were established in eight other places. With the growing demand for the education of women, in April of 1908, the "Girls Higher School Ordinance" and the regulations for its enforcement were promulgated; and the Seoul Higher School for Girls was established at the same time. In January of 1908, the different Government language schools were combined and named the "Seoul Government Language School."

Besides the common schools, the following educational institutions deserve a special mention; and, first

The Normal School

In order that the training of teachers for the public school system might be uniform and competent, the Government instituted in August, 1906, a normal school; and at the same time it promulgated an edict that no private normal school would be recognized, but that every normal school must be founded by either the central or the

provincial Government. In this school the regular course is three years; tuition, board and clothing are given to all regular students. A new building for this school was completed in December, 1907. By the end of the month there were 106 students enrolled, under five Japanese and three Korean teachers. In this connection it is pertinent to mention the existence in Seoul, at the end of the year 1907, of one high school and five foreign language schools.

One of my pleasantest experiences while in Seoul was in attendance on the opening ceremonies of

The Government School of Industry or Polytechnic School

Under centuries of misrule and plunder the artistic and artisan work, for which Korea was at one time rather celebrated, had become almost extinct. The Japanese administration in Korea has undertaken to revive and improve it. Six courses were to be given in this institution: namely, in (1) dyeing and weaving, (2) ceramics, (3) metal work, (4) wood work, (5) applied chemistry, and (6) civil engineering. At the first entrance examination in April, 1907, there were 1,100 applications, of which only 74 were passed upon favorably. In addition to free tuition and lodging, an allowance of six *yen* each month is made to each student. The report of the results already reached in April 22, 1909, was most encouraging.

A School of Commerce

was opened in Seoul last December, which owed its inception to the generous gift of a citizen of Tokyo, Mr. K. Okura, who gave for this purpose the sum of 200,000 *yen*.

Prominent among the educational matters undertaken by the Japanese administration in Korea for the blessing of the common people is the institution of

A Medical School

which is attached to the Tai-Han hospital, and which is designed to give a modern medical training to Korean doctors and nurses. Its teaching force in January, 1908, consisted of three Japanese professors, three Korean doctors, and one American physician, Dr. Scranton, who had been for many years medical missionary of the American M. E. Church North. The course of instruction extends over four years for medicine, three years for pharmacy, and one year for mid-wifery and nursing. Those who pass the entrance examinations with good marks are received as Government students, all their expenses for clothing, dormitory and tuition being given to them; while in the cases of other students the fees only are remitted and text-books are lent.

I have spoken of the medical school as attached to the Tai-Han hospital. Up to the institution of this enterprise there was no adequately equipped hospital on a large scale, although there were several fairly well-conducted hospitals organized by foreign missionary societies or by the municipalities of the various Japanese settlements. In accordance with the advice of the Resident-General, the Korean Government decided in 1906, to establish one large new hospital by combining the three small hospitals which had hitherto been under its control. During the first year 175 in-patients were received by the Tai-Han hospital; and 2,767 out-patients were treated, of whom 1,928 were Koreans.

The formerly prevailing filthy conditions of living, and the ravages of filth-diseases among the Koreans are

difficult even of imagination by one who has not traveled either in that country or in China. To improve these conditions and prevent these ravages, the Government loaned large sums of money for installing water-works in three of the principal cities of Korea; to Chemulpo the sum of 2,170,000 *yen*; to Ping-yang 1,300,000 *yen*; and as a subsidy to Fusan, 350,000 *yen*.

The difficulty of enforcing measures for the improved sanitation of the country is greatly increased by the poverty, and especially by the superstition of the people. To diminish the scourge of smallpox the Government undertook to enforce vaccination. Between May 5 and June 22 of this year, under the jurisdiction of the police, 5,245 persons were vaccinated in Chemulpo; but when the attempt was made to carry out the regulation in a neighboring village of forty houses, the entire village fled precipitately to the mountains, under the impression that the Japanese intended to paralyze them by injecting poison into their veins. Measures have also been enacted and to a certain degree enforced for the suppression of cholera, typhoid fever, dysentery and diphtheria.

There are several large and indefinite interests, which are, however, vitally related to the success of the Japanese administration in Korea, that cannot be treated in the statistical way. Among these is its relation to the foreign religious teachers and missionary bodies established in Korea. From the first, the attitude of the administration, so far as the Resident-General could control it, has been toward these moral and religious forces, characterized by justice, generosity, and the effort to secure their active co-operation for the good of the Korean people. It was in part to assist in bringing about an understanding of this attitude that His Excellency invited me to Seoul as his guest in the spring of 1907. What was then doubted by many is now, I believe,

doubted by none who are competent to give a judgment. Prince Ito has labored throughout, with unsparing industry and consummate skill for the welfare of the common people of Korea. His settled policy toward the Christian missionaries is clearly defined in the closing words of his report published in English about six months ago.

Almost exactly a year later, in December of 1908, the same distinguished authority, in addressing the delegates who had come from every quarter to Seoul to attend the opening exercises of the recently completed Y. M. C. A. building, and at a banquet given by His Excellency in their honor, spoke as follows: "In the early years of Japan's reformation the senior statesmen were opposed to religious toleration, especially because of distrust of Christianity. But I fought vehemently for freedom of belief and propagation, and finally triumphed. My reasoning was this: Civilization depends upon morality, and the highest morality upon religion. Therefore, religion must be tolerated and encouraged. It is for the same reason that I welcome the Young Men's Christian Association, believing that it is a powerful ally in the great task I have undertaken in attempting to put the feet of Korea upon the pathway of true civilization." On the other hand, it should be remembered that the Resident-General had been sorely tried by the conduct of the Koreans, who had been using this and other Christian organizations for secret purposes of sedition and assassination; by the fact that not all the foreign missionaries had uniformly confined their offices to the moral and religious sphere, but had on occasion taken an active part in politics; and by the fact that reports detrimental to his plans—sometimes true, indeed, but oftener false or grossly exaggerated—were being sent abroad without giving the Government a chance for investiga-

tion, and for the punishment of those found guilty. It, therefore, affords a peculiar pleasure to the writer to record the fact, that at the present time the forces of the Japanese administration and the foreign moral and religious forces are, for the most part, in hearty active co-operation for the welfare and uplift of the Korean people. With this state of things continuing, the present marvelous growth of missions in Korea is sure to accomplish the highest good for all the parties chiefly interested.

Three years ago there were not unreasonably grave fears expressed that the rapid immigration of Japanese settlers into the land would result in driving the weaker and less enterprising native race to the wall. But I then ventured to predict (see "In Korea with Marquis Ito," p. 451f.) that the net increase in Japanese population in Korea for the next fifty years would not greatly exceed 20,000 per annum, and that meantime the resources of the country would be so developed as easily to support, in far superior conditions of living, double the 10,000,000 of its present population. Moreover, I am one of those who hold the opinion that, when the Korean is awakened and given a fair chance for securing his own economic, political, and social betterment, he will show himself quite capable of competing favorably with the Japanese. The statistics of the last three years have for this brief period verified the prediction. They show that, besides the Chinese, there are more Americans residing in Korea than subjects of any other foreign country.

In no other way has the kindly and far-seeing wisdom of Prince Ito been more conspicuously shown than in his painstaking efforts to provide for the future Korea a competent and well-trained and morally well-disposed sovereign. If the present Crown Prince had been left to the corrupting influences of the eunuchs and palace

women surrounding him, there is scanty reason to doubt that he would have become, like his ancestors, physically impotent and morally degenerate. Since he was proclaimed the heir-apparent to the throne, the Prince has done for him all that any father could under the circumstances do for his own son. During his Residency-Generalship he accepted the office of tutor, and secured with great difficulty the consent of the boy's parents and of the Korean Government to have his young pupil taken to Japan for an education befitting his position and responsibilities in the future. His parents, the ex-Emperor and Lady Om, who at first appeared to suspect some plan for the virtual imprisonment if not the murder of their son, are now quite reconciled and greatly gratified with the proofs they constantly receive of the young man's physical and mental advancement. On his resignation of his position in Korea, Prince Ito resigned also his position as guardian of the Korean Crown Prince. But at the urgent request of the latter's parents, and by command of his own Emperor, Ito consented to continue the charge under another name. There is, therefore, every prospect possible so far ahead that Japan will redeem its promise to secure and protect the Imperial House of Korea in the best of all ways possible. This way there, as everywhere, is the way of making worthy to rule, by encouraging and compelling the rulers to rule worthily.

Perhaps the most difficult problem of all those still confronting the Japanese administration in Korea, is the winning of the good-will of the Koreans themselves. For those who persist in insurrection, in arson, robbery, and murder, as well of their peaceful fellow countrymen as of the officials of the Government, I suppose only one way of treatment is possible. But happily, the insurrection seems at present nearly to have spent its force.

The people will not only accept the Japanese administration, but will welcome it, so soon and so far as they find that it affords them improved conditions for their daily living. The children, who will play together, work together, teach and be taught together, are not likely to continue to hate each other. Indeed, there is no little evidence that the feelings of scorn on the one hand, and of bitterness on the other hand, are already abating. Indeed, in some places they had already almost vanished when I was in Korea. To this desirable result it is the prime business and imperative duty of the foreign Christian missionaries to bend all their energies. And if in the long run they cannot make a notable contribution to this result, they will in my judgment fail of proving their right to support from the home-lands. Above all is it necessary for all well-wishers of the people to discourage the newly revived practice of assassination, which, if continued, will inevitably result in the destruction of the nationality of Korea.

All that has thus far been done by the Japanese administration for reform and betterment of economic, judicial, and educational conditions among the people of its protectorate, Korea, is indeed only a beginning. But I submit that, considering the brevity of the time and the magnitude of the difficulties involved, it is a notable and even a praiseworthy beginning. Nations in the prophetic future may be born in a day; but nations that have degenerated through centuries of corruption and misrule, are not at present to be redeemed in a day, and in both cases it must be remembered that the "Day of the Lord" is as a thousand years. In a recent conversation, Admiral Uriu assured me that he and the other men most prominent in navy and army circles were heartily in accord with the policy of the late Resident-General for the peaceful development and permanent

friendship of Korea. A yet more recent communication prepared by order of Prince Ito, brings the assurance that Viscount Soné, who succeeded to the position of Resident-General, is following the same line of policy. It seems to me fair, then, to condone any failures in the past, to credit present successes, and to look into the future with hope, for the Japanese administration of Korea.

XXII

RELIGIOUS CONDITIONS IN KOREA

It has been said by certain travelers that Korea is a country without a religion. Whether or not this is true depends upon how one defines the word. But without attempting to discuss the question as to what should properly be called religion, let us consider those systems which have been practiced by the Koreans, and which are expressions of their spiritual nature, whether those systems are rational or superstitious.

Previous to the entrance of Christianity three forms of religion had become rooted in Korea, Shamanism, Buddhism and Confucianism. The supremacy of each marked a distinct change in the national life. Nevertheless the religious changes did not produce eradication of the forms previously existing. Buddhism did not drive out Shamanism, nor did Confucianism drive out Buddhism. While holding to much of the old, the people adopted the new, and so we find to-day the three systems living together. A man may even practice all three in his own individual life. It has been well pointed out that "a Korean will be a Confucianist when in society, a Buddhist when he philosophizes, and a Spirit Worshiper when he is in trouble."

The Korean may also be called a theist in addition to his other faiths, for there are evidences of his belief in an overruling Supreme Being, although not clothed with the perfections which we ascribe to God. He is not a polytheist though he believes in the existence of

countless demons. So far as he is a theist, he is a monotheist. He calls the great, overruling being Hananim, which corresponds to the Chinese "Lord of Heaven," and the Chinese written character for it in use in Korea is made up of marks which mean great and one. The worship of this Being is left mainly to the Emperor, who appeals to him in times of national distress, such as famine and pestilence. The name ascribed to him, Hananim, has been adopted by the Protestant missionaries for God, and is so translated in the Korean Bible and Christian literature.

From earliest times sacrifice has been common among the Koreans. On the top of Mari Mountain in the Island of Kangwha there is a stone platform called "Tangun's Altar." Tangun, the first king of the ancient tribes in Korea, offered sacrifice there and built an altar for the purpose in 2265 B.C., according to the most authentic records. At the time of the Manchu invasion in 1637 A.D., the king ordered a great sacrifice in behalf of the spirits of the Koreans whom the Manchus killed. We find also records of an annual sacrifice in behalf of the country and in the latter part of the eighteenth century orders were issued as to where this sacrifice should be made. If the dates recorded are correct, we are able to look to-day on an altar which was erected in Korea near the time of Noah. Another curious fact, which, however, we are unable to relate directly to their religion, is that the Koreans have legends concerning a great flood which overspread the land, and an ark. To the south of the city of Taiku the Koreans point out the mountain peak where the ark is supposed to have rested.

Buddhism was introduced into Korea in 372 A.D. from China, and at once became popular because patronized by royalty; soon after that, priests were in-

vited to come from China to teach it. It may be said to have been the state religion for 1000 years. Professor H. B. Hulbert, in his "History of Korea," writes: "In 1065, the king's son cut his hair and became a Buddhist monk. A law was passed forbidding the killing of any animals for a period of three full years. A monastery was built in the capital, consisting of 2,800 kan each eight feet square. This gave a floor space of nearly 180,000 square feet, the equivalent of a building one-third of a mile long and one hundred feet wide. It required twelve years to complete it. A great feast lasting five days marked its opening, at which thousands of monks from all over the country participated. There was a magnificent awning of pure silk which formed a covered passageway from the palace to the monastery, in which was a pagoda on which one hundred and forty pounds of gold and four hundred and twenty-seven pounds of silver were lavished." Large tracts of land were given to the Buddhist monasteries, many of which remain in their possession at the present time.

About 1100 A.D. Buddhism came into conflict with Confucianism, because of the corruption of the former and the superior ethical teachings of the latter. The result was that Buddhism was disestablished at the beginning of the present dynasty in 1392. To-day it would be difficult for the ordinary traveler to find the remains of Buddhism. He must go off the beaten line of travel, for there he will see no temples, no shrines, nothing to remind him of that ancient system which for a thousand years swayed the minds and hearts of the people. When he has learned to distinguish the types of dress, he will occasionally recognize Buddhist priests on the streets of the cities, for they are now allowed to enter, although in 1392 they were forbidden. There are some ancient temples among the hills where Buddhist priests can be

found performing the mystic rites, but the temples are not frequented by the people.

Confucianism dominates the mind of Korea and may be called the foundation on which society there is reared. Strictly speaking, this system can scarcely be called a religion, yet it should be considered, for it influences the moral and superstitious life of the people. It entered Korea from China some time after the entrance of Buddhism and affects all departments of life from the cradle to the grave. The five laws of society on which it rests are: the relations between king and subject, father and son, husband and wife, older and younger, and friends. There are also five virtues, love, righteousness, ceremony, knowledge and faith, and five original elements, metal, wood, water, fire and earth. Dr. Gale says, "These five laws, five virtues and five elements constitute the Korean world of thought." Confucianism has many noble sentiments, but it has hindered progress and caused national stagnation. Beneath it all is ancestor-worship; the spirits of departed ancestors must be worshiped for fear that harm will come to the family if it is omitted. The oldest male member of the family must perform this sacrificial rite; hence the desire for a son in the family, and the origin of early marriage. The prolonged watching at graves has produced various forms of sickness; bodies long unburied have often caused most unsanitary conditions. Confucianism has debased woman in this life and consigned her soul to hell when she dies. The family resources have been exhausted for the sake of maintaining ancestor-worship. All these things have conspired to produce ideals and to demand conditions of life which hinder the full development of the individual and of the nation.

Shamanism has been present from the earliest times. It is really demon-worship; countless evil spirits are

everywhere, ready to injure and torment, but they may be appeased by sacrifice. The Shaman is of two orders, the Pansu, who is the blind exorcist, and the Mutang, the female sorcerer. They belong to a low social rank, yet hold a very important position in the life of the nation. The difference between the powers of the two is that the Pansu is really master of the demons, and if they will not do his bidding voluntarily he can use force and compel them. The Mutang, on the other hand, has power only to placate the spirits and can get them to do her bidding only by offering them sufficient sacrifice. Fetiches, also, are common in Korea. The evil spirits are often supposed to be frightened away by grotesque figures placed on the roofs of buildings, by the hideous picture of a Chinese general on the door, or by other such means. South of the city of Taiku is a curious illustration of this superstition. From the South Mountain it is supposed that the fire spirits used to come to set fire to buildings, so an ingenious device was contrived to keep them away. On one side of the road leading from the South Mountain was built an ice house and on the opposite side was placed a huge stone turtle; both of these are suggestive of water, and it is believed that the fire demons dare not come along that road on account of these two objects.

It is said that an attempt was made to introduce Roman Catholicism into Korea late in the sixteenth century at the time of the invasion of Korea by Japan under Hideoshi; that Japanese Romanists were sent over, but that the attempt was not successful. According to native records Roman Catholicism first entered Korea in 1686, being introduced by foreigners. There is no definite information in regard to this and we must date the beginning of the Roman Catholic propaganda from late in the eighteenth century when certain Koreans who came in

contact with it in Peking attempted to introduce it. It was bitterly opposed and both Korean and French Catholic priests who came later were killed. In 1837, there are said to have been 9,000 Roman Catholics in Korea. In 1839, came a general persecution when many were killed, including three French priests. One reason why this faith was bitterly opposed was that the priests attempted to gain temporal power, and to have Western nations send armies to open Korea. They have never translated the Bible for the people.

The work which Protestant Christianity undertook was to supplant fear with love and to make intelligent faith take the place of superstition. We shall be able to judge how well it has begun its work as we consider what it has already done.

Until 1882, when Western nations began to make treaties with them, the Koreans were a hermit nation, and the political, social and religious systems under which they lived gave no proper incentive for development. The history of their achievements, however, will show that there is much intellectual acumen among them, and that when the proper incentive is put before them they manifest remarkable mental ability. We might mention in passing some of the facts in their later history which show what they have accomplished. In 1592 the Koreans built a suspension bridge across the Imchin river, using for cables fifteen heavy strands of a tough fibrous vine twisted together and anchored securely at the ends. Branches and earth were used to make the roadway, and across this bridge their allies, the Chinese army, passed. In the same year they devised a bomb and mortar which was known as the "flying thunderbolt"; and the great Admiral Sun Sin invented an iron-clad war vessel which did great damage to the invading Japanese fleet. This vessel was built in the form of a tortoise. The head was

used for ramming, and certain iron scales on the back could be lifted for the purpose of shooting fire arrows.

The Koreans used movable printing type before the days of Gutenberg and more than 400 years ago one of their wise emperors caused to be invented an alphabet of twenty-five simple characters with which they write phonetically. This is founded on the Chinese seal and the ancient Tibetan characters taken from the Sanscrit. Some of the finest brass-work in the world is now made in Korea. Wherever Koreans are employed by Westerners to-day, in their own country, in Hawaii, Mexico, Yucatan, the United States, they are found to be superior workmen. The national calamity which has overtaken Korea is giving an opportunity for the young men especially to show their ability, and it may be safely said that no nation in the Far East shows greater native talent or gives promise of greater future usefulness to the world according to its strength than Korea.

Probably no nation in all the history of the Christian era has accepted Christianity more rapidly than Korea. Extensively it has overspread the entire country within a quarter of a century, so that the "Jesus Church" and the "Jesus Doctrine" are common topics of conversation. There is no way to adequately explain the rapid progress of the Christian Church in Korea on political or psychological grounds. Many things have conspired to cause her old governmental and religious foundations to crumble, but when we have considered them all, we must still say that her acceptance of Christianity is beyond human understanding. Certain it is that the movement of God in Korea has made the Church of Christ realize that He is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, and that the same power which wrought in the lives of the early apostles is working to-day to accomplish His will in the earth.

In 1882 America secured the first treaty which Korea made with any Western nation, and the treaty ports began to open. Before that time foreigners were not only unwelcome, but it was dangerous for them to try to enter Korea. Two years afterwards, in 1884, the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions sent Dr. Horace N. Allen, an American physician, to Seoul as the first Protestant missionary. He himself has said that he was given the task of attempting to open Korea to Christianity at the point of a physician's lancet. The work was well done, and to-day the missionary is not only admitted, but Korea is beseeching America to send many more to teach them how their land may be made Christian. From the time Dr. Allen went to Korea until the present there has never been any attempt on the part of the Korean Government or the Korean people to take the life of a foreign missionary, a Western business man or a diplomat.

If we were able to take some elevated viewpoint where we could see the whole country spread out before us and could count the banners of the Cross which fly every Sabbath Day from the flag-masts in front of every church—a red cross on a white ground—we should have to count on and on until we had numbered at least 1,500. We should find these places of worship scattered throughout the thirteen provinces which comprise the entire land, north, south, east and west, and we should find beneath these hundreds of banners, at least 150,000, and possibly as many as 200,000, believers of the true God. We should find groups small and large, some a mere handful, gathered in a man's house, others in churches accommodating fifty, one hundred, five hundred, one thousand, and one thousand five hundred. So marvelously have the Christians multiplied within half a dozen years that many of the church buildings are far too small and the worshipers meet in sections.

This is true even of the large church in Ping-yang, which seats more than 1,500 people. The building is well filled by women at one hour and by men at another hour. Eighteen years ago when Rev. S. A. Moffett went to that city to begin missionary work the natives pelted him with stones. At the time of the Chino-Japanese War, in 1894, he had to flee from the city. After the war he returned and was able in the course of a year or so to have a Sunday congregation of about a dozen people meeting in the home of one of the believers. It was my privilege to visit the city about ten years later and on Sabbath morning to worship in the Korean church where more than fifteen hundred people were gathered together. In another part of the city was a church accommodating about one thousand. Since that time three other churches have been built within the city walls, all of which are filled to overflowing. Christianity has been a transforming power in that city. Magistrates have testified that what was once one of the wickedest cities in that part of the world has become wonderfully changed. Even Sunday is observed and many places of business are closed on that day.

In the northern part of Korea is a little village of three thousand people who live in straw-thatched houses hidden away among the hills. Eight years ago there were but few Christians in that region when missionaries went to make their homes there. It was a journey of three days overland from the city of Ping-yang, a trip to be taken by pack pony, on foot, or in a sedan chair. Those missionaries did what people in America often facetiously refer to as "burying oneself among the heathen." About four years afterwards it was my privilege to visit the village. On Sunday morning in a low Korean building I found assembled to worship God not less than five hundred men, with no room for the women. After the

men had gone away the women, who had been waiting their turn, came in and filled the building again. To-day in that village is a church building built and largely paid for by the Koreans which seats some fifteen hundred people. It is filled every Sabbath day. Twelve days overland from that station is Kang Kai, where missionary work has but recently been begun. There is already a congregation of some seven hundred people, and they have planned a church building which when completed will seat two thousand.

Incidents like the above might be multiplied showing that all over the country the Koreans are attending church in large numbers. It is no wonder that Mr. John R. Mott, after his visit there some two years ago, said that he believed that "If America would take advantage of the present opportunity, Korea, one of the last nations of the earth to hear the Gospel of Jesus Christ, would of all non-Christian nations be the first to become Christian." It seems to us who have been working there that if the present rate of increase continues, another quarter of a century will see the old religious systems demolished and Korea a Christian nation.

In educational lines there has also been a remarkable development. Until about a dozen years ago the old Chinese system of schools and examinations prevailed. That has now been abolished and everywhere modern schools are springing up with wonderful rapidity. About ten years ago our missions reported that there was "the nucleus of a boys' academy at Ping-yang, and that the desire for an education is coming." The prophecy has been very rapidly fulfilled. The Boys' Academy now numbers some four hundred, and several academies for boys and girls have been started in other parts of the country. The figures of our own mission show that in 1902 we had about 1,000 pupils in our schools. The

number increased by about 1,000 each year for four years, when we had some 4,000 students, in 206 schools. A year later, June, 1907, we reported 344 schools with over 7,500 pupils and after another twelve months 457 schools and over 12,000 pupils. These schools were all Christian and with the exception of a very few were entirely supported by the Christian people that their children might be given the privileges of a modern education. Other missions report a similar condition. A desire for knowledge is permeating the whole nation; they realize that their only hope of being able to take their place in the world's work, now that their country has been brought out of its seclusion, is in becoming educated along modern lines.

Thus far our mission educational work has been chiefly from the primary up through the high school grades, but we have begun college work and have introduced industrial departments in some of our academies. For the education of the native ministry both the Methodists and Presbyterians have started Bible and theological schools, with a constantly increasing number of students in attendance.

Medical education has also been begun. There are several hospitals in charge of American physicians in connection with the several stations, and each doctor has an average of something like one thousand patients a month to care for. In each one of the hospitals Korean young men are in training. A year ago Dr. Avison of the Severance hospital in Seoul was able to rejoice in the fruits of the instruction which he had been carrying on for years when seven young men were graduated in medicine. Their diplomas subsequently received the official seal of the government of Korea and later were also approved in Japan. Thus a beginning has been made in providing Korea with Christian physicians.

Not only is the extensive side of the work of great interest, but the intensive side is quite as remarkable. The Koreans are proving themselves to be possessed of vital Christianity. Their eagerness to know what the Bible teaches often puts Western Christians to shame. The sale of the Scriptures has been so great that it has been impossible to provide enough copies to supply the demand. When a man makes profession of his faith in Christ he feels that he must own a Bible and purchases one from the book store or colporteur. For several months the supply of the Scriptures had been exhausted, and when a new edition of 20,000 was ordered they had all been spoken for before a word was printed, and it was found that the edition would be far too small to meet the demand. The entire New Testament and several books of the Old have been translated into the native character, and also into a mixed character composed of Chinese and Korean. If one could see the desire for Bible study he would realize that there is a great famine in Korea, a famine for the Bread of Life, the Word of God.

At the time of the Korean New Year it is our custom to hold men's Bible institutes for about ten days, at the several station centers where the missionaries reside. The Koreans come from all over the provinces, often walking long distances, and many of them bringing their rice with them, for we do not support them during the classes. In Fusan, the southern port, two years ago about 300 men came to the Bible institute; last year about 500. In Taiku, seventy-five miles farther north, two years ago the attendance was about 500; the next year over 700. In Ping-yang, the city in the north which has been so wonderfully transformed, about 1,000 men have come from the country districts every year. At Syen Chyun, where eight years ago the missionaries might be said to have "buried themselves among the heathen,"

last year some 1,200 men attended the institute, many of them walking eleven or twelve days to get there and walking back the same distance in order to spend about ten days studying the Bible with the missionaries. One Korean exclaimed: "I am hungry; I want to be fed." He did not mean he had no rice, but that he was hungry for the Word of God. He lived at a considerable distance from where the institute was held, in a small village where there was a little group of Christians. They had no regular pastor and could have the assistance of the missionary only a few times during the year as he itinerated through his large district, several thousand square miles in extent. That man had been appointed by the missionary as the leader of that congregation. Whenever they met for worship, he would instruct them in the Scriptures as best he could, and lead them in their devotions. For a whole year he had been doing that until he felt that he had no more to give them. Then with eager expectancy he came to the annual Bible institute to feast his hungry soul at the table of the Lord on the Bread of Life as it should be broken by the missionaries. After a few days' instruction he would go back to his village and the next New Year's attend another institute, for he must remain the leader of the congregation, since they had no native pastor. Such is the condition in hundreds of places throughout the land. The work has grown so rapidly that native preachers and well-qualified leaders could not be prepared rapidly enough to supply the need.

At the close of a meeting in a small country church one of the Korean Christians came to me with this request: "Pastor, we do not know much here and our faith is small. Will you not please come and stay with us a long time and teach us the Bible? We will come every day and every night as long as you are here. Please come soon and stay long." That request could not at

that time be granted, but the church has continued to grow and has been compelled to enlarge its house of worship. We are not surprised at this when we know that at the time the request was made the Christians in that village had been meeting at the church building for Bible study and prayer among themselves every night for two whole years. Similar instances can be multiplied to show that all through the country there is a desire to know the things which God has revealed in His word.

The Koreans feel that it is not enough merely to believe in Jesus as Saviour of the world, but they must propagate their faith, and so we find them going everywhere "Doing the Doctrine," as they express it, and preaching. This alone will explain the rapid and extensive growth of the church in that country. It has been a common practice in recent years at the time of our men's annual Bible institutes to take up subscriptions of service. The men write on a piece of paper their names and the number of days that they will spend during the coming year preaching directly to the heathen. So there has been a great service done by laymen.

The work has now become so extensive that the missionary has more than he can do to properly look after the needs of the Christians, to visit and instruct the churches from time to time, and to train and instruct the leaders. The churches spring up spontaneously, or rather as a result of the evangelizing efforts of the native Christians. A man asked me if I would not go over seven miles to a village where there was a new group of Christians. They had been meeting together for two months and now had sent a request that the missionary visit them. It was the first knowledge I had that there were Christians in that village, though it was in my territory. A man had heard the Gospel story from his fellow Koreans in the capital city, had bought a New Testament,

read it and decided to be a Christian. He gathered his friends together, as many as could come, and there began a church in his own home. Most of the churches in Korea now spring up after that fashion.

One of the clear teachings of the Bible is that Christians should be people of prayer. This is carried out by the Koreans. They seem to be coming into the Kingdom with a simple childlike faith. They call God, Father, and believe that He will do what He has promised. In response to prayer continued persistently through several months, God fulfilled His promise and poured out His Holy Spirit in such mighty power some two years ago, that there was a revival which swept all over the country and which will take its place in the history of the Christian Church along with such great movements as the recent revival in Wales. It seemed in many respects like a repetition of the coming of God's Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost, when confession of sin and restitution were made, lives were changed and the church was purified. One of my native helpers told me that under the power of God's Holy Spirit, the Koreans confessed sins, which even the most extreme torture of the magistrates would not have been able to wring from them. We may speculate as we will in regard to such a movement, but certain it is that the fact of changed lives shows that God was working in an unusual manner to produce righteousness in the nation.

The Korean Church is self-supporting. In connection with my own mission we have at the present time well on to one thousand congregations all supported by the native Christians. We have encouraged them to build their own church buildings and in probably not more than a dozen cases have we allowed any money from America to be used for the erection of a Korean church, and then the total amount granted in any case has not exceeded

one-third the original cost of the building. In several instances this money has afterwards been paid back to the mission by the native Christians. The Korean Church has also sent out and supports a number of native evangelists.

A great deal has been said about "rice Christians," a term used by those who assert that it is necessary to offer some material gain to the heathen in order to induce them to become Christians. Enough has been said to show that this is not true in Korea, and that it would be absolutely impossible for us to offer any such inducement to so many thousands of people. The following incident is illustrative of the pleasure which the Koreans have in giving of their means: At the time the Korean Presbyterian Church was organized in September, 1907, the church decided that it would at the very beginning of its existence undertake missionary work. It selected as its mission field the large island of Quelpart lying off the southern coast of Korea, where there were 100,000 Koreans at that time unevangelized. A subscription was taken up to send out a native pastor and his family, and when the offering was counted it was found to be three times as much as was needed, so they determined to send three men with their families, which was done. Among those who contributed were three brothers who were rice farmers. They had given a tithe of their income already to the church, but wanted to add for this purpose what they called "a freewill offering." Not having any ready money they decided, after talking the matter over together, to sell their rice crop and buy millet and eat that during the coming year. Now millet is not so good a food as rice, but by the transaction they were able to save and add to the Lord's treasury six dollars, reckoned in American money. This is not an unusual occurrence showing the self-sacrificing spirit of many Christians in

Korea, but is one which can be duplicated again and again. The Korean Church seems to be determined that Korea shall be Christian. A fact illustrative of this is as follows: Mission work has recently been begun in the city of Kang Kai, which is twelve days overland by pack pony from the nearest station in the northern part of Korea. There is already a large congregation there which is increasing very rapidly. So simple is the faith of the people that the missionary writes that they have no other expectation than that the whole city of 10,000 will soon become Christian.

Korea probably offers as good an opportunity as any mission field in the world for the study of the foreign missionary enterprise. The ultimate aim of foreign missions as carried on by the church to-day is to establish throughout the world a self-supporting, self-propagating, self-controlling, indigenous church. The first three principles we have already found illustrated in Korea. Every nation must eventually evangelize its own people. It is not the purpose of the foreign missionary enterprise to place Americans as pastors over the churches in foreign lands. The missionary is a superintendent of various forms of work, educational, evangelistic, medical and literary. He is teaching them the principles of the Christian religion and training native leaders who shall in turn be preachers and leaders of others. The unique condition in Korea has made it possible early in the history of Christian work there to establish a church along the lines mentioned. It is not the hope to establish an American Church in Korea. The Oriental and Occidental minds and modes of life are very different. The basic principles of Christianity are the same. The way in which the church shall express those principles and work them out in practical life will differ in different lands. Hence the desire to establish a church in Korea which, while


it shall be Christian, shall be so adapted as to accomplish the work of Christianizing the whole land and of giving the people the opportunity to express themselves in work and in worship in a manner best suited to their own ideals and modes of thought.

Up to this time the Methodist and Presbyterian Churches have been doing nearly all the work in Korea. The Northern and Southern Methodist Churches in the United States, the Northern and Southern Presbyterian Churches in the United States, the Australian and Canadian Presbyterian Churches, together with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel of the Anglican Church, are the missionary societies at present represented in Korea. It has been the hope that eventually there can be one Church of Christ in that land. There are at present co-operation and certain forms of union. All the Presbyterian Churches have united in one presbytery. The Methodists and Presbyterians have united in educational work in the city of Ping-yang, and the physicians in the hospitals of both missions there are co-operating in their work. A union hymnal has been published. A religious newspaper in the native language, *The Christian News*, and *The Korea Field*, which gives reports in English of the work being done, Bible translation and the preparation of Sabbath-school lesson helps, are all done by joint committees of Presbyterians and Methodists.

The influence of Christianity upon Korea cannot be estimated. It has been a constructive force, changing the ideals of the people and giving them moral fiber. It has influenced all classes of society, rich and poor, high and low, ignorant and educated. Without doubt it has helped to give a new feeling of national unity. It has been difficult for the missionaries to keep the church at all times free from political entanglements, but it has been the policy so to do. We have said to the Koreans that

it is not our business to determine whether they shall rule themselves or whether they shall be controlled by another nation, but that we are attempting to establish the Kingdom of God which shall rule within their hearts. In spite of this refusal to interfere with political affairs they have continued to come to the church in increasing numbers, a fact which shows that the Christian Church is being established on the right foundation. Magistrates have testified that where the church has entered, cities and villages have been transformed. Without doubt even Japan has felt the importance of sending to Korea men who are in sympathy with this great religious movement. One of the judges recently sent by Japan to Korea is an elder in a Japanese Presbyterian Church and regularly attends church in the city of Seoul. Other men who stand for Christian principles have also been sent to assist in working out Korea's destiny. Korea is now entering upon a new era. What it shall be politically no one can foretell, but if the history of the Christian Church continues making progress as it has within the past quarter of a century, and especially within the past ten years, it is safe to prophesy that Korea will become a Christian nation.


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